Quote from: AS-503 on 01/12/2013 05:05 amRemember, Columbia was "too heavy in the rear end" as Bob Crippen said at the STS-107 memorial for a flight to the ISS.This is a myth really. She was to have flown STS-118 in November 2003, a mission to deliver and install the S5 Short Spacer ITS along with a SpaceHAB SLM with supplies to ISS.What she couldn't launch was the big heavy trusses.
Remember, Columbia was "too heavy in the rear end" as Bob Crippen said at the STS-107 memorial for a flight to the ISS.
The image analysis was hampered by the lack of high resolution and high speed ground-based cameras. The existing camera locations are a legacy of earlier NASA programs, and are not optimum for the high-inclination Space Shuttle missions to the International Space Station and oftentimes cameras are not operating or, as in the case of STS-107, out of focus. Launch Commit Criteria should include that sufficient cameras are operating to track the Shuttle from liftoff to Solid Rocket Booster separation.Similarly, a developmental vehicle like the Shuttle should be equipped with high resolution cameras that monitor potential hazard areas.
We are never ever going to say that there is nothing we can do.
Ben,The more pertinent question for the future is why was there not better ascent imagery?Keep digging.
After seeing the video from the fore and aft SRB cameras in addition to the ET camera, I found myself wondering why these were not a requirement for the program since STS-1. Of all the technical challenges STS presented during its development, I can't believe that adding cameras would have ranked highly among them. Apollo boosters even had cameras in the cryo tanks!There is no substitute for knowledge. Knowledge is power.
The toe of the ellipse where the heaviest pieces would come down cut across the southwestern suburbs of Houston. My home my wife would have been in the target zone where the 2 ton steel main engine combustion chambers would have hit the ground at supersonic speeds. JSC would have been at ground zero for the debris; the MCC would likely have been struck. That is a scenario that is just too implausible for words.
QuoteThe toe of the ellipse where the heaviest pieces would come down cut across the southwestern suburbs of Houston. My home my wife would have been in the target zone where the 2 ton steel main engine combustion chambers would have hit the ground at supersonic speeds. JSC would have been at ground zero for the debris; the MCC would likely have been struck. That is a scenario that is just too implausible for words.I read this and think - if that happened it would eradicate space shuttle from existence in a heart beat. No?
Quick question; do new flight controllers in any way review the Apollo-1, Challenger and Columbia accident histories for historical and lessons learned perspectives as part of their training activities?
The video of the inside of the MCC at that moment is one of the most powerful bits of factual footage that I've ever seen - the dawning horror on the controllers' faces as CAPCOM's calls to Columbia go unanswered.
However, I would imagine that all of these tragedies form part of the primers for engineers, mission planners, safety team members, managers and in-flight data analysts. There are things that can be learnt from all three events of things not to do, things that you must do and attitudes that cannot ever be allowed to develop in your team.
This is the first time that I realised just how horrible the experience must have been for the team at KSC who, lacking consoles, probably didn't know anything until JSC called them to warn that they had lost comms.
New part:http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2013/01/29/after-ten-years-picking-up-the-pieces/
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2013/01/31/after-ten-years-enduring-lessons/