NASASpaceFlight.com Forum
General Discussion => Live Event Section - Latest Space Flight News => Topic started by: hpras on 09/24/2010 04:09 am
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http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2010/09/23/6/
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Woo-Hoo!
Looks like he replies to comments too!
I hope he likes discussing ET foam! ;D
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Cool!
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The blog post itself is an interesting account about the post CAIB report, post VSE announcement time period. It's also relevant to the policy and budget discussions going on now.
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Should be fun to follow his posts. The first one out is an interesting read.
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The blog post itself is an interesting account about the post CAIB report, post VSE announcement time period. It's also relevant to the policy and budget discussions going on now.
Might be worthwhile looking up who he refers to as the person who proposed ending American human spaceflight after Columbia.
Very likely Paul Shawcross, who was at OMB at the time. (Maybe still is, not sure.) Assuming that rings a bell: :)
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1391/1
(Also an interesting read at this time, too.)
I seem to recall at least one Congressman or Senator who was publicly advocating retiring Shuttle after the accident.
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Woo-Hoo indeed! I see most excellent bed-time reading forthcoming.
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Thanks for the publicity folks. I look forward to having much less constrained conversations than I had in the future. And look, I even registered with NASASpaceFlight.com! So here is my first post on your website.
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Thanks for the publicity folks. I look forward to having much less constrained conversations than I had in the future. And look, I even registered with NASASpaceFlight.com! So here is my first post on your website.
Nice! Your insight will definitely be appreciated around here.
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Welcome aboard, Wayne! NASA press conferences have not been the same without you.
Brent
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Indeed, Welcome aboard Wayne, and thanks so much for sharing your experiences and insight!
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Welcome, Wayne. Have enjoyed your NASA blog posts for years, and are very much looking forward to hearing any stories or insight you care to take the time to tell!
-Alex
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Thanks for the publicity folks. I look forward to having much less constrained conversations than I had in the future. And look, I even registered with NASASpaceFlight.com! So here is my first post on your website.
(falls to the ground)
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Thanks for the publicity folks. I look forward to having much less constrained conversations than I had in the future. And look, I even registered with NASASpaceFlight.com! So here is my first post on your website.
Oh my word, Mr. Hale on our site! Welcome, sir! :)
You should know that you already have God-like status around here, even with just 1 post! ;D
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Thanks for the publicity folks. I look forward to having much less constrained conversations than I had in the future. And look, I even registered with NASASpaceFlight.com! So here is my first post on your website.
Oh my goodness, it's the legend himself! Welcome sir, you're a hero round these parts.
Please stop by when you can. We'll keep following your stories on your new site as required reading.
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Wow! I nearly fainted when I saw Wayne Hale post.
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Wow! I nearly fainted when I saw Wayne Hale post.
Very cool to have a living legend among us. Welcome sir, make yourself at home. 8)
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Wayne Hale, the king of Shuttle on the site that is the central homage to shuttle. Love his stories.
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Thanks for the publicity folks. I look forward to having much less constrained conversations than I had in the future. And look, I even registered with NASASpaceFlight.com! So here is my first post on your website.
Welcome aboard, sir! Looking forward to reading more of your stories. All the best from the NASASpaceflight.com team!
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Thanks for the publicity folks. I look forward to having much less constrained conversations than I had in the future. And look, I even registered with NASASpaceFlight.com! So here is my first post on your website.
:D
I just set you up on my blogroll and also look forward to your posts here.
Can't tell you how much I appreciated your technical explanations in the press conferences in the RTF days and beyond.
Before I had access to L2, I depended on the pressers to keep informed and always looked forward to them if you were briefing (probably a lot more than you did :) ).
I thank you for your service.
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Best SSP manager there's been. Absolutely a hero to all us shuttle huggers.
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OK guys enough already, this is over the top.
Chris, you should know that I visited York a couple of years ago and thought about looking you up, but decided the NASA bosses wouldn't approve. If I get back across the pond to beautiful Yorkshire I will rectify that problem.
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Best SSP manager there's been. Absolutely a hero to all us shuttle huggers.
Agree with that. Welcome Mr Hale.
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Glad to see you continuing your Blog, Mr Hale. There is virtually no one I respect more. And you are 100% percent correct, Sir in your recent statement about the entrenched, stubborn attitudes all over the Net. Some of them are downright childish!! I used to be a regular ‘Space Blogger’, but rarely contribute anymore. Partly because I have little to say any longer, but partly because it gets real, real OLD clashing with anonymous, self-appointed experts who label you a fool for not adhering to their fantasy space program of sometimes weird & wonderful technologies/vehicles. You can be labeled as a ‘Retro Spam-Canner’ or worse. Their view is trash everything even remotely ‘heritage’ in nature (Shuttle-Derived,
EELV and Apollo-style Crew Capsules are the chief moustache-twirling villains here) and build amazing, all-new ships – with the ‘piles of cash’ the villains are consuming!
How do you reach out from the real world to people like this? After all, many of these folk are space-loving American taxpayers (I’m not) and possible future Space Venture Capitalists? Surely the eventual reality is somewhere between Constellation and the 'Sci-Fi Re-Usable Superspaceship' crowd? Matt.
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OK guys enough already, this is over the top.
Chris, you should know that I visited York a couple of years ago and thought about looking you up, but decided the NASA bosses wouldn't approve. If I get back across the pond to beautiful Yorkshire I will rectify that problem.
Now that would be beyond the realm of human cool - having Wayne Hale unexpectedly turn up at your door! :D
I live in the UK too....just sayin'! ;D
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OK guys enough already, this is over the top.
Not really. You're literally a superstar with shuttle fans, and rightly so.
Chris, you should know that I visited York a couple of years ago and thought about looking you up, but decided the NASA bosses wouldn't approve. If I get back across the pond to beautiful Yorkshire I will rectify that problem.
Please do sir! I live next to the Minster Cathedral - our Gothic VAB. You can see my roof in this photo:
(http://www.lincolnmotorhomehire.co.uk/images/York.jpg)
Anyway, I don't want to derail the thread, so I'll send you a personal message (top bar on the forum page, "My Messages") later today.
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Welcome Mr. Hale !
"Starting a conversation - June 17,2008 ...
33 On Jun 18, 2008 05:17:07 PM renclod added a comment on your blog post.
Wayne, welcome !
Starting this conversation is promising. If you would make it your day job, it would still not be enough - there is a dry sponge thirst for good quality space exploration info and discussion. Visit us at forum.nasaspaceflight.com, just to see your fans in action, hundreds of us active at any given time ! "
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Bet you never thought of yourself as a superstar, did you?
Bet you never knew a segment of the unwashed public actually hung on your every word in all those press conferences, did you?
Kinda scary, isn't it? :)
All kidding aside, what you're seeing here revolves around a fading concept... trust and respect.
Thanks for your service and welcome to the forum.
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How about a quick Q&A with Wayne Hale ?
Wayne, would you give it a try ? You get to choose the topic ... as long as it is NASA/commercial HSF and space exploration ! ;)
Chris ?
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Welcome Mr Hale.
You will feel at home here. There's a surprising amount of us here (I'm SOMD). Large amount of KSC and also MOD, Orbiter etc.
They do a very good job, very transparent.
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Omg. I was at my parents place for the weekend, with an underwear manifest of two pcs. Needless to say I almost ran out while I read Wayne's post.
Welcome!
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Omg. I was at my parents place for the weekend, with an underwear manifest of two pcs. Needless to say I almost ran out while I read Wayne's post.
Welcome!
Yeah I don't think he knows about the WHUM 8) ;D
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Thanks for the publicity folks. I look forward to having much less constrained conversations than I had in the future. And look, I even registered with NASASpaceFlight.com! So here is my first post on your website.
