Creating capability foundations for NASA’s exploration roadmap

[Chris Bergin]

Another article from our new writer Marshall Murphy - very promising young writer who we've hit the jackpot again per our great writer pool.

http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2014/03/creating-capability-foundations-nasas-exploration-roadmap/

Very much a state of play overview via a L2 document, which will branch out into a few more articles by myself on the Upper Stage and Fairing options over the coming period.

Timing is just right as we'll have a lot of people newly introduced into SLS/Orion per the Live in Space shows. This gets them to see what it's about and keeps the regulars happy with the overview of current status, etc.

[Peter NASA]

I like this writer. Not a breaking news item, more a feature, but much more snap to it than what we churn out on NASA.gov.

[vulture4]

I agree the article is a good summary of NASA's current position. As such, it touches on numerous interesting points that might be discussed. i.e.:

"For ascent on EM-2, ESD documentation states that the probability of LOC is 1 in 1400 for Orion and 1 in 550 for SLS. Orion’s LOC threshold for Earth entry, descent and landing is 1 in 650"

Having been on the dirty end of some similar estimates I would like to point out that they are created by arbitrarily listing anticipated failure modes and fault trees, and (also arbitrarily) assigning probabilities to each potential failure. These numbers are precise to three decimal places but seldom accurate to within an order of magnitude. Most launch and entry failures are deterministic. Obviously we would not launch if we knew a failure was going to occur. Consequently such incidents are due to unanticipated failure modes. As a result the probabilities of the failures that actually cause losses are not included in the PRA at all or vastly inaccurate.

The only accurate estimator of LV reliability is its track record. Ironically the NASA probabalistc risk assessment (PRA) assumes failure rate will remain constant. Historically the only consistent feature of LV reliability is that it starts low and gets better as experience is gained. Meanwhile in the EELV competition we have ULA and SpaceX arguing about reliability by discussing only track record; neither of them is even suggesting that a NASA-type PRA would have any bearing on the question. Nor are they suggesting that a human being should ever be launched on a rocket that doesn't have at least a dozen missions under its belt with no unresolved anomalies.

[Chris Bergin]

A fair point and a hangover from CxP I would guess. Ares I had a hilarious LOV probability ratio.

[Coastal Ron]

A good article, with lots of things to talk about, starting with the lead paragraph:

"NASA managers have created new mandates for future exploration systems, as the Agency continues to refine a capability-driven approach to its exploration aspirations."

A capability-driven approach.  Not a budget-driven approach.

Mandates and plans are all good, but if they are disconnected from fiscal realities they are no more than expensive theoretical exercises.

For instance, what were the cost assumptions that were used?  Did they assume that NASA's current budget profile would stay the same, or possibly change over time?  Or maybe no costs assumptions were implied to start, but certainly they should be able to estimate what the budgetary needs would be for each of the capabilities.

Because if we're not open and honest about the costs of these proposed plans, how is anyone supposed to evaluate them?  Anyone can dream up a plan that gets us to the Moon or Mars, but can anyone outline a plan that gets us there within the fiscal constraints NASA has?

[Ben and Paul]

Very good article again on this site.

I really like the way NASA is using allocated budget, less than Shuttle and creating a roadmap that is more exciting than Shuttle (the missions, not the Shuttle itself, as Shuttle was amazing).

I suppose there will always be a few negative people, but I can imagine the same people would be saying the same thing if NASA had 100 billion a year and planned to be on Mars in five years.

For 0.4 cents of my tax dollar, I'm hugely impressed.

[butters]

Fantastic. Now if they could only identity a mission which we are capable of doing with SLS and Orion alone. A capability-based assessment of SLS and Orion indicates a lack of any suitable destinations. We can do Apollo 8. That's our capability level.

Unless I'm missing the part where we fund an L2 station or a lunar lander, it doesn't seem like we are any closer to expanding our capabilities than we were before, unless the point of this is to call attention to our lack of capability.

[mike robel]

NASA's use of Tactical and Strategic as reported in the article troubles me.  People have a hard enough time with the concept of tactical and strategic weapon systems.  A B-52 is considered a Strategic Weapon System, but it is used tactically in support of ground troops in Afghanistan.  An Airborne Brigade is a tactical system, but if you use it to seize an airfield, then it a strategic use of a tactical system.

