OIG report on SLS RS-25 and boosters (May 2023)

[FutureSpaceTourist]

https://twitter.com/nasaoig/status/1661808907449237522

Our auditors found that long-standing issues related to NASA’s management of #SLS contracts for the RS-25 Engines and Boosters—the two components that will power the mega rocket to space—have contributed to $6 billion in increased costs and delays of 6 years.

https://oig.nasa.gov/docs/IG-23-015.pdf

WHAT WE FOUND

NASA continues to experience significant scope growth, cost increases, and schedule delays on its booster and RS-25 engine contracts, resulting in approximately $6 billion in cost increases and over 6 years in schedule delays above NASA’s original projections. These increases are caused by long-standing, interrelated issues such as assumptions that the use of heritage technologies from the Space Shuttle and Constellation Programs were expected to result in significant cost and schedule savings compared to developing new systems for the SLS. However, the complexity of developing, updating, and integrating new systems along with heritage components proved to be much greater than anticipated, resulting in the completion of only 5 of 16 engines under the Adaptation contract and added scope and cost increases to the Boosters contract. While NASA requirements and best practices emphasize that technology development and design work should be completed before the start of production activities, the Agency is concurrently developing and producing both its engines and boosters, increasing the risk of additional cost and schedule increases.

Additionally, Marshall Space Flight Center procurement officials who oversee all four contracts are challenged by inadequate staff, their lack of experience, and limited opportunities to review contract documentation. Specifically, inadequate procurement management led us to question $24.5 million in payments to Northrop Grumman to resolve a disputed request for equitable adjustment (REA) of award fee payments. Marshall procurement officials also encountered significant issues with the award of BPOC, the follow-on booster contract, which started as an undefinitized letter contract in which terms, specifications, and price were not agreed upon before performance began. We found NASA took 499 days to definitize the letter contract, which is far outside the 180-day federal guidance. At definitization, BPOC also lacked scope details, omitted key contract clauses, underwent a limited legal review, and is at risk of making duplicate payments for overlapping work performed under BPOC and the upcoming Exploration Production and Operations Contract. We also questioned an additional $5.6 million payment NASA made to Northrop Grumman related to the Agency’s improper liquidation of funds.

Further, NASA used cost-plus contracts at times where we believe fixed-price contracts should have been considered to potentially reduce costs, including the addition of 18 new production engines under the RS-25 Restart and Production contract and acquisition of Artemis IV booster long-lead materials under the BPOC letter contract. In addition, contractors did not receive accurate performance ratings in accordance with federal requirements, such as the “very good” rating awarded to Aerojet Rocketdyne on the end-item Adaptation contract despite only finishing 5 of 16 engines. As a result, we question $19.8 million in award fees it received for the 11 unfinished engines which were subsequently moved to the RS-25 Restart and Production contract and may now be eligible to receive additional award fees.

Faced with continuing cost and schedule increases, NASA is undertaking efforts to make the SLS more affordable. Under the RS-25 Restart and Production contract, NASA and Aerojet Rocketdyne are projecting manufacturing cost savings of 30 percent per engine starting with production of the seventh of 24 new engines. However, those savings do not capture overhead and other costs, which we currently estimate at $2.3 billion. Moreover, NASA currently cannot track per-engine costs to assess whether they are meeting these projected saving targets.

WHAT WE RECOMMENDED

To increase transparency, accountability, and oversight of the SLS booster and engine contracts and NASA’s affordability efforts, and ensure duplicative award fees are not earned, we recommended NASA senior leadership: (1) assess whether the 18 new RS-25 production engines under the RS-25 Restart and Production contract can be adjusted to fixed price; (2) identify procurement needs and resources available to address staff shortages at Marshall; (3) ensure Marshall officials comply with best practices for establishing and maintaining internal controls related to REAs, fiscal law, and appropriate internal and external engagement; (4) ensure appropriate separation of program and procurement actions and compliance with federal requirements for use of letter contracts, proper definitization, overpayments, and duplicative payments of award fees for modified scope and contracts; (5) update RS-25 production per engine cost estimates to include investments in production restart; (6) review and update BPOC’s scope of work and technical requirements needed to complete the respective periods of performance; (7) review BPOC’s definitization to ensure proper liquidation of funds paid under the letter contract; and ( develop a separate non-fee bearing contract line item for completion of the 11 unfinished heritage RS-25 adaptation engines.

We provided a draft of this report to NASA management, who concurred with Recommendations 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7, and partially concurred with Recommendations 4, 5, and 8. We consider management’s comments responsive to all eight recommendations, and therefore the recommendations are resolved and will be closed upon completion and verification of the proposed corrective actions. Despite concurring and partially concurring with all eight recommendations, the Associate Administrator for Exploration Systems Development Mission Directorate’s and Assistant Administrator for Procurement’s response to the draft of this report stated that the directorate and program do not concur with the facts as presented in the body of the report. We take issue with this summary characterization and are disappointed that the Agency’s formal response failed to specify the facts with which it disagrees. Consistent with professional standards, we carefully considered management’s technical comments to our draft and, when sufficiently supported, incorporated that information in the final report.

[FutureSpaceTourist]

YIKES. "NASA continues to experience significant scope growth, cost increases, and schedule delays on its booster and RS-25 engine contracts, resulting in approximately $6 billion in cost increases and over 6 years."

oig.nasa.gov/docs/IG-23-015…

https://twitter.com/sciguyspace/status/1661809892619943975

NASA has spent as much on cost *increases* for SLS rocket boosters and engines as it is spending on two fully reusable lunar landers. LOL. Cost-plus contracts, baby!

[joek]

Read it and weep. This is NASA and old-space at their worst. Shame on all of them.

[FutureSpaceTourist]

https://twitter.com/sciguyspace/status/1661814569700917278

Amazing. "The cost impact from these four contracts increases our projected cost of each SLS by $144 million through Artemis IV, increasing a single Artemis launch to at least $4.2 billion."

[joek]

Oh, but there's so much more...

For example, NASA initially awarded the RS-25 Restart and Production contract for six new production engines under a cost-plus structure. Approximately 3 years later, the contract was modified to include an additional 18 production engines valued at $1.8 billion. Given its established design, purchase of these additional engines could have been structured under a fixed-price contract.
...

All I can think of is: Dumb and dumber.

[FutureSpaceTourist]

Hmm, notable differences of opinion between OIG and NASA:

https://twitter.com/lavie154/status/1661826832218591232

NASA has a lot to say. At the bottom of the report:

“As a result, the directorate and the program do not concur with, not endorse, the facts as presented in the body of the report.”

👀

Government Accountability Office (GAO), as was the case with the SLS program in the present audit. While both directorate and program leadership welcome the healthy debate and dispositioning of comments that accompany these engagements, they are concerned that the foregoing report offers an incomplete view of the program's decision-making regarding its boosters and engines elements and that the information in the report is presented without the context that would have rendered it more accurate. Despite several hours of follow-up meetings with the OIG team following the release of the initial draft report and submission of extensive supporting documentation by the SLS program, NASA leadership was disappointed to see that few of the clarifications offered by the Agency's subject-matter experts were incorporated herein. As a result, the directorate and the program do not concur with, nor endorse, the facts as presented in the body of the report.

Nonetheless, the program does concur or partially concur with the recommendations provided by the OIG since much of the suggested work was either already completed or scheduled prior to the initiation of the audit. It is evident that the OIG and directorate and program leadership agree on several key principles: major acquisitions and contract management practices should continue to be reviewed at the highest levels of leadership to ensure the Federal Acquisitions Regulation (FAR) is faithfully employed, accountability and oversight is rigorously practiced, and maximum transparency is evident in contract execution. NASA will continue to welcome engagements with audit teams while pushing forward its priority the development, production, and testing of hardware for the next Artemis mission in a responsible manner.

To which the OIG responded in the report:

A final note: The Associate Administrator for Exploration Systems Development Mission Directorate’s and Assistant Administrator for Procurement’s response to the draft of this report stated that NASA leadership “was disappointed to find that few of the clarifications offered by the Agency’s subject matter experts were incorporated herein” and thus “the directorate and the program do not concur with, nor endorse, the facts as presented in the body of the report.” We take issue with this summary characterization and are disappointed that in its formal response the Agency failed to specify the facts in the report with which it disagrees. Consistent with professional standards, we carefully considered management’s technical comments to our draft and, when sufficiently supported, incorporated that information in the final report. Further, we had multiple additional discussions with senior Agency officials at Headquarters and Marshall about the report’s findings. However, from our perspective personnel involved in these conversations did not provide evidence to fundamentally change our findings and recommendations. In addition, in conducting this audit we followed the quality control procedures required by government auditing standards, including ensuring the report received an independent verification of its findings and supporting evidence by auditors unconnected with this review.

[VSECOTSPE]

Past time to can Free and Jackson…

[WindnWar]

I just don't understand the continued use of cost plus contracts for finished designs. Cost plus might make sense for the first 1 or 2 when the design is not certain and changes are needed, after that it's just a recipe for waste. And the fact that they can't track the costs per engine build is just criminal.

[Zed_Noir]

I just don't understand the continued use of cost plus contracts for finished designs. Cost plus might make sense for the first 1 or 2 when the design is not certain and changes are needed, after that it's just a recipe for waste. And the fact that they can't track the costs per engine build is just criminal.