Wayne- Welcome aboard! I enjoyed a lengthy conversation with you, Ross Tierney and others after the HSF Committee hearing in Cocoa Beach last year. I am looking forward to reading your thoughts in the forum and on your Wordpress site! (I was one of the speakers during open mike time at the HSF hearing)
Regards,
Brian Hathaway
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Wayne
Just saw this comic and my first thought was some of your Blog entries http://xkcd.com/787/
Welcome aboard!
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New posting
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/
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New posting
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/
Thanks for the reminder; here's the permalink:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2010/10/01/until-the-fat-lady-sings/
The title -- "Until the Fat Lady Sings" -- kind of sums things up, but this is the line that underscores the "problem" now:
Much of the government does not have a real budget but is being funded by a Continuing Resolution – in other words, keep doing what you were told to do in FY 2010 at the same spending level you were given in 2010.
(My emphasis.)
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I loved that opening paragraph. It was perfect!
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Just watched Mr Hale's Mission Ops lecture to Dr Hoffman's MIT Systems Design class in 2005. Interesting to hear his thoughts, and the other guest lecturers. Especially in light of what's happened to STS and CxP since then.
F=ma
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Read the new post. Now.
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2010/10/08/chasing-augustine
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Read the new post. Now.
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2010/10/08/chasing-augustine
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ouch! Lots of embarrassed people?
Read the new post. Now.
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2010/10/08/chasing-augustine
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OMB OMB OMB... ::)
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Now the weather is turning cooler and I’m thinking about stoking up the fireplace. I’ll need some paper to get the first fire going. I think I know where I can find a piece to burn.
Blimey! Interesting read again!
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That probably also explains where the NASA FY 2011 Budget comes from: OMB and OSTP.
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{pain}
Just when I was kinda-sorta-starting to believe (against most logic) the relentless charges that the Augustine Commission was too pessimistic, that the hardware/budget/timeline picture is better than it looks ... Wayne Hale goes and pours water on those hopes.
Thank you very, very much for your candor.
-Alex
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{pain}
Just when I was kinda-sorta-starting to believe (against most logic) the relentless charges that the Augustine Commission was too pessimistic, that the hardware/budget/timeline picture is better than it looks ... Wayne Hale goes and pours water on those hopes.
Thank you very, very much for your candor.
-Alex
That's not how I read it.. I'm honestly not sure what to make of Wayne's Blog.
Does he feel like a lot of effort was wasted on options that could never fit in the budget and that the commission should have spent more time coming up with, and making sure they had the numbers right on options that could fit in the budget???
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Yes, this is partly while I voted on the opinion poll in the space policy sector. We would have been better off with Delta IV/Orion together with a unmanned supply Orion to preserve the near term future.
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I'm curious to see Mr. Hale's thoughts on what we can/should pursue, and specifically whether any beyond-LEO human spaceflight should be attempted within the existing budget constraints.
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I'm curious to see Mr. Hale's thoughts on what we can/should pursue, and specifically whether any beyond-LEO human spaceflight should be attempted within the existing budget constraints.
Ask him on his blog. There's a fairly good chance he will respond to you and tell you or at very least say he is saving that for a future post.
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Ask him on his blog. There's a fairly good chance he will respond to you and tell you or at very least say he is saving that for a future post.
Looks like somebody beat me to it! ;) And indeed, he replied with "subject of another post for another day."
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I'd really like to hear more about what happened to Craig Steidle's spirals, CEV flyoffs, and the entire pre-ESAS era of VSE implementation.
Nobody is willing to tell the story.
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Now the weather is turning cooler and I’m thinking about stoking up the fireplace. I’ll need some paper to get the first fire going. I think I know where I can find a piece to burn.
Blimey! Interesting read again!
I love his way of thinking :)
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Wow! I nearly fainted when I saw Wayne Hale post.
Old eyes. Small fonts. The "i" and the "n" blurred into an "r". I nearly fainted myself!
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Wow! I nearly fainted when I saw Wayne Hale post.
Old eyes. Small fonts. The "i" and the "n" blurred into an "r". I nearly fainted myself!
That'll teach ya not to eat in cheap restuarants!
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anyone know where I can get the transcript from the telecon today?
I would like to ask Wayne Hale what he thinks of Sen. Nelsons comment re. "if heavy lift based on existing shuttle and CxP assets can't be built today for $11 Bil then we might want to reconsider if that's something NASA should be doing at all" para-phrasing of course.
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anyone know where I can get the transcript from the telecon today?
Uhhh, it's not going to be on Wayne Hale's blog. You might post a new thread.
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{pain}
Just when I was kinda-sorta-starting to believe (against most logic) the relentless charges that the Augustine Commission was too pessimistic, that the hardware/budget/timeline picture is better than it looks ... Wayne Hale goes and pours water on those hopes.
Thank you very, very much for your candor.
-Alex
That's not how I read it.. I'm honestly not sure what to make of Wayne's Blog.
Does he feel like a lot of effort was wasted on options that could never fit in the budget and that the commission should have spent more time coming up with, and making sure they had the numbers right on options that could fit in the budget???
If I may be so bold, he may be tired of the second guessing by everyone.
He may be tired of the constant change in direction.
He may be tired of the promise of one thing, only to be shot down in reality because those in power do not deliver.
He may be likely tired of "doing more with less"
He may be tired of essentially being told to explore the universe for less than 19 billion a year but at the same time having to fund everything else on NASA's plate.
He may be tired of not being able to leave LEO in 40 years but hearing that "Mars is the ultimate goal" for the duration of some of his co-workers lives yet never seeing any real progress.
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anyone know where I can get the transcript from the telecon today?
I would like to ask Wayne Hale what he thinks of Sen. Nelsons comment re. "if heavy lift based on existing shuttle and CxP assets can't be built today for $11 Bil then we might want to reconsider if that's something NASA should be doing at all" para-phrasing of course.
http://www.cbsnews.com/network/news/space/home/spacenews/files/ceb32821135eca04378b5a360ef0d46a-83.html
"What is in this bill is eleven-and-a-half billion dollars over the next six years, anticipated, even though it's a three-year authorization, for development and testing of a heavy lift rocket," he said. "Now if we can't develop a new rocket for eleven-and-a-half billion dollars, building on a lot of the technologies that were already developed in spending nine billion (on the Constellation program's Ares rockets), if we can't do it for that, then we ought to question whether or not we can build a rocket."
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I think OV-106 may be close, but I suspect some other issues simmering as well. Wayne may be dragging things out a little, but in the interim it should at least provide the impetus for a more interesting discussion than if he came out with a singular comprehensive tome.
I can't wait for the next installment.
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(1)I'm honestly not sure what to make of Wayne's Blog.
(2)Does he feel like a lot of effort was wasted on options that could never fit in the budget and that the commission should have spent more time ... making sure they had the numbers right ...???
(1) Well, he's saying several slightly different things, which I'll elaborate on.
(2) I dunno about him, but I know that a lot of effort was wasted. The key proof of this, in my mind, is the front and center presentation of BTDT as a valid reason for government policy. Once that completely erroneous axiom is accepted, it opens the gate for justification of future government policy only upon the criteria of newness. As I've mentioned, "Rox in space? New, new, new!"
The wasted effort went to hashing out, in elaborate detail, the costs of uber-expensive possible missions, largely to provide fodder for the master debaters of policy. Either that, or to give some substance to the forward looking statements of insider corporate interests, which I suspect is more to the point. Either that, or our policymakers are deliberately satisfying that British prediction that Americans will try all the wrong things before accepting the right thing.
Causuistry: The sophistry of causality; a form of deliberate cognitive dissonance where the same data point is used to argue in favor of one course of action, and agains a different, but essentially similar, course of action. Two examples: The alcoholic parent disapproving of his kid wanting to go out drinking. Finding out where Phobos came from is very important; the Moon's origin, not at all.
