Quote from: JohnFornaro on 09/01/2012 01:28 pmQuote from: Blackstar on 09/01/2012 03:43 amQuote from: Starlab90 on 09/01/2012 03:13 amQuote from: JohnFornaro on 08/30/2012 12:48 pmI drag out the TO problem of Ares...You really have no understanding of what the problem really was.He has lots of opinions, however.I do have some understanding of the former, and I do have a lot of the latter. Pretty good observations.Quote from: Blackstar on 09/01/2012 05:22 pmYou need to adjust the ratio.First, from the snappy comebacks department.It was pointed out that I have "no understanding of what the [TO] problem really was". A group of people were paid $11B in part because they asserted that they, being rocket scientists, understood TO, and late changes to the OML, and who knows how many other issues besides. They lost the support of their own political constituencies, because they couldn't produce.Why? Maybe they don't understand what they're doing either. At least I don't pretend to be an expert.Second, as to adjusting the "ratio". Presumably this is some ratio of the number of my expressed opinions to the demonstration of my technical knowledge underlying certain failed programs? As always, I will continue to read on these topics.I don't know the technical abilities of the various site lurkers. I have asked questions about why certain decisions on prioritization have been made. It cannot have gone unnoticed that the types of answers which dominate the responses have to do with my ignorance, leaving the questions unanswered. [Snif.] Yes, this does hurt my feelings, but I'll get over it.It remains that one of the cost drivers in HSF is exactly that managerial arrogance will not serve to solve difficult technical problems. Neither will late changes in fundamental design requirements. At some point, reducing payload mass results in a rocket not getting off the ground. Even politicians understand this, eventually.
Quote from: Blackstar on 09/01/2012 03:43 amQuote from: Starlab90 on 09/01/2012 03:13 amQuote from: JohnFornaro on 08/30/2012 12:48 pmI drag out the TO problem of Ares...You really have no understanding of what the problem really was.He has lots of opinions, however.I do have some understanding of the former, and I do have a lot of the latter. Pretty good observations.
Quote from: Starlab90 on 09/01/2012 03:13 amQuote from: JohnFornaro on 08/30/2012 12:48 pmI drag out the TO problem of Ares...You really have no understanding of what the problem really was.He has lots of opinions, however.
Quote from: JohnFornaro on 08/30/2012 12:48 pmI drag out the TO problem of Ares...You really have no understanding of what the problem really was.
I drag out the TO problem of Ares...
You need to adjust the ratio.
Quote from: Blackstar on 09/02/2012 12:08 amQuote from: vulture4 on 09/01/2012 11:28 pmAn interesting report but it is concerned with poor prediction of cost in science mission payloads, not with lowering the cost of human spaceflight. The subject line says "spaceflight," not "human spaceflight." And because so many of these discussions seem devoid of references to actual reports on the subject, I think a little data is not going to hurt the discussion.I would argue that the bureaucracy in both HSF and SMD is one of the primary, if not the primary, causal factor in both schedule slip and cost projection errors. You simply cannot calculate what FAR based contracting will do. It grows.Another is the mentality in NASA management that if a program gets started, it will be finished. Rightly so, no one on Capitol Hill wants to kill a NASA project, even when it is so screwed up its at least a eight years behind schedule and $7 billion over budget.When you have "incompetent and arrogant" NASA managers running around saying a billion dollars doesn't buy you much, you have a problem. I simply disagree when people tell us the private sector cannot build an HLV. Are you telling me ULA cannot? I think they can, I think their best people believe so too... for billions less.Respectfully,Andrew GasserTEA Party in Space
Quote from: vulture4 on 09/01/2012 11:28 pmAn interesting report but it is concerned with poor prediction of cost in science mission payloads, not with lowering the cost of human spaceflight. The subject line says "spaceflight," not "human spaceflight." And because so many of these discussions seem devoid of references to actual reports on the subject, I think a little data is not going to hurt the discussion.
An interesting report but it is concerned with poor prediction of cost in science mission payloads, not with lowering the cost of human spaceflight.
