Creating capability foundations for NASA’s exploration roadmap

[Chris Bergin]

I am interested in Tim's source; it sounds more confident than my own knowledge warrants.  Maybe I missed something somewhere...

He is a SLS manager. That trumps any spacesite.com link.

[93143]

IOW he is a source.  Sounds good to me...

[CNYMike]

...what were the cost assumptions that were used?  Did they assume that NASA's current budget profile would stay the same, or possibly change over time?  ....

The UTexas web site you've pointed to in the past also has a status report on SLS; the audio presentation part of it talks about those questions.

Would you like to provide a short summary so that everyone doesn't have to go listen to it themselves?

I'll do better: I'll provide links.  Here is the link to the presentation's PDF, and here is the audio file.  You're welcome.

[CNYMike]

The thinking behind SLS and Orion may be to get the bookends done -- the rocket that gets you up and the capsule that gets you back -- and fill in the blanks later...because there's no other way to do it.

Who do you think did that "thinking"?  ...

The people working on the program as they deal with the hand they've been dealt.

The good news is the idea we're going BEO seems to be stuck in public discourse now, but things are still jammed up.

Maybe going BEO is stuck in the public discourse, but "WHEN" is not .....

SLS debuts in 2017; the first manned flight in 2021.  President Obama through out dates for asteroid and Mars missions, and it cam up in the authorization bills last year.  The dates are there.

[Coastal Ron]

IOW he is a source.  Sounds good to me...

Let's be careful when we talk about "cost" for a government program.  For instance, the quote you reference from the Space.com article is:

""We've estimated somewhere around the $500 million number is what an average cost per flight is," SLS deputy project manager Jody Singer, of NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Ala., said..."

Likely she is talking about the recurring material costs, like buying the SRM's, RS-25's, Core Stage, Upper Stage, etc.  As a point of reference, the last contract for the Shuttle External Tank valued the ET at $173m each, and that was in volume production ($2.94B for 17ea).  Shuttle SRM's cost $68.6M/set, again in volume production ($2.4B for 35 sets).  So for the Shuttle, in volume production and mature designs, the recurring material cost for just the ET and SRM's was $242M per flight.  And the SLS is supposed to cost just $500M?

Her assumptions would also be based on a certain flight rate, but that flight rate is not revealed in the article.  Could have been assuming a flight rate of two flights a year, or one every other year.  We don't know.

Lastly, Design Development Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) is likely not figured into the number Singer quoted, but can't be ignored.  Whatever that number is, $20B, $30B, $10B - it has to averaged into the overall cost to use the SLS.

For instance, what if I told you that I could lower the launch cost of a 200mt HLV down to $100M?  Sure it would cost $1 Trillion to do it, but hey, $100M PER LAUNCH!!  What a bargain, right?  Except that $1 Trillion would represent lost opportunity cost, which is what has to be taken into account with the SLS DDT&E too.  Whatever that ends up being.

[Coastal Ron]

The thinking behind SLS and Orion may be to get the bookends done -- the rocket that gets you up and the capsule that gets you back -- and fill in the blanks later...because there's no other way to do it.

Who do you think did that "thinking"?  ...

The people working on the program as they deal with the hand they've been dealt.

No, the people working on the program didn't decide to commit public funds to build the SLS and MPCV.  Only the people that approved the building of the SLS can claim to have "thinking behind SLS and Orion".  This isn't communism where the workers run the companies...

The good news is the idea we're going BEO seems to be stuck in public discourse now, but things are still jammed up.

Maybe going BEO is stuck in the public discourse, but "WHEN" is not .....

SLS debuts in 2017; the first manned flight in 2021.  President Obama through out dates for asteroid and Mars missions, and it cam up in the authorization bills last year.  The dates are there.

The 2017 and 2021 flights are test flights, not operational ones.  The article we are discussing is talking about the attempt by NASA to "refine a capability-driven approach to its exploration aspirations."