Per Wayne: "the committee was snookered by OMB". I'd add, the OMB was snookered by the political direction it was given, in that, in all probability, it's numbers were also suspect on certain fundamental levels. This is me looking at what comes out of the black box of OMB, and attempting to understand the working process within that black box. There I go again, but what else does Wayne mean when he sez: "the financial estimates made for the committee are highly suspect"?
He goes on to say: "at the very least the committee had ensured that NASA would get a significant budget increase". As I've said, and what must be true, government activity is deliberate conscious effort. It is goal seeking and it is fundamentally teleological.
Picking on HEFT again from this standpoint, and just because it is fresh in my mind. From the recommendations: Focus technology development on near term exploration goals (NEO by 2025); Do not develop a dedicated ISS ERV. If the goal of NEO by 2025 is accepted, then the recommendation of no dedicated ERV might very well result from the data generated in seeking to prove the feasibility of that goal. But that is no recommendation to make that visit; it is the goal and purpose of the report in the first place.
I would say that a purpose of the OMB report was, not surprisingly, to get an increase in NASA's budget. There's nothing wrong with overtly asking for an increase with the support of logical data, and everything wrong about hiding purpose behind false data. OMB was snookered.
Finally getting back to TrueBlue. It seems that the A-Comm was given a menu of choices to choose from. In part, what we need is the creation of the proper choice. That is, what we need is a proper path towards colonization. What we're getting instead is fireworks and BFR's. The clear outcome is that, for the forseeable future, we stay on planet.
He may be tired of not being able to leave LEO in 40 years but hearing that "Mars is the ultimate goal" for the duration of some of his co-workers lives yet never seeing any real progress.
Naaaah. Ya think?
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What do you mean by statements like, "I would say that a purpose of the OMB report was, not surprisingly, to get an increase in NASA's budget." Are you mixing up OMB and the Augustine Cmte?
-Alex
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The OMB wants to increase NASA's budget? AS IF...
It's 'not surprising' if OMB allows NASA's funding to decrease to 2008 levels as some congressmen proposed
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From Alex: "What do you mean by statements like, 'I would say that a purpose of the OMB report was, not surprisingly, to get an increase in NASA's budget.'"
I know that I use a word, or possibly two words more than Jim uses in a typical post. The issues around this site, in my mind, are not trivial, nor can they be accurately synthesized in a soundbite. Yet I try to be as succint as I can, even if it includes lame jokes, and explanations of my rationale. Back to yer question:
Mr. Hale suggested that the A-Comm was "snookered" by OMB. I ran with that analysis, and suggested that OMB was in turn, "snookered" by "the political direction it was given". I went on to suggest that a purpose of the report, not the purpose, was to increase NASA's budget. It would not be a surprise to me that other people besides me would want NASA's budget to increase. In principle, that is exactly what should be happening.
My understanding of OMB's official purpose is that the agency takes the financial data it is given, and analyzes it thoroughly in order to assure Congress that the financial data is accurately portrayed. Many of the entities, but not all, feed OMB with "cooked" data, but the worker bees at OMB are pretty good, I understand, at ferreting out these cooking errors, which range from major to minor. Sometimes OMB can compare prices on the open market, because the budget items are available from a large number of purveyors. In the case of the budgetary numbers that pertain to the A-Comm, it cannot be said that there are a large number of HSF purveyors.
OMB must use a different process to properly vet the numbers that it was provided. I don't know what that process is, but I am sure that they cannot go out and solicit bids for verification purposes. Mr. Hale opined that "the financial estimates made for the committee are highly suspect". And they are, first, for the simple reason that there is absolutely no way to get an independent verification about the estimates. If LockMart says that an Orion capsule costs a buck thirty-nine, who is to say that the capsule should cost under a buck?*
And second? That would be a different post.
The short answer? GIGO. There is nothing for the public but trust in those volumes of financial data. OMB probably did the best they could with the informational menu they were given. Now that S-3729 has been signed, the very next battle is mission prioritization.
*Mod note: I'm talking about capsules, not beer nuts. Lurker note: Inside joke. Lame rating: Pretty.
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Latest post: "Perspective".
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2010/10/11/perspective
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"Perspective", huh?
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Did you read it John?
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{pain}
Just when I was kinda-sorta-starting to believe (against most logic) the relentless charges that the Augustine Commission was too pessimistic, that the hardware/budget/timeline picture is better than it looks ... Wayne Hale goes and pours water on those hopes.
Thank you very, very much for your candor.
-Alex
That's not how I read it.. I'm honestly not sure what to make of Wayne's Blog.
Does he feel like a lot of effort was wasted on options that could never fit in the budget and that the commission should have spent more time coming up with, and making sure they had the numbers right on options that could fit in the budget???
If I may be so bold, he may be tired of the second guessing by everyone.
He may be tired of the constant change in direction.
He may be tired of the promise of one thing, only to be shot down in reality because those in power do not deliver.
He may be likely tired of "doing more with less"
He may be tired of essentially being told to explore the universe for less than 19 billion a year but at the same time having to fund everything else on NASA's plate.
He may be tired of not being able to leave LEO in 40 years but hearing that "Mars is the ultimate goal" for the duration of some of his co-workers lives yet never seeing any real progress.
Agreed. The post was very interesting, especially the behind the scenes insight.
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Wayne:
Yep. I did read it, and found it to be quite along the lines of my thinking as well.
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Funny, around my lab at work, there are lots of guys complaining about this or that. Every now and then I chime in say something like "It could be worse, it could be September 1939." Usually shuts 'em right up.
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Funny, around my lab at work, there are lots of guys complaining about this or that. Every now and then I chime in say something like "It could be worse, it could be September 1939." Usually shuts 'em right up.
You know what to say and Wayne Hale knows how to write!
Cheers!
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A very interesting new post from Mr. Hale - "The coming train wreck for Commercial Human Spaceflight".
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2010/11/14/the-coming-train-wreck-for-commercial-human-spaceflight
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A very interesting new post from Mr. Hale - "The coming train wreck for Commercial Human Spaceflight".
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2010/11/14/the-coming-train-wreck-for-commercial-human-spaceflight
The room stands, cheers and says "Bravo!" to Wayne!
Here's hoping this gets wide circulation and has a positive impact!
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A very interesting new post from Mr. Hale - "The coming train wreck for Commercial Human Spaceflight".
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2010/11/14/the-coming-train-wreck-for-commercial-human-spaceflight
The room stands, cheers and says "Bravo!" to Wayne!
Here's hoping this gets wide circulation and has a positive impact!
I hope so too. Very disturbing to know NASA is making things more difficult than they probably should.
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A very interesting new post from Mr. Hale - "The coming train wreck for Commercial Human Spaceflight".
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2010/11/14/the-coming-train-wreck-for-commercial-human-spaceflight
The room stands, cheers and says "Bravo!" to Wayne!
Here's hoping this gets wide circulation and has a positive impact!
I hope so too. Very disturbing to know NASA is making things more difficult than they probably should.
Wayne said it too, it is not intentional. It's a form of requirements creep where various factions insert something they believe to be important and absolute.
Add all these small pieces together and you get a massive document that drives cost and schedule. It's a counterpart to the traditional requirements creep process that is responsible for a lot of projects going belly-up within NASA and the DOD.
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I hope so too. Very disturbing to know NASA is making things more difficult than they probably should.
Not at all unexpected IMO. A lot of bureaucrats are scrambling to justify their existence at this time. What better way than by producing requirements documents and, hopefully, parlaying that to a permanent position reviewing compliance?
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I hope so too. Very disturbing to know NASA is making things more difficult than they probably should.
Not at all unexpected IMO. A lot of bureaucrats are scrambling to justify their existence at this time. What better way than by producing requirements documents and, hopefully, parlaying that to a permanent position reviewing compliance?
I think you are implying a little too sinister intent.
Government employees really do not need to "justify their existance". Look at what is happening within the space community with all the layoffs and uncertain future. At this moment, and further enforced by the Authorization Act of 2010, government employees do not have to be concerned with not having a job.