If they wanted to be complete on this quasi-military terminology, then they could have used Strategic, Operational, and Strategic, but that is even more confusing.

Sooo.   Near Term, Mid Term, and Far Term Missions would have been better terminology.

I really wish NASA would use plain language.  Up mass = cargo delivery  Down Mass = cargo return and so on.  They potentially, in my opinion, alienate much of the public with their techno-babble.

[Ben the Space Brit]

A capability-driven approach.  Not a budget-driven approach.

It's not a bad thing. Optimistically, a realistic-enough capability plan may persuade those holding the purse strings that it is worth the cost to bring about. The trick is to find the balance point between ambition, cost and capability that satisfies the politicians.

[darkbluenine]

A very good but depressing article in terms of flight safety, sustainability, and overall direction:

The capability-driven framework requires that NASA select celestial destinations based on future space and ground systems’ capabilities rather than designing space and ground systems’ capabilities based on destinations.

Cart before the horse and a hammer in search of a nail.

Tactical DRMs, which include lunar flybys and lunar orbit missions, use only the earliest variants of NASA’s planned systems... According to ESD documentation, GSDO must maintain a launch rate of one launch every two years for Tactical-level missions.

Gerst told ASAP that SLS must launch every year for flight safety.  Unless Gerst is wrong, a requirement of one launch every two years does not support a safe system.  The NAC Chair has also hit on this issue in congressional testimony.

Spreading this launch rate over an annual program runout cost of ~$1.5B, the launch cost alone of each Tactical Mission will be ~$3B.  Add in an MPCV, ground support, and mission-specific costs, and total cost for each Tactical Mission will be pushing/exceeding $5B.  Just for one 1960s-era mission around the Moon.  It's hard to see that being sustainable for more than a mission or two.
 

Strategic DRMs, such as missions to near-Earth asteroids (NEAs), use upgraded systems along with conceptual, currently undeveloped systems... Strategic-level missions must maintain a launch rate of one to three launches per year.

Despite requiring an eventual three SLS launches per year, ESD documentation includes a caveat to the launch rate’s upper limit, stating, “3 launches per year is not considered to be a sustainable rate and is not to be construed as a production capability. During these periods, nominal flight activity will be suspended to enable this surge capability. Storage of assets may be required for a 3 launch DRM.”

A half-decade or so between launch campaigns is an ever larger disconnect from what Gerst told ASAP that SLS needed in terms of launch rate to maintain safety.

And now we're looking at ~$9B just for the launch of a Strategic Mission.  Add in MPCV, ground support, some hab, and mission specific cost, and we're looking at something in the neighborhood of $15B.  Just for one mission to a NEO.  Again, it's hard to see that being sustainable.  Or even happening.  I can hear the next White House now: "$15B for a mission to a rock?!?!"

Finally, Architectural DRMs encompass NASA’s long-term goals, such as Mars surface missions, and use systems with the highest-planned upgrades...

Refinements to the evolution are continuing, not least with the Upper Stage – per additional L2 documentation – which will surround a series of planned upgrades, including a stretched first stage, advanced boosters, upgraded RS-25 engines, and an upgraded cryogenic propulsion stage (CPS) that is currently into long-term evaluations.

We're going to spend years and billions of dollars developing all these SLS upgrades before touching any manned Mars mission-specific hardware.  It's hard to see that ending well programmatically.

The Block 1, 1B and 2B will be the likely evolving family of HLVs, which will eventually use the Exploration Upper Stage (EUS), completely removing the J-2X from ever flying with SLS.

Another couple billion dollars down the drink for a piece of hardware that will never fly.

[Chris Bergin]

Gerst told ASAP that SLS must launch every year for flight safety.

That will be the plan. A future article, which will help better inform you.

Another couple billion dollars down the drink for a piece of hardware that will never fly.

That's just your negative opinion. As seen by the since deleted post, people here are finding it somewhat boring. Myself included. It's rather monotonous.

[darkbluenine]

That will be the plan. A future article, which will help better inform you.

If it's not in the requirements, it's not the plan.

That's just your negative opinion.

