Next Gen Shuttle-Capable vehicle interest as secret effort to save orbiters ends

[Namechange User]

No but some of them excede certain capabilities of the Shuttle.

I'll bite just this one time.  Those are??

You really need them to be listed?

I did ask the question. 

Low development cost
Low operational cost
Launch abort and crew recovery at any point during ascent
Fast turnaround and relaunch with minimal servicing
Small ground crew
Lean ground infrastructure
Rapid recycle and launch after countdown anomaly
(SNC Dreamchaser) Ability to land on standard airport runway
(Evolved Dragon) Ability to land in parking lot(!)
(Red Dragon) Ability to serve as Mars lander
Ability to serve as station lifeboat

I appreciate the list, thanks.  I guess my only comment would be many of those are not "capabilities".  Some on that list are "potentials", because they are not guaranteed in any way at this point, and some are very much functions of that lesser capability if they turn out the way you described. 

I already addressed the station lifeboat issue and a LAS is a great capability but it also must not be used or perceived as a "crutch" that with this single system all launches are "safe".  It's really in the processes and engineering where safety lives most comfortably and if one of these companies has to use their LAS on several occassions, make no mistake it will hurt them. 

It's not to say your list above is bad and I truly hope that list is an eventual reality.  Again, I would just comment that this was not meant to be in competition with CCP and CRS.  It had/has its own unique business case and offers a potential capability where no others exist.  For those who truly want commercial, etc this should be seen as a good thing and not something as necessary to pit against something else. 

[alk3997]

One thing that has continually annoyed me is the phrase "point of no return".  Excuse me, but since the vehicle and most of the launch system was purpose built from scratch then there is no true "point of no return".  It all is just a (significant) cost issue for when you put the system into reverse and lead time to get GSE replaced or refurbished depending on it's final disposition.

I think you're missing one piece.  There are long lead items which really are points of no return when that vendor decides to no longer make them.  Now you're right, given enough time and money then those can be recreated to a certain extent.

On the extreme would be if you wanted to build an Apollo Guidance Computer, no amount of money or time could reproduce that capability.  Closer to the present, if you want to buy new 2" recording tape, I think you would find that impossible.  The manufacturing infrastruture that used to produce the components that went into the AGC and the manufacturing capability for tape have gone away because there is no demand.

In the case of 2" recording tape you might be able to restart a manufacturer given a significantly large amount of money.  But that 2" recording tape will be different than the 2" recording tape previously purchase so you would have to re-verify that it still meets the purpose.  For the AGC, the components that went into the computer are no longer made, let alone the skills needed to create core memory.

So, there really are points of no return that even money and time can't fix.  However, given enough time and money I believe a Shuttle launch would be possible.  I also believe it would take a significant amount of time to rebuild the skills and get the long lead items ready.  Even if you find a bolt that looks and acts exactly the same as the part you certified, you still have to certify that the new bolt will work just like the old one did.  BTW, that drove me crazy with commercial off-the-shelf computer hardware because minor changes were always happening but the part number might still be the same.  Tough to track changes...

While in principle agreeing with your point about the complete non-availability of 2" mag tape, it could be overcome with a bit of emulation hardware to make a Solid State Drive look the same to the system.  And other problems could be resolved in a similar fashion.
Tracking changes to the provided is indeed a tough nut to track!  Always has been, always will be; the Soyuz folks will certainly agree...

Unfortunately (or fortunately) as soon as you make any changes you have to recertify the system.  Even the FAA requires that a new box undergo certification.  Introduce a new box (a SSD) you have to pay for the engineering, the testing and the certification paperwork and meeting costs.

Having helped review the spec for the Shuttle's onboard solid state memory replacement of an obsolete tape drive, it was basically starting from sratch for certification even though the drive was designed to completely emulate the tape (not sure that was a smart idea to this day).  That way the interfaces to the "tape" didn't have to change.

It still costs money and time to do all that (which was my point, if I remember right).  Once human beings are riding the rocket, the amount of checking goes up and unless we are willing to accept an increased chance of fatalities, then it's still the right thing to do (IMHO, of course).


Andy

[Chris Bergin]

I did find it notable that "safety" has become far less of a player in such evaluations, and I think that is credit to the way the orbiters and their teams conducted themselves over that run of post RTF missions. There is a lot to be said about matured hardware and seasoned engineers/managers and we might be looking back at those final years with envy when the new vehicles find they need to go through some very hard times to find their feet.