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Not at all unexpected IMO. A lot of bureaucrats are scrambling to justify their existence at this time. What better way than by producing requirements documents and, hopefully, parlaying that to a permanent position reviewing compliance?
I think you are implying a little too sinister intent.
Government employees really do not need to "justify their existance". Look at what is happening within the space community with all the layoffs and uncertain future. At this moment, and further enforced by the Authorization Act of 2010, government employees do not have to be concerned with not having a job.
As a former government employee (DOD and Interior) I've seen this kind of behavior first hand. (I've seen it in the commercial sector too, of course.). It isn't "sinister" it is the natural environment of bureaucrats.
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Not at all unexpected IMO. A lot of bureaucrats are scrambling to justify their existence at this time. What better way than by producing requirements documents and, hopefully, parlaying that to a permanent position reviewing compliance?
I think you are implying a little too sinister intent.
Government employees really do not need to "justify their existance". Look at what is happening within the space community with all the layoffs and uncertain future. At this moment, and further enforced by the Authorization Act of 2010, government employees do not have to be concerned with not having a job.
As a former government employee (DOD and Interior) I've seen this kind of behavior first hand. (I've seen it in the commercial sector too, of course.). It isn't "sinister" it is the natural environment of bureaucrats.
That's fair and maybe the motives of some, after all who's to say. But implying that is the general motive and the driving force is all I was getting at.
Given they are government employees, securing their jobs probably is not at the forefront of their minds. Unless congress takes some currently unexpected action, they *will* have a job.
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A very interesting new post from Mr. Hale - "The coming train wreck for Commercial Human Spaceflight".
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2010/11/14/the-coming-train-wreck-for-commercial-human-spaceflight
The room stands, cheers and says "Bravo!" to Wayne!
Here's hoping this gets wide circulation and has a positive impact!
I hope so too. Very disturbing to know NASA is making things more difficult than they probably should.
Wayne said it too, it is not intentional. It's a form of requirements creep where various factions insert something they believe to be important and absolute.
Add all these small pieces together and you get a massive document that drives cost and schedule. It's a counterpart to the traditional requirements creep process that is responsible for a lot of projects going belly-up within NASA and the DOD.
Yes, but again, by knowing this requirements creep can happen, there is the opportunity to descope the whole thing and make it more of a broad brushstroke, rather than a scalpel.
Would it solve the problem? I don't know. But Wayne is defintely correct that a train wreck might be an inevitable outcome. Thinking SpaceX here and the recent changes they had to make...seemed rather abrupt, and possibly in relation to this new document.
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As a former government employee (DOD and Interior) I've seen this kind of behavior first hand. (I've seen it in the commercial sector too, of course.). It isn't "sinister" it is the natural environment of bureaucrats.
That's fair and maybe the motives of some, after all who's to say. But implying that is the general motive and the driving force is all I was getting at.
Given they are government employees, securing their jobs probably is not at the forefront of their minds. Unless congress takes some currently unexpected action, they *will* have a job.
That's fair also and I did not mean to impugn all. In any case the question of cause or motivation is probably off topic. More to the point is the question of can this 'requirements creep' be nipped in the bud and who will do the nipping.
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Wayne, you'll be perhaps glad to hear that while at the JSC Tweetup this past week I heard someone (NASA employee) say nearly exactly this same thing. (S)he said if NASA didn't change its mode of operations to allow the commercial companies to be *commercial* (ie profit other than cost+ contracts), then NASA would ruin them by restricting their speed, flexibility and innovation.
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I posted this on his blog but I don't think it has showed up yet even though other posts seem to be showing up. Perhaps this is a more visible place to get answers.
I have a some questions:
1) I recall seeing a document (but can’t find ATM) that mentioned vehicles with more than 14 successful flights in a row to be considered human rated. Is there no consideration for demonstrated reliability?
2) The existing EELV fleet launches nuclear payloads from time to time. How do the risks and requirements of “Nuclear rating” compare to “Human rating”?
Perhaps Boeing/SpaceX should focus on commercial crew for Bigelow and allow NASA to find its own way.
edit: I think the 'document' was one of the authorization bills. I'm not sure if the provision is in the one that has become law.
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I have many data points from at least 2 of the CxP projects of requirements being inserted to ensure individuals or offices were still needed to verify and own them later. Managers were too weak or averse or supportive/collusive to fight them.
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I have many data points from at least 2 of the CxP projects of requirements being inserted to ensure individuals or offices were still needed to verify and own them later. Managers were too weak or averse or supportive/collusive to fight them.
Did you do anything about it if it was in excess to what was considered necessary? After all, these were government projects and those "offices" are required to ensure their compliance. I assume, based on previous posts, you are a government employee too.
With all due respect to you, I have seen multiple posts where you claim to have "proof" of certain "ills" but if another government employee does not stand up to other government employees to hold them accountable, then how does it ever change on the levels that Wayne is refering to in his post?
Contractors, and I'm sure potential commercial providers will too, generally have an opportunity to have input on most requirements. However, that influence can only carry so far.
It seems to me it starts with you and others like you.
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A very interesting new post from Mr. Hale - "The coming train wreck for Commercial Human Spaceflight".
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2010/11/14/the-coming-train-wreck-for-commercial-human-spaceflight
The room stands, cheers and says "Bravo!" to Wayne!
Here's hoping this gets wide circulation and has a positive impact!
Agreed.
~Jon
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I have many data points from at least 2 of the CxP projects of requirements being inserted to ensure individuals or offices were still needed to verify and own them later. Managers were too weak or averse or supportive/collusive to fight them.
Did you do anything about it if it was in excess to what was considered necessary? After all, these were government projects and those "offices" are required to ensure their compliance. I assume, based on previous posts, you are a government employee too.
With all due respect to you, I have seen multiple posts where you claim to have "proof" of certain "ills" but if another government employee does not stand up to other government employees to hold them accountable, then how does it ever change on the levels that Wayne is refering to in his post?
Tried to avoid Constellation, failed. Tried to help Constellation, failed, was told to sit down and shut up, didn't have RIDs accepted, was threatened by a manager and other engineers. They eventually stopped asking for my help. I fight battles I might actually win. It was clear that Constellation would collapse eventually, so it was wise to get out. Most of my data comes from compatriots who could do nothing but stay in. If you challenge a manager high enough, it costs you your career. Politics suck. The entrenched interests cannot be fought individually. It has to be turned around office by office, with open-minded decision makers all along the line.
I don't mind being challenged, because I do post tangentially to what I know without enumerating it. Sometimes on internet fora, one can only establish credibility and others can only judge it by what is said provably - and then the rest is taken as something to go validate with other sources of information.
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Thread deleted back. The basic rule of being civil is not to be broken by anyone. If you want to have a back and forth mudslinging contest, do it via PM.
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Excellent thread, it exposes the inside politics of NASA which many of us usually have to guess about.
Tried to avoid Constellation, failed. Tried to help Constellation, failed, was told to sit down and shut up, didn't have RIDs accepted, was threatened by a manager and other engineers. They eventually stopped asking for my help. I fight battles I might actually win. It was clear that Constellation would collapse eventually, so it was wise to get out.
Out of interest: I understand why managers didn't like what you were doing (by trying to do "the right thing" in the technical sense, you were endangering their careers), but why *engineers* were against you?
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Excellent thread, it exposes the inside politics of NASA which many of us usually have to guess about.
Tried to avoid Constellation, failed. Tried to help Constellation, failed, was told to sit down and shut up, didn't have RIDs accepted, was threatened by a manager and other engineers. They eventually stopped asking for my help. I fight battles I might actually win. It was clear that Constellation would collapse eventually, so it was wise to get out.
Out of interest: I understand why managers didn't like what you were doing (by trying to do "the right thing" in the technical sense, you were endangering their careers), but why *engineers* were against you?