Those that would authorize the funding of such exploration aspirations - our politicians - have not said what they want NASA to do, nor when they want NASA to do it.  Not yet at least.  Maybe that will change soon, maybe not.

[93143]

Likely he is talking about the recurring material costs, like buying the SRM's, RS-25's, Core Stage, Upper Stage, etc.  As a point of reference, the last contract for the Shuttle External Tank valued the ET at $173m each, and that was in volume production ($2.94B for 17ea).  Shuttle SRM's cost $68.6M/set, again in volume production ($2.4B for 35 sets).  So for the Shuttle, in volume production and mature designs, the recurring material cost for just the ET and SRM's was $242M per flight.  And the SLS is supposed to cost just $500M?

That cost for the ET seems wrong.  (Yes, I've seen it before.)  Based on an older number from 1995, inflating with NASA New Start, it looks like about $100M in modern dollars is more likely, perhaps a bit less before STS-107 and a bit more afterwards.

The contract modification announcement was at the end of 2007.  "The contract calls for the delivery of 17 external tanks to NASA."  Notice how the number of tanks mentioned corresponds nicely to the number of remaining STS missions, plus a couple of spares?  Yet the contract was signed in 2000.  I think the total contract amount was for more than 17 tanks; it's just that a lot of them had already flown...

And yes, plainly SLS was "supposed to cost just $500M" from the vantage point of late 2012, because NASA said it was (it was an early target; it may have changed, and if not it may yet do so).  Volume production isn't all it's cracked up to be if it uses '70s-vintage manufacturing processes and is being compared to a modern heavily automated right-sized manufacturing operation using a simpler assembly design.

Also, that's not a "material" cost, if I understand you correctly.  It's a total cost for those operations, spread over a certain number of flight units.  STS marginal costs were roughly $100M per flight in modern dollars; it was a very infrastructure-heavy operation and a lot of the fancy stuff was reused.

His assumptions would also be based on a certain flight rate, but that flight rate is not revealed in the article.  Could have been assuming a flight rate of two flights a year, or one every other year.  We don't know.

"NASA is eyeing $500 million as a target right now for the Space Launch System (SLS) when it begins making roughly one flight per year"

Now, that may be a journalist interpolating, and as I said I wouldn't be surprised if the target is for two flights per year.  But it still looks like you weren't paying attention.

Also, Jody Singer is a she.

Lastly, Design Development Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) is likely not figured into the number Singer quoted, but can't be ignored.  Whatever that number is, $20B, $30B, $10B - it has to averaged into the overall cost to use the SLS.

That idea smacks of double-counting.  We already know SLS costs several billion dollars to develop.  If we're talking about the ability to actually use the developed system given a certain annual budget, lumping in amortized development cost occludes the relevant information.

It also requires one to guess how long the operational program will run, which has resulted in some truly ridiculous numbers in the past, and which somehow managed to trip up at least one person who was trying to calculate the marginal cost per flight...

No, development and operations costs should be kept separate, especially for an open-ended program like SLS.

lost opportunity cost

I would say it is the other way around.  A funded mandate from the government to build an exploration-class rocket is an opportunity that it would be risky and perhaps foolish to fight against at this point, because just slotting in an arbitrary replacement program with the same budget and no lost time or personnel (or morale) is not how this stuff works.

Historically, NASA managed to screw up both Bushes' exploration initiatives by getting greedy.  But the current budget squeeze, combined with the sting of the recent CxP cancellation, seems to have resulted in NASA genuinely attempting to minimize cost - not just development, but operations cost.  I recently watched a PR video about the booster process improvements at ATK, and at one point they mentioned that partway through their "value stream mapping" exercise, the workers started to believe the higher-ups were serious this time and engaged in the process...  If this attitude is successful, it could carry over to other things NASA does, such as the rest of the exploration architecture.  Considering all this, and the fact that SLS is almost unique among large NASA projects in being ahead of schedule and under budget, I don't think NASA really needs the rug pulled out from under it yet again at this point.