Spot on mate, top comment. Only thing I'd add is safety was always massive, but there was an obvious lack of safety issues seen per MER during flight and IFA post flight etc. That probably caused the "Oh no, 1/8!" ASAP concern to see to be based more on the entire SSP over 30 years than a reflection of missions since STS-114 onwards - and thus seemed unfair.

I would imagine safety was pretty good right after Challenger, too.

That's a tap in waiting to be finished (sorry for the football (soccer) reference)

I'm not sure one can say the post-Columbia SSP was no better (same risk) than the SSP of the late 80s, early 90s, when the CAIB cited culture issues again.

That *could* be argued - as much as everything I've seen via my reporting makes those post 51L and 107 "risk" issues appear alien. We can qualify via all saw the MMTs and FRRs and there was no way in hell they were going to launch - be it lack of investigation or schedule pressure - even with some issues which appeared to be very minor to us outsiders.

I'll tell you all this little story too. About two years into running the site, I had a top level NASA manager at HQ tell me that I was to call him, any time of the day and night, if I ever heard an engineer say he wasn't happy about something, that the person complaining would be completely immune and could remain confidential, and that he would "sort it out". He said the chances of such a thing happening would be tiny, but they "didn't want to leave any route closed, as a failsafe". That was his decision, I never had to call him.

There was one example internally, and it was so impressive I wrote an article - which ties right into this post.

http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2007/08/endeavour-dissent-from-engineer-a-sign-of-post-columbia-changes/

Also take into account that 51L's issue from a hardware standpoint was mitigated via LCC rules and heaters in the SRB joints.

Also take into account 107's fault tree via the huge amount of RTF improvements, not least the OBSS, RPM, DAT and so on (and I could write a 5,000 word article and it wouldn't even touch all of the improvements).

Then take into account the proof, those run of missions, refined ET mods (which continued after the initial RTF mods), as noted in the weekend article:
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2011/12/michoud-hollywood-movie-teams-utilize-facilitys-expanses/

Sure, doesn't stop a SSME turbine blade breaking loose and ripping off the aft - there was always risk - but I'd claim there's no way Shuttle was still in the risk bracket of post-Challenger.

And guess what, I can pretty much bet you any money an actual orbiter guy will post on here and tell me I'm probably being too nice about the orbiters, because that would be typical of them, they don't wear rosey tinted glasses, and that's half the reason they are so bloody good at what they do.

[dks13827]

Fair enough - like I said, it would have been a good challenge for those who were involved.  Unfortunately, we're at a point where a restart would have still been better than what the current timelines seem to be for returing the U.S. to human launch capability.  2021, here we come.  Do we even have a destination yet? (rhetorical question, of course)

I'd like to be more optimistic than this.

Thanks for the response.  I appreciate it.

Andy

As far as I have heard, CST-100 ;  and Orion if there is a booster ( Liberty ? )  should both fly much sooner than that, under current plans.

[STS Tony]

I did find it notable that "safety" has become far less of a player in such evaluations, and I think that is credit to the way the orbiters and their teams conducted themselves over that run of post RTF missions. There is a lot to be said about matured hardware and seasoned engineers/managers and we might be looking back at those final years with envy when the new vehicles find they need to go through some very hard times to find their feet.

Spot on mate, top comment. Only thing I'd add is safety was always massive, but there was an obvious lack of safety issues seen per MER during flight and IFA post flight etc. That probably caused the "Oh no, 1/8!" ASAP concern to see to be based more on the entire SSP over 30 years than a reflection of missions since STS-114 onwards - and thus seemed unfair.

I would imagine safety was pretty good right after Challenger, too.

That's a tap in waiting to be finished (sorry for the football (soccer) reference)

I'm not sure one can say the post-Columbia SSP was no better (same risk) than the SSP of the late 80s, early 90s, when the CAIB cited culture issues again.

That *could* be argued - as much as everything I've seen via my reporting makes those post 51L and 107 "risk" issues appear alien. We can qualify via all saw the MMTs and FRRs and there was no way in hell they were going to launch - be it lack of investigation or schedule pressure - even with some issues which appeared to be very minor to us outsiders.