The most intractable problem with Shuttle-type SRBs is not vibration or risk, it is cost. Even if they are made expendable (apparently the plan as the SRB retrieval ships have been sold)...
http://www.space.com/17224-shuttle-rocket-recovery-ship-merchant-marine.htmlNASA's Space Shuttle Rocket Recovery Ship Gets New MissionRobert Z. Pearlman, collectSPACE.comDate: 22 August 2012 Time: 11:46 AM ET<snip>On Tuesday (Aug. 21), NASA signed a memorandum of understanding with the U.S. Transportation Department's Maritime Administration (MARAD) to transfer the agency's solid rocket booster recovery ship, MV Liberty Star, to the National Defense Reserve Fleet to be used for training at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy in Kings Point, NY.<snip>
http://uspolitics.einnews.com/pr_news/111215777/nasa-maritime-administration-announce-new-home-for-liberty-starNASA, Maritime Administration Announce New Home For Liberty StarPR NewswireWASHINGTON, Aug. 21, 2012<snip>NASA will continue to have access to Liberty Star if the agency requires its use and it is available.<snip>NASA still is working to identify a suitable new use for M/V Freedom Star, the other recovery ship.<snip>
Quote from: Blackstar on 09/02/2012 12:08 amQuote from: vulture4 on 09/01/2012 11:28 pmAn interesting report but it is concerned with poor prediction of cost in science mission payloads, not with lowering the cost of human spaceflight. The subject line says "spaceflight," not "human spaceflight." And because so many of these discussions seem devoid of references to actual reports on the subject, I think a little data is not going to hurt the discussion.I agree and appreciate the reference.
Quote from: vulture4 on 09/02/2012 05:10 amQuote from: Blackstar on 09/02/2012 12:08 amQuote from: vulture4 on 09/01/2012 11:28 pmAn interesting report but it is concerned with poor prediction of cost in science mission payloads, not with lowering the cost of human spaceflight. The subject line says "spaceflight," not "human spaceflight." And because so many of these discussions seem devoid of references to actual reports on the subject, I think a little data is not going to hurt the discussion.I agree and appreciate the reference. Neither does the subject line say "unmanned" spaceflight. Should we be talking about "alien" spaceflight?Both manned and unmanned spaceflight suffer from issues which drive costs higher.Appreciate as always the references and other documentation.
One of the interesting things we learned while doing Aerospace Corp's CATE process on the decadal surveys was that the advocates are often pretty good at estimating their own costs. The problem is that their estimates don't take into account the external factors that they are not able to control.
Multiple factors underlie NASA’s historical inability to consistently meet project cost, schedule, and performance goals. However, based on our interviews with 85 individuals involved in all levels of project development, we identified four factors [my bold] that appear to present the greatest challenges to successful project outcomes.Factor I: NASA’s Culture of OptimismHowever, this same optimism can sometimes prevent managers and leaders from making critical assessments of requirements, budgets, and schedules to determine what a project can realistically accomplish within a set budget and timetable. To this point, when asked whether their projects had been successful, every project manager we interviewed answered in the affirmative, regardless of the project’s fidelity to cost and schedule goals. ...From our discussions with senior NASA officials and project managers, we identified three related ways in which optimism contributes to cost and schedule challenges. First, the mindset has manifested itself in a lack of documented success criteria for cost and schedule performance in NASA projects. ...Second, NASA’s culture of optimism appears to increase the difficulty of developing and maintaining realistic cost estimates. Many interviewees indicated that project managers and senior NASA leaders are often hesitant to admit they cannot overcome technological challenges or meet mission requirements within the funding profile provided. ...Finally, many project managers we spoke with mentioned the "Hubble Psychology"– an expectation among NASA personnel that projects that fail to meet cost and schedule goals will receive additional funding and that subsequent scientific and technological success will overshadow any budgetary and schedule problems. ...Factor II: Underestimating Technical Complexity Increases Cost and Schedule RiskProject managers cited the technical complexity inherent in most NASA projects as a major challenge to achieving cost and schedule goals. Five sub-factors [my bold] explain the inherently uncertain nature of estimating costs for the types of space technologies NASA develops. First, because NASA projects often involve technologies that are new and unique, many development efforts do not have readily available historical data, cost models, lessons learned, and other information project managers can use to estimate the effort needed to develop the required technologies. Second, NASA projects often involve combining several interdependent technologies to accomplish novel missions, and the resulting complexities are often difficult to predict. Third, NASA systems generally require more testing than other development efforts because, unlike land-based systems, they function remotely in space where repair or replacement is extremely difficult or impossible. Fourth, because space systems are often one-of-a-kind instruments, NASA cannot produce them in sufficient quantities to benefit from manufacturing economies of scale where the average cost of a product decreases as quantity increases. Lastly, according to many of the interviewees, the quality and availability of parts and instruments procured from some contractors has decreased over time. This affects managers’ ability to estimate project costs accurately because a part’s poor quality may not be evident until testing has begun, resulting in the need for costly rework or identifying alternative suppliers late in development. ...Factor III:Funding Instability Can Lead to Inefficient Management Practices.Nearly 75 percent of the individuals