I smell Pork. 

[yg1968]

Past time to can Free and Horne…

Fixed costs doesn't work because the companies would ask an exorbitant fixed price. The whole procurement method is flawed. Instead of fixed cost, NASA ended up implementing fixed cost plus incentives which is better than cost plus.

Here was NASA's answer to the fixed cost recommendation by the IG.

Recommendation 1: Assess whether the 18 new RS-25 production engines under the RS-25 Restart and Production contract can be adjusted from cost-plus to fixed-price.

Management’s Response: NASA concurs with this recommendation. Before initiating the RS-25 Production Restart contract, an assessment was conducted to determine the most cost-effective contract type. Due to the high amount of development, test, and engineering design work associated with the restart of new production lines and qualification of new manufacturing processes, we assessed that cost risk would have driven the contractor to propose an unaffordable fixed-price cost to cover their identified risk; therefore, a cost-plus-incentive-fee contract was determined to be more cost effective and to provide additional insight. As currently structured, a cost-type arrangement affords the Government the opportunity to monitor cost efficiencies and risk and ultimately discontinue development if deemed unaffordable or unachievable from a technical perspective. A fixed-price contract does not equate to reduced costs; in development work, it can have the opposite effect if entered with high uncertainty in cost and/or technical requirements.

[joek]

Fixed costs doesn't work because the companies would ask an exorbitant fixed price. The whole procurement method is flawed. Instead of fixed cost, NASA ended up implementing fixed cost plus incentives which is better than cost plus.

Sorry, no. Two distinct efforts in play: production restart and ongoing production.

Recommendation 1: Assess whether the 18 new RS-25 production engines under the RS-25 Restart and Production contract can be adjusted from cost-plus to fixed-price.

Management’s Response: NASA concurs with this recommendation. Before initiating the RS-25 Production Restart contract, an assessment was conducted to determine the most cost-effective contract type. Due to the high amount of development, test, and engineering design work associated with the restart of new production lines and qualification of new manufacturing processes, we assessed that cost risk would have driven the contractor to propose an unaffordable fixed-price cost to cover their identified risk;
...

That is BS. Might apply to production restart, but not subsequent ongoing production.

NASA folded for whatever reason; they need to grow some balls.

[VSECOTSPE]

Past time to can Free and Horne…

Fixed costs doesn't work

I did not write anything about contract cost structure.  I only wrote that Free and Jackson should be shown the door.

[Hog]

I just don't understand the continued use of cost plus contracts for finished designs. Cost plus might make sense for the first 1 or 2 when the design is not certain and changes are needed, after that it's just a recipe for waste. And the fact that they can't track the costs per engine build is just criminal.

I smell Pork. 

C'mon man, I just showered.

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Looks like everyone is rushing the trough while there's still water in it.  I like the RSRM/V and RS25 as pieces of amazing hardware, but the wastage, the wastage...  The most powerful rocket engines ever flown along with the most efficient large cryo rocket engines coupled to get the Orbiter Vehicles and Orions up to orbital velocities.  The current gluttony in supporting these systems isn't worth it anymore.  But I don't see it ending anytime soon, it's a big Band-Aid and it's so firmly entrenched. 

12 Adaptation engines in stock with 21 Restart engines on order with a single Cert/Dev engine-10001 delivered and just fired for the 8th time at Stennis. So that's enough engines to support Artemis-2 through 9.  I wonder what the Artemis-10+ contract will look like?  Cost-Plus?  Just imagine what the Spacelaunch Industry will look like by the time engines for Artemis-10 are needed?

Here's the good old NASA  Production Restart RS25 comparison that basically shows the requirements for RS25 to go from reusable(Heritage) RS25 to expendable(Adaptation/Production Restart). No reuse, you can run them harder.

[yg1968]

Past time to can Free and Horne…

Fixed costs doesn't work

I did not write anything about contract cost structure.  I only wrote that Free and Horne should be shown the door.

Why? Most of this pre-dates them.

[yg1968]

Fixed costs doesn't work because the companies would ask an exorbitant fixed price. The whole procurement method is flawed. Instead of fixed cost, NASA ended up implementing fixed cost plus incentives which is better than cost plus.

Sorry, no. Two distinct efforts in play: production restart and ongoing production.

Recommendation 1: Assess whether the 18 new RS-25 production engines under the RS-25 Restart and Production contract can be adjusted from cost-plus to fixed-price.

Management’s Response: NASA concurs with this recommendation. Before initiating the RS-25 Production Restart contract, an assessment was conducted to determine the most cost-effective contract type. Due to the high amount of development, test, and engineering design work associated with the restart of new production lines and qualification of new manufacturing processes, we assessed that cost risk would have driven the contractor to propose an unaffordable fixed-price cost to cover their identified risk;
...

That is BS. Might apply to production restart, but not subsequent ongoing production.

NASA folded for whatever reason; they need to grow some balls.

You are probably right but the whole thing doesn't work. They should contract for services like they have done for HLS and commercial crew, etc.

[VSECOTSPE]

Why? Most of this pre-dates them.

Free became Exploration AA in 9/21.  Before Free, BPOC was $199M.  Two months after Free, it was $3.2B.  And the contract still had undefinitized terms, which remain undefinitized to this day!  RS-25 Restart and Production tripled to $3.6B by 6/22.  There was another $102M of cost growth and 17 months of schedule slip thru 10/22.  IG testified 3/22 that each Orion/SLS thru Artemis IV would be $4.1B.  Now barely a year later it’s $144M more just from SLS increases alone.  Free’s budget profligacy is a long-standing issue.  One of his first actions after becoming AA was a multi-billion increase for Orion.  Artemis could not afford these kinds of increases when it’s budget was going up.  That budget will likely be flatlined or worse after the White House and House Republicans finish debt ceiling/deficit negotiations.  And then there’s just the plain old abuse of the taxpayer trust.

Jackson is in charge of NASA’s 4000-strong acquisition workforce.  But as of 12/22, she had only nine staff on these major, challenging, multi-billion dollar contracts.  They’re too few to provide supervisory review. And they’re not following procedures on claims, leaving out critical contract clauses, and giving legal only hours to review 1500-page documents.  Oh, and just plain old violating the FAR to the tune of millions of dollars.

Throw these bums out.  They and their leadership teams are not doing their basic jobs, and the resulting waste has jeopardized and made the agency’s flagship program unsustainable.  NASA needs an Exploration AA who will track and control costs on their largest contracts and a Procurement AA who will adequately staff those contracts.

And there should also be a follow-on investigation into all the contract consolidation efforts.  It’s just plain fraud to exclude recertification and production (?!) costs from claims of 30% cost savings on RS-25 “manufacturing”.
 
Folks are making a big deal about the contract type, but most of this is just plain old, sheer dysfunction.  No contract type will save a project from management that doesn’t know or care what it’s doing on cost and procurement management and is willing to obfuscate costs on the rare occasions that it does care.

[Coastal Ron]

Past time to can Free and Horne…

Fixed costs doesn't work because the companies would ask an exorbitant fixed price.

A couple of thoughts from someone that has been on the contractor side of government contracts:

1. NASA is already paying exorbitant prices for their hardware, so your logic doesn't hold up.

2. Fixed Price contracts make sense when the design and production processes are mature enough that there is little anticipated variances. So if the RS-25 contractor was not agreeing that they could commit to fixed price contracts, that tells me that the design and production processes for the RS-25 restart were not mature enough and they should not have proceeded into a production phase.

3. This cost issues continue to come back to one simple reason - Congress mandating that the SLS be "operational" - not in test - by the end of 2016. NASA was forced to take risks purely for a fake need date.

The whole procurement method is flawed.

Who is to blame for that?

Instead of fixed cost, NASA ended up implementing fixed cost plus incentives which is better than cost plus.

Don't pat yourself on the back too quickly, because you don't know what the incentive schedule was for the fixed cost plus incentives option. Remember the NASA OIG also pointed this out:

Marshall procurement officials also encountered significant issues with the award of BPOC, the follow-on booster contract, which started as an undefinitized letter contract in which terms, specifications, and price were not agreed upon before performance began. We found NASA took 499 days to definitize the letter contract, which is far outside the 180-day federal guidance.

And:

In addition, contractors did not receive accurate performance ratings in accordance with federal requirements, such as the “very good” rating awarded to Aerojet Rocketdyne on the end-item Adaptation contract despite only finishing 5 of 16 engines. As a result, we question $19.8 million in award fees it received for the 11 unfinished engines which were subsequently moved to the RS-25 Restart and Production contract and may now be eligible to receive additional award fees.

The bottom line is that upper management allowed all of this to happen, so then the question is WHY did they allow it to happen? And my theory is that Congress was pushing on them VERY HARD to spend money on these contractors, because at the time of the RS-25 award the SLS had NO PROGRAM IT SUPPORTED.

This is why purely political programs like the SLS are such a waste of taxpayer money. Oh sure, they produce jobs somewhere, but the real goal is to produce profits with the right companies.

[woods170]

Past time to can Free and Jackson…

And while you're at it, please show Nelson the door as well. He's in large part responsible for starting the bottomless pit that is SLS.

[joek]

Fixed costs doesn't work because the companies would ask an exorbitant fixed price.
...