I'll tell you all this little story too. About two years into running the site, I had a top level NASA manager at HQ tell me that I was to call him, any time of the day and night, if I ever heard an engineer say he wasn't happy about something, that the person complaining would be completely immune and could remain confidential, and that he would "sort it out". He said the chances of such a thing happening would be tiny, but they "didn't want to leave any route closed, as a failsafe". That was his decision, I never had to call him.

There was one example internally, and it was so impressive I wrote an article - which ties right into this post.

http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2007/08/endeavour-dissent-from-engineer-a-sign-of-post-columbia-changes/

Also take into account that 51L's issue from a hardware standpoint was mitigated via LCC rules and heaters in the SRB joints.

Also take into account 107's fault tree via the huge amount of RTF improvements, not least the OBSS, RPM, DAT and so on (and I could write a 5,000 word article and it wouldn't even touch all of the improvements).

Then take into account the proof, those run of missions, refined ET mods (which continued after the initial RTF mods), as noted in the weekend article:
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2011/12/michoud-hollywood-movie-teams-utilize-facilitys-expanses/

Sure, doesn't stop a SSME turbine blade breaking lose and ripping off the aft - there was always risk - but I'd claim there's no way Shuttle was still in the risk bracket of post-Challenger.

And guess what, I can pretty much bet you any money an actual orbiter guy will post on here and tell me I'm probably being too nice about the orbiters, because that would be typical of them, they don't wear rosey tinted glasses, and that's half the reason they are so bloody good at what they do.

[Lars_J]

I'm kind of shocked at the many STS supporters who have doubted the business case for commercial crew (less capable overall but certainly cheaper) - yet now they cling their hopes to this venture with a yet-to-be-revealed business case.

I wish them good luck, but I am skeptical - very skeptical - that this is anything more than wishful thinking.

[Jim]

Fair enough - like I said, it would have been a good challenge for those who were involved.  Unfortunately, we're at a point where a restart would have still been better than what the current timelines seem to be for returing the U.S. to human launch capability.  2021, here we come.  Do we even have a destination yet? (rhetorical question, of course)

I'd like to be more optimistic than this.

Thanks for the response.  I appreciate it.

Andy

As far as I have heard, CST-100 ;  and Orion if there is a booster ( Liberty ? )  should both fly much sooner than that, under current plans.

Dragon will fly before CST-100
Delta IV.  Liberty is not going to happen

[baldusi]

That *could* be argued - as much as everything I've seen via my reporting makes those post 51L and 107 "risk" issues appear alien. We can qualify via all saw the MMTs and FRRs and there was no way in hell they were going to launch - be it lack of investigation or schedule pressure - even with some issues which appeared to be very minor to us outsiders.

Chris,
  I've been influenced by Tauffte's analysis of 51L. Plus I see the problem of 107 as a lack of understanding of statistic and the limitations of extrapolation. So, there are many cultural changes and such. But I'm particularly interested if they had tackled on that sort of educational problem.
My experience with statistic analysis, is that is great having good problem report automation and the correct visualization tools. But you need the people reading those tools to be able to correct the writers of the software and design their own visualizations. Not in the sense that they are programmers, but in the sense of being able to discern when relationship are spurious, when the extrapolation in too much, or even when the extrapolation "creates" artifacts on the data.
That is a very thorough understanding of statistics, but it's very difficult to have a statistics professor teach that, since it's more the experience of having applied experience. So, was there a statistics teaching program or something like that?

[Longhorn John]

I'm kind of shocked at the many STS supporters who have doubted the business case for commercial crew (less capable but certainly cheaper) - yet now they cling their hopes to this venture with a yet-to-be-revealed business case.

I wish them good luck, but I am skeptical - very skeptical - that this is anything more than wishful thinking.

Capability. And I think it's a good thing NASA fans are showing support for a commercial venture, as much as it's back to regaining capability, rather than getting overexcited about SpaceX videos. It's a shame some commercial fans aren't showing consistency to their commercial mantra.

[Jim]

Also take into account 107's fault tree via the huge amount of RTF improvements, not least the OBSS, RPM, DAT and so on (

Not to start an argument, that is just more overhead and expense to the vehicle.   Yes, they increased safety but took resources away from the mission.  You would want a vehicle that does need inspection once on orbit.

[Chris Bergin]

That *could* be argued - as much as everything I've seen via my reporting makes those post 51L and 107 "risk" issues appear alien. We can qualify via all saw the MMTs and FRRs and there was no way in hell they were going to launch - be it lack of investigation or schedule pressure - even with some issues which appeared to be very minor to us outsiders.

