I'm curious about a true, pragmatic "Space Transportation System" to be happily used by both USAF and NASA (rather than the shotgun wedding of STS), using information know to people in the early 70's, but assuming enough foresight to have forseen some of the issues that would come of STS and to have turned a bit different direction.
How about S-ID as a lift vehicle for anything that needs a lift uphill. Capacity about right, only one stage and one kind of engine. Would need a new pad to west coast, though. And for crews a smaller orbiter that is light enough to get to LEO without external tank, maybe using J-2S with internal hydrolox tanks if extra capacity was needed.
So I was more thinking about a new rocket that was neither "Saturn" or "Titan" per se, but something new for both
Still not workable. The contractor would be pulled in two different directions. ELV's can support multiple users now because they are contractor owned and operated. One of the biggest problems that the USAF had with the shuttle was that NASA managed it. There is no way around this in the 70's. One organization would be in charge and the other would be subservient to the other. Thats how it worked on all the other launch vehicles of the 60's and 70's. There wasn't much mixing. NASA had SCOUT, Delta, and Centaur and the USAF had Titan, Agena, Atlas and Thor. If one agency wanted to use the other's vehicle, they worked through the other agency. There was little crossover, a mission here and there and the payload agency knew they had to work through the other and follow its processes.
Ok, I think we've established that bureaucratically this couldn't happened, unfortunately.
Quote from: Lobo on 02/04/2015 04:49 pmOk, I think we've established that bureaucratically this couldn't happened, unfortunately.And there's the main problem! See it should have come down to a simple turf-war... Really. Between the USAF and NASA they both had enough SCA members in the crowd... Pick a spot and duke it out (pun intended )...Winner manages the STS program and looser... Gets Pittsburgh! Oh wait that's a different war all together...Randy
...The company didn't control the configuration of the vehicle, the gov't did.
MSC had their own redundant, independent Saturn V S-IC test stand in Huntsville, separate from the one in Mississippi (see attached). In that era the booster contractor did only what they were told, and numerous MSC personnel were at each contractor location to ensure this happened.
...The MSFC stand wasn't redundant or independent of the Mississippi stand. The Mississippi stand replaced the MSFC due to noise issues.
Why is that? Couldn't the contractor simply build the rockets for one or the other customer, deliver it to them, and hand over control? Suppose that for some reason NASA adopts the Titan as its LV. Couldn't Martin continue to build Titans as normal for the Air Force, for delivery to VAFB/CCAFS and launch from their Titan pads, then build some more and deliver them to Kennedy for processing at the VAB and launch from LC-39 for NASA? Why would either organization have to talk to each other at all outside of where they would do so whether or not they happened to be launching the same vehicle, or when deciding on which vehicle to procure?
Who is going to control the design of the rocket? What is going to be the basic rocket, will it be manrated or designed for performance? Back in the 60's and 70's, the gov't ran the program office for the launch vehicles, there was no commercial launch services. The company didn't control the configuration of the vehicle, the gov't did.
Well, politics and beuacracy aside, ...
I was speaking of the historic viewpoint of hands-on ownership and control by Von Braun's team and how this created a totally different situation back then for contractual issues. I think that was your point -- booster contractors back then were much less independent than today and MSFC exercised an extreme degree of oversight.In Von Braun's own words he described his view of the MSFC vs MTF facilities in the early 1960s: "Studies indicate that as far as noise level is concerned, there will probably be no objection to firing up eight F-1 engines at MSFC...The Mississippi Test Facility is still a cow pasture...and cannot compete with any test stand availability dates in Huntsville....MTF should therefore be considered an acceptance firing and product improvement site for Michoud rather than a basic development site". (Werhner Von Braun: His Life and Work).That same book described the the in-house capability at MSFC as "..much like a large aerospace company...they could design, test and build rockets or almost any other kind of aerospace hardware...with its capability to make prototypes and test components, the Structures and Mechanics lab in itself had capabilities comparable to a rocketry corporation...the Center was almost like a space agency in miniature."With booster contractors on that tight a leash and overseen by people who could build their own rockets, they would not independently design and build their own LV for a speculative new customer -- the government was the customer.
-NASA experiment tries parachute and dunk recovery of first stage and fails. Eventually NASA builds a test vehicle for first stage downrange or RTLS vertical landing based off a core modified with some landing rockets.
SpaceX amazing people-ism aside, why would you make the assumption that this would in fact "fail" as NASA had a much deeper background and knowledge on how to MAKE this work than SpaceX did? The specifically worked on making the Saturn-C/1 stage at least "recoverable" to study if not actually make reusable.
Oh yes I forgot to address this one from Lobo:On the economics of "reusable" Titan SRMs; If they could get refurbishment and re-filling done at the Cape (or Vandenburgh) instead of having to ship them all the way back to Utah every time it would probably be a lot more "economical" than the Shuttle SRBs. Given NASA is along for the ride there might be enough push to replace the solids with "simple-cheap" liquid boosters instead.