Therein is a fundamental issue. This was for all intents and purposes a sole source contract. AJR has/had NASA by the balls, and they know it. Fixed price would not work because AJR could demand whatever they wanted, justified or not.^* (Who else are you going to go to for RS-25's?) Same for all SLS and related contractors (Boeing, LM, NG, AJR, ...).

Only way to end this insanity is to end SLS.


^* Maybe. NASA could have pushed back, but apparently did not and went down the path of least resistance: cost+.

[VSECOTSPE]

And while you're at it, please show Nelson the door as well. He's in large part responsible for starting the bottomless pit that is SLS.

I wish.  Senator Administrator Monster Rocket has been an adequate caretaker of what was essentially the Bridenstine plan at exit, i.e., onboard a second lander contractor.  But besides publicly grouching about ML-2, he’s done little to improve the survivability of the Artemis Program going forward.  And by letting the cancer of Orion/SLS cost growth spread unabated, he’s arguably leaving Artemis in a worse position than when he started.  His deputy’s effort on Artemis “goals” (and I use that term loosely) have also not positioned the program well for coming budget battles.

[yg1968]

A couple of thoughts from someone that has been on the contractor side of government contracts:

1. NASA is already paying exorbitant prices for their hardware, so your logic doesn't hold up.

As usual you have misunderstood what I said by breaking down the sentences instead of reading the entire paragraph. For fixed cost to work properly, you need to have competition. If you don't, the sole-source company can ask whatever price that they want (fixed price or not). That is why I said that the whole procurement is flawed. A services procurement with competition would be better.

Don't pat yourself on the back too quickly, because you don't know what the incentive schedule was for the fixed cost plus incentives option.

Why would I pat myself on the back? I am not involved in any of this. In any event, from what I have read, the incentives under a cost plus incentive fee contract are incentives to reduce cost, so it is better than a regular cost plus contract. Here is how Wikipedia explains it:

Unlike a cost-plus contract, [under a cost-plus-incentive fee contract] the cost in excess of the target cost is only partially paid according to a Buyer/Seller ratio, so the seller's profit decreases when exceeding the target cost. Similarly, the seller's profit increases when actual costs are below the target cost defined in the contract.

[yg1968]

Past time to can Free and Jackson…

And while you're at it, please show Nelson the door as well. He's in large part responsible for starting the bottomless pit that is SLS.

Apparently, there is rumors that Nelson would step down if Biden is re-elected and that Pam Melroy would then become the NASA administrator. I have nothing against Melroy but I find that a lot of her stuff relating to the Moon to Mars objectives and strategies sound a little bureaucratic. I have nothing against the goals or the strategies being proposed so far but I am not sure how much value it actually adds to the Artemis program.

[joek]

...In any event, from what I have read, the incentives under a cost plus incentive fee contract are incentives to reduce cost, so it is better than a regular cost plus contract. ...

Yup. In the pecking order cost+incentive sems to be the best of the cost+whatever options. The specific failure here, as pointed out by the OIG was: (1) cost+whatever was not the best option; and (2) more specifically, failure to properly manage the cost+whatever contract. OIG has dinged NASA for that before. You would think NASA might learn, but apparently not.

<rant>NASA, while doing some great stuff, has shown that they are incapable of properly managing the $B of taxpayer funds they are entrusted with (SLS, JWST, ...). Their excuses are worn thin. Time for adults to take charge.</rant>

[yg1968]

Why? Most of this pre-dates them.

Free became Exploration AA in 9/21.  Before Free, BPOC was $199M.  Two months after Free, it was $3.2B.  And the contract still had undefinitized terms, which remain undefinitized to this day!  RS-25 Restart and Production tripled to $3.6B by 6/22.  There was another $102M of cost growth and 17 months of schedule slip thru 10/22.  IG testified 3/22 that each Orion/SLS thru Artemis IV would be $4.1B.  Now barely a year later it’s $144M more just from SLS increases alone.  Free’s budget profligacy is a long-standing issue.

It's hard for Free to look good with SLS and Orion as it relates to costs. But Free's interventions have not all been negative. Free has also been involved with Appendix P (he was the selecting officer) and the upcoming LTV (both services contract). He also insisted that NASA have more than one base camp which is an improvement. However, there is room for improvement in determining the contributions of each international partner. It's taking longer than expected to finalize the agreements. 

[VSECOTSPE]

It's hard for Free to look good with SLS and Orion as it relates to costs.

No, if Free had put even a modicum of effort into reining in Orion/SLS cost growth, he’d have a better look.  Instead, in his first press event with Nelson, Free passed along a multi-billion dollar overrun on his old Orion program.  A couple months later, Free let the boosters hemorrhage a few billion.  A couple years later, he still has not definitized the clauses that led to the bleeding in the first place.  A year or so ago, the IG testified that Orion/SLS was unsustainable at $4.1B per and that NASA had to reduce costs.  What’s happened under Free since?  Another $140M+ in cost growth per Orion/SLS.  All the recent ML-2 baloney.  The fact that the contract consolidation efforts are leaving production out of manufacturing costs (?!).  And on and on.   Free is the Exploration AA.  Has been for going on a couple years.  The buck has to stop with him.  If he doesn’t do his job, Orion/SLS will eat Artemis alive even more than it already has.  Free doesn’t have to succeed at every effort to contain/reduce cost.  But he must have at least some cognizance of what happening in his budget and try.  Seriously, Free is like an ER doctor whose patient is bleeding out on the table, and he’s still looking for a pulse.  Free is the wrong guy for the job.  Orion/SLS especially and Exploration generally needs a hard-nosed manager with proven experience bringing complex programs to the finish line who will, you know, actually manage — not a flaky leadership guru type whose main claim to fame was playing second fiddle on a capsule program that has yet to fly a crew after a couple decades of development and tens of billions of taxpayer dollars down the drain.

But Free's interventions have not all been...

This is the point.  What intervention?  What has Free done to reduce, or even just tried to do to contain, Orion/SLS costs?  Intervention?  Free could not spell “intervention” even with the intervention of an autocorrect function.

has also been involved with Appendix P

Free executed a plan that was put in place under the prior Administrator without pulling a Griffin, reversing course, and screwing it up.  I guess he gets a pat on the back for that, but it’s hard to imagine a lower bar for NASA leadership.

(he was the selecting officer)

Selecting officials are practically and usually figureheads.  The hard work, if any, is done by the source selection committee and the staff supporting them.  If you can write a cogent memo rubber stamping a committee’s conclusion, then you too can be a selecting official.

And usually there’s only hard work if there are fine differences between proposals.  That was not the case here.  Blue was always going to win on financial, Dynetics stubbed their toe again on technical/management, and no one else bid.

and the upcoming LTV

That effort also started before Free’s tenure.  Again, I guess Free gets kudos for not screwing it up so far, but not being as bad as the worst NASA Administrator ever (Griffin) is damnation by faint praise.

(both services contract).

The contract type doesn’t matter if leadership doesn’t have basic development program management chops.  Free does not.  If he sticks around for years to come, Blue Moon and LTV will augur in, too.

He also insisted that NASA have more than one base camp which is an improvement.

Last I knew, Free stated that they were looking at some camper model — not that he was insisting on one strategy over another.  And it’s all angels on the head of a pin anyway, because the program has no concrete, driving goals.  The camper model is probably better for dispersed science research, if that’s what the program is about.  But it’s probably not the right model for building up and demonstrating an ISRU capability at the south pole, if that’s what the program is about.  We don’t know what the program is about because the program’s goals are mostly not goals and when they are actual goals, they’re so generic and nonspecific that everything including the kitchen sink fits under them.  And that’s not necessarily Free’s fault given that the Deputy Administrator was given that task.  But it doesn’t help to have a flake in the Exploration AA’s position, either.

However, there is room for improvement in determining the contributions of each international partner. It's taking longer than expected to finalize the agreements.

Okay... I guess.  But compared to the other ginormous problems that Artemis is facing, this is so far down the list that it shouldn’t be taking up any Exploration AA time.  Free (or whoever replaces him) has much bigger issues on their plate.

Edit/Add:  Just to put a finer point on how disconnected and uninvolved Free is on the cost management of his projects, compare his tenure with Zurbuchen’s recently finished tenure as Science AA.  You can point to actions, usually proactive, that Zurbuchen took to rein in or contain costs.  Coronagraph on WFIRST downgraded to tech demonstrator.  ICEMAG instrument on Europa Clipper terminated.  Independent, non-agency review of Mars sample return architecture.  SOFIA finally put out of our misery,  Etc.  Zurbuchen gets at least an “A” for effort on cost management, if not a passing grade across the board.  By comparison, there’s no cost management on Orion/SLS.  Not even an iota or scintilla of effort.  Free is failing cost management all around.

One AA made hard decisions, managed costs, and earned his pay.  The other is not.  (Won’t happen but) Terminate the employment of the one who is not and conduct follow-on investigations.

[yg1968]

The contract type doesn’t matter if leadership doesn’t have basic development program management chops.  Free does not.  If he sticks around for years to come, Blue Moon and LTV will augur in, too.

I disagree, I think that the procurement method makes the results predictable. I expect HLS Options A & B, Appendix P, the LTV and the spacesuits to be successes because they are services contracts with fixed prices. I don't think that SLS and Orion will be successes regardless who is the AA because they are not services contract with fixed prices. Perhaps, Free is to blame for SLS costing $200m more than before but it was already $4.1B before this new IG report came out. Lets face it, in terms of costs, SLS and Orion are a s*** sandwich.