Entitlement spending is what's crowding out everything else.  If it isn't brought under control, it won't matter what strategy NASA pursues.  If it is, well, the interested parties seem to have realized that NASA is underfunded, and without concerted opposition from deficit hawks, compounded with the current climate of distrust between Congress and the President, they could ameliorate this little issue.  In such a scenario a relatively inexpensive HLV could be a great asset.

...

Then there's the question of whether the alternatives really are all that.  According to my calculations, if you ignore sunk costs, SLS development to Block 1B is currently about a wash with EELV Phase 1 plus depots, and could be less expensive to operate.  SpaceX is of course a disruptive element, but even now it still hasn't proved itself sufficiently to justify hanging an exploration program on it.

[Oli]

Then there's the question of whether the alternatives really are all that.  According to my calculations, if you ignore sunk costs, SLS development to Block 1B is currently about a wash with EELV Phase 1 plus depots, and could be less expensive to operate.  SpaceX is of course a disruptive element, but even now it still hasn't proved itself sufficiently to justify hanging an exploration program on it.

Its only a matter of time until SLS makes economic sense, but I'm not quite ready to switch sides yet

[Coastal Ron]

Likely he is talking about the recurring material costs, like buying the SRM's, RS-25's, Core Stage, Upper Stage, etc.  As a point of reference, the last contract for the Shuttle External Tank valued the ET at $173m each, and that was in volume production ($2.94B for 17ea).  Shuttle SRM's cost $68.6M/set, again in volume production ($2.4B for 35 sets).  So for the Shuttle, in volume production and mature designs, the recurring material cost for just the ET and SRM's was $242M per flight.  And the SLS is supposed to cost just $500M?

That cost for the ET seems wrong.  (Yes, I've seen it before.)  Based on an older number from 1995, inflating with NASA New Start, it looks like about $100M in modern dollars is more likely, perhaps a bit less before STS-107 and a bit more afterwards.

The contract modification announcement was at the end of 2007.  "The contract calls for the delivery of 17 external tanks to NASA."  Notice how the number of tanks mentioned corresponds nicely to the number of remaining STS missions, plus a couple of spares?  Yet the contract was signed in 2000.  I think the total contract amount was for more than 17 tanks; it's just that a lot of them had already flown...

Look, this was contract information that NASA stated.  The contract was initially awarded in 2000, modified in 2007, and covered the last 17 External Tanks.  $2.94B for 17 tanks equals $172.9M.  Where in the world are you getting $100M?

As to why they awarded the contract in 2000, every heard of lead time?  There is a heck of a lot of aluminum that has to be bought for each External Tank, and Lockheed Martin was not going to be committing to that much aluminum - IN ADVANCE - on their own.  We're talking government contractors here, they don't do anything without getting paid.

Volume production isn't all it's cracked up to be if it uses '70s-vintage manufacturing processes and is being compared to a modern heavily automated right-sized manufacturing operation using a simpler assembly design.

Having been in manufacturing for the bulk of my career, I'm quite aware of what makes a difference and what doesn't.  Yes, modern machinery can do wonders to lowering production costs, but volume truly is everything.

Why?  Because if you're only building one unit per year, that one unit has to absorb the full overhead cost of it's part of the factory.  It doesn't matter what the age of the machinery is inside the factory, or how "efficient" it is.  If anything an argument can be made NOT to upgrade machinery when you don't have enough volume to make a significant cost difference (you would upgrade for quality of course).

Don't get distracted by how shiny the machines are.

Also, that's not a "material" cost, if I understand you correctly.  It's a total cost for those operations, spread over a certain number of flight units.  STS marginal costs were roughly $100M per flight in modern dollars; it was a very infrastructure-heavy operation and a lot of the fancy stuff was reused.