Quote from: Jim on 02/05/2015 02:32 amWho is going to control the design of the rocket? What is going to be the basic rocket, will it be manrated or designed for performance? Back in the 60's and 70's, the gov't ran the program office for the launch vehicles, there was no commercial launch services. The company didn't control the configuration of the vehicle, the gov't did.To answer Jim's questions:Both would have to have input and in the end joint control I'd think. The vehicle HAS to meet both specs.The vehicle will be manrated to fullfill NASA requirements and either have or be capable of being upgraded to meet current and future USAF and NASA performance requirements.So in the end "someone" is going to have to control and direct the specifics of the suggested vehicle to the "company or companies" the actually build it. The USAF is going to want design control as will MSFC so the stage is set for a pretty hefty dose of infighting and back-biting
Yea, I'm sure it -could- have been done if USAF and NASA both wanted it too,
Quote from: RanulfC on 02/06/2015 12:30 pmSpaceX amazing people-ism aside, why would you make the assumption that this would in fact "fail" as NASA had a much deeper background and knowledge on how to MAKE this work than SpaceX did? The specifically worked on making the Saturn-C/1 stage at least "recoverable" to study if not actually make reusable.Good point. Deceleration burn, parachute deploy, flotation devices, it checks out. I always thought ocean recovery might be better if the vehicle and lets say engine development was designed with it in mind from the get go, although I too was intrigued by that photo of engine dunking tests NASA did in the 70s; in this case though I presume expendable oriented design. Another idea I thought to mention was NASA trying something like engine pod recovery.
Well, that's part of it. The other part is the casings themselves. I'm no expert, but from what I've learned recently about the shutdown of the facilities that made the Shuttle SRB sections was pretty specialized and had some exotic treatments they did to the them so that they could withstand more than one burn. Of course, production is limited because once the segments are made, they are reused repeatedly so like the RS-25's, new unit production was low year to year. Although I suppose a single joint 25mt-ish LV being used by both USAF and NASA may have enough flight rate to keep an exotic casing production facility busy enough at making replacement casings to those damaged or just at the end of their service life. Maybe.
Myself, I'd probably opt for ditching them completely and going complete liquid, and pursuing an engine ring that's jettisoned and recovered. My Option #2 above. If you are reusing the engine ring, theoretically you could still run into an RS-25 issue where the production line isn't getting enough work to make it economical...but given each LV would have probably 9 H-1's on the booster and another vacuum optimized one on the 2nd stage, and two of those 10 would be expended every launch, with others that are periodically damaged during recovery, I think the H-1 production line would keep busy enough with new units to make it economical.Recovering the engine ring would be much easier than recovering two large SRB casings (even if they aren't as large as the Shuttle's). A relatively small ship with a crane can just lift it onto the deck, and take it can go back to CCAFS (or VAFB), vs. having to drag them back like STS's boosters were or have a big barge to put them on or whatever. And obviously dealing with a 6m wide ring of liquid engines which all come off, is easier than filling, stacking, unstacking, and refilling and restacking big segmented reusable solids.
But USAF may have preferred to keep solids for more synergy with their Titan assemblies buildings.
Quote from: RanulfC on 02/06/2015 12:21 pmQuote from: Jim on 02/05/2015 02:32 amWho is going to control the design of the rocket? What is going to be the basic rocket, will it be manrated or designed for performance? Back in the 60's and 70's, the gov't ran the program office for the launch vehicles, there was no commercial launch services. The company didn't control the configuration of the vehicle, the gov't did.To answer Jim's questions:Both would have to have input and in the end joint control I'd think. The vehicle HAS to meet both specs.The vehicle will be manrated to fullfill NASA requirements and either have or be capable of being upgraded to meet current and future USAF and NASA performance requirements.So in the end "someone" is going to have to control and direct the specifics of the suggested vehicle to the "company or companies" the actually build it. The USAF is going to want design control as will MSFC so the stage is set for a pretty hefty dose of infighting and back-biting Yea, I'm sure it -could- have been done if USAF and NASA both wanted it too, and perhaps there was strong leadership form the Whitehouse to facilitate it. Perhaps a deligation from both NASA and USAF meets to discuss what they each want and see if there's a design that they'd both be satisfied with (maybe some 3rd party members to keep the economic side of it in mind...as that often seems easily forgotten in government...weird...). Then they shop that design to the various aerospace contractors and get bids on building it. I think that's how it was done back then, rather than contractors proposing their own designs to USAF or NASA?Then a contractor is selected, and they build what they the joint commitee tells them to. From that point on, it shouldn't be too difficult. The contractor makes the hardware to fill the NASA or USAF orders that come in. The joint committee could have some sort of oversight in case there's scheduling squabbles between the two, and decide if and when and how they want to upgrade the system. The committee has both NASA and USAF personnel on it so it's not "NASA" or "USAF" per se. But, without the desire on both sides, or a very strong President to force the issue (like Reagan more or less did once STS was flying) then it wouldn't likely happen. But intersting to think about what -might- have been.
Quote from: Lobo on 02/06/2015 05:09 pmYea, I'm sure it -could- have been done if USAF and NASA both wanted it too, Not really. They have differing requirements. See NPOESS, TFX, and others.
Jim has a point we need to keep in mind; What WERE the payloads that the USAF "needed" and how did they compare to what NASA wanted. So far as I can see the USAF payloads rarely needed the kind of weight lifting that NASA did until the late 80s early 90s. Meanwhile NASA would be seriously impared with the "basic" Titan LVs up through the Titan-III. Titan II-LV was the last time the two had a common vehicle and it was nothing like the vehicle NASA 'really' needed for HSF. On the other hand the "workhorse" LV for NASA would have been something like the Delta-II LV while the similar workhorse for the AF didn't show up till the Titan-IIIC. And neither of them were MANNED vehicles. (And you've got those solids AND toxic propellants on the Titan where as the Delta has smaller {somewhat cheaper} solids and more benign propellants)
On site processing would have helped a lot I'm told, and building a "reusable" SRB around Titan sized was studied and while the casing was a pain it was also very dependent on how MANY reuses you built for. From what I've read you actually wanted about 10 flights before you "retired" one and that with on-site processing and check-out would have saved a lot. Not as much as "simple" LRBs but a lot compared to the RSRBs at any rate.