we interviewed stated that funding instability was among the most significant challenges to project management. ...Funding instability can result in inefficient management practices that contribute to poor cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. For example, inadequate funding in the early phases of a project’s life cycle decreases management’s ability to identify and address key risks at project inception. Moreover, in the absence of sufficient funding, project managers may have to defer the development of critical technologies to a time when integration of those technologies may be more difficult or when the costs of material and labor may be greater. In some cases, shifting tasks to later project phases may require managers to sustain a workforce longer than originally planned or add shifts in an attempt to make up for lost time, both of which can lead to increased costs. For example, an independent review of the JWST Project noted that deferred work can potentially result in overall costs doubling or tripling due to its impact on other work.Interviewees noted that funding instability originates primarily from two sources: external decisions [my bold] made by the President and Congress and internal decisions [my bold] made by Agency personnel. ... Although it is difficult to quantify the cost and schedule impacts to individual projects, many interviewees said starting the fiscal year without an approved budget can force project managers to delay work, limits the Agency’s ability to make necessary program changes, and prevents the Agency from beginning new projects.While external factors may contribute to funding instability, internal [my bold] Agency decisions also play a significant role. ... NASA leadership often takes funds from the budgets of other program areas to cover those increased costs. ...Factor IV: Limited Opportunities for Project Managers’ Development.[Here, the gist is that hands on experience is of crucial importance for project managers. There is much learning gained by these managers over the years, growing from smaller missions to flagship missions. There are not as many smaller missions these days, and the flagship missions suffer from the lack of personnel experience, contributing to cost overruns.]ConclusionNevertheless, in our judgment NASA needs a “unity of effort” – strong, consistent, and sustained leadership by the President, Congress, and NASA management – to meet the challenges outlined in this report and achieve more consistent fidelity to cost and performance goals. Articulating a clear, unified, and sustaining vision for the Agency and then providing the necessary resources to execute that vision is a critical cornerstone of success. For their part, NASA leaders must temper the Agency’s culture of optimism by requiring realistic cost and schedule estimates, well-defined and stable requirements, and mature technologies early in project development. In addition, to the extent possible they must ensure that funding is adequate and properly phased and that funding instability is identified as a risk and accounted for in risk mitigation strategies. Finally, they must be willing to take remedial action when these critical elements are not present.Although technological innovation and mission success as defined by scientific advancement and discovery are central to NASA’s core existence, an appropriate balance must be struck that also recognizes the importance of meeting project cost and schedule goals. Accordingly, we believe that NASA needs to find ways to reward managers for good stewardship of NASA’s resources as enthusiastically as it does for successful technological achievements and to hold managers appropriately accountable for mismanagement of resources. With renewed focus on and appropriate recognition of technical, cost, and schedule risks and rewards, NASA project managers will be better positioned to meet the performance goals expected by Congress and the U.S. taxpayer.
The advocates hated this, because it drove up the cost of the things they wanted to do, and also because they viewed it as an affront, as if somebody was calling them deceitful. But it is really a very hard-headed, senior management approach to the issue.
As long as we refuse to fund large projects unless the cost is underestimated, we aren't going to get accurate estimates.
Unfortunately we learned the wrong lesson in Apollo, that a major development project could, through the magic of systems engineering, be simulated on paper, built, and flown.
Here is a partial explanation. One adjusts the ratio of frequencies such that the lower stage, which may be excited by a vibration due to the solids near the end of the burn, does not have the same frequency as the upper stage. Damping can be added too. The further the two frequencies are apart, the less chance for amplification. Note that the lower stage is consuming mass, so its frequency is always changing.
Like vulture says - "underestimate and you will be funded"
Thought this just-released report may be of interest to readers of this thread:NASA's Challenges to Meeting Cost, Schedule, and Performance GoalsOffice of Inspector General, Audit Report IG-12-021, September 27, 2012Four factors were identified that appear to present the greatest challenge to successful project outcomes - these are:• NASA’s Culture of Optimism• Underestimating Technical Complexity Increases Cost and Schedule Risk• Funding Instability Can Lead to Inefficient Management Practices• Limited Opportunities for Project Managers’ DevelopmentThe 72-page report can be found here:http://oig.nasa.gov/audits/reports/FY12/IG-12-021.pdf
In the above chart, why was "lack of probabilistic estimating" a reason for cost growth in the 80s and 00s, but not in the 90s?
Quote from: neilh on 10/02/2012 07:45 pmIn the above chart, why was "lack of probabilistic estimating" a reason for cost growth in the 80s and 00s, but not in the 90s?it just wasn't found in any documents on cost growth in that time period. not that it wasn't 'an issue'...it just isn't cited by any doc in that time period. NASA didn't institute probabilistic estimating policies until late in the 00s (circa 06 IIRC)NASA now has a joint cost/schedule probabilistic policy at KDP-C and individual probabilistic (cost & sched) at KDP-B.