How did we end up getting so much out of the Freedom-to-ISS transition?

[jadebenn]

This is sort-of a follow-up to the question posed in my other topic.

How is it that the ISS regained so much of Freedom's capabilities even though the program was cut to the bone in the mid-90s? The cuts themselves are quite well-documented, but I haven't been able to find much on why they were (mostly) undone or failed to materialize.

The modern US orbital segment is only a few modules short of the configuration depicted here, and of those modules, the majority were simply replaced by Russian equivalents capable of performing the requisite task. Really, the only module I can think of that never manifested is the US Habitation module. For the other modules, the configuration may be different, but just about everything pictured made the cut. Even though the 30-year intended lifespan of Freedom was relaxed to 15 years as part of the cuts, the ISS is looking like it'll reach the original figure after all.

Just about everything promised for Freedom (after the abandonment of the dual-keel and power tower configurations) actually ended up happening with the ISS, one way or another. This "resurgence" is certainly not unwelcome, but I find it quite puzzling. How is it that a program targeted for such drastic cuts, reductions in scope, and changes in design during the mid-90s rebounded so hard afterwards? What caused the proposed drastic reductions to not stick, and instead give us Freedom in almost all-but-name (and with Russian bits)?

[RonM]

Freedom was a NASA project and hard to justify the large cost. ISS added international cooperation, making the project have diplomatic aspects the State Department could use. Having Russia as a major partner by adding their Mir 2 project kept the Russian space program going. That was good for US national security because the US didn't want Russian (former USSR) aerospace talent moving to hostile nations to find work. These different aspects of the program was more attractive to Congress than it just being a NASA space station.

[alexaltair]

Really, the only module I can think of that never manifested is the US Habitation module.

We also lost the Centrifuge Accommodations Module. Although according to this JAXA page, it was going to hold the Life Sciences Glovebox, which was recently installed in the Kibo module.

[SWGlassPit]

There was also a potential fourth node module that never flew.  It ended up being used for various engineering tests on the ground.

[Jorge]

Freedom was a NASA project and hard to justify the large cost. ISS added international cooperation, making the project have diplomatic aspects the State Department could use.

False. Freedom had all the major ISS international partners except Russia (ESA, Japan, Canada). The State Dept had plenty of involvement in Freedom.

Having Russia as a major partner by adding their Mir 2 project kept the Russian space program going. That was good for US national security because the US didn't want Russian (former USSR) aerospace talent moving to hostile nations to find work.

That was the theory, anyway. The reality was that said Russian talent could proliferate weapons technology to those hostile nations without having to leave Russia. Hence the need for Congress to pass the Iran Nonproliferation Act, later amended into the Iran-Syria Nonproliferation Act, later amended into the Iran-Syria-North Korea Nonproliferation Act. Then finally Congress simply had to admit they had no leverage over Russia and waived said act to exempt US payment for Soyuz flights to ISS because Russia wouldn't stop proliferating.

There are some real benefits to having a Russian segment on ISS, such as dissimilar redundancy in many critical systems. But that was not the rationale used to sell it (cost savings and foreign policy). In the end NASA didn't save any money on ISS vs Freedom, since they ended up having to largely pay for the Russian segment. The foreign policy justifications for ISS were mostly bu!!$#!+, in hindsight. But they served to keep the program sold.

[libra]

Freedom had all the major ISS international partners except Russia (ESA, Japan, Canada). The State Dept had plenty of involvement in Freedom.

ESA become involved in Freedom late 1988, and all the others followed. I think the original poster meant 1984.
I'm often wondering, did the other partners (ESA / Japan / Canada) having committments helped saving the station from Tim Roemer in 1993 ?
What would have happened had Freedom been cancelled ? political damage with the three partners ?

[Jorge]

Freedom had all the major ISS international partners except Russia (ESA, Japan, Canada). The State Dept had plenty of involvement in Freedom.

ESA become involved in Freedom late 1988, and all the others followed. I think the original poster meant 1984.

ESA and the US signed the Intergovernmental Agreement in 1988, but they (and the other partners) were involved right from the start in 1984. It took four years to get to formal agreement due to a number of sticking points (e.g. Congressional restrictions on non-US materials science experiments, whether the DoD would be allowed to conduct classified research on the station, what percentage the US and Canada would get to utilize of the ESA and Japanese labs, etc).

I'm often wondering, did the other partners (ESA / Japan / Canada) having committments helped saving the station from Tim Roemer in 1993 ?
What would have happened had Freedom been cancelled ? political damage with the three partners ?

Undoubtedly it helped, but how much is a legitimate question. The political fallout from cancellation would have been intense but short-lived; the main long-term consequence would have been reluctance of the partners to ever do big joint projects with the US again.

[jadebenn]

I'm often wondering, did the other partners (ESA / Japan / Canada) having committments helped saving the station from Tim Roemer in 1993 ?
What would have happened had Freedom been cancelled ? political damage with the three partners ?

Undoubtedly it helped, but how much is a legitimate question. The political fallout from cancellation would have been intense but short-lived; the main long-term consequence would have been reluctance of the partners to ever do big joint projects with the US again.

Reading up on the '93 station options (A, B, and C) that were presented to Clinton, I think there's a pretty good chance that without international involvement the program would've ended then and there. Or, at least, gotten massively down-scaled to the point of near-uselessness.

One of the major factors driving each option presented was the need to maintain a minimum level of capability acceptable to the partner space agencies. For example, one of the reasons Option 'C' was not recommended was due to the displeasure the massively-downsized space station design would cause amongst the international agencies (this isn't speculation - it was explicitly mentioned in the report).

The other two options presented, 'A' and 'B,' were both above the price the Clinton administration wished to pay for a space station, but were significantly more in-line with the space station both NASA and the partners had been expecting. So even though either option was more than the administration really wanted to pay for, they paid for it anyways, lest they give the US and NASA a reputation of being an unreliable partner in space exploration.

If Freedom had still been entirely NASA-internal at that point, I think it's very likely the administration would've arrived at a different conclusion.

[jadebenn]

There are some real benefits to having a Russian segment on ISS, such as dissimilar redundancy in many critical systems. But that was not the rationale used to sell it (cost savings and foreign policy). In the end NASA didn't save any money on ISS vs Freedom, since they ended up having to largely pay for the Russian segment. The foreign policy justifications for ISS were mostly bu!!$#!+, in hindsight. But they served to keep the program sold.

True, the cost-savings didn't really manifest. But, in hindsight, I think it's hard to argue that including the Russians was a mistake.

Imagine a world where the ISS had gone ahead without Russian involvement. What would happen to it after a Columbia-like event and/or Shuttle retirement? Would we surrender our manned presence and space and sink it? Would we tie it to Shuttle retirement and sink it? Would we stretch the Shuttle out pending a replacement despite the safety risks just to maintain a constant presence on the station? None of those scenarios are good ones.

The Soyuz meant that an end of Shuttle didn't have to be an end of the ISS. That's a pretty valuable contribution in my book.