I provided the contract information that NASA announced for the ET and SRM's.  Those two alone cost $242M a flight, so I have no idea where you are pulling that $100M figure from.

Another fact I can add though is the yearly cost of United Space Alliance, which ran the Shuttle program for NASA.  USA was a joint venture of - wait for it - Boeing and Lockheed Martin (where have we heard those two before?).

Support contracts get lots of modifications, and sometimes can be hard to isolate enough for a specific period of time.  Luckily we have one snapshot from 1996 when USA was formed, and that initial contract for Space Shuttle operations was awarded for $7B over a 6-year period.  That would equal $1.17B/year, or $97.2M/month, regardless if the Shuttle flew that month or not.

So just from a support standpoint, the Shuttle program cost nearly $100M/month to run, regardless if it flew.  Now the SLS won't have the same support needs (nothing to refurbish), but it will have recurring support costs - regardless how often it flies.

[CNYMike]

The thinking behind SLS and Orion may be to get the bookends done -- the rocket that gets you up and the capsule that gets you back -- and fill in the blanks later...because there's no other way to do it.

Who do you think did that "thinking"?  ...

The people working on the program as they deal with the hand they've been dealt.

No, the people working on the program didn't decide to commit public funds to build the SLS and MPCV. 
...

But they are designing it.  Who do you think is? 

..... Those that would authorize the funding of such exploration aspirations - our politicians - have not said what they want NASA to do, nor when they want NASA to do it.  Not yet at least.  Maybe that will change soon, maybe not.

In 2011, President Obama gave dates for a mission to an asteroid and a landing on Mars.  Last year, a Democratic member of Congress floated an authorization bill calling for a mission to Mars in 2030.  There's still skepticism of the ARM but Congress has backed off language forbidding it.  NASA is assuming it will happen; they've done work on the spacewalks in the neutral buoyancy tank.

Those who would authorize the funding have not been quiet on the subject.

[James (Lockheed)]

Don't get distracted by how shiny the machines are.

And I would say people should not get distracted by people who used convoluted figures and unrealistic comparisons to previous hardware to try and make a point about a vehicle they obsessively hate. You seem to be using raw material comparisons for contract costs. That was your first mistake.

I understand you don't work in the industry, but I would at least expect you to come up with a better argument than "Shuttle cost this much, so SLS will cost even more!!"

Wrong.

[muomega0]

Don't get distracted by how shiny the machines are.

And I would say people should not get distracted by people who used convoluted figures and unrealistic comparisons to previous hardware to try and make a point about a vehicle they obsessively hate. You seem to be using raw material comparisons for contract costs. That was your first mistake.

I understand you don't work in the industry, but I would at least expect you to come up with a better argument than "Shuttle cost this much, so SLS will cost even more!!"

Wrong.

As of today NASA has not officially released its cost estimates for one, two or three launches per year, nor for one launch every 18 months, 2 years, 3 years, etc.   Why is that? 

The answer is quite simple.   The numbers are showstoppers, that is why Tim S only said production is 2 per year and said nothing on costs.  One major driver is recovery or not of sunk costs.  The second is to ignore the total costs to the country by retaining 1.5B+ cross agency support for decades.  Note that cross agency support has grown from 200M to 3.5B over the last decade as SLS tries to hide its fixed costs. 

No one will testify to Congress because of the truth in disclosure and the criminal percussions.   It is time for someone to file a FOIA however

The NASA Joint Cost Schedule Paradox- A History of Denial pg 35-36   Also included:  6.5B spent on Constellation "Development" from 2005 to 2009.  1.5B until 2013  now 1.9B in 2014.  SLS will not be complete in 2017 either, perhaps only 110mT.

To "MAY" reach "500M" per flight, at 300M recurring and 1.5B fixed, no sunk, it takes SIX flights/year.  Like ESAS, this values assumes a 2.1% productivity gain for five years or so to reach the value.

To reach a lower value of "ops and launch" costs, no development or recovery, they also forget to mention the freebies laying around, and all the new developments still required for the 178mT beast.   Apples and oranges....