Again I'm not sure that recovering an "engine ring" versus recovery of the whole stage down-range would have been that much more "cost-effective" in the long run. And I don't see even the Air Force being able to convince NASA to go with a kerolox upper stage for much of any reason As described I'd have to think that a "compromise" design would have a kerolox first and LH2 second stage with the "target" payload design being AF requirements for GTO/GEO and NASA manned and other missions secondary. Pretty much somehow coming up with an acceptable "Saturn-1B-ish" design the Air Force could buy into.
AFAIKTFX was nothing else than the F-111. Back in 1962 SecDef McNamara tried to turn it into a multirole fighter-bomber for both USN and Air Force. The USN F-111B was a disaster of epic scale. The F-111A had a lot of teething issues that were solved on later models.
Quote from: Archibald on 02/07/2015 11:53 amAFAIKTFX was nothing else than the F-111. Back in 1962 SecDef McNamara tried to turn it into a multirole fighter-bomber for both USN and Air Force. The USN F-111B was a disaster of epic scale. The F-111A had a lot of teething issues that were solved on later models. I'm not sure why Jim tossed TFX into the mix. But TFX was the "Tactical Fighter Experimental" program that Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara initiated. McNamara thought that it was stupid that the services had separate fighter development programs and he wanted to force them to jointly develop a fighter/bomber. So TFX was a joint Air Force/Navy program. As you noted, the aircraft had a bunch of different problems.Generally, TFX/F-111 gets used by people as an example of why it is a bad idea to force different services to jointly develop hardware. So, for instance, people claim that the F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter) is a mistake because it ignores the lesson of the TFX.I actually don't buy the argument that TFX demonstrates that the Air Force and the Navy should never share an aircraft. I think that what TFX really proves is that if you do a bad job in development, you'll suffer the consequences. There are in fact many examples of Navy aircraft that proved quite successful in Air Force service: the F-4, A-7, A-4 (not the U.S. Air Force, but many others), the Skyraider and a whole bunch of helicopters. It generally doesn't work the other way around because Navy aircraft have to land on carriers, and that requires a much beefier airframe. But there's no inherent reason why the services cannot share aircraft. So I don't think the TFX lesson is the dangers of joint development, rather than the perils of bad development.Finally, I'd note that it is important to differentiate between technical requirements and bureaucratic ones. As Jim noted earlier, a lot of the issues between NASA and the Air Force were more along the lines of bureaucratic differences like who ran the program. There were not big technical differences between many USAF and NASA payloads.
Unlike USN and USAF in an aircraft, the needs of USAF and NASA in a rocket are fundamentally pretty much the same.
Quote from: Lobo on 02/09/2015 04:13 pmUnlike USN and USAF in an aircraft, the needs of USAF and NASA in a rocket are fundamentally pretty much the same.No, the analogy between USN and USAF aircraft and NASA and DOD launch vehicles is perfect.USN aircraft - carrier landing/ops and NASA LV - manrating. Items that the USAF and DOD don't need for their systems.Carrier landing is just more structure and more redundancy much like manrating a launch vehicle.
No, the analogy between USN and USAF aircraft and NASA and DOD launch vehicles is perfect.USN aircraft - carrier landing/ops and NASA LV - manrating. Items that the USAF and DOD don't need for their systems.Carrier landing is just more structure and more redundancy much like manrating a launch vehicle.
AF handles launches from the ETR/WTR and NASA handles launches from the Cape. The main question then becomes defining vehicle requirements and horse-trading between NASA and the USAF on same...Randy
Quibbly-point though Jim was that AT THE TIME, the USAF was open to and in fact had suggested continuing to "man-rate" larger Titan LV's both for their own use AND as a "suggestion" for NASA needs. So the "difference" was not so clear cut as you suggest. The stated conflict WOULD get larger as time went on and USAF requirements diverged from those of NASA but OTHER than bureaucratic and some specific operations issues both organizations COULD have cooperated to specify the needs of a joint launch vehicle.AF handles launches from the ETR/WTR and NASA handles launches from the Cape. The main question then becomes defining vehicle requirements and horse-trading between NASA and the USAF on same...
....From a purely technical standpoint, a perfectly reasonable system that could have achieved all of the principle goals of both sides was surely achievable...and such a vehicle could surely have been designed to have been more economical and safer than STS proved to be...
Quote from: truth is life on 02/09/2015 10:16 pm....From a purely technical standpoint, a perfectly reasonable system that could have achieved all of the principle goals of both sides was surely achievable...and such a vehicle could surely have been designed to have been more economical and safer than STS proved to be...In hindsight there is limited credible basis this was practically achievable. In fact the core problem was the pervasive assumption that "surely a reusable winged vehicle is the way forward". This mindset was deeply ingrained from the 1950s onward. Von Braun's associate Walter Dornberger may have coined the term space shuttle, and described it as "an economical space plane capable of putting a fresh egg, every morning, on the table of every crew member of a space station circling the globe".When you combine this compelling, seemingly plausible vision with success of the X-15 and Dyna-Soar (even thought it never flew), it's understandable how this led to a superficial, optimistic viewpoint that a large winged LV can be made with airliner-like turnaround and operating costs.In retrospect you can almost rekindle the reasoning: X-15 was turned around in two days, there were plans for orbital versions, shuttle will be like that only bigger. Obvious problems like TPS, engines and turnaround had facile solutions. TPS would use "new technology", the J-2 engine actually has a long lifetime, how hard could the SSME be? George Mueller's solution for turnaround was "automated checkout", which he said would make it possible for a small ground crew to carry out the preflight checks, achieving true aircraft-like simplicity. In his vision each major system would have built-in health and trend monitoring as a fundamental core element. This would facilitate targeted servicing, especially attractive in an era of clipboards and visual inspection of gauges and pen plotters.Unfortunately the devil is in the details. IF this was achievable (which is unclear), it would have required a dogged, persistent focus on how every design decision along the way affected serviceability and turnaround goals. From the smallest access panel, to cable routing, to subcomponent selection, to overall vehicle architecture.