Probably best explained by the story of the monkeys/banana/water experiment (which is an urban legend, but it makes a good metaphor).
http://freekvermeulen.blogspot.com/2008/08/monkey-story-experiment-involved-5.html
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Out of interest: I understand why managers didn't like what you were doing (by trying to do "the right thing" in the technical sense, you were endangering their careers), but why *engineers* were against you?
Parts of NASA have been indoctrinated that *ANY* trade of safety and cost, even if the safety is only intuitive and negligible when quantified, is verboten. Parts of NASA refuse to hear what you say if you attack requirements they own if you are from another part of NASA. Some parts of NASA refuse to deal with other customers of NASA's suppliers - only NASA's interests may be considered, no compromise for the greater good is allowed.
And then there's the infallibility of systems engineering, where all shalls must be traceable to higher shalls, and every shall must be justified (which is where the personnel to verify the shalls are embedded). Many other posts I've made show I'm pro-systems engineering, but not how CxP implemented it. 'Course, they were hamstrung by prescribed solutions to the shalls at level 1 and 2 and mostly at 3.
But please don't extrapolate my single perspective to all elements of CxP. I dealt mostly with CxP L2 and Ares L3. I have friends' perspectives from all over CxP (L2, Ares, Ground, Orion, MOD). Read others' perspectives besides mine and do a best fit to what your brain tells you.
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New post:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2010/11/17/trying-to-clean-up-a-mess/
Sad to hear that, it was nice to see some balance and objectivity in the previous post, as there's a ridiculous amount of "everything will be rosey" backslapping going on for commercial spaceflight, usually from the same "bodies" that keyboard-bash about how "old" the orbiters are when Discovery's age has nothing to do with a two year old (if that) ET - which is the troublemaker for 133.
I'm probably digressing anyway, as the problem appears to be people's interpretations of the original post. Nothing one can do about that, however!
Welcome to the internet ;)
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Just read Wayne's trainwreck article. Spot on. Beauracracy is mos' def part of the problem. Add cost-plus, and you have profit before accomplishment.
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Wayne,
Were you familiar with how NASA dealt with Spacehab and how that could relate to the current situation?
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Some people have difficulty with attempts at constructive criticism. I hope that this is not going to discourage Wayne from continuing to share his thoughts -- I thought his original post stood perfectly well on its own.
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Phil McAlister of NASA's CCDev program responds to Wayne Hale's comments:
http://www.spacenews.com/civil/101119-former-shuttle-manager-decries-nasas-commercial-crew-safety-regs.html
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And let me be the first to say, Phil is exactly right. It is a complex business and ensuring safety is difficult.
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I want to second MadScientist's comments and hope that we can recognize that these are serious, dedicated people talking about serious issues. I am so grateful to Wayne for his hours of patient explanations to the news media to make the "technical" into the "understandable". Let's please not degenerate into flaming, and keep this dialogue going at a high level.
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And let me be the first to say, Phil is exactly right. It is a complex business and ensuring safety is difficult.
I guess at a fundamental level, that's the problem -- everyone has the same end in mind, it's just a matter of how you get there.
My impression is that this issue ultimately comes down to trust; this is about the trade-off between trusting in NASA to ensure safety and trusting in commercial companies to ensure safety. As far as specification goes I see at least three options:
* NASA providing explicit specifications
* NASA providing limited specifications (with implicit subsidiary implications, obviously)
* NASA providing explicit specifications but with ad-hoc alterations and waivers to allow for innovation (I see this as being the most probable outcome).
If we assume the necessity to guarantee a certain level of safety we can trade-off between more limited specifications and a more complex oversight process (Not that I see guarantees of safety in this business as being more than rough indicators of safety.)
I think the most important question that can be asked about commercial cargo/crew is 'What do we actually want out of it?' Part of the issue may be that we don't have a truly rational discussion because we don't explicate all the trade-offs; we merely recite our own prejudices. Sometimes I hear commercial cargo/crew recited as being an end in itself -- it is not. Presumably we want a decrease in the cost of launching mass to orbit, perhaps even a self-sustaining space-launch industry. Unfortunately, humanity has yet to find a reliable process by which to formalise the process of innovation, so we are merely finding our way in the dark.
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And let me be the first to say, Phil is exactly right. It is a complex business and ensuring safety is difficult.
I guess at a fundamental level, that's the problem -- everyone has the same end in mind, it's just a matter of how you get there.
Not really. The goal is not the same. Of course everybody wants safety, but safety isn't a binary variable with just two states: "safe" and "unsafe". It's a continuum.
Obviously no one wants to use utterly unsafe rockets, but no one wants absolutely safe rockets too, because the only way to make rockets absolutely safe is to ensure they never fly.
Thus, the real question is not merely "how to ensure safety?", it's also "with understanding that too much safety can be crippling, what level of safety do we want to have?".
Since this second part of the question is not immediately obvious, "safety card" can be played by people who are more interested in keeping their oversight positions than in advancing HSF.
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McAllister is spinning with enough centrifugal force to lose the truth.
Hale wrote: “Somewhere along the line, we have crossed over the optimum point to ensure safety and just added cost and delay,” he added.
The regs have crossed well over the optimum point, in my mind, having read some of them lately. That's the issue. The solution is to get back to that optimum point, where the requirements can be succinctly stated and be less confusing. From the article:
Still, commercial space proponents said the initial draft demonstrates the reluctance by some NASA officials to the type of dramatic changes in oversight necessary to create a thriving commercial sector.
The dramatic change in oversight is not Lazy-Fair. [Using Walt Kelley's authoritative spelling.] The dramatic change is reasonable, succinct, unambiguous clarity in the regulations.
“The document runs a mind-numbing 260 pages of densely spaced requirements,” Hale wrote.
I would say categorically that I could rewrite that document in a month, so as to be one hundred pages. I know I'll be criticized for saying this, but I would start with the Gemini twelve pager, and write in that style, with that clarity. It could be done.
“Most disappointing, on pages 7 to 11 is a table of 74 additional requirements documents... Taken all together, there are thousands of requirement statements...
What they need is an editor, more than anything else.
And for every one NASA will require ... massive amounts of paperwork and/or electronic forms. ... This is one of the major reasons why spaceflight is as costly as it is.”
This is one of the reasons for excessive costliness, not the reason. It needs to be tightened up. Launch costs include all costs, and cost reductions need to be found everywhere. It almost seems that the necessary innovation would be the less glamourous work of eliminating waste wherever it is found. The wasted effort of excessive regulation is the problem; to be solved by working to characterize the regulation as appropriate, not excessive.
McAlister countered those assertions, saying the space agency is striving “to maximize safety and reliability” without burdening commercial firms with unnecessary requirements that lead to higher development and operations costs.
Counter the assertions if you will, but it is a falsehood to change the goalposts: the issue is not at all a call for less safety and less reliability. The falsehood lies in this subtle charge made by McAlister. Instead, he should counter the assertions by saying that the regulations have to be overly complex rather than sufficiently complex. Defend that position of excess complexity.
“A simplistic page count” of the commercial crew requirements document does not “reflect the quality of the requirements,” he wrote...
And it is a false characterization to simplify Hale's commentary as only a page count.
... adding that most of the pages published include the rationale for requirements to show industry the intent of the requirements and give them “the flexibility to meet the requirements in innovative ways.”
In other words, by his own petard he is hoisted. Uhhh, that would be McAlister. The regulation is: Thou shalt drive at 65mph on the Interstate. The rationale? Saves lives, yada yada. Not part of the reg, however. Part of backup documentation for those who wonder, why 65?
The wordy rationale should not be part of the regulation. It is backup information. And another falsehood: The rationale simply doesn't give anyone any flexibility. Not only that, the regs actually stifle flexibility, like this one: The launch system shall bring home the astros alive. The flexibility of maybe bringing them home un-dead, or gravely wounded, or partially incapacitated, or flat out dead as doornails, or in some other "innovative" fashion is exactly the sort of "flexibilty" that a regulation aims to eliminate.