At the end of the day, NASA has refused to provide cost estimates and caps for SLS to the public with confidence levels similar to JWST(8B JWST development cap, Oct 2018, 66% JCL)--Congress makes up its own rules.

Recall that to obtain realistic cost estimates requires

organizational frankness and individual honesty at every level of the budgeting process, 2) employing the use of sophisticated and intelligent assessment tools that resulting estimate projections which history will validate as intuitive, timely, and accurate.

It is found with overwhelming statistical significance that cost underestimation and overrun cannot be explained by error and seems to be best explained by strategic misrepresentation, namely lying, with a view to getting projects started.

Oh the games people play....

[darkbluenine]

You've seen them too.  In fact I just posted one of them.

Great!  Is Gerst's desired 2-3/yr. (or 1/yr.) launch rate or Tim S's 2/yr. achievable launch rate embodied in a requirement or other program documentation?

It's a near-term requirement for IOC, not a long-term program goal.

From STS to EELV to Falcon to date to you name it, I know of no LV that has met/exceeded (or even come close to) its launch rate goals.  So I'm fundamentally skeptical about long-term launch rate goals for SLS (or any other LV).

I'm even more skeptical if those goals are not part of the project's requirements.

They were going for the old version of Block 2, which was in continuous development over the entire analysis window in those scenarios.

Block II reached the end of development in some, but not all, of those scenarios.  There was no drop off in costs as the last of the project transitioned to operations.

That document also seems to get its cost estimates directly from Shuttle and CxP numbers, which are already known to be too high and may turn out to be much too high.

There are many cost reduction activities ongoing, but it remains to be seen whether they translate into budget savings given how the project's hands were tied in the 2010 NAA.  Hopefully we'll be pleasantly surprised.

[Coastal Ron]

Don't get distracted by how shiny the machines are.

And I would say people should not get distracted by people who used convoluted figures and unrealistic comparisons to previous hardware...

Nothing convoluted about real costs.  Unless you don't understand them...   

...to try and make a point about a vehicle they obsessively hate.

It's true, I hate waste.  And since I don't think there is an established need for a government-owned, government-run HLV, I see the SLS as waste.  Luckily I'm not alone.

You seem to be using raw material comparisons for contract costs. That was your first mistake.

How in any way do you get the idea that I was talking about raw material costs when I referenced the end-item contract pricing?

I understand you don't work in the industry...

I've primarily worked for government contractors during my career.  I understand the RFP process, and the pricing process post award.  And I know many of the "tricks" government contractors use to make money - legally - from government contracts.

Do you work "in the industry"?  Or are you just frustrated because what I am showing does not look good for the SLS program?

...but I would at least expect you to come up with a better argument than "Shuttle cost this much, so SLS will cost even more!!"

There were 135 Shuttle flights, so the manufacturing process was very well understood, so of course it is a good basis of reference.  Plus the SLS is based on Shuttle technology, but upsized, so there too there is a lot of commonality.

The Shuttle used two SRM's, and the SLS is using two SRM's that are the same diameter, just longer.

The Shuttle used an External Tank, and the SLS is using the same diameter body for it's 1st stage.

The Shuttle used three reusable RS-25 engines, and the SLS is using four disposable RS-25 engines.

A lot that is common.  And since the SLS masses far more than the Shuttle disposable parts did, of course it will cost more, especially when the production rate is likely to be far less.

Wrong.

Well quite honestly no one knows, do they?  Maybe I am, but maybe not, since NASA has not revealed any pricing information yet.

However the reason I talk about cost is because how it affects our ability to do any roadmap, including the ones that NASA is putting together.  If the transportation system that every mission has to rely upon is unaffordable to start, then no amount of planning will ever result in an affordable mission.  And my supposition is that without a big increase in NASA's budget, it cannot afford to both build SLS payloads and missions for the SLS, AND use the SLS at the same time.  This is really a question about money, not destinations, as we can go anywhere we want - given enough money.  We've always had that ability, yet we haven't left LEO in 40 years... because of money.