It's not an opinion.  It's a fact from the article posted on your site, which states that "the Exploration Upper Stage (EUS)" will be "completely removing the J-2X from ever flying with SLS."  If J-2X doesn't launch on SLS, there's nothing else for J-2X to launch on.  My and many other U.S. taxpayer dollars have been spent wastefully developing an engine that will never fly.

As seen by the since deleted post, people here are finding it somewhat boring. Myself included. It's rather monotonous.

It's your site, but requiring groupthink and Pollyanna attitudes in all posts kills sites more quickly than allowing for dissenting opinions.

[muomega0]

Laying the Groundwork:
The starting line for all of NASA’s current DRMs is GSDO, which includes the infrastructure needed to transport, assemble and launch SLS, Orion and other elements needed for exploration.

Single mission DRMs are the root of all NASA's problems when it comes to fitting Exploration within a budget.
Starting with SLS and Orion as elements needed for exploration is the issue with nothing fitting within the budget.

Gerst told ASAP that SLS must launch every year for flight safety.

That will be the plan. A future article, which will help better inform you.

Another couple billion dollars down the drink for a piece of hardware that will never fly.

That's just your negative opinion. As seen by the since deleted post, people here are finding it somewhat boring. Myself included. It's rather monotonous.

These are simply not opinions but FACTS.  Depending on your POV, they are either positive or negative.  

For every mission proposed to date, even with adequate flight rate, the alternatives to SLS/Orion are cheaper  with savings in the Bs to 10s of billions depending on the number of missions and timeframe.  Even a SLS flight rate of twice of year raises a number of issues. 

Here is a another example of monotonous"  "SLS and Orion are needed for exploration".

The best contract in the world is to receive 2.9B/year with no real milestones to meet.  I suppose to some this is quite the accomplishment.   

If you haven't notice by now, because of politics, NSF is a vehicle to provide Post-incident contingency planning per our HLV expert Mark S.

[Chris Bergin]

That will be the plan. A future article, which will help better inform you.

If it's not in the requirements, it's not the plan.

That's just your negative opinion.

It's not an opinion.  It's a fact from the article posted on your site, which states that "the Exploration Upper Stage (EUS)" will be "completely removing the J-2X from ever flying with SLS."  If J-2X doesn't launch on SLS, there's nothing else for J-2X to launch on.  My and many other U.S. taxpayer dollars have been spent wastefully developing an engine that will never fly.

As seen by the since deleted post, people here are finding it somewhat boring. Myself included. It's rather monotonous.

It's your site, but requiring groupthink and Pollyanna attitudes in all posts kills sites more quickly than allowing for dissenting opinions.

Right, the J-2X. Very good. You quoted an entire para with SLS vehicles listed, so thanks for clearing that up.

And I agree about the singular opinion, which is why some sites have about five members, all group hugging each other over how NASA sucks. Notably, even those people seem to get sick of it and end up on places like this, where they stand out more for rubbing against the grain, thought they have to work harder to stand out.

Same goes for a member with 200 posts saying nothing other than "woo hoo. SLS is great. We're absolutely going to Mars!" As it does for a member who has 200 posts of negativity. However, monotonous (nothing but) negativity is a bigger issue, because they have to work DAMN hard to say why they apparently know better than the likes of Gerst. Citing a selective line from a 2008 NTRS document - and then wrapping negative opinion around it - isn't going to pass the sniff test.

This site is the most balanced site you could dream to visit on this subject matter, because of its membership size, providing wide opinions, the good and the bad, the expert and the fan based. What is noticeable is some people are nowhere to be seen for the good news, yet you can bet they'll be around to latch on to anything negative. That's not objective, and that's heavily dilutes whatever that person has to say. That should, and will be, called out.

Now I don't have all day to make posts on here, so this conversation is over. Continue with the thread.

[M129K]

The best contract in the world is to receive 2.9B/year with no real milestones to meet. 

Except for... You know... Flying in december 2017. That's quite the milestone.

[muomega0]

The best contract in the world is to receive 2.9B/year with no real milestones to meet. 

Except for... You know... Flying in december 2017. That's quite the milestone.

Thank you for this post.

Despite requiring an eventual three SLS launches per year, ESD documentation includes a caveat to the launch rate’s upper limit, stating, “3 launches per year is not considered to be a sustainable rate and is not to be construed as a production capability.

 

What is the difference between a milestone and mission?
Further, does the milestone really enable future missions?