Last I knew, Free stated that they were looking at some camper model — not that he was insisting on one strategy over another.

The camper model seems to be out. Free is now saying that the Italian Space Agency will likely be providing 3 separate habitats at different locations in order to have multiple landing locations which helps because of the lighting conditions on the south pole. NASA would likely be providing a fourth landing location with its foundation surface habitats. A nuclear power unit could make the lighting conditions less problematic but that is further down the road. 

[VSECOTSPE]

I disagree, I think that the procurement method makes the results predictable.

Not really.  See Starliner.

Fixed cost mainly limits the govt’s downside.  But bad managment at the contractor or agency level will still result in long delays, costly overruns that someone has to eat, and junky hardware.

I don't think that SLS and Orion will be successes regardless who is the AA because they are not.

Programmatic failure was baked in long ago, but if Orion/SLS can’t be turned off soon, then someone has to at least stop the bleeding.  That final tourniquet is the Exploration AA’s responsibility.

Perhaps, Free is to blame for SLS costing $200m more than before but it was already $4.1B before this new IG report came out.

There’s no “perhaps” here.  This has happened squarely on Free’s watch.  He can’t make Orion/SLS efficient, but he has to stop the cost growth.  Free has to take responsibility instead of sleepwalking through his management duties.  That IG testimony should have been a wake up call.  Free keeps hitting the snooze button.  He’s SES.  Fire him.

The camper model seems to be out.  Free is now saying that the Italian Space Agency will likely be providing 3 separate habitats at different locations in order to have multiple landing locations which helps because of the lighting conditions on the south pole.

Doesn’t matter.  They’re just bouncing from one idea or offer to another without thinking through what it is they’re trying to achieve.  Even without Orion/SLS, the program is turning into another white elephant.

It’s probably more the cold sink than the lighting, but there are fairly lightweight ways to safely beam power wirelessly at low weight/high-efficiency from one location to another.  If it doesn’t make sense otherwise, they don’t have to build in multiple locations just to get lighting.

[Coastal Ron]

A couple of thoughts from someone that has been on the contractor side of government contracts:

1. NASA is already paying exorbitant prices for their hardware, so your logic doesn't hold up.

... For fixed cost to work properly, you need to have competition. If you don't, the sole-source company can ask whatever price that they want (fixed price or not). That is why I said that the whole procurement is flawed. A services procurement with competition would be better.

First of all this debacle was created by the Congress that created the SLS, including then Senator Nelson who is now NASA Administrator. They mandated that NASA use certain contractors, and that removed competition for the design and for existing components such as the SSME/RS-25. Shame on that Congress, and all the rest that have allowed this money pit to continue.

Second, the type of contract used is just a legal framework for assigning responsibility and defining payment. Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contracts are neither good nor bad, it is up to those that create the contracts and approve them that bear the responsibility of whether they are delivering value to the American taxpayer.

Third, while NASA can't force a contractor to take a contract, they could have managed the RS-25 program in a more incremental fashion so that the production contract was not awarded UNTIL AJR had proved that they were ready, and at that point an FFP contract could have been awarded based on the confidence that both sides understood the risks.

And the proof of this is that AJR was NOT ready for production, and NASA ended up paying AJR contract awards for unfinished units regardless. So it is hard for you to argue that NASA would have been paying more for a FFP contract when it is clear that NASA is paying a lot under a non-FFP contract.

While the SLS contractors should be shamed, let's remember that it was Congress that originally created this pig trough, and subsequent Congresses that have continued to dump in American taxpayer money with very little oversight or concern. Which is why NASA doesn't have much leverage to keep costs down, but they also don't seem to be using the few they have to any real effect - which is a NASA management problem.

This is why it is hard to have any enthusiasm for the Artemis program as currently structured. No amount of praise for the non-SLS hardware can overcome the shear amount of waste the SLS program is, and will continue to be. 

[yg1968]

I disagree, I think that the procurement method makes the results predictable.

Not really.  See Starliner.

Fixed cost mainly limits the govt’s downside.  But bad management at the contractor or agency level will still result in long delays, costly overruns that someone has to eat, and junky hardware.

Despite its problems, Starliner is still a lot better than SLS and Orion. Having said that the Starliner problems does show the importance of having more than one award.

[Coastal Ron]

I disagree, I think that the procurement method makes the results predictable.

Not really.  See Starliner.

Fixed cost mainly limits the govt’s downside.  But bad management at the contractor or agency level will still result in long delays, costly overruns that someone has to eat, and junky hardware.

Despite its problems, Starliner is still a lot better than SLS and Orion. Having said that the Starliner problems does show the importance of having more than one award.

Boeings issues with the Starliner program are based on Boeing management incompetence. They were awarded the amount of money THEY said it would take to produce the crew spacecraft THEY had designed. They have only themselves to blame for their results.

And let's not forget that NASA was considering only awarding a Commercial Crew contract to one provider, with Boeing considered the "safe choice" at the time. So yes, competition is good, but so is defining the requirements properly at the beginning, which didn't happen with the congressionally-defined, single-sourced SLS.

The issues with the SLS RS-25 and SRM are indicative of the constraints that Congress put on the SLS program when it was created - NASA was not allowed to define the goals of the SLS, nor were they able to competitively bid part or all of the vehicle itself. Congress pretty much locked in who the major suppliers were, and that removed a great deal of leverage that the U.S. Government normally has when negotiating contracts of any type, including Firm Fixed Price, Cost Plus, etc.

Beyond defining the scope of work, procurement methods are just a way to define liability and define how/when payments are made. ALL methods of procurement can be manipulated in the favor of the contractor, which is why the customer must always remain not only vigilant, but proactive in managing their contractors.

It is clear that throughout the history of the SLS program that NASA management has been unable or unwilling to properly manage their major SLS contractors, such as with the RS-25 contractor being given award fees for work that wasn't completed per the contract.

[yg1968]

This is why it is hard to have any enthusiasm for the Artemis program as currently structured. No amount of praise for the non-SLS hardware can overcome the shear amount of waste the SLS program is, and will continue to be. 

I disagree. I think that the HLS program will do the same to the Moon as commercial crew is doing for LEO. Create an economy for these destinations by encouraging private non-NASA missions. The Appendix P award is another step in the right direction in that respect.

[Coastal Ron]

This is why it is hard to have any enthusiasm for the Artemis program as currently structured. No amount of praise for the non-SLS hardware can overcome the shear amount of waste the SLS program is, and will continue to be. 

I disagree. I think that the HLS program will do the same to the Moon as commercial crew is doing for LEO.

As long as NASA is mandated to use the SLS+Orion to take humans to the Moon, there can never be robust Moon program. And increasing the number of SLS+Orion flights per is simply too expensive.

Create an economy for these destinations by encouraging private non-NASA missions.

You are just repeating NASA PR with the "economy" word. The only economy NASA will ever create with the Artemis program is here on Earth, by feeding money into NASA contractors. You can't create an economy in space until there is an exchange of currency IN SPACE that stays IN SPACE. NASA is not doing that with the Artemis program.

The Appendix P award is another step in the right direction in that respect.

Again, as long as NASA is mandated to use the 4-person SLS+Orion, the Artemis program will never be able to fully take advantage of ANY non-NASA operated hardware. Four people once a year for a few weeks on the Moon is not a very robust Moon program - it pales in comparison to what Apollo did.

But if it inspires some non-NASA organization to build a crew transportation system to the Moon that bypasses the SLS+Orion, and causes Congress to finally cancel the SLS+Orion, that would be nice. Don't expect it this decade though, because the contractors that make the RS-25 and SRMs have too close of ties to Congress, and Congress is fine overpaying for what they do - which the NASA OIG report proves.

[yg1968]

You are just repeating NASA PR with the "economy" word. The only economy NASA will ever create with the Artemis program is here on Earth, by feeding money into NASA contractors. You can't create an economy in space until there is an exchange of currency IN SPACE that stays IN SPACE. NASA is not doing that with the Artemis program.

An economy isn't defined by where money is exchanged. You keep using your own definition of words that are not based on any dictionary meaning. We keep having the same discussion over and over. An economy can be producing and consuming things (goods or services) in space, it doesn't matter where the money is exchanged.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy

Private lunar missions wouldn't use Orion and SLS.

[VSECOTSPE]

I’m not sure HLS does anything for SX and Starship that SX and Starship weren’t going to do eventually.  HLS certainly accelerated Lunar Starship by some years, but I don’t think NASA funding is enabling for Lunar Starship like NASA funding enabled F9/Dragon at a much earlier point in SX history.

Blue is not the dynamic, risk-taking company that SX is, so I think an argument can be made that HLS funding is enabling for Blue Moon.  But unlike Starship, Blue Moon is not an end-to-end human transport system.  Unless Blue is also funded to develop a crew transport element to lunar orbit  (which is probably dependent on Orion/SLS being drawn down), NASA’s investment in Blue Moon doesn’t open up the Moon, even if it is enabling for that lander.