I've raised the issue, provided relevant facts, and I'll leave it there for now unless there are any other facts added.

[Oli]

The second is to ignore the total costs to the country by retaining 1.5B+ cross agency support for decades.

In the end you have to prove that alternatives are cheaper in terms of annual recurrent costs. Maintaining a propellant depot infrastructure in space plus the capability to fill depots and launch/dock hardware in a reasonable time when needed is unlikely to get cheaper. Maybe it is, but it would require an analysis of yours that proves otherwise (not one of the SpaceX-fantasy kind).

[Coastal Ron]

Also, Jody Singer is a she.

Good catch.  I have corrected my post. Thanks.

Lastly, Design Development Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) is likely not figured into the number Singer quoted, but can't be ignored.  Whatever that number is, $20B, $30B, $10B - it has to averaged into the overall cost to use the SLS.

That idea smacks of double-counting.

No.  But it does force you to understand how much each SLS flight really costs versus if we would have used commercial launchers.  For instance, if after the 2021 SLS & MPCV test flight, if the SLS and MPCV are only flown one time operationally, the cost of that operational flight would be the procurement cost of all of the components, and the entire DDT&E to get to that point.  If the SLS were to fly 100 times, then the DDT&E would be allocated across those 100 flights.

You can't ignore $Billions in spending and pretend that DDT&E is "Free".

We already know SLS costs several billion dollars to develop.  If we're talking about the ability to actually use the developed system given a certain annual budget, lumping in amortized development cost occludes the relevant information.

The SLS will cost several "tens" of billions to develop.  And again, you can't ignore all the money that it took to develop it.

It also requires one to guess how long the operational program will run...

Yes.  So?  Businesses do that all the time when they introduce a new product to the market.  How else can you understand what the alternatives are?

...which has resulted in some truly ridiculous numbers in the past, and which somehow managed to trip up at least one person who was trying to calculate the marginal cost per flight...

Yes, many people thought the Shuttle was far cheaper to operate than it actually was.  It wasn't until Roger Pielke Jr., a political scientist at the University of Colorado, Boulder, did a series of cost studies that everyone finally understood how truly expensive the Shuttle really was.  Even NASA agrees with his cost figures now.  If only we would have understood that decades ago, we might have decided to replace the Shuttle with something less expensive.

No, development and operations costs should be kept separate, especially for an open-ended program like SLS.

Who said it's "open-ended"?  No program is open-ended, and programs that are continued have to be evaluated against other alternatives.  How else do you know that you should continue them?

For instance, if the SLS DDT&E ends up being $20B, an alternative use would have been to spend $10B to buy 22 Delta IV Heavy flights ($450M ea) and $10B to buy 74 Falcon Heavy flights.  That would have given NASA the ability to put 4,418mt of mass to LEO, or the equivalent of 10 ISS.  That would be compared to 70mt the SLS program would be able to put to LEO using the same amount of money.

lost opportunity cost

I would say it is the other way around.

I like to use established definitions in discussions and debates so that everyone has a common context.  If you want to make up your own word to describe something, fine, but the definition of "Opportunity Cost" is already established.

A funded mandate from the government to build an exploration-class rocket is an opportunity that it would be risky and perhaps foolish to fight against at this point, because just slotting in an arbitrary replacement program with the same budget and no lost time or personnel (or morale) is not how this stuff works.

I've been around long enough to know that no government program is immune from cancellation.  And to be clear, the only thing that is funded on the SLS program is just part of the development program - the funding law does not go out far enough yet to cover making the SLS or the MPCV operational.

And remember that there are no funded programs that must use the SLS, nor debate or discussion within Congress about creating them.  In fact the House wants to outlaw the only proffered use the SLS (i.e. the ARM).

