True as this may be, they did not conceive of the idea. Rather, they appear to be briskly finishing off the program that Prez Bush suggested canceling in the 2004 VSE. It seems to me like this important detail needs to be frequently restated.As to "extending the Shuttle significantly beyond its current manifest", it is my opinion that extending the manifest by about five or six flights, which would virtually completely use up existing hardware, would not qualify as a "significant" extension, but rather as a "practical" and "cost effective", and "fiscally responsible" limited extension, serving also the valuable interim goal of "minimizing the gap".
In a report accompanying the S. 3729 issued a few days later, Senate lawmakers state that regarding the heavy-lift rocket, “the most cost-effective and ‘evolvable’ design concept is likely to follow what is known as an ‘in-line’ vehicle design, with a large center tank structure with attached multiple liquid propulsion engines and, at a minimum, two solid rocket motors composed of at least four segments being attached to the tank structure to form the core, initial stage of the propulsion vehicle.”The report notes that the committee “will closely monitor NASA’s early planning and design efforts to ensure compliance with the intent of this section” of the bill.
http://spacenews.com/civil/081310senate-prescribed-heavy-lifter-looks-like-ares.htmlQuoteIn a report accompanying the S. 3729 issued a few days later, Senate lawmakers state that regarding the heavy-lift rocket, “the most cost-effective and ‘evolvable’ design concept is likely to follow what is known as an ‘in-line’ vehicle design, with a large center tank structure with attached multiple liquid propulsion engines and, at a minimum, two solid rocket motors composed of at least four segments being attached to the tank structure to form the core, initial stage of the propulsion vehicle.”The report notes that the committee “will closely monitor NASA’s early planning and design efforts to ensure compliance with the intent of this section” of the bill. Inline it is then . Also, is this report available online anywhere?
Section 302. Space Launch System as follow-on launch vehicle to the Space Shuttle.<snip>Should resources and manufacturing capacity be available to permit parallel development of both the core elements of the launch system and an integrated upper stage for missions beyond low-Earth orbit, the Committee believes such concurrent development should be pursued.In order to meet the mission and cost goals of the vehicle authorized by this section, NASA should focus on designing and building `to cost' versus overall performance. The Committee notes that this requirement represents a fundamental change from NASA's recent history with the Constellation program and a number of previous NASA launch initiatives, and believes it is critical that NASA follow this guidance. In the near-term, NASA should maximize the use of existing assets and capabilities from Shuttle and Ares programs to the extent practicable, while constraining requirements and performance to only those necessary to meet the schedule authorized for early operational capability. Modifications of ground infrastructure and other elements to support the vehicle should be minimized.
A couple other interesting bits not highlighted in the spacenews article:QuoteSection 302. Space Launch System as follow-on launch vehicle to the Space Shuttle....In order to meet the mission and cost goals of the vehicle authorized by this section, NASA should focus on designing and building `to cost' versus overall performance. The Committee notes that this requirement represents a fundamental change from NASA's recent history with the Constellation program and a number of previous NASA launch initiatives, and believes it is critical that NASA follow this guidance. In the near-term, NASA should maximize the use of existing assets and capabilities from Shuttle and Ares programs to the extent practicable, while constraining requirements and performance to only those necessary to meet the schedule authorized for early operational capability. Modifications of ground infrastructure and other elements to support the vehicle should be minimized.
Section 302. Space Launch System as follow-on launch vehicle to the Space Shuttle....In order to meet the mission and cost goals of the vehicle authorized by this section, NASA should focus on designing and building `to cost' versus overall performance. The Committee notes that this requirement represents a fundamental change from NASA's recent history with the Constellation program and a number of previous NASA launch initiatives, and believes it is critical that NASA follow this guidance. In the near-term, NASA should maximize the use of existing assets and capabilities from Shuttle and Ares programs to the extent practicable, while constraining requirements and performance to only those necessary to meet the schedule authorized for early operational capability. Modifications of ground infrastructure and other elements to support the vehicle should be minimized.