I struggle to find (as in I want to believe there is) a benefit to Artemis that outweighs the $50 billion sunk into Orion/SLS/EGS through last year:

https://www.planetary.org/space-policy/cost-of-sls-and-orion

I just don’t see it.  The relative pittance planned to be spent on landers ($6 billion) and other surface systems (few billion?) is bass ackwards.  And even if it wasn’t, those lunar activities are heavily constrained by a mission rate of one crew of four every year or two.  And even if there was a better ratio of transport to actual lunar activity, there’s no clear articulation in Melroy’s goals of what that lunar activity is suppossed to deliver, certainly nothing worth some handful of tens of billions of dollars.

I wish it were otherwise, but so far, no justification/rationale or capabilty/achievement for Artemis has been put forth that is commensurate with its cost.

[yg1968]

I’m not sure HLS does anything for SX and Starship that SX and Starship weren’t going to do eventually.  HLS certainly accelerated Lunar Starship by some years, but I don’t think NASA funding is enabling for Lunar Starship like NASA funding enabled F9/Dragon at a much earlier point in SX history.

I am not sure that I agree with that. Starship will cost at least $10B to develop, having a customer such as NASA that pays you $4B for a variant of Starship is incredibly important to Starship's development and success.

Blue is not the dynamic, risk-taking company that SX is, so I think an argument can be made that HLS funding is enabling for Blue Moon.  But unlike Starship, Blue Moon is not an end-to-end human transport system.  Unless Blue is also funded to develop a crew transport element to lunar orbit  (which is probably dependent on Orion/SLS being drawn down), NASA’s investment in Blue Moon doesn’t open up the Moon, even if it is enabling for that lander.

I think that the speculation is that LM's space tug could be used to ferry propellant or crew to Blue's lander. A commercial crew spacecraft (Starliner, Dream Chaser or Blue's own capsule) could be used to reach the space tug in LEO.

[VSECOTSPE]

Yeah, I can imagine a crew coming up on a Dreamchaser, transferring to a Blue Lagoon station, and then to a fueled Blue Moon landing stack and vice versa for a round trip to the lunar surface, a la 2001: A Space Odyssey.  But that’s just me projecting desires, not reality.  Until there’s a plan to do something like that with Blue Moon and that plan is funded, I’d stay skeptical.

[yg1968]

Yeah, I can imagine a crew coming up on a Dreamchaser, transferring to a Blue Lagoon station, and then to a fueled Blue Moon landing stack and vice versa for a round trip to the lunar surface, a la 2001: A Space Odyssey.  But that’s just me projecting desires, not reality.  Until there’s a plan to do something like that with Blue Moon and that plan is funded, I’d stay skeptical.

I think that you mean Orbital Reef, there is no Blue Lagoon.

[woods170]

And while you're at it, please show Nelson the door as well. He's in large part responsible for starting the bottomless pit that is SLS.

I wish.  Senator Administrator Monster Rocket has been an adequate caretaker of what was essentially the Bridenstine plan at exit, i.e., onboard a second lander contractor.  But besides publicly grouching about ML-2, he’s done little to improve the survivability of the Artemis Program going forward.  And by letting the cancer of Orion/SLS cost growth spread unabated, he’s arguably leaving Artemis in a worse position than when he started.  His deputy’s effort on Artemis “goals” (and I use that term loosely) have also not positioned the program well for coming budget battles.

Agreed on Pam Melroy. She also is a major disappointment so far.
When will the USA finally learn that the two kinds of people who should NOT run NASA are (ex)-politicians and (ex)-astronauts.

[Coastal Ron]

You are just repeating NASA PR with the "economy" word. The only economy NASA will ever create with the Artemis program is here on Earth, by feeding money into NASA contractors. You can't create an economy in space until there is an exchange of currency IN SPACE that stays IN SPACE. NASA is not doing that with the Artemis program.

An economy isn't defined by where money is exchanged...
...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy

Actually if you read that Wikipedia article, it does. But going into it would OT, so move along... 

As to the RS-25 and SRMs, and the very clear evidence that the contractors are milking the U.S. Taxpayer, does anyone think Congress will care? That this will be a "straw", to be added to the many that could eventually lead to a "last straw" for the SLS?

[punder]

As to the RS-25 and SRMs, and the very clear evidence that the contractors are milking the U.S. Taxpayer, does anyone think Congress will care? That this will be a "straw", to be added to the many that could eventually lead to a "last straw" for the SLS?

This is the bottom line. Very cogent arguments here, but the bugs we see are the features that Congress sees. Nelson and Free (who always looks like he’s heartily tired of having to deal with mere humans) are doing exactly what they were put there to do. Congress represents the People, sorta/kinda, but 99% of the voters have more immediate concerns.

Despite your and VSECOTSPE’s logic, there is absolutely no hope that this mess will be reformed from within. The only answer is the end run, and frankly (distastefully to many) that means Musk/SpaceX. SpaceX is no longer a little company dependent on NASA. It can forge its own path regardless of the USG. Not without difficulties, whether technical or political; but there is a track record of success that cannot be ignored, no matter how heroic the attempt. Musk might decide to fulfill his contractual obligations and concentrate fully on Mars, but once SS/SH is flying routinely, I’m guessing there are more NASA contracts in store for lunar Starship. Meanwhile, SLS will roll on until Congress finds a convenient way to shift their favorites onto other lucrative pit-digging operations for taxpayer dollars.

[VSECOTSPE]

Despite your and VSECOTSPE’s logic, there is absolutely no hope that this mess will be reformed from within

To be clear, I’ve made no argument that NASA’s exploration house will reform from within, certainly not with Free in charge (another reason to fire him) and likely not with Nelson in the Administrator’s suite.

The only answer is the end run, and frankly (distastefully to many) that means Musk/SpaceX.

SX is not an end run for the Moon.  They will only undertake lunar efforts if paid by NASA or bazillionaires.  And bazillionaire joy rides won’t recreate a program like what Artemis could/should be.

I’m repeating myself from other threads, but reform will start with the White House.  It’s possible that the combination of a flat budget over the next two years and Shelby’s exit will both push the Administration to undertake change and make it more possible.

But I would not bet on change yet.  More likely, the White House will let NASA and other discretionary agencies run on autopilot until either election results enable a non-flat budget calculus for FY25 or FY26 starts rolling.

And autopilot under the flat budget agreed to by the White House and House Republican leadership means multi-year delays in Artemis missions as Orion/SLS is slowed even further and/or the deferrel/termination of new content like the Blue Moon award and LTV.  I’ll try to post numbers in the Artemis thread later today or tomorrow.

Meanwhile, SLS will roll on until Congress finds a convenient way to shift their favorites onto other lucrative pit-digging operations for taxpayer dollars.

Congress cares about the Orion/SLS workforce.  Provide that workforce with other, more useful tasks (there’s plenty to pick from in a real human space exploration effort) and the Gordian knot of the Apollo/STS infrastructure/workforce that has bedeviled NASA since Goldin can be untied.  But if an administration fails to address the workforce as the Obama White House did, Congress will likely  just shove another iteration of STS/Ares V/SLS down the agency’s throat.

[yg1968]

You are just repeating NASA PR with the "economy" word. The only economy NASA will ever create with the Artemis program is here on Earth, by feeding money into NASA contractors. You can't create an economy in space until there is an exchange of currency IN SPACE that stays IN SPACE. NASA is not doing that with the Artemis program.

An economy isn't defined by where money is exchanged...
...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy

Actually if you read that Wikipedia article, it does. But going into it would OT, so move along... 

It says that it only accounts for a small part of the economic domain:

Economic transactions occur when two groups or parties agree to the value or price of the transacted good or service, commonly expressed in a certain currency. However, monetary transactions only account for a small part of the economic domain.

[JayWee]

... quotes ...
Congress cares about the Orion/SLS workforce.  Provide that workforce with other, more useful tasks (there’s plenty to pick from in a real human space exploration effort) and the Gordian knot of the Apollo/STS infrastructure/workforce that has bedeviled NASA since Goldin can be untied.  But if an administration fails to address the workforce as the Obama White House did, Congress will likely  just shove another iteration of STS/Ares V/SLS down the agency’s throat.

Is the workforce argument as strong as it was 14 years ago though? Certainly commercial space has way way bigger share of US space workforce than it was back then. I doubt the "we must preserve shuttle technology" will be as compelling.

[DanClemmensen]

... quotes ...
Congress cares about the Orion/SLS workforce.  Provide that workforce with other, more useful tasks (there’s plenty to pick from in a real human space exploration effort) and the Gordian knot of the Apollo/STS infrastructure/workforce that has bedeviled NASA since Goldin can be untied.  But if an administration fails to address the workforce as the Obama White House did, Congress will likely  just shove another iteration of STS/Ares V/SLS down the agency’s throat.

Is the workforce argument as strong as it was 14 years ago though? Certainly commercial space has way way bigger share of US space workforce than it was back then. I doubt the "we must preserve shuttle technology" will be as compelling.

It's not about some generic "workforce". It's about specific jobs in specific facilities in specific congressional districts.

[Coastal Ron]

You are just repeating NASA PR with the "economy" word. The only economy NASA will ever create with the Artemis program is here on Earth, by feeding money into NASA contractors. You can't create an economy in space until there is an exchange of currency IN SPACE that stays IN SPACE. NASA is not doing that with the Artemis program.

An economy isn't defined by where money is exchanged...
...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy

Actually if you read that Wikipedia article, it does. But going into it would OT, so move along... 