Chris,
  I've been influenced by Tauffte's analysis of 51L. Plus I see the problem of 107 as a lack of understanding of statistic and the limitations of extrapolation. So, there are many cultural changes and such. But I'm particularly interested if they had tackled on that sort of educational problem.
My experience with statistic analysis, is that is great having good problem report automation and the correct visualization tools. But you need the people reading those tools to be able to correct the writers of the software and design their own visualizations. Not in the sense that they are programmers, but in the sense of being able to discern when relationship are spurious, when the extrapolation in too much, or even when the extrapolation "creates" artifacts on the data.
That is a very thorough understanding of statistics, but it's very difficult to have a statistics professor teach that, since it's more the experience of having applied experience. So, was there a statistics teaching program or something like that?

That flew over my head a bit I'm sure someone else (cleverer) will be able to answer that.

Also take into account 107's fault tree via the huge amount of RTF improvements, not least the OBSS, RPM, DAT and so on (

Not to start an argument, that is just more overhead and expense to the vehicle.   Yes, they increased safety but took resources away from the mission.

Sure, but the context was risk post Challenger and risk post Columbia - but your note it did increase safety backs up the point (on that).

[Rocket Science]

I am looking forward to see the X-37 data of the TPS perfomance on orbit for the prolonged periods. Would provide valuable insight for a Next Gen Shuttle... When declassified of course...

[RocketJack]

... seasoned engineers/managers ...

It is amazing that KSC has lost Mike Moses, Mike Wetmore, Rita Wilcoxon, and Mike Leinbach in a period of two months.

All good people no doubt.  But we have lost more than that across many centers, suppliers, etc.  People who you will never know their name but made the jobs of the people above much easier.  And we ain't done yet.....

True, but there is a difference between people that were let go because the program ended and the ones I listed. These four were among the brightest, most influential civil servants at KSC and would have had significant involvement in any next program. The fact that they voluntarily left - one for non-aerospace GE, one for non-aerospace BP, one for who knows where, and one for Virgin means something.
It is also telling that Marshall and Johnson have not seen similar losses. It is clear that KSC will be a ghost town for the next five years while development is done elsewhere.

[93143]

I'm kind of shocked at the many STS supporters who have doubted the business case for commercial crew (less capable overall but certainly cheaper) - yet now they cling their hopes to this venture with a yet-to-be-revealed business case.

This business case stuff is Kremlinology.  No one wants to put their detailed business plan on display, so we go with what we see.

In the case of commercial crew, what we saw was ISS as an anchor tenant, and NASA money required for development or no go.  Also, they're just crew and small cargo services, which limits their applicability.  Crew transport in particular requires a destination beyond the ISS or it will fizzle when ISS goes.  Bigelow?  I don't recall ever being dismissive of the business case for commercial crew - I've been very hopeful - but the doubts were not unwarranted.  Particularly since the anchor tenant was being put at risk by the administration's policies.

In the case of commercial Shuttle, what we see is billions committed with no NASA skin in the game, no requirement for NASA as a customer, and full reimbursement for the use of NASA infrastructure.  The vehicle itself has a broad range of capabilities, so that the range of potential applications is much wider than for the capsules.  Not only that, but they're still going ahead with it even though they can't use Shuttle itself - they apparently want the capability so bad they're willing to try to replicate it.  I will admit it is a surprise that someone thinks the business case is that good, but you must admit the signs point to either a very good business case or a very misinformed rich guy.

[neilh]

In the case of commercial Shuttle, what we see is billions committed with no NASA skin in the game, no requirement for NASA as a customer, and full reimbursement for the use of NASA infrastructure.  The vehicle itself has a broad range of capabilities, so that the range of potential applications is much wider than for the capsules.  Not only that, but they're still going ahead with it even though they can't use Shuttle itself - they apparently want the capability so bad they're willing to try to replicate it.  I will admit it is a surprise that someone thinks the business case is that good, but you must admit the signs point to either a very good business case or a very misinformed rich guy.

Indeed, the possibility of the former is what excites me most about all of this.