I recently watched a PR video about the booster process improvements at ATK...

Uh huh...

Considering all this, and the fact that SLS is almost unique among large NASA projects in being ahead of schedule and under budget...

Not sure how you think they are ahead of schedule when they are missing their Congressionally mandated operational date by years.  As to budget, considering that NASA has never released any budget goals, how can you say they are under budget?  Development isn't even done, so it's hard to declare victory when test dates are being pushed out, vehicles are still over-weight, and NASA has yet to acknowledge how much things cost.

I don't think NASA really needs the rug pulled out from under it yet again at this point.

This is not about "NASA".  This about U.S. Taxpayers.  Does the U.S. Taxpayer get enough "value" from the SLS and MPCV effort to merit the cost, and are there alternatives that were ignored or overlooked that would be better even after the amount of progress that has been done?

Entitlement spending is what's crowding out everything else.

Of please.  Congress can spend whatever it wants on NASA - there are no set limits.  There is only a lack of interest.

[Coastal Ron]

The second is to ignore the total costs to the country by retaining 1.5B+ cross agency support for decades.

In the end you have to prove that alternatives are cheaper in terms of annual recurrent costs. Maintaining a propellant depot infrastructure in space plus the capability to fill depots and launch/dock hardware in a reasonable time when needed is unlikely to get cheaper. Maybe it is, but it would require an analysis of yours that proves otherwise (not one of the SpaceX-fantasy kind).

We're not going anywhere in space without propellant depots.  The only question is how are we going to replenish them?  From that standpoint it pretty much boils down to $/lb, and for various reasons it won't be NASA replenishing depots, but the private sector.

Regarding propellant depots, look on the Future In-Space Operations (FISO) Working Group archive for a study called "Evolved Human Space Exploration Architectures Using Commercial Launch and Propellant Depots".  There is no question that commercial launch systems are the better value when paired with propellant depots.

[Khadgars]

What an excellent article, thank you writing it up I quite enjoyed the material. 

What I find interesting is that one of the main arguments against SLS has been lack of destinations.  Though we don't have any exact ones as of yet, its quite clear NASA has a robust road map.  Very encouraging despite the heavy headwinds it still faces.

To Chris/Marshall or anyone else in the know, any idea when we'll get more juicy details in regards to tactical and or strategic DRM's?

[Far Reach]

Great article, as are all the articles here.

However, after reading the thread and coming across the gang of three carrying pitch forks, with massive posts and usually the same posts as posted before, I'm not sure if SLS should phone the police and say she's got some stalkers.

Seriously guys, if you're posting more than 10,000 words on thread that's only a few days old, you need to turn off the computer, take the kids to the park and get some fresh air. Obsession isn't healthy.

[93143]

Likely he is talking about the recurring material costs, like buying the SRM's, RS-25's, Core Stage, Upper Stage, etc.  As a point of reference, the last contract for the Shuttle External Tank valued the ET at $173m each, and that was in volume production ($2.94B for 17ea).  Shuttle SRM's cost $68.6M/set, again in volume production ($2.4B for 35 sets).  So for the Shuttle, in volume production and mature designs, the recurring material cost for just the ET and SRM's was $242M per flight.  And the SLS is supposed to cost just $500M?

That cost for the ET seems wrong.  (Yes, I've seen it before.)  Based on an older number from 1995, inflating with NASA New Start, it looks like about $100M in modern dollars is more likely, perhaps a bit less before STS-107 and a bit more afterwards.

The contract modification announcement was at the end of 2007.  "The contract calls for the delivery of 17 external tanks to NASA."  Notice how the number of tanks mentioned corresponds nicely to the number of remaining STS missions, plus a couple of spares?  Yet the contract was signed in 2000.  I think the total contract amount was for more than 17 tanks; it's just that a lot of them had already flown...

Look, this was contract information that NASA stated.  The contract was initially awarded in 2000, modified in 2007, and covered the last 17 External Tanks.  $2.94B for 17 tanks equals $172.9M.