So, I think we've established there was little chance of there being a joint NASA/USAF launch system in the early 70's, but assuming the two -could- play nice, what might a joint LV have looked like?
Quote from: Lobo on 02/10/2015 11:03 pmSo, I think we've established there was little chance of there being a joint NASA/USAF launch system in the early 70's, but assuming the two -could- play nice, what might a joint LV have looked like?It seems to me we're then looking at something like the low-cost expendables that I mentioned a few posts back. I think we can be confident such a thing would have saved money, because, unlike the Shuttle, its development would not have entailed much technological risk. Maybe NASA could have built a re-usable crew vehicle to ride on such a thing, as an X-vechicle for a reusable shuttle, if nothing else.
OK then something both could use.Atlas V like-Core plus US able to lift ~30,000 lb to LEO. ( No SRB's for crew safety, add bells and whistles for crew launch )US most likely Centaur V1 or V2.New crew capsule. Three minimum seating or more if NASA wanted more crew within the mass limit of the two stage lifter.( Land-landed reusable capsule ) Add Atlas V like SRB's for added lift. ( That would be 70's tech )NASA has it's own launch pad and USAF has it's own pad.Manufacture takes orders from both NASA and USAF.Latter if greater payload mass was needed they could add in the tri-core option with cross feed.
Quote from: RocketmanUS on 02/12/2015 03:29 amOK then something both could use.Atlas V like-Core plus US able to lift ~30,000 lb to LEO. ( No SRB's for crew safety, add bells and whistles for crew launch )US most likely Centaur V1 or V2.New crew capsule. Three minimum seating or more if NASA wanted more crew within the mass limit of the two stage lifter.( Land-landed reusable capsule ) Add Atlas V like SRB's for added lift. ( That would be 70's tech )NASA has it's own launch pad and USAF has it's own pad.Manufacture takes orders from both NASA and USAF.Latter if greater payload mass was needed they could add in the tri-core option with cross feed.On the right track now. In early 70's there were no Atlas like SRB's. There were Titan III segmented SRB's, and Minuteman ICBM small monolithic SRB's. (as I understand).New motors could be made for a new launch system. Basically an EELV 20 years early. It'd be a new development but probably wouldn't have been overly expensive. What core and engines would you use. would this be just two stage? or multi stage? GG kerolox engines and hypergolic engines with relatively low ISP typically had two stages to LEO. Titan III was 2.5 stages to LEO. Atlas and Atlas II used the MA-5 which dropped 2 of it's three nozzles partway up to help performance. Saturn 1 and 1B were two stage to LEO LV's. I believe Proton's first two stages are to get it to LEO. And Saturn V/Skylab LV was basically a 2 stage to LEO LV.Also, it'd have to have good performance to LEO specifically as that's what NASA's needs were. As to where current EELV are more optimized for BLEO than LEO because that was USAF/DoD's primary need. Falcon has better LEO performance compared to it's BLEO performance. If Falcon had a hydrolox 3rd stage on it, it'd have fantastic BLEO performance. Which is why I was thinking something like a large Falcon, with an optional Centaur-D 3rd stage (could be later upgraded to Centaur-T size) for those BLEO payloads for USAF. It'd have great LEO performance for NASA and other LEO payloads. And solids could be omitted entirely and the focus on economics of scale of the liquid engines, with the possibility to have a reusable engine ring.An alternative would be to have a hydrolox core powered by J2S, with Titan III SRB's as sort of a 70's version of Ariane 5. That would satisfy NASA's excitement over hydrolox as the miracle propellant and the core could possibly get all the way to disposal without the need for a whole 2nd stage. But unmanned LEO paylaods would still need a kick stage as there's no big orbiter to do it. But, I think that would be more expensive...and obviously hydrolox is temperamental.If going that route, probably better to make the core kerolox with like 4 or 5 H-1's, and Titan III SRB's, and make it essentially a kerolox version Titan III. Could launch with or without the boosters. Without booster it'd cover the Titan II/III and Atlas-Centaur payloads with more capacity than those. With Titan III SRB's it'd be Titan IV/STS performance. The Titan IIIM UA1207 man rated SRB's would probably need to be developed for this configuration as NASA would need to launch with those SRB's for it's missions. (Could be made reusable if desired).But I still like that SRB-less “Large 1970’s Falcon 9” the best so far. :-)
...although it seems nobody was paying attention, one 1966 study of X-15 operations (attached) concluded that "the present estimates and extrapolations for future reusable boosters and orbital space vehicles appear to be overly optimistic in comparison to the actual X-15 experience, especially in the length of time required for turnaround."...The paper also notes that turn-around costs were about 3% of the cost of a new vehicle. Apply that to the fully-reusable Shuttle that was meant to cost $10 billion (1971 dollars) for a fleet of five, and NASA's projections of $6 million per flight look awfully optimistic.
...More generally on the question of the Shuttle's economics, two RAND studies...indicated that a shuttle did not make economic sense unless the space program were going to be ramped up quite a bit.
In hindsight there is limited credible basis this was practically achievable. In fact the core problem was the pervasive assumption that "surely a reusable winged vehicle is the way forward". This mindset was deeply ingrained from the 1950s onward. Von Braun's associate Walter Dornberger may have coined the term space shuttle, and described it as "an economical space plane capable of putting a fresh egg, every morning, on the table of every crew member of a space station circling the globe".