[Lars_J]

In the case of commercial Shuttle, what we see is billions committed with no NASA skin in the game, no requirement for NASA as a customer, and full reimbursement for the use of NASA infrastructure.  The vehicle itself has a broad range of capabilities, so that the range of potential applications is much wider than for the capsules.  Not only that, but they're still going ahead with it even though they can't use Shuttle itself - they apparently want the capability so bad they're willing to try to replicate it.  I will admit it is a surprise that someone thinks the business case is that good, but you must admit the signs point to either a very good business case or a very misinformed rich guy.

Indeed, the possibility of the former is what excites me most about all of this.

Ever heard the saying "if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is"? It applies here. A shuttle-like successor, with no funding from NASA? Does everyone get ponies too?

Honestly, step back and look at this again.

[Chris Bergin]

In the case of commercial Shuttle, what we see is billions committed with no NASA skin in the game, no requirement for NASA as a customer, and full reimbursement for the use of NASA infrastructure.  The vehicle itself has a broad range of capabilities, so that the range of potential applications is much wider than for the capsules.  Not only that, but they're still going ahead with it even though they can't use Shuttle itself - they apparently want the capability so bad they're willing to try to replicate it.  I will admit it is a surprise that someone thinks the business case is that good, but you must admit the signs point to either a very good business case or a very misinformed rich guy.

Indeed, the possibility of the former is what excites me most about all of this.

Ever heard the saying "if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is"? It applies here. A shuttle-like successor, with no funding from NASA? Does everyone get ponies too?

Honestly, step back and look at this again.

The information is all to hand, if you want to use actual information, and not baseless, and pointless, assumptions.

http://www.marylynnedittmar.com/

"“The guy”, whose name is Kevin Holleran, turned out to be brilliant, gifted investor and entrepreneur, a genuinely original thinker, a man possessed of great wit, and a natural leader despite his being an English bloke (joke!)"

"Kevin’s leadership was extraordinary on all fronts."

Remember MLD's calibre, then re-read the above.

[Namechange User]

I am looking forward to see the X-37 data of the TPS perfomance on orbit for the prolonged periods. Would provide valuable insight for a Next Gen Shuttle... When declassified of course...

The one that landed didn't have any noticeable issues.  Also, given the right circumstances I find it hard to believe that the USAF would classify any TPS damage related to long-duration flight. 

[Namechange User]

... seasoned engineers/managers ...

It is amazing that KSC has lost Mike Moses, Mike Wetmore, Rita Wilcoxon, and Mike Leinbach in a period of two months.

All good people no doubt.  But we have lost more than that across many centers, suppliers, etc.  People who you will never know their name but made the jobs of the people above much easier.  And we ain't done yet.....

True, but there is a difference between people that were let go because the program ended and the ones I listed. These four were among the brightest, most influential civil servants at KSC and would have had significant involvement in any next program. The fact that they voluntarily left - one for non-aerospace GE, one for non-aerospace BP, one for who knows where, and one for Virgin means something.
It is also telling that Marshall and Johnson have not seen similar losses. It is clear that KSC will be a ghost town for the next five years while development is done elsewhere.

I see no reason to get into a back and forth here on this subject so I would just like to leave it at this.  How you described those four individuals I could do with a significant number of others, others who informed those four individuals. 

Their loss is significant, but not more so than many others, and they did not engineer, launch, operate, troubleshoot, test, evaluate, recover the vehicles themselves.  We were all part of a Team, a Team that went before its time because as I noted earlier many of those skills and experience could have contributed to a great many other things in this industry and one that was not strictly wedded to one configuration of one particular vehicle.  Many of those un-named individuals I speak of are gone, some to other industries and some still looking, and some still on borrowed time. 

While the loss at KSC was hard, I would hardly characterize the loss at other facilities as insignificant and not similar, it just a matter of where one wants to put their focus (remember it is an election year) and other industries that are in the relatively local area to cushion the rather large smack. 

[Rocket Science]

I am looking forward to see the X-37 data of the TPS perfomance on orbit for the prolonged periods. Would provide valuable insight for a Next Gen Shuttle... When declassified of course...

The one that landed didn't have any noticeable issues.  Also, given the right circumstances I find it hard to believe that the USAF would classify any TPS damage related to long-duration flight. 

Yes, it looked clean to me. I only mention classified in terms of China wanting its own space plane equivalent to X-37. They would probably love to get their hands on advanced TPS technology. Now the successful performance on long orbital stay may be a step in the right direction for the Dream Chaser being used as a lifeboat onboard ISS, with other mods of course.

Edit: (add) I know SNC mentioned a replaceable ablative heat shield…