Gass:"I’ve also experienced some of the launch industry’s darkest days, such as in the late 1990s when the U.S. suffered a series of six major launch failures over a 10-month period. "Pop quiz. Name all six....
Quote from: Chris Bergin on 03/05/2014 04:13 pmGass:"I’ve also experienced some of the launch industry’s darkest days, such as in the late 1990s when the U.S. suffered a series of six major launch failures over a 10-month period. "Pop quiz. Name all six....Three Titan IV missions (two were upper stage phases), two Delta III flights, and one amazing Delta II explosion right above the launch pad - although the timeline of the Delta II failure might not be right. There was an Athena failure in 1999 that might be a better fit for the 10 month interval.UPDATE: It was the Athena. Here's a list.08/12/98 Titan 401A A20/TC? Vortex 2 (NRO) CC 41 (FTO)(a)08/27/98 Delta 8930 D259 Galaxy 10 CC 17B (FTO)(b)04/09/99 Titan 402B B27/IUS21 DSP 19 CC 41 (GTO)(1)04/27/99 Athena-2 LM005 Ikonos 1 VA 6 (FTO)(2)04/30/99 Titan 401B B32/TC14 Milstar 2 F1 CC 40 (EEO)(3) 05/05/99 Delta 8930-13.1C D269 Orion 3 CC 17B (EEO)(4) (a) Exploded at T+41.3s after power glitch caused loss of guidance and pitchover(b) First Delta 3; exploded at T+75s; guidance failure (algorithm)(1) IUS SRM-2 apogee failed due SRM-1 bad sep(2) Fairing no sep (electrical) (3) Bad Centaur attitude control software, improper final orbit(4) RL10B-2 chamber rupture at transfer burn start - Ed Kyle
08/12/98 Titan 401A A20/TC? Vortex 2 (NRO) CC 41 (FTO)(a)08/27/98 Delta 8930 D259 Galaxy 10 CC 17B (FTO)(b)04/09/99 Titan 402B B27/IUS21 DSP 19 CC 41 (GTO)(1)04/27/99 Athena-2 LM005 Ikonos 1 VA 6 (FTO)(2)04/30/99 Titan 401B B32/TC14 Milstar 2 F1 CC 40 (EEO)(3) 05/05/99 Delta 8930-13.1C D269 Orion 3 CC 17B (EEO)(4) (a) Exploded at T+41.3s after power glitch caused loss of guidance and pitchover(b) First Delta 3; exploded at T+75s; guidance failure (algorithm)(1) IUS SRM-2 apogee failed due SRM-1 bad sep(2) Fairing no sep (electrical) (3) Bad Centaur attitude control software, improper final orbit(4) RL10B-2 chamber rupture at transfer burn start
Fantastic thread, coverage and comments. Thanks all! I hope to find time this evening to review the links.As for phasing out AtlasV: I think it more likely AtlasV would be phased out than the RD-180 being fabricated in the U.S. due to development cost (and thus cost increase of the booster). Remember, even if/when the Ukraine deal resolves (peacefully we hope), the question of the AtlasV core propulsion will still be valid. CST100 and DC better consider a different option (Delta IV M4+2?, Falcon?).I think ultimately this (attention on U.S. spaceflight) is good for us.
Mr. Chairman, we appreciate this Committee’s timely review of the EELV Program. We commend theAir Force and NRO efforts to reintroduce competition into the EELV Program as a means to counter therising costs of national security space launch and the stagnant innovation in this critical sector. In orderfor true, meaningful competition to occur, we respectfully suggest the EELV Program be further reformedto adopt contracting practices and other acquisition reforms consistent with a competitive procurementenvironment, as follows:1) Most importantly, every single mission capable of being launched by qualified new entrantsshould be competed this year and every year moving forward. There should be no reason that amission is sole-sourced to ULA, whether as part of the recent 36-core deal or any otherarrangement. And if competition opportunities are being delayed, we should understand why thatis so, and we should fix it immediately;2) Introduce a FAR Part 12 commercial contract structure that creates rational incentives for boththe contractors and the government to achieve reliable, cost effective on-time launches;3) Leverage commercial practices wherever possible – a philosophy and acquisition approach thatNASA has successfully employed in its launch programs. Fundamentally, the Air Force shouldestablish clear requirements for launch services and associated activities, but it should not dictatehow those requirements are implemented. Rather, contractors should be empowered to meetrequirements in a manner best suited to their organization’s strengths; and4) Eliminate payments—more properly called subsidies—under the EELV Launch Capability (ELC)contract line item that are exclusively in support of the incumbent provider. And whenconducting competitions for launches, properly account for the subsidies that the incumbentenjoys so that an even playing field is created. The long-term elimination of the ELC isparamount if an efficient acquisition approach is to be created. As was noted in DOD’srecertification of the EELV program after its 2012 “critical” Nunn-McCurdy breach, cost-plus
I disagree about phasing out Atlas 5, because the Atlas 5 propulsion problem is also for all practical purposes the Antares propulsion problem. This problem needs to be resolved, either by guaranteed access to RD-180, or by replacing the engine entirely. - Ed Kyle
ULA contracts are fixed price
Elon Musk's written statement pulls no punches:
I disagree about phasing out Atlas 5, because the Atlas 5 propulsion problem is also for all practical purposes the Antares propulsion problem. This problem needs to be resolved, either by guaranteed access to RD-180, or by replacing the engine entirely.
Quote from: Jim on 03/05/2014 05:43 pmULA contracts are fixed priceMusk was talking about the ELC contract. The more than $1B per year that ULA gets whether it launches or not.
But that's the rub. There is no such thing as guaranteed access to the RD-180 outside of fabricating it here in the U.S. And replacing the RD-180 means development of a SC (likely oxy rich) kerolox engine. Either way, huge development time and cost (seems that the domestic RD-180 might be the better option, but I don't know enough about true domestic progress on other kerolox options, including AJ26).
Quote from: edkyle99 on 03/05/2014 04:44 pmI disagree about phasing out Atlas 5, because the Atlas 5 propulsion problem is also for all practical purposes the Antares propulsion problem. This problem needs to be resolved, either by guaranteed access to RD-180, or by replacing the engine entirely. - Ed KyleBut that's the rub. There is no such thing as guaranteed access to the RD-180 outside of fabricating it here in the U.S. And replacing the RD-180 means development of a SC (likely oxy rich) kerolox engine. Either way, huge development time and cost (seems that the domestic RD-180 might be the better option, but I don't know enough about true domestic progress on other kerolox options, including AJ26). Either way, per comments from Mr. Gass, it seems unlikely ULA will go down that road. And even if they did, the affordability of the AtlasV (the big selling point) goes away with said development and fabrication costs.
The partial Atlas V failure was AEHF-1, right?