It implies there was a better alternate design available with the money, knowledge and technology in 1971 which would have achieved the goals. This is by no means clear.
Most of the STS alternatives discussed in this thread have a fatal defect: they LOOK old-fashioned by the standards of the average person in 1969-71. We had all been conditioned by SF artists, Von Braun/Disney animations, and corporate PR departments to expect that ICBM technology would eventually be replaced by sleek winged spaceships. Anything that LOOKED conventional -- couldn't have been sold as advanced technology-- couldn't have been sold as more spectacular than anything the USSR might do-- couldn't have been sold as cheaper than pressing on with Titans and/or Saturns.This is why the program stuck with the "fully reusable" flyback booster until the Phase B sudies showed it to be unbuildable, and why people even today criticise the final STS design as "old-fashioned" or "inferior".Most of these designs also ignore the real unstated goal of the program: preserving the Apollo industrial base during a period of strong anti-technology, anti-space public sentiment. That's why the program was originally intended to last a maximum of 10 years, by which time space would be back in public favor again and the Space Task Group program would finally be funded.
I have only one data point, "After Apollo" by John Logsdon, but the take away was budget cuts that eliminated the Saturn V, NERVA, Mars, a Space Station and the rest left NASA with a 'shuttle' as the only project that could be funded. NASA wanted something that could loft space station modules sometime in the future. Technology and budget eliminated the fully reusable plane like booster with orbiter on top. Pressure was on for a smaller orbiter or no Manned Space Program at all. Politics couldn't accept no Manned Space and NASA wanted the large cargo bay. There was some in NASA that felt the length of the cargo bay was needed for spy satellites.So, the result was the STS.
Pressure was on for a smaller orbiter or no Manned Space Program at all. Politics couldn't accept no Manned Space and NASA wanted the large cargo bay. There was some in NASA that felt the length of the cargo bay was needed for spy satellites.So, the result was the STS.
- PSAC answer: this is very bad, better to go with Big Gemini and stock Titan III to launch the spy sats.
That's pretty right - Tom Heppenheimer "The space shuttle decision" (chapter eight ) clearly show how the OMB really tried to "scare NASA" as you say. http://www.nss.org/resources/library/shuttledecision/chapter08.htmThere was also what I call "the fat DynaSoar" (lame pun assumed) wich was a 100 000 pound mini shuttle launched by a Titan III-L. Just like Big Gemini, it was not a "true" program but mostly a paper project used to scare the hell out of NASA. What always surprised me was how little support from the military did NASA got in this difficult time, late 1971. The military had imposed a large orbiter with a large bay, the PSAC and OMB criticized NASA shuttle for that (it is too big) , yet the military say nothing to help them. OMB "NASA orbiter is really big, and expensive. Why so big ?"PSAC "it's because of that big payload bay, 15X60 ft"NASA "hey, the big payload bay is not my idea. It is the military that imposed it"OMB "Oh yeah ? So why don't they defend the big payload bay by themselves ? Tell us, you don't get a lot of suport from the military ? NASA (sigh....)
No, the big payload bay was just as much NASA's. The 15"diameter was NASA's requirement.
I'm not convinced that after 1969 Big Gemini was even a real program anymore. I think it was mostly kept around as an option to scare NASA into keeping the costs down. See my Big Gemini article on this.
I just wanted to point out that the "absurdity" of filling SRB segments in Utah and then shipping them all the way across country to Florida, isn't so "absurd" as it may seem.
Quote from: Lobo on 02/04/2015 12:43 amI'm curious about a true, pragmatic "Space Transportation System" to be happily used by both USAF and NASA (rather than the shotgun wedding of STS), using information know to people in the early 70's, but assuming enough foresight to have forseen some of the issues that would come of STS and to have turned a bit different direction.
Based on the Bellcom and NASA papers I've read from the late 60s and early 70s as well as "The Space Shuttle Decision", the ideas that were kicking around were: 1) Titan III (would have required a fair amount of R&D money to make a version NASA could have used - Titan IIIM is the minimum here, but likely more would have been required - of course that's still cheaper than developing the shuttle, likely by an order of magnitude - this is also by far the most likely option since the Titan III production line was massively underutilized and the USAF would have been very happy to keep using their rocket to there are powerful political and cost-saving gains here).
2) The next idea that comes up alot is the SRM-SIVB (I've attached some interesting documents that discuss these rockets). A cluster of Titan SRMs with a streamlined cheapened SIV as the second stage. NASA seems to have been fairly keen on this idea, and it seemed to offer very economical launch costs at very low development cost. I am somewhat doubtful that these would have been quite so wonderful as their boosters claimed. Also, I have no idea if the SRM-SIVB was of any interest at all to the USAF, though according to the Bellcomm memo on near-term intermediate LVs, the USAF was apparently looking at a LH2/LOX upper stage for the Titan.
3) Dust off the Saturn IB and use that. Obviously, not something that would be acceptable to the USAF without exotic tortures being applied.
1) Use of hypergolics. NASA did use them for Gemini as they had little choice. Saturn 1B was developed at this time, so would NASA have gotten on board with this new variant, which had less capacity than Saturn 1B, that also went back to toxic propellants and SRB's?
2) SRB's. They obviously did go with them with STS, and Titan was developing a version that could be terminated in case of a manned launch failure. But Titan IIIM would have used UA1207, which was a new upgrade that flew on Titan IVA before being replaced with even larger ones. Which leads to...
3) The Titan's going away as ICBM's. A lot of why the Titan III's were relatively inexpensive was that USAF/DoD funded them out of Defense budgets for ICBM's. But in the 70's, the Titan's were going away for more storable solid Minuteman ICBM's. So USAF/NASA would have had to have supported the line themselves in the future, and so costs would have went up. Likely still would have been a lot cheaper than STS, but the Titan IV's turned ended up being quite costly when they were put into service after Challenger.