It says that it only accounts for a small part of the economic domain:

Economic transactions occur when two groups or parties agree to the value or price of the transacted good or service, commonly expressed in a certain currency. However, monetary transactions only account for a small part of the economic domain.

*Sigh*

The paragraph preceding that gives you the answer, which is:

A given economy is a set of processes that involves its culture, values, education, technological evolution, history, social organization, political structure, legal systems, and natural resources as main factors. These factors give context, content, and set the conditions and parameters in which an economy functions. In other words, the economic domain is a social domain of interrelated human practices and transactions that does not stand alone.

The Artemis program is a science expedition, not a location where "interrelated human practices and transactions" will occur.

You want to debate this more, PM me. Otherwise let's get back to the topic at hand, which is that yet ANOTHER non-biased investigation of the SLS program has found rampant mismanagement and overpayments to contractors. This will only end when the SLS program is ended... 

[yg1968]

You are just repeating NASA PR with the "economy" word. The only economy NASA will ever create with the Artemis program is here on Earth, by feeding money into NASA contractors. You can't create an economy in space until there is an exchange of currency IN SPACE that stays IN SPACE. NASA is not doing that with the Artemis program.

An economy isn't defined by where money is exchanged...
...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy

Actually if you read that Wikipedia article, it does. But going into it would OT, so move along... 

It says that it only accounts for a small part of the economic domain:

Economic transactions occur when two groups or parties agree to the value or price of the transacted good or service, commonly expressed in a certain currency. However, monetary transactions only account for a small part of the economic domain.

*Sigh*

The paragraph preceding that gives you the answer, which is:

A given economy is a set of processes that involves its culture, values, education, technological evolution, history, social organization, political structure, legal systems, and natural resources as main factors. These factors give context, content, and set the conditions and parameters in which an economy functions. In other words, the economic domain is a social domain of interrelated human practices and transactions that does not stand alone.

The Artemis program is a science expedition, not a location where "interrelated human practices and transactions" will occur.

You want to debate this more, PM me. Otherwise let's get back to the topic at hand, which is that yet ANOTHER non-biased investigation of the SLS program has found rampant mismanagement and overpayments to contractors. This will only end when the SLS program is ended... 

I was talking about private lunar missions that will be enabled by the Artemis program (not the Artemis missions themselves). The Sustained Lunar Evolution Segment discusses the lunar economy. You can reply on this topic in this thread if you wish:

https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=57221.msg2477294#msg2477294

[Robotbeat]

I don’t see why astronauts couldn’t shop online from the international space station, so I kind of suspect this has already occurred. The difference might be on a private space station you can order food from the kitchen, and you pay the cook to prepare your food. Or you pay for someone to 3-D print you something. On space station, the original arrangement with the Sabatier reactor was that the company provided the reactor for free but would get paid by NASA per liter of water it produced from the hydrogen and CO2 feedstocks that were waste products. I’m sure the transactions were all occurring on computers on earth, but there is no reason why that would have to be so, nor does it really matter where the ledger computer is located.

I would not be surprised if there is an informal barter economy on ISS where people exchange personal items. Kind of like what happens on naval vessels.

The real question of economy is whether there are multiple entities doing business with one another on orbit. NASA gets money from these private astronaut flights to the international space station, and I don’t see why they couldn’t get money from private astronauts visiting some Artemis base on the moon or Gateway or something. And I imagine some similar arrangement to the Sabatier reactor on ISS where some lunar water mining company could sell water to NASA by the liter. Of course, there were some experiments with this already with a CLPS landers and regolith.


NASA is buying seats on commercial landers, and already Starship is gonna be used by private astronauts for lunar flyby missions, and although the physical landers will be different (at least at first), no doubt Dear Moon style Starships will benefit a lot from commonality with HLS. And Artemis benefits a lot from SpaceX (and Blue Origin for that matter) being willing to pay most of the development cost. This is already the beginning of a nascent lunar economy. Not just pure government as the only customer, nor purely top-down requirements from NASA to determine everything.

[yg1968]

NASA inspector general faults agency on SLS booster and engine overruns:
https://spacenews.com/nasa-inspector-general-faults-agency-on-sls-booster-and-engine-overruns/

[yg1968]

I struggle to find (as in I want to believe there is) a benefit to Artemis that outweighs the $50 billion sunk into Orion/SLS/EGS through last year:

https://www.planetary.org/space-policy/cost-of-sls-and-orion

I just don’t see it.  The relative pittance planned to be spent on landers ($6 billion) and other surface systems (few billion?) is bass ackwards.  And even if it wasn’t, those lunar activities are heavily constrained by a mission rate of one crew of four every year or two.  And even if there was a better ratio of transport to actual lunar activity, there’s no clear articulation in Melroy’s goals of what that lunar activity is supposed to deliver, certainly nothing worth some handful of tens of billions of dollars.

I wish it were otherwise, but so far, no justification/rationale or capability/achievement for Artemis has been put forth that is commensurate with its cost.

Artemis inherited SLS and Orion. The rest of Artemis: the Artemis Accords, HLS, the Spacesuits, CLPS, the LTV are all great programs or agreements that can and should survive SLS and Orion. The Moon to Mars goals and strategies are fine but in the end what really matters are the programs that are associated with these objectives and the programs are good.

[envy887]

They should contract for services like they have done for HLS and commercial crew, etc.

Those contracts have competition. Applying the same logic to SLS would mean either not using RS-25 on SLS, or taking the design to a competing engine manufacturer. As long as it's sole sourced to Aerojet and NASA has no choice about using it, NASA is over a barrel.

NASA designed themselves into a corner with SLS by using RS-25 with no possibility of a change to anything else. They could have used off-the-shelf hydrocarbon engines and gotten the required performance while having competitive options. But the "not-invented-here" delusion is strong...

[Coastal Ron]

...
I wish it were otherwise, but so far, no justification/rationale or capability/achievement for Artemis has been put forth that is commensurate with its cost.

Artemis inherited SLS and Orion.

No, the Artemis program was built on top of the SLS+Orion.

Prior to the V.P. Pence announcing the 2024 Moon landing goal, SLS supporters (including those on NSF) had been claiming that the SLS was a "Moon rocket", and obviously the Orion as-built can only make it to the Moon, so the SLS+Orion were perceived as the only option to allow a Moon landing by the end of a potential second Trump Administration. There was simply no other option for making the 2024 politically-oriented date.

The rest of Artemis: the Artemis Accords, HLS, the Spacesuits, CLPS, the LTV are all great programs or agreements that can and should survive SLS and Orion. The Moon to Mars goals and strategies are fine but in the end what really matters are the programs that are associated with these objectives and the programs are good.

It doesn't look like Congress agrees with your assessment, since Congress continues to dump money into the SLS, regardless of the MANY warnings that U.S. Taxpayer money is NOT being economically spent. Because the goal that Congress has for the Artemis program is not what your goal is - everything BUT the SLS+Orion are just secondary to spending money on the right large NASA contractors, as the cost overruns on the RS-25 and booster show.

If Congress truly cared about the Artemis program then they would care about WHY the SLS & Orion program costs so much, are NOT meeting their planned schedule goals, and CANNOT provide a meaningful Artemis mission tempo without massive budget increases. In other words, Congress would care about what it would take to make the Artemis program more than a flags & footprints exercise...

[yg1968]

No, the Artemis program was built on top of the SLS+Orion.

Prior to the V.P. Pence announcing the 2024 Moon landing goal, SLS supporters (including those on NSF) had been claiming that the SLS was a "Moon rocket", and obviously the Orion as-built can only make it to the Moon, so the SLS+Orion were perceived as the only option to allow a Moon landing by the end of a potential second Trump Administration. There was simply no other option for making the 2024 politically-oriented date.

I am not sure that I agree with that assessment. VP Pence made it clear in his March 2019 speech that the 2024 goal should be attained by all means necessary and he specifically referred to commercial rockets as a possibility. Trump made a similar comment later on to say that NASA should seek the help of commercial companies (these billionaires love their rockets comment). Bridenstine was essentially forced by Shelby to conclude that SLS was the only way to go but it was obvious that there was other options including Falcon Heavy and Orion which NASA had started to look at.

It doesn't look like Congress agrees with your assessment, since Congress continues to dump money into the SLS, regardless of the MANY warnings that U.S. Taxpayer money is NOT being economically spent. Because the goal that Congress has for the Artemis program is not what your goal is - everything BUT the SLS+Orion are just secondary to spending money on the right large NASA contractors, as the cost overruns on the RS-25 and booster show.

If Congress truly cared about the Artemis program then they would care about WHY the SLS & Orion program costs so much, are NOT meeting their planned schedule goals, and CANNOT provide a meaningful Artemis mission tempo without massive budget increases. In other words, Congress would care about what it would take to make the Artemis program more than a flags & footprints exercise...

I am not sure that I agree with that assessment either. These other Artemis programs received sufficient funding from Congress. The HLS FY23 budget was more than adequate.

In terms of SLS and Orion, I don't think that Congress will cancel them anytime time soon especially now that Artemis I has flown. Having said that, Congress is supportive of reducing costs and you can hear more and more questions during hearings about reducing and controlling costs. So I wouldn't say that it is not a concern. As you noted, Congress is largely to blame for these costs because of the passage of the 2010 NASA Authorization Act and the appropriations that followed it but they usually blame NASA for the costs overrun and not themselves (that is generally what politicians do).