McAlister is making marketing statements with a dead pan delivery. It's simply wrong to approach Hale's comments in this fashion.
What’s more, the task being undertaken is extremely complex, McAlister wrote.
Next, he'll be telling us that rocket science is hard or that the Moon has no atmo.
Space agency officials must evaluate a wide variety of factors to gain the confidence that missions will be successful. Those factors include ... the contractor’s flight vehicle, ... systems, operating conditions, mission planning and flight crew training, McAlister wrote.
Absolutely. Pick a number between twelve and one hundred, however. If we can say that the Gemini capsule should protect the astros, why can't we say that the Orion capsule should protect the astros? What's the functional difference needing a twenty fold increase in statement length?
“NASA and the aerospace community have developed an outstanding complement ...
Rah, rah, ree. Kick 'em in the knee. Rah, rah rass. Kick them in the other knee. This is a cheerleading statement, and has nothing to do with Hale's essential assertion that launch costs can be adversely affected by overly complex regulation, such that it is entirely conceivable that the nascent commercial industry will be hamstrung, not enabled, by the theoretical leveling of the playing field to an unnecessary fineness.
“Simple, straightforward requirements and the flexibility to use good industry based standards could allow commercial space flight to be as successful as those programs or the NASA Launch Services program,” Hale wrote. “But we are not on that path.”
No, Mr. McAlister, we are not on the path to accomplishment. Tighten up both your language, and the language of the necessary regulations.
Somebody call an insurance agent. This is part of the holdup.
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Important point to keep in mind in these discussions...
When a Government Body lets a contract for a service it, rightly or
wrongly, accrues much of the consequences of failure. It may not do so
legally (although often it does) but it does so in the minds of the
press, a legal and investigatory system that tends to be harsher on
mistakes made by government bodies and employees than those made by
commercial entities, and Politicians (who will rapidly step away from a
decision that they may have pressurised the body to make). Some of this
is or course justified, people are held to higher standards when
spending 'other people money' rather than their own.
This is one of the major reasons why government bodies are risk averse,
sometimes overly so. If people want to ease the 'regulatory burden'
they need to ensure that the pressures that work against government
bodies doing so are also eased. Otherwise the excessive paperwork will
either remain in place or be legislated out of existence - and we
should all realise what a blunt, inflexible, instrument, with many
attached 'unintended consequences', legislation is.
A lot of modern external oversight and failure investigations tend to
criticise 'lack of paper'. Reasonable judgement calls or a 'hands off'
approach are not accepted by an external investigation process
that is often looking to attach blame rather than discover underlying
causes (although NASA has been rather fortunate in the way its
investigations have been carried out). Unless the external oversight
and investigation process is willing to relax its strong attachment to
paperwork then its unlikely the bodies they oversee and investigate
will relax their attachment.
In short, if people want to see the causes of excessive regulation they
need to look within themselves, within the press and to their Political
Representatives as well as at the bodies actually implementing it.
Rant/lecture/sermon over! :)
(Edited for slight miswording)
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Important point to keep in mind in these discussions... if people want to see the causes of excessive regulation they need to look within themselves, within the press and to their Political Representatives as well as the bodies actually implementing it.
In the "looking within themselves" part, first, they should realize that the truth exists outside of their opinions. Should they resolve to tell the truth as they know it, to research what the truth might be, and learn to revise their opinions accordingly, the regulations would soon become sufficiently simple and efficiently effective.
Ahhh.
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The question I'm not clear on is how much unique knowledge/experience NASA has from it's various manned programmes, which is not otherwise available to startup companies such as SpaceX? Are requirements the best way to make these available to commercial crew providers?
Getting the launch element out of the way (presumably a small part of the total requirements), does it need to have much more than "LOC must be 1:000 or better - you prove you can meet that"?
I presume that most of the requirements to approach ISS are already covered in the two COTS contracts, which don't seem to have been too expensive for SpaceX & Orbital to take on.
cheers, Martin
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As to LOC: I decree that the shuttle's track record stand as the applicable standard.
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I was browsing through past TSR articles and came across this really great read & thought others might like it as well (if they haven't already).
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/709/1
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For those wondering what Wayne was alluding to in his blog. It's likely related to this:
From the CCDev-2 Questions and Answers:
Background: Requirement 3.3.1.5 states “The CTS shall provide an overall abort effectiveness of 0.95 (TBC) for all single abort events along the nominal and dispersed ascent trajectory profile.”
95% Abort Effectiveness seems to be a rather aggressive requirement given the fact that NASA’s own calculations for the Ares I (which was suppose to be one of the safest crew vehicles NASA had ever designed) showed that this vehicle had an abort effectiveness of about 80% to 85%. Enclosed is a transcript from one of the recent Augustine Committee public hearings where one of NASA’s safety & reliability experts (highlighted in the document) specifically says that “95% effectiveness is a very difficult thing to achieve” – the transcript is available at www.nasa.gov/doc/378830main_Huntsville_Transcript_part4b.doc
Question: If one of NASA’s own experts in this area has already stated publically that a 95% abort effectiveness is very difficult to achieve, is this requirement reasonable to be placed on commercial crew providers? Moreover, requirement 3.2.1.2 states “The mean LOC risk for any ISS mission ascent phase shall be no greater than 1 in 1000” so since the mean LOC risk is simply the probability of launch vehicle failure that ends the mission (also called Loss-of-Mission or LOM Risk) multiplied by 1 – abort effectiveness, why not let the commercial crew providers determine how best to meet the 1 in 1000 LOC risk regardless of how effective the abort portion of this equation is?
Answer: The requirement documents referenced in the Announcement are in draft form and are intended to inform participants on the development of NASA’s crew transportation certification requirements. NASA will continue to openly develop these requirements for eventual use in development and use in an ISS crew transportation system. NASA is not requiring compliance as part of CCDev 2 but is informing industry as early as possible the considerations being given by NASA as part of crew rating space systems.
See:
http://procurement.jsc.nasa.gov/ccdev2/Questions%20and%20Answers%20Round%202%20final.docx
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"So, what is my recommendation? Simple. Do what the Launch Services Program does: require that providers HAVE standards and follow them – don’t make them pick particular processes or standards, let the flexible, nimble, [your adjective here] commercial firms pick what suits their business best. As long as they have standards and stick to them – that is what we should require." --Wayne Hale
Another thought to consider.
When you build a house or a building, you have to follow a standard called the "National Electric Code" (among others). It's a very rigorous (and long) standard on how electric *installations* shall be built. It leaves very little to interpretation and almost no room for creativity. It's designed for one primary purpose - to prevent electrical fires.
However, when you purchase an item that is to be installed in such a building, the internal construction of that item does not have to meet the rules of the National Electric Code. You can buy a microwave with wire inside that doesn't meet NEC requirements, you can buy a stove with wire that isn't even described by the NEC, you can buy a dryer that doesn't have circuit protection consistent with the NEC, and so on. Why is this possible? Because devices have to meet an entirely different requirement - they have to be UL certified.
UL certification is an entirely different type of standard from the NEC. The NEC tells you how to build things. The UL tests your things for how they were built - it's a *performance* standard. It doesn't matter how you build your widget, as long as it can pass some tests spelled out in standards documents and executed by Underwriters Laboratories or another accredited testing lab. If your gizmo performs okay (from an electrical point of view), it can be sold and used in the US, regardless of its actual internal construction.
Just a thought.
P.S. I realize there were a number of simplifications posted above.