4) USAF's eventual needs were more than what Titan IIIM could do (17mt) Titan IV was 22mt, and Shuttle was ~24mt. So development of Titan IIIM would then needed additional development of Titan IV the next decade. And again, costs really went up there for Titan IV in the 80's and 90's. Not saying it wasn't feasible and had NASA and USAF been at it together, there likely would have been some various cost savings that could be applied to Titan as it evolved. But Titan IIIM Wouldn't have done it itself for every long, something like Titan IV would be needed in short order.
So...it's certainly very plausible that could have happened. I tend to think had STS not happened, more likely NASA probably would have retained Saturn 1B for their program, and USAF would have continued with Titan. I was hoping for a new joint LV that could be made to cover both needs, shared, and not have hypergolics and solds.
Interesting but I think collaborating on Titan or retaining Saturn 1B would have been more likely. While this would cost shared with USAF/DoD in the SRB's, it would have required a complete redesign of the S-IVB with a lot of new supports added to support all of that solid thrust.
My alternate "STS" system was basically a 1970's version of Falcon 9. using 9 RS-27 engines on the monocore booster, and one RS-27A on the upper stage. USAF could use Centaur for a 3rd stage if needed, NASA could put a mini reusable shuttle on top of the 2nd stage for their LEO program, post-Apollo.
no, NASA would not have kept the Saturn IB. And it did go for Titan III. NASA paid for IIIE development vs using IB
I've not seen any evidence that the Americans were worrying about hypergols before 80s Before 1986 when both a Titan and Challenger were lost due to problems with the solids, SRMs looked really good though.
The Saturn IB would, however, require alot of development money to be spent before it could serve the USAF's needs (polar orbits and GSO), never mind the cost of re-tooling their facilities to support the rocket.
One idea that I find interesting (but I don't think it could realistically displace Titan for the USAF or the Saturn IB if NASA can restart the production line at a reasonable cost) is a first stage based on a cluster of 7 Thor tanks. The Thor tanks were real marvels of aerospace engineering and even a cluster like this wouldn't be too heavy. With 7 of the uprated 250k lbf H-1 engines that had been proposed, it would be very, very like the Saturn I first stage, but of course the components would share much of the tooling of the Delta first stage since both the tanks and the engines used would be the same. If I remember rightly, the cluster of tanks would have an overall diameter of around 7.7 meters. With a ker-LOX upper stage (perhaps something based on the Atlas first stage - say an Atlas tank with a quincunx of Atlas sustainer engines powering it), the payload should be in the ballpark of being practical for the military.Sort of a kludged together American Zenit.
of course, the odds are that in such a situation, bolting together tanks like this wouldn't be very advantageous from a development perspective, so new tanks would probably be developed.)
To get up to the sorts of payloads NASA wanted, they'd need a more powerful second stage, like NERVA or the SIVB.
Jim, can you explain a little as to why NASA was looking more into Titan than their own Saturn 1B, even funding the IIIE? (I did not know they did that). Purely a cost standpoint of sharing with USAF and DoD (ICBM budgets)?It seems they wouldn't have been big fans of toxic hypergolics and big solids vs. an all kerolox LV that was already operational and KSC already set up to handle and process.
Good input here, thanks. And a lot of good historical info that have learned me some new things. Much like whenever we can coax Jim to share some of his really great historical knowledge.
Yes, I may be looking at that with a little too much 20/20 hindsight. Today the advantages for HSF of non toxic, all liquid seem fairly standard. For my conceptual joint USAF/NASA "Space Transport System" I do use a little 20/20 hindsight, but with existing hardware and tech of the early 70's.
I'm not familiar with the Thor tanks, so I can't really comment on that.
As for engine on it, the H-1 derived RS-27A would be a good option. Or the other H-1 derivative the Atlas II sustainer engines. The nice thing about using this H-1 family of engines, is they were the right size, a cluster of them allow for engine out capability, and they were relatively simple and inexpensive. And the H-1 held up pretty well in salt water tests, in case they wanted to experiment with parachute water landing reusability, as reusability was an important political topic of the day, and drove the Shuttle STS.
Actually a clustered tank design may have been more structural strong than a mono core for such a recovery method.
My 1970's F9 concept joint LV would have been more like 5-6m wide, with the upper stage being made the same diameter on the same line, like F9. That may have ultimately been more streamline.
What sort of payloads did NASA want? Shuttle only had around 23mt.
Quote from: Lobo on 03/16/2018 04:10 pmGood input here, thanks. And a lot of good historical info that have learned me some new things. Much like whenever we can coax Jim to share some of his really great historical knowledge.When comparing me to Jim, just remember, I'm getting this stuff out of history books and by reading the publicly available documents that were written at the time. Jim was actually there.
Unfortunately, the people designing this alternate system in the alternate 70s wouldn't have that hindsight.
I am a real fan of the H-1 family. Of a size that it could be used for a broad range of LVs and an astoundingly low cost for its size.
Maybe. I'm not sure exactly how strong it would need to be. One advantage that a cluster of Thor tanks do definitely have over the Saturn 1 stage is that the fuel and oxidizer tanks didn't run the full length of the stage, meaning you could blow the dome off the top tanks (which I think was the kerosene tank), and keep the empty LOX tanks below them as a float, like the proposed stage recovery method for the Saturn 1C stage. Of course, blowing the domes off a cluster like this I can see being appreciably more finicky than blowing the dome off a mono-tank design like the Saturn 1C.