Facts:  Zero missions for the available budget by 2025, the big goose egg. 2017 will not have a crew rated upper stage, a heat shield to return from an asteroid, lightweight radiation shielding that meets the duration and risk requirements to Mars nor an asteroid, nor have any mission hardware that fits the mass and budget and violates the TRL 6 PDR requirement.  Even if 'it' is built, NASA cannot afford to operate 'it'.

In the Marketing of the moon:  Selling the Apollo program--The U.S. space program was determined to be markedly different from the Soviets — it would be an “open program” in which facts and data would flow freely between the agency and the public using an extensive public relations program  "It was a radical proposition: NASA, not the military, would release information and information would be released before, not after, a mission — an antithesis to the typical military strategy of confidentially. Tragedy would be reported alongside success."

Follow the links to the NGT bittersweet complement to marketing the moon:

To govern a society shared by people of emotion, people of reason, and everybody in between — as well as people who think their actions are shaped by logic but in fact are shaped by feelings and nonempirical philosophies — you need politics. At its best, politics navigates all the minds-states for the sake of the greater good, alert to the rocky shoals of community, identity, and the economy. At its worst, politics thrives on the incomplete disclosure or misrepresentation of data required by an electorate to make informed decisions, whether arrived at logically or emotionally.

Rohrabacher on the 2013 Budget

"If I had someone come to me and say they wanted to spend well over a hundred billion dollars when they knew the task could be done more quickly and less expensively, I'd say, 'You're fired,'" declared Rohrabacher.

"As expected, the President did not request an additional $1 billion above last year's appropriation, which NASA's plans seem to require. Of course, even that funding level would have fallen about $2 billion short of what NASA would need next year to keep the SLS Titanic on schedule," Rohrabacher added.

Now let's see, which part of congress threw out depot centric for a HLV requiring a $3B/yr plus up with ESAS back in 2005, failed to provide the plus up, and blames the Admin for cancelling Constellation, when cheaper alternatives were on the table.....?

[newpylong]

As Chris said, it has nothing to do with SLS, it has to do with same old arguments, page after page, thread after thread.  It doesn't matter at all that they are negative, they are monotonous.

[M129K]

It's a milestone nonetheless, and linking to your own posts as sources for a lack of missions for SLS doesn't change that.

Keep your posts clean and to the point please, because there's no reason to spend five paragraphs to say something you could say in one, and already say in every darn thread about SLS.

[Mark S]

If you haven't notice by now, because of politics, NSF is a vehicle to provide Post-incident contingency planning per our HLV expert Mark S.

Why are you dragging me into your rant? And mocking me as an "HLV expert"? And linking to my post about Bolden's disturbing lack of contingency planning (twice in the past week)? And making it sound as though I approve of that approach, when in fact I was pointing out the absurdity of it?

If you sincerely believe that I am an HLV expert, I can assure you that I'm not. But I am still entitled to my opinions, and to express them here on occasion. I am not a fan of the way the Administration has slow-rolled SLS, made it into a permanent development project, and deferred any real missions for at least a decade. My opinion is that an HLV is necessary, and that depots, L1/L2 gateways, SEP, NTR, VASIMR, GCR protection, and the rest are also necessary in the long run. But one has to start somewhere, and SLS will be an enabler (aka capability foundation) of those follow-on in-space developments.

And if you believe that I was advocating for post-incident contingency planning, then you need to bone up on your reading comprehension skills.

Cheers!

[yg1968]

Rohrabacher on the 2013 Budget

"If I had someone come to me and say they wanted to spend well over a hundred billion dollars when they knew the task could be done more quickly and less expensively, I'd say, 'You're fired,'" declared Rohrabacher.

"As expected, the President did not request an additional $1 billion above last year's appropriation, which NASA's plans seem to require. Of course, even that funding level would have fallen about $2 billion short of what NASA would need next year to keep the SLS Titanic on schedule," Rohrabacher added.

Now let's see, which part of congress threw out depot centric for a HLV requiring a $3B/yr plus up with ESAS back in 2005, failed to provide the plus up, and blames the Admin for cancelling Constellation, when cheaper alternatives were on the table.....?

That quote from Rohrabacher made me laugh. I know that not everybody on this forum agrees with him but he does have a sense of humour.