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Here is more of Mr Hale's insight from the latest issue of
ASK, NASA's in-house systems engineering magazine.
v/r,
F=ma
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Mr. Hale had some time to post another blog update:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2010/12/09/abort-request-command/ (http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2010/12/09/abort-request-command/)
Below the STS-51F Hi-Res image of the Abort Mode switch set to ATO
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Mr. Hale had some time to post another blog update:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2010/12/09/abort-request-command/ (http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2010/12/09/abort-request-command/)
Below the STS-51F Hi-Res image of the Abort Mode switch set to ATO
Here's the abort video
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JSbMs_OnE4c
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Another excellent post by Mr Hale on leadership. Glad to see he gave credit to Scouting. I was an Explorer, both scout and leader, and learned much from that experience as well.
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Welcome Mr. Hale. :) It's an honor to have one of the NASA legends here.
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Latest post: Certifying Soyuz.
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/01/07/certifying-soyuz
On this subject, I wonder if the Russian modules of the ISS comply with the same safety standards as are used for the USOS modules?
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The UL tests your things for how they were built - it's a *performance* standard.
Mr. Hale addresses this concept in his latest blog post, which I failed to notice until just now:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/01/07/certifying-soyuz/
"Airworthiness regs are generally considered to be performance based."
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http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/01/20/space-architecture/
I wish we could pick a plan and stick to it long enough to get it to work. Orbital Space Plane was a good plan, it could have worked. X-33/Venture Star was a good plan, it could have worked. X-38 was a GREAT idea that was just on the cusp of working. Even Constellation was a good plan, it could have worked. Don’t write me any emails saying that they were unsustainable from the political/economic viewpoint. I get that. I’m speaking as an operator, an engineer, a manager. Those programs, those vehicles, could have worked. Any one of them. And we would be years down the road, and money ahead. But we always stop. Just pick one. And see it through.
Common sense talk.
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http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/01/20/space-architecture/
Just read this. I like Wayne, good guy.
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http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/01/20/space-architecture/
Just read this. I like Wayne, good guy.
Thanks for posting that. While I have my opinions about the architecture mode (and the level of sustainability), I really would not complain about what rocket we use to get to Mars, as long as we get there!
Heck, I don't care if we go to Mars using SRB-X, as long as we get there! http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=19248.msg498455#msg498455
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I love reading Wayne Hale's articles. No wonder he was such a good manager.
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Required reading.
"X-33/Venture Star was a good plan, it could have worked."
My favorite deceased SSTO there.
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Venture Star was an inspiring concept, but the level of ambition behind it still makes me hesitant to mourn that it was canceled.
His references to all these past canceled programs was a minor trip back to reading about them as a kid in Popular Mechanics. As a kid, each one of them seemed absolutely like the future.
Which brings me to another thought - as a kid I had no concept of the size of Venture Star. It was only recently that I saw a size comparison to the shuttle on Wikipedia. Gigantic!
Anyways, Mr. Hale's thoughts very much echo my own - Let's commit to something, build it, and start flying missions!!! Too much running in circles.
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New post:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/01/30/memory-fault/
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New post:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/01/30/memory-fault/
I wonder if someone on NSF could help out Wayne's memory of this event.
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Required reading.
"X-33/Venture Star was a good plan, it could have worked."
My favorite deceased SSTO there.
Let's not derail this by focusing on the one line about X-33. It is the least favorite rocket for some of us. I disagree with Mr. Hale's statement above, although I wholeheartedly agree with everthing else in the post. It is possible we all agree on his main point.
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New post:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/01/30/memory-fault/
I wonder if someone on NSF could help out Wayne's memory of this event.
I think Wayne concluded this didn't happen as remembered.
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New post:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/01/30/memory-fault/
I wonder if someone on NSF could help out Wayne's memory of this event.
I think Wayne concluded this didn't happen as remembered.
I know, but I'm wondering if someone remembers a sim or document or something that led his memory to store this as a real event.
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New post:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/01/30/memory-fault/
I wonder if someone on NSF could help out Wayne's memory of this event.
I think Wayne concluded this didn't happen as remembered.
It actually did happen, though it was a different valve.
This is what Steve T. said in the comments:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/01/30/memory-fault/
There was a mis-configured valve in one of the experiments in the lab, designed to allow the experiment to vent to vacuum on orbit. It’s this valve you’re thinking of earlier. The question started out asking if anyone had heard of something like this happening and morphed into a discussion of the cabin depress valve, as communications without a lot of details will sometimes do. At one point your name is mentioned, but the conclusion never got back around to you.
And:
It was during the turnaround between the first and second launch attempts of STS-55 (there were three attempts; the third was successful). The experiment valve in question was leak checked and failed. They discovered the valve was not in the fully closed position and a redundant sealing cap was not installed correctly. The misconfig likely happened during CEIT. Due to the dilligence you described, the situation was found and corrected. Over the years, it became a story about the depress valve you alluded to in your blog. Typically, the folks who were discussing this are not involved a lot in nitty-gritty pre-launch work, so that’s likely why it got turned into a depress valve story (so probably a lesson more in communicating to upper management properly!). This does not as far as I know involve any data collected from the case studies.
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New post:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/01/30/memory-fault/
I wonder if someone on NSF could help out Wayne's memory of this event.
I think Wayne concluded this didn't happen as remembered.
It actually did happen, though it was a different valve.
This is what Steve T. said in the comments:
Seems like a pretty big difference. Different valve, presumably different hypothetical mission impact...one relationship would be how, as noted in the response on the blog, "Over the years, it became a story about the depress valve you alluded to in your blog."
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Really enjoyed Mr Hale's latest!
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/03/11/breaking-through/
Now searching to see what we have on STS-53 :)
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I remember my father working (perhaps leading, we didn't talk much about it) elements of the autoland system. he was always irritated that it was not used. He mostly dealt with the antennaes for the sytem, as I recall.
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I remember my father working (perhaps leading, we didn't talk much about it) elements of the autoland system. he was always irritated that it was not used. He mostly dealt with the antennaes for the sytem, as I recall.
The software for MLS / autoland involved comparing the KF position centroid against a modelled trajectory with appropriate control feedback.
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The really scary thing is that I understood that last post.
The biggest challenge seemed to be multipathing of the antenna signal which would lead to navigation errors. At KSC we put up microwave "fences" to minimize the possibility of multipath signals.
I think you might soon be able to buy one of those MSBLS units at the government surplus sale; everybody uses GPS these days and there is probably no use for them after the shuttle retires.
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So was the autoland system actually used on a later flight?
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So was the autoland system actually used on a later flight?
We came very close to testing auto land several yeas ago but changed 'our' mind a few weeks (days?) Before launch. I personally think auto would work great.
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Didn't a late transition to manual control during the only White Sands landing have something to do with the late gear deployment?
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Really enjoyed Mr Hale's latest!
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/03/11/breaking-through/
Now searching to see what we have on STS-53 :)
Wayne's responses in the comments are great, too -- I particularly like the note about what John Shannon said.
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Mr. Hale's latest is thought provoking, to say the least.
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/03/12/a-not-so-simple-truth/
Columbia, it turns out, wasn't "Crater's" fault.
"A more important lesson is that experts, even in their field of expertise, can be wrong."
- Ed Kyle
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Some interlinking :)
Philip's interview with Mr Hale:
http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=24466.0 <--thread linking to the article and the book thread.
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Some interlinking :)
Philip's interview with Mr Hale:
http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=24466.0 <--thread linking to the article and the book thread.
Chris, this is what you need a "like" button for!
Great stuff!
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In reply to Mr. Hale's STS-53 blog entry and comment:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/03/11/breaking-through/#comment-862
waynehale says:
March 11, 2011 at 8:55 pm
Well, 10 seconds is my rough guess without going back to my files. It seemed like forever. John Shannon was my GNC and I remember him saying out loud: “where is he going?” But the orbiter was coming back with an empty payload bay so it could take more stress.
Below is an excerpt of the STS-53 GNC PFR - Title: Low Energy HAC
(Full report available on L2)
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Really enjoyed the post re STS-53. Mike Mullane had some good flying stories re Dave Walker in his book Riding Rockets. Wish I could grab some backseat time in a T-38 with Captain Walker... I think.