Hm. A cluster of 4 Thor tanks would fit inside a circle with a diameter of 5.88 meters. That is a bit closer to what you're looking for. (Though since a cluster of 4 is closer to a square it is maybe more useful to look at the length of one side of the square that would surround the tanks, which would be 4.88 meters.)I'm curious - is there any advantage to having it under 6 meters in diameter?
The Titan IIIM however would have been too weak to be of any use without either remaking it into a different and more powerful rocket or a major re-design of the package for getting crew and supplies up to the station (i.e. a new crew capsule). By contrast, the SRM-SIVB was supposed to get almost 26 tonnes to the target orbit, meaning NASA would be able to (if I am remembering this right) halve the launches/year required to support their space station.
To launch space station modules, you want a LV with as much payload as possible, to take advantage of economies of scale. For example, with the skylab-like stations proposed in the report, each station was supposed to be around 92 tonnes, with a pressurized volume of over 300 cubic meters. By contrast, Mir, which was built out of modules sized for the limits of the Proton, had 350 cubic meters of pressurized volume and massed 130 tonnes. A 302 cubic meter space station built like Mir would have weighed in at over 112 tonnes - much less mass-efficient. To build a Mir-type space station with SRB-SIVB launches would take 5 launches, for which the cost of vehicle acquisition would total 200 million 1971 USD. And that's assuming the SRB-SIVB is as cheap as was anticipated (which I doubt). By contrast, the Saturn Int-21, whose costs were much better understood, would launch an equivalent station for a vehicle acquisition cost of 80 million 1971 USD. And that's just the costs of buying the launch vehicle - not the full launch costs - which of course are higher if you have more launches.
If NERVA hadn't been cancelled, then a nuclear second stage on the Saturn IB could have produced a LV capable of Energia-level performance with 80-100 tonnes to LEO.
There is a definite moment when Saturn IB lost to Titan III, but it is not related to manned spaceflight but to robotic exploration. *snip*One can ask why didn't they brought back Saturn IB Centaur for Viking, the answer was that by 67-68 Saturn production had been frozen (not cancelled, just frozen) so they went for Titan III instead.
During Voyager 1.0 NASA considered Titan III for the first time, but back then they disliked military boosters because of bad experiences, notably with Atlas and Titan.
The official start of the space shuttle program was between december 1967 and july 1968, Voyager had already been cancelled (July 1967) and Viking was on very early planning stages.
What is sure is that there was a large number of Saturn IB left by Apollo (SA-209 to SA-216, minus ASTP, AS-210 in the end that's SEVEN rockets, not all them complete). But as you said, they crucially lacked the Centaur stage. Bringing back the Saturn-Centaur in 1968 would have duplicated Titan IIID-Centaur (that was the name back them, it become III-E later) but also probably the future Space Shuttle, as you noted. Surely, during its funding quest for the shuttle, NASA had very hard times proving OMB and Congress the Shuttle would bring any cost improvement compared to the Titan, so imagine if the Saturn IB was there, too. More generally, by 1968 Saturn IB was already a relic of the past, at least in NASA eyes.
I would say first scrap the shuttle and get Big Gemini as NASA space station logistic vehicle. The funny thing, Big Gemini is superficially similar to the MOL, maybe NASA and the Air Force could get a kind of hybrid of the two spacecrafts, launched by a Titan III-M.
It would be pretty easy for Martin Marietta to tweak a Titan II to replace both Atlas and Delta. The end result ? having slained the shuttle, Saturn IB, Atlas and Delta the Titan family would achieve total domination of U.S launch systems, something the Space Shuttle tried to achieve but failed. Then the Titan could try to pull a Falcon 9 - mass production to drop cost, followed by (partial) reusability to drop cost further. I would say - start from the enlarged core, four engine Titan III-L without SRMs but scrap the storable propellants and return to the Titan I kerolox LR-87. Four kerolox LR-87 topped by one kerolox LR-91, and then goes full Falcon 9, if that's ever doable in the 80's. By the way, Big Gemini makes an honest-to-god Dragon 2...
I would say first scrap the shuttle and get Big Gemini as NASA space station logistic vehicle.
Would Big Gemini have had any chance of winning out over some sort of reusable space plane during this era? I'm no expert on it, but wasn't it still basically an expendable capsule? I know there was a pretty palpable push for reusability and going "futuristic" at the time. That's why I mention an HL-20/42 style mini shuttle at the time. Or something like a larger Dyna-Soar perhaps.
1. (note: Big Gemini was a serious project, up to a full-size mockup, but only between 1967 and 1969, after what it was only OMB prefered option to scare the hell out of NASA into cutting Shuttle development costs) 2. Big Gemini crew module was to land on an airstrip, using X-15 -like skids and a parafoil or parasail. On paper it could be refurbished and reused, but that's very, very uncertain and probably not worth it. Maybe just scavenging the spent modules for cheap spares, as NAR planned to do for future Apollo CMs.
Anyway, the attached is courtesy of Dr. Logsdon.
Lobo asked for an "Alternate Joint NASA/USAF "STS" system and I totally forgot about the 'fact' they actually DID have one... But timing is everything after all USAF "SLS" (Space Launching System) of 1960:http://www.astronautix.com/s/sls.html
NASA "Almost-SLS" of 1966/68-ish:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saturn_IIIf only the 'kids' could play nice with each other Randy
Interesting. I love this site, I always learn something new.
Obviously this was the USAF preferred concept with a whole bunch of big solid boosters. Heh.
In the 50's, solids looked pretty good as big liquid engines were in their early stages. And later it was figured out that when those solids got really big, they weren't all that cheap and easy.
Yea, I was aware of Saturn II. An interesting design.