You mean this, I assume:

http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2007/dec/HQ_C07065_Shuttle_ET.html

Technically, it doesn't say what you did above.  The wording is ambiguous, the coincidence with the number of remaining flights is suggestive, and in the presence of countervailing evidence the statement "the contract calls for the delivery of 17 external tanks to NASA" should not be taken to mean what you claim it does, especially since it was almost certainly filtered through at least one PR person before appearing on the website.

Where in the world are you getting $100M?

GAO report from 1993 (Table 1)
NASA New Start Inflation Index

Supposedly the switch to the SLWT added about $5M per tank...

As to why they awarded the contract in 2000, every heard of lead time?  There is a heck of a lot of aluminum that has to be bought for each External Tank, and Lockheed Martin was not going to be committing to that much aluminum - IN ADVANCE - on their own.  We're talking government contractors here, they don't do anything without getting paid.

Yes, there were a couple years lead time on ETs.  But seven?  That doesn't seem quite obvious enough to justify the attitude you're showing.

Volume production isn't all it's cracked up to be if it uses '70s-vintage manufacturing processes and is being compared to a modern heavily automated right-sized manufacturing operation using a simpler assembly design.

Having been in manufacturing for the bulk of my career, I'm quite aware of what makes a difference and what doesn't.  Yes, modern machinery can do wonders to lowering production costs, but volume truly is everything.

Why?  Because if you're only building one unit per year, that one unit has to absorb the full overhead cost of it's part of the factory.  It doesn't matter what the age of the machinery is inside the factory, or how "efficient" it is.  If anything an argument can be made NOT to upgrade machinery when you don't have enough volume to make a significant cost difference (you would upgrade for quality of course).

Hence the "right-sizing".  The new operation at MAF is much leaner than it was, even before upgrades, because it's not being set up for the same maximum production rate.  Shuttle-era MAF could do something like 12 tanks per year, though of course it never did.  For SLS it's apparently being set up to do two.  And the upgrades are specifically designed to keep costs low at a low production rate.

Currently I believe part of the building is leased out.  I wonder if that will remain the case?

Also, that's not a "material" cost, if I understand you correctly.  It's a total cost for those operations, spread over a certain number of flight units.  STS marginal costs were roughly $100M per flight in modern dollars; it was a very infrastructure-heavy operation and a lot of the fancy stuff was reused.

I provided the contract information that NASA announced for the ET and SRM's.  Those two alone cost $242M a flight, so I have no idea where you are pulling that $100M figure from.

See above.  That GAO report mentions a $44M marginal cost, which inflates up to about $80M.

Surely someone with a manufacturing background knows what a marginal cost is.  And that if you're the sole buyer of a widget, the entire fixed cost of the widget factory gets rolled into the unit price...

Another fact I can add though is the yearly cost of United Space Alliance, which ran the Shuttle program for NASA.  USA was a joint venture of - wait for it - Boeing and Lockheed Martin (where have we heard those two before?).

Support contracts get lots of modifications, and sometimes can be hard to isolate enough for a specific period of time.  Luckily we have one snapshot from 1996 when USA was formed, and that initial contract for Space Shuttle operations was awarded for $7B over a 6-year period.  That would equal $1.17B/year, or $97.2M/month, regardless if the Shuttle flew that month or not.

So just from a support standpoint, the Shuttle program cost nearly $100M/month to run, regardless if it flew.  Now the SLS won't have the same support needs (nothing to refurbish), but it will have recurring support costs - regardless how often it flies.

If you have no idea how much of that cost transfers to SLS (and you don't), why mention it?

Here, have a Shuttle program cost breakdown:

http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=32927.msg1103637#msg1103637

These are lower than Pielke's numbers, because Pielke included stuff that was lumped in with Shuttle's budget prior to 2009 but not subsequently.  He also included all of SFS...