Ross maintains that the older studies show that inline is cheaper in production, and now that inline is getting more recent official study within NASA to catch up with not-shuttle-C that may turn out to be the case
Section 308. Development of technologies and in-space capabilities for beyond near-Earth space missions. This section would authorize the Administrator to develop technologies necessary for missions beyond low-Earth orbit. To develop these technologies, this section would allow the Administrator to invest in a space suit, a space-based transfer vehicle, advanced life support capabilities, improved in-space propulsion systems, in-space propellant transfer and storage systems, in situ resource utilization capabilities, and technologies to mitigate of biological impediments to human deep space missions, including radiation challenges. This section would allow the Administrator to utilize the ISS as a test-bed for technologies developed in these areas, where applicable, and require the Administrator to pursue technology development through a coordinated agency technology approach, which includes mission-driven technology developments and risk reduction.
Section 1103. NASA capabilities study requirement. This section would, after the completion of the study described in section 1102, require the Administrator to contract with an inde-pendent entity to submit a report to Congress within 1 year from initiation of this analysis that examines alternative management models for NASA’s workforce, centers, and capabilities, including the potential conversion of NASA centers to federally funded re-search and development centers.
QuoteSection 1103. [...] alternative management models for NASA’s workforce, centers, and capabilities, including the potential conversion of NASA centers to federally funded re-search and development centers.
Section 1103. [...] alternative management models for NASA’s workforce, centers, and capabilities, including the potential conversion of NASA centers to federally funded re-search and development centers.
Jim Muncy, a space policy consultant here, said the $7 billion the bill authorizes over three years for the new rocket may not be enough to undertake a major development program while also sustaining the U.S. solid-rocket motor industrial base, which has more capacity than business.“If you’ve got to spend $600 million or $700 million a year to keep the base alive, that’s a fairly substantial fraction of your heavy-lift launch development budget keeping that industrial capacity in place,” he said. “It’s very expensive to have those fixed costs while you’re trying to develop something new.”
From the Space News article:QuoteJim Muncy, a space policy consultant here, said the $7 billion the bill authorizes over three years for the new rocket may not be enough to undertake a major development program while also sustaining the U.S. solid-rocket motor industrial base, which has more capacity than business.“If you’ve got to spend $600 million or $700 million a year to keep the base alive, that’s a fairly substantial fraction of your heavy-lift launch development budget keeping that industrial capacity in place,” he said. “It’s very expensive to have those fixed costs while you’re trying to develop something new.” Do those fixed costs actually come from the SLS development budget, and not the Space Operations budget?
Inline it is then .
Quote from: 2552 on 08/13/2010 11:18 pmInline it is then . Hold your horses. They have completed the assessment on the sidemount. They have only just begun to bring the inline assessment into line. There is no decision on the configuration.At present, inline is deemed more expensive and a long dev cycle:http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2010/06/sd-hlv-assessment-highlights-post-shuttle-solution/ - and that is from the absolute master presentation of all things SD HLV, period.Where things will stand after the inline assessment is brought up to speed is where the interest is, and where people say inline will win through........but that's only just started.
Wouldn't this extension use up the available hardware that could be used for Jupiter type test vehicles, thus extending the time till the new rocket is launched?
And no money has been set aside to finish assembly...
Bolden has stated publically that flying the shuttle is "like playing Russian roulette."
At present, inline is deemed more expensive and a long dev cycle...
Either that or his will explode like a muppet.
Presumably JSC have a better understanding of the side-mount config, because that's what they work with now. I do wonder whether MSFC quite share that view, and I believe the Senate bill pushes te work their way.However, your post raises the question for me whether MSFC might prefer to build an in-line, but the cost constraints force them to go side-mount because it's cheaper to develop.
Quote from: 2552 on 08/13/2010 11:18 pmInline it is then . Hold your horses. They have completed the assessment on the sidemount. They have only just begun to bring the inline assessment into line. There is no decision on the configuration.