I never quite liked that it needed Solids to get off the ground with the existing J2 engines (although it could with sea level variants or the HG-3). Also, hydrolox is difficult and just not a good booster propellant.
There's a case to be made for it in STS (Or Ariane 5) where it's basically a ground lit 2nd stage/sustainer stage all the way to orbit. But Saturn II would have the hydrolox S-IVB as the 2nd stage anyway. The S-II is itself a 2nd stage rather than a sustainer stage.
It probably could have been modified into a sustainer stage with the help of a lot of solid booster assistance, then it'd basically have been a smaller, fatter 1970's SLS. heh.
With 20/20 hindsight, I still think having a kerolox booster that could get the stack off the ground efficiently would have been preferable.
With maybe small Minuteman solids (shared with other LV, small, easy to handle) that can augment it for heavier payloads. But I think SpaceX has shown, just simple kerolox, of a size to cover your whole payload range without solids is a good concept and perfectly economical (even without any reusability).
Don't over think it, keep it simple and reliable, which gas generator kerolox was in the 60's and 70's.
That's why I kind of like the "1970's Falcon 9" concept, with H-1C engines on a mono core booster, with then a single vacuum H-1 for a kerolox 2nd stage. Add the Centaur 3rd stage for BLEO payloads, and it'd have been a perfectly fine shared launcher for USAF as well, with engine family shared with Delta and Atlas for smaller payload needs.
Well there was that "Titan-variant" called Arcturus back around 1959
Kind of depends on what assumptions you're using since Aerojet could actually 'show' the math working for a big solid built IN Florida, (rather than say Utah or Colorado ) at least cost-wise. Operationally however...
QuoteYea, I was aware of Saturn II. An interesting design.I knew that YOU knew, that "I" knew, that you knew, but then again what's new?
Seriously, it was and it showed that NASA was willing to consider, (not for long but...) using such components. The main thing was the "Saturn-II" obviously being based on existing Saturn hardware whereas SLS...
True but being the 'uber-propellant' (in theory) kept it in the running on math alone Nobody 'liked' the need for solids or dense liquid boosters because they always brought the overall performance numbers down, but, (as we've seen with the Delta-IV) anything else is a bit wasteful. Despite being flaky as heck over design, propulsion, performance, and mission the one thing the AF got right from the start was hydrolox was best for anything OTHER than boosters.
QuoteThere's a case to be made for it in STS (Or Ariane 5) where it's basically a ground lit 2nd stage/sustainer stage all the way to orbit. But Saturn II would have the hydrolox S-IVB as the 2nd stage anyway. The S-II is itself a 2nd stage rather than a sustainer stage.Eh, check that. The SLS air-light the J2s once the SRBs burned out. Oddly enough it seems to be where Martin got the idea for the Titan-III and later because running the numbers showed much better performance, (with less vehicle stressing) by air-starting the liquid stages after the SRBs lifted the vehicle to altitude. There was by design no 'sustainer' stage.
QuoteIt probably could have been modified into a sustainer stage with the help of a lot of solid booster assistance, then it'd basically have been a smaller, fatter 1970's SLS. heh.You mean "SLS" not "SLS" right?
QuoteWith 20/20 hindsight, I still think having a kerolox booster that could get the stack off the ground efficiently would have been preferable.Again the answer you get depends on what answer you were looking for in the first place In the Air Force mind of the time the segmented solids had a pretty sweet draw in that by varying the number of segments AND boosters you could launch a wide variety of payloads on the same 'upper' stages. Especially if you varied the propellant load as well.
As per 'standard' planning of the time they were looking at several launches a month up to a couple a week in some cases of various mission payloads. Quite obviously everyone noted you ran into problems with 'big' boosters in that they required very specialized, and extensive, (not to mention expensive) infrastructure. As the flight rate went up some infrastructure would end up pretty much the same, (propellant production, handling and storage come to mind) for small/medium and big boosters but you didn't have to have It all right away. Having said that another 'obvious' conclusion was you eventually wanted to go with reusable, (the AF had "Astrorocket" studies going on around the same time-frame I think) but at the same time you had significantly different payload missions that were often not as 'suited' to a single launch system or design.
And a launcher that big, like the current Falcon-9 is not going to be able to service the vast amount of different payloads developed and designed between the 60s and the 80s. It will be vastly too large for some, (most actually early on) and need additional upper stages or boost assists for others. And then there's the difference between what NASA and the Air Force 'wanted' at any one time. If the USAF doesn't have a 'manned' mission to support they won't want anything over about the Titan, (10 to say 12 feet) whereas NASA who are running a manned mission
A lesson we learned again from the Shuttle. Monlithic systems tend to lead to fixed designs which don't scale well or at all whereas 'modular' can be scaled in any direction at an economic cost.
And actually I have to point out that SpaceX didn't in fact 'prove' this at all since the good-old R7 was doing it long before Elon Musk got the space bug.
The problem is a full kerolox LV is NOT efficient and the only way it stays relevant is if you can make it vastly cheaper. Which arguably SpaceX does but, in truth anyone with a more efficient upper stage and similar costs would eat their lunch.
There's a reason they are moving to methalox after all
QuoteThat's why I kind of like the "1970's Falcon 9" concept, with H-1C engines on a mono core booster, with then a single vacuum H-1 for a kerolox 2nd stage. Add the Centaur 3rd stage for BLEO payloads, and it'd have been a perfectly fine shared launcher for USAF as well, with engine family shared with Delta and Atlas for smaller payload needs.You're mixing your metaphors there buster The only reason the US had 'any' decent LVs at the time, (talking early 60s) was because they invested in LH2 upper stages and engines.