The reason that Artemis won't be a flag and footprint program is because of the public-private partnerships that were created as part of the Artemis program. Every major Artemis program (HLS, the Spacesuits, CLPS and the LTV) that was created since 2017 has been a public-private partnership (except for the PPE and Halo). NASA expects these providers to have non-NASA customers. To me that is the most exciting part of the Artemis program. Eric Berger called the Artemis Accords and HLS the most exciting part of the Artemis Accords and I agree with him, they are. It's popular to be negative these days but there is a lot of positive programs or agreements within Artemis such as the Artemis Accords, HLS, the Spacesuits, CLPS and the LTV.

[tea monster]

Bridenstine was essentially forced by Shelby to conclude that SLS was the only way to go but it was obvious that there was other options including Falcon Heavy and Orion which NASA had started to look at.

I think that what happened to Kathy Lueders was a pretty good sign that "other options" were not actually on the table no matter how much they appeared to be.

[yg1968]

Bridenstine was essentially forced by Shelby to conclude that SLS was the only way to go but it was obvious that there was other options including Falcon Heavy and Orion which NASA had started to look at.

I think that what happened to Kathy Lueders was a pretty good sign that "other options" were not actually on the table no matter how much they appeared to be.

That happened after Bridenstine left, under the new Administration. However, if your point is that Congress never would have accepted a non-SLS-solution, I agree with that.

[Coastal Ron]

Bridenstine was essentially forced by Shelby to conclude that SLS was the only way to go but it was obvious that there was other options including Falcon Heavy and Orion which NASA had started to look at.

I think that what happened to Kathy Lueders was a pretty good sign that "other options" were not actually on the table no matter how much they appeared to be.

That happened after Bridenstine left, under the new Administration. However, if your point is that Congress never would have accepted a non-SLS-solution, I agree with that.

Bridenstine never could have forced Congress to consider an alternative to the SLS, because of the exact issues the NASA OIG found in this latest report - the program is functioning as intended by Congress, which is NOT the same as being the right solution for the right price.

The proof of that is that despite many of these types of reports being released, Congress doesn't care. The Artemis program is just a fig leaf for spending money on the SLS and Orion programs, regardless of how expensive, inefficient, and outmoded they may be.

If Congress really cared about the Artemis program they would be looking for ways to remove the elements of the Artemis program that are holding back the potential for returning to the Moon. Let me know when that happens and I'll be happy to say I was wrong, but until then the Artemis program is not really a priority within Congress, spending money on the right SLS & Orion contractors is the priority.

[spacenut]

SLS was originally supposed to use off the shelf components.  Boosters, SSME, and RL-10's on the upper.  They spent a lot developing the 5 segment solids, a lot on changing the SSME to RS-25's, and a lot on developing the J2X that they didn't or haven't used.  Direct had the right approach.  Use what they had until Jupiter could evolve. 

Spending some money to manufacture the RD-180 in America and making an 8-10 engine RD-180 booster with a J2X upper stage would have been cheaper and given the same or better results.  This booster could have been made reusable using F9 technology. 

Solids are heavy and expensive and cost as much to refurbish as new ones.  Core and RS-15's are expendable and expensive.  No clear way to evolve into a reusable rocket. 

Almost all new rockets being developed are to be reusable.  Neutron, New Glenn, Starship/Superheavy, and probably a few others.  We already have Falcon 9 and FH as well as Electron parachuting down for possible reuse.  I was hoping these new ones would be operational by now to make SLS obsolete.  I still think it will be obsolete by 2030 or 2035.  Not even as long as the Shuttle's 30+ years. 

[tea monster]

SLS was originally supposed to use off the shelf components.  Boosters, SSME, and RL-10's on the upper.  They spent a lot developing the 5 segment solids, a lot on changing the SSME to RS-25's, and a lot on developing the J2X that they didn't or haven't used.  Direct had the right approach.  Use what they had until Jupiter could evolve. 

Spending some money to manufacture the RD-180 in America and making an 8-10 engine RD-180 booster with a J2X upper stage would have been cheaper and given the same or better results.  This booster could have been made reusable using F9 technology. 

Solids are heavy and expensive and cost as much to refurbish as new ones.  Core and RS-15's are expendable and expensive.  No clear way to evolve into a reusable rocket. 

We keep coming back to the SLS program being a jobs program for certain companies and districts and having nothing to do making rational engineering decisions to promote human spaceflight or advance a return to the moon. None of the current design and implementation of SLS makes any sense unless you approach it in these terms.

I have not followed the engine saga for the RS-25s. Please correct me if I have missed something - at what point did they realise that they did not have enough shuttle engines to fulfil the SLS program? I would have thought that this point would come up pretty early in planning the SLS. In descriptions of the development of the SLS it seems to be almost an afterthought that they would need to somehow come up with more SSMEs to keep the program going. If I've missed something, I'm sorry.

[Coastal Ron]

I have not followed the engine saga for the RS-25s. Please correct me if I have missed something - at what point did they realise that they did not have enough shuttle engines to fulfil the SLS program? I would have thought that this point would come up pretty early in planning the SLS. In descriptions of the development of the SLS it seems to be almost an afterthought that they would need to somehow come up with more SSMEs to keep the program going. If I've missed something, I'm sorry.

IIRC there was some consideration of using the RS-68 instead of the SSME/RS-25, but once they decided to use the SSME/RS-25 they would have known that they were going to need to build more engines.

As a note, Aerojet Rocketdyne makes both the RS-68 (used on Delta IV) and the SSME/RS-25, so the SLS program was going to provide guaranteed work for them regardless which was chosen.

[joek]

I have not followed the engine saga for the RS-25s. Please correct me if I have missed something - at what point did they realise that they did not have enough shuttle engines to fulfil the SLS program? I would have thought that this point would come up pretty early in planning the SLS. In descriptions of the development of the SLS it seems to be almost an afterthought that they would need to somehow come up with more SSMEs to keep the program going. If I've missed something, I'm sorry.

IIRC there was some consideration of using the RS-68 instead of the SSME/RS-25, but once they decided to use the SSME/RS-25 they would have known that they were going to need to build more engines.

As a note, Aerojet Rocketdyne makes both the RS-68 (used on Delta IV) and the SSME/RS-25, so the SLS program was going to provide guaranteed work for them regardless which was chosen.

Yup. But IIRC that was squashed cuz RS-68: (1) Had no relationship to Shuttle. Which, as we all know would have violated the raison d'être of SLS continuing on with reusing Shuttle legacy parts (*cough*). (2) Would have to be human rated (a long history of yes-no-maybe with RS-68). (3) The heat flux and ablative nozzles in proximity to the SRB's would likely have been problematic. (4) ...

In any case, those issues were recognized fairly early on. And much of the rework to use RS-68's likely would have landed outside of AJR. So path of least resistance (*cough*), RS-25 it wuz and is.

[mn]

I have not followed the engine saga for the RS-25s. Please correct me if I have missed something - at what point did they realise that they did not have enough shuttle engines to fulfil the SLS program? I would have thought that this point would come up pretty early in planning the SLS. In descriptions of the development of the SLS it seems to be almost an afterthought that they would need to somehow come up with more SSMEs to keep the program going. If I've missed something, I'm sorry.

IIRC there was some consideration of using the RS-68 instead of the SSME/RS-25, but once they decided to use the SSME/RS-25 they would have known that they were going to need to build more engines.

As a note, Aerojet Rocketdyne makes both the RS-68 (used on Delta IV) and the SSME/RS-25, so the SLS program was going to provide guaranteed work for them regardless which was chosen.

Yup. But IIRC that was squashed cuz RS-68: (1) Had no relationship to Shuttle. Which, as we all know would have violated the raison d'être of SLS continuing on with reusing Shuttle legacy parts (*cough*). (2) Would have to be human rated (a long history of yes-no-maybe with RS-68). (3) The heat flux and ablative nozzles in proximity to the SRB's would likely have been problematic. (4) ...

In any case, those issues were recognized fairly early on. And much of the rework to use RS-68's likely would have landed outside of AJR. So path of least resistance (*cough*), RS-25 it wuz and is.

It's very simple: you tell a congressman that reusing the RS25 will be simple, quick and cheap. Building more of the same engine will also be simple, quick and cheap.

Then you go write contracts to refurbish existing RS25s and start up production of new ones to the tune of billions.

Seems like it all went exactly to plan.

[joek]

It's very simple ...

You have it backwards. Senator Shelby, Administrator of the Northern Alabama Space Administration (ret.), made the call. And it has gone exactly to his plan.

[VSECOTSPE]

Artemis inherited SLS and Orion.

That doesn’t absolve Artemis or NASA of the program’s lousy mission rate and high transport cost per mission/astronaut.  If I’m dumb enough to drive the farm tractor that I inherited from my grandfather  instead of selling it and taking the subway, I can’t use that as an excuse for being late to work every day with the boss.  Everything else in the program is highly restricted by a tiny mission rate of four crew for a few weeks every 2-3 years and very constrained by the $4.3B and counting cost of getting them there.  Artemis is not worth $8B/yr. and tens of thousands of aerospace careers for that.  There’s literally nothing they can do or that would grow out of their activities that would ever be remotely commensurate with those costs.  It’s a really expensive stunt.

The rest of Artemis: the Artemis Accords, HLS, the Spacesuits, CLPS, the LTV are all great programs or agreements that can and should survive SLS and Orion.

The Accords, CLPS, and the Starship half of HLS all largely exist independently of the program.  The Artemis budget could disappear tomorrow and those three elements would continue based on rounding in the HQ overhead budget (Accords), what Planetary Science wants/needs (CLPS), and StarLink revenue/SpaceX deep pockets (Starship).

If they’re only going to be used once every 2-3 or 4-6 years, the suits, the second lander, and the LTV aren’t worth it.  Yeah, they’re fixed-price contracts so the government’s downside is limited unlike Orion/SLS.  But that doesn’t mean that the money being spent on them can produce anything commensurate with their costs under such limited usage.  And to be realistic, even these fixed-price contracts don’t open up frontiers without a SpaceX-like organization on the other end.  Antares and Starliner attest to that, and so far there’s no other company with SpaceX’s combination of organizational drive, technical competence, and deep pockets amongst these contractors.  (As much as I wish we were not relying so much on SpaceX.)

The only reason to keep Artemis going in its current form is if the White House wants a grossly expensive hedge against the PRC ever announcing and putting renminbi behind a human lunar landing.  And even if/when that happens, I’m not sure that the White House will care. 

The Moon to Mars goals and strategies are fine but in the end what really matters are the programs that are associated with these objectives and the programs are good.

There’s no clarity or consensus on what Artemis is supposed to concretely achieve.  NASA has produced dozens of bullets of really bad engineering process speak, but precious few actual goals.  And the few bullets that actually express goals are just generic, self-licking ice cream cones.  No one higher than the Deputy Administrator buys into her WBS, which is what those documents actually are.  There’s certainly no ownership in Congress or the White House.

The program has no drivers, and that actually is important independent of the quality of the programs.  The program is likely facing 7% cuts starting in 2024, and the Deputy Administrator’s documents provide no clarity on where priorities lie and what should go and what should stay.

[yg1968]

Artemis is not worth $8B/yr. and tens of thousands of aerospace careers for that.  There’s literally nothing they can do or that would grow out of their activities that would ever be remotely commensurate with those costs.  It’s a really expensive stunt.

I disagree that it is a stunt and I think that it is worth it even at $8B per year. Having said that there is room for improvement including the rate of missions (having a commercial HLV program in addition to SLS would help in that respect).

The Accords, CLPS, and the Starship half of HLS all largely exist independently of the program.  The Artemis budget could disappear tomorrow and those three elements would continue based on rounding in the HQ overhead budget (Accords), what Planetary Science wants/needs (CLPS), and StarLink revenue/SpaceX deep pockets (Starship).

If they’re only going to be used once every 2-3 or 4-6 years, the suits, the second lander, and the LTV aren’t worth it.  Yeah, they’re fixed-price contracts so the government’s downside is limited unlike Orion/SLS.  But that doesn’t mean that the money being spent on them can produce anything commensurate with their costs under such limited usage.  And to be realistic, even these fixed-price contracts don’t open up frontiers without a SpaceX-like organization on the other end.  Antares and Starliner attest to that, and so far there’s no with SpaceX’s combination of organizational drive, technical competence, and deep pockets amongst these contractors.  (As much as I wish we were not relying so much on SpaceX.)

Only one company has to succeed in finding non-NASA clients for the program to be successful. The jury is still out on Starliner; it is supposed to be used for Orbital Reef. Even if Dragon and HLS-Starships are the only ones to be successful at finding non-NASA clients, the commercial crew and HLS programs will have been a huge success.

The program is likely facing 7% cuts starting in 2024, and the Deputy Administrator’s documents provide no clarity on where priorities lie and what should go and what should stay.

Where do you get your 7% cut? From what I have read discretionary spending will be frozen in FY24 and will get a 1% increase in FY25.

[VSECOTSPE]

I disagree that it is a stunt and I think that it is worth it even at $8B per year.

What will 2-4 Artemis crew on the lunar surface for a couple/few weeks at a time every 2-3 years deliver, create, produce, etc. that is worth $8B/yr?  That’s $16-24B per mission or $4-6B per astronaut.  What can they possibly do that is commensurate with these costs?  These costs per astronaut are on par with the entire annual budgets of the National Science Foundation, the National Cancer Institute, or the Department of Energy’s Office of Science.  To say nothing of the tens of thousands of technical careers tied up doing such negative-return work when we need those folks elsewhere in the economy.

I accept the sunk cost fallacy argument that Artemis inherited Orion/SLS.  But Orion/SLS imposes such ginormous costs and such a low mission rate on Artemis that the program still looks insane just on the numbers going forward.

Only one company has to succeed in finding non-NASA clients for the program to be successful.

I’d argue that’s a bad yardstick or goal for Artemis.  Taxpayers shouldn’t spend $8B per year just so SpaceX can sign up another dearMoon or Polaris customer.  Or so that Blue Origin or another company can do the same.  The program has to achieve something more worthwhile than that for those kinds of dollars.

But there’s little sense in making that argument in the first place because it’s already happened without Artemis.  SpaceX has the dearMoon and Polaris customers for Starship.

Where do you get your 7% cut? From what I have read discretionary spending will be frozen in FY24 and will get a 1% increase in FY25.

Artemis goes up in FY24/25 compared to FY23 in the President’s FY24 Budget Request.  Holding Artemis flat in FY24 and to +1% in FY25 will require nearly $1.1B in reductions from the President’s Request over those two years, a more than 7% cut.

[Coastal Ron]

Only one company has to succeed in finding non-NASA clients for the program to be successful.

So for the RS-25 and booster overruns to be looked at as good investments, and not corporate pork, all we need is for SpaceX to sign up a non-NASA customer? And then all sins are washed away?

And yeah, you may have been WAY off topic and talking about things not related specifically to the SLS cost overruns, but it is all related. Because as long as the SLS is justified as being required for the Artemis program, then massive cost overruns will continue to be ignored.

When do rational people get a voice in all of this? When will Congress do their job and ask NASA to reassess their use of the SLS due to the enormous cost and likelihood of lower cost alternatives?

THAT is the topic being debated here.

[yg1968]

Only one company has to succeed in finding non-NASA clients for the program to be successful.

So for the RS-25 and booster overruns to be looked at as good investments, and not corporate pork, all we need is for SpaceX to sign up a non-NASA customer? And then all sins are washed away?

And yeah, you may have been WAY off topic and talking about things not related specifically to the SLS cost overruns, but it is all related. Because as long as the SLS is justified as being required for the Artemis program, then massive cost overruns will continue to be ignored.

When do rational people get a voice in all of this? When will Congress do their job and ask NASA to reassess their use of the SLS due to the enormous cost and likelihood of lower cost alternatives?

THAT is the topic being debated here.

My comment was in the context of what VSECOTSPE said about Boeing and Antares. It's not the only criteria for success but it is important in the sense that the services should be cheaper if the service provider has non-NASA customers. In any event, Cygnus has all kinds of derivatives including HALO that are useful to NASA, so I wouldn't call it a failure at this point. I don't think that Starliner will be a failure either since I believe that it will be used for Orbital Reef. It's easy to be negative about everything but when someone does that other people will generally ignore them because they will find that this person either lacks objectivity or is pushing an agenda.

[Coastal Ron]

Only one company has to succeed in finding non-NASA clients for the program to be successful.

So for the RS-25 and booster overruns to be looked at as good investments, and not corporate pork, all we need is for SpaceX to sign up a non-NASA customer? And then all sins are washed away?

And yeah, you may have been WAY off topic and talking about things not related specifically to the SLS cost overruns, but it is all related. Because as long as the SLS is justified as being required for the Artemis program, then massive cost overruns will continue to be ignored.

When do rational people get a voice in all of this? When will Congress do their job and ask NASA to reassess their use of the SLS due to the enormous cost and likelihood of lower cost alternatives?

THAT is the topic being debated here.

My comment was in the context of what VSECOTSPE said about Boeing and Antares.

Yes, and the Starliner, Cygnus, and Orbital Reef programs are NOT the topic here, the RS-25 and boosters are. There are other threads for those programs.

Do you have anything to say about the SLS program RS-25 or boosters cost issues the OIG uncovered?

[yg1968]

Only one company has to succeed in finding non-NASA clients for the program to be successful.

So for the RS-25 and booster overruns to be looked at as good investments, and not corporate pork, all we need is for SpaceX to sign up a non-NASA customer? And then all sins are washed away?

And yeah, you may have been WAY off topic and talking about things not related specifically to the SLS cost overruns, but it is all related. Because as long as the SLS is justified as being required for the Artemis program, then massive cost overruns will continue to be ignored.

When do rational people get a voice in all of this? When will Congress do their job and ask NASA to reassess their use of the SLS due to the enormous cost and likelihood of lower cost alternatives?

THAT is the topic being debated here.

My comment was in the context of what VSECOTSPE said about Boeing and Antares.

Yes, and the Starliner, Cygnus, and Orbital Reef programs are NOT the topic here, the RS-25 and boosters are. There are other threads for those programs.

Do you have anything to say about the SLS program RS-25 or boosters cost issues the OIG uncovered?

You and VSECOTSPE brought up the discussion that Artemis as a whole should be cancelled and my point was that there is a lot to like in the Artemis program even if you don't like SLS and Orion. That's how we got into this discussion.