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P.S.
On a lighter note, STS-53 had a stoweaway, named dog breath.
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Crater was programmed to calculate ice impact damage to the Saturn V.
It was not optimised for lower mass debris damage to a tile.
The big problem with crater and STS-107 was fully spelled out in the CAIB.
The lack of upkeep/funding of the launch cameras gave the team using crater 'less' data than they needed.
No one knew the 'exact' location of the debris strike. Was it the leading edge or just below near the landing gear door?
What was the clocking angle of the rotating debris?
What was the size/mass of the debris?
Without good data in you do not get good data out.
The engineers also knew that crater over-calculated damage AND we are just talking about foam here (dangerous combination).
The precise angle of attack was unknown. The tests with the foam gun and leading edge samples that had flown 28 times had to be carried out multiple times with best-guesstimates on the angle of attack.
The flagrant dis-regard for more analysis from the upper management (Linda Ham) caused in-part by intense schedule pressure resulted in the foam strike being classified as nothing more than a turn around issue post flight in the OPF.
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Crater was programmed to calculate ice impact damage to the Saturn V.
It was not optimised for lower mass debris damage to a tile.
The big problem with crater and STS-107 was fully spelled out in the CAIB.
The lack of upkeep/funding of the launch cameras gave the team using crater 'less' data than they needed.
No one knew the 'exact' location of the debris strike. Was it the leading edge or just below near the landing gear door?
What was the clocking angle of the rotating debris?
What was the size/mass of the debris?
Without good data in you do not get good data out.
The engineers also knew that crater over-calculated damage AND we are just talking about foam here (dangerous combination).
The precise angle of attack was unknown. The tests with the foam gun and leading edge samples that had flown 28 times had to be carried out multiple times with best-guesstimates on the angle of attack.
The flagrant dis-regard for more analysis from the upper management (Linda Ham) caused in-part by intense schedule pressure resulted in the foam strike being classified as nothing more than a turn around issue post flight in the OPF.
But Mr. Hale tells us that "more analysis" wouldn't have mattered. Crater turned out to give a reasonable answer for tile damage, but there were no analysis tools for the RCC leading edge parts where the impact actually occurred. For that, management depended on expert opinion. The experts, and every one else (it was common knowledge that foam could never, ever, break RCC), were wrong.
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But Mr. Hale tells us that "more analysis" wouldn't have mattered.
More analysis of the data set they had, which was inconclusive. Some of the criticism from the investigation board was for not pursuing additional data. Some of the recommendations were (in part) to collect more data.
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So was the autoland system actually used on a later flight?
We came very close to testing auto land several yeas ago but changed 'our' mind a few weeks (days?) Before launch. I personally think auto would work great.
Yes sir. It would've. It was tested on another airframe, just not used on Shuttle.
The tricky part is in getting the guidance feedback modelling correct - so called "control theory" (made harder by having started with the wrong aerodynamics at the beginning). Now that we have much faster computers, you have more ways to be certain that you don't have a "digitally induced oscillation". Sometimes due to interesting numerical issues less common in modern computers where you don't have to use as many approximations to make up for the lack of "speed".
Would have been less exciting if more tries with more ALT tests IMHO.
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re nooneofconsequence
Careful. Nobody else uses the MSBLS system developed for shuttle. Many of the significant issues had to do with the ground equipment, the specific antenna arrangement, etc. I seriously doubt that any other airframe used (uses?) that system.
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re nooneofconsequence
Careful. Nobody else uses the MSBLS system developed for shuttle. Many of the significant issues had to do with the ground equipment, the specific antenna arrangement, etc. I seriously doubt that any other airframe used (uses?) that system.
Absolutely true. Unique reflection/multipath issues. But MLS itself was deployed more widespread.
Was talking about the software and algorithms for autoland, variations of which were tested on various other platforms. I can tell you tons about the error propagation of each of them, some of the problems with how they worked and where the root causes were.
As for GPS, it also has several issues too. Every navaid has its issues.
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Wasn't sure where to put this, but Denise Chow w/Space.com interviewed Mr. Hale on the eve of the 30th anniversary of the first launch:
http://www.space.com/11343-space-shuttle-anniversary-wayne-hale.html
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Wayne's latest (on the Shuttle decision) is sure to generate some discussion. I'm on my phone or I'd link it...
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http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/04/14/why-houston-did-not-get-a-shuttle/
Lots of truth in there. Kinda knocks the wind out of you.
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Very true. Unfortunately.
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http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/04/14/why-houston-did-not-get-a-shuttle/
Lots of truth in there. Kinda knocks the wind out of you.
:(
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http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/04/14/why-houston-did-not-get-a-shuttle/
Lots of truth in there. Kinda knocks the wind out of you.
:(
Blame the victim. Typical.
You JSC guys should not fall for this tactic. It is not your fault.
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http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/04/14/why-houston-did-not-get-a-shuttle/
Lots of truth in there. Kinda knocks the wind out of you.
:(
Blame the victim. Typical.
You JSC guys should not fall for this tactic. It is not your fault.
I didn't really read it as blaming JSC per say, but more so the city of Houston and the state of Texas. I think he was touching on topics greater than landing a shuttle too.
I took the main points to be lack of future programs and projects, and not doing anything about it. I took it as trying to light a fire to do something about it. Just my take though.
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Blame the victim. Typical.
You JSC guys should not fall for this tactic. It is not your fault.
I didn't really read it as blaming JSC per se, but more so the city of Houston and the state of Texas. I think he was touching on topics greater than landing a shuttle too.
I took the main points to be lack of future programs and projects, and not doing anything about it. I took it as trying to light a fire to do something about it. Just my take though.
In that case, I agree that we (Texas in general and Houston in particular) should have made more of an effort in this recent instance, and that it should definitely be taken as a wake-up call. We are going to have to fight for every scrap of NASA business in the future, as Sen. Hutchison has been doing for SLS. Texas will have to keep up the fight for SLS, as well as any and all future NASA programs. Otherwise Hale's vision of a mothballed JSC may just be closer to becoming reality than we all think.
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Texas will have to keep up the fight for SLS, as well as any and all future NASA programs. Otherwise Hale's vision of a mothballed JSC may just be closer to becoming reality than we all think.
Yes. If you bet everything on SLS, you are in for a depressing future - the writing is on the wall. So have your representatives do their best to bring different kinds of aerospace projects to your state/city. NASA is in a transition, and whatever comes out of it will for sure not look like the Shuttle era.
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New post, dovetails with the CCDEV-2 announcement:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/04/18/tanstaafl/
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OK kind of a reach, but Wayne's tweet is how I became aware of it:
http://twitter.com/waynehale/status/74830931332055040
"Many old collegues gave a good summary of the space shuttle program on CBS Sunday Morning show - all us retirees watched!"
Here is the link to the CBS Sunday Morning piece, which I'm double posting for those like me that generally avoid embedded YT vids:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HLjmGLFQ1A4
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HLjmGLFQ1A4
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Here is the link to the CBS Sunday Morning piece, which I'm double posting for those like me that generally avoid embedded YT vids:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HLjmGLFQ1A4
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HLjmGLFQ1A4
What Gen. Bolden fails to mention is that we are throwing away our existing capability in order to field a system that, with possible upgrades, might be used to send humans back to the moon or elsewhere beyond LEO someday, but not anytime soon. Talking about going somewhere in 2025 isn't going to make up for the loss of what we have right now.
As I posted elsewhere earlier today, this is my take on the situation: We have invested over $100 billion in the International Space Station, and now we are putting this just completed laboratory in space at risk with this decision. We are completely dependent upon the Russians for crew transport (and have already been reliant on the Soyuz as an emergency lifeboat for resident crews, thanks to the cancellation of CRV). That is a potential single point of failure, so let's hope the Soyuz never suffers an accident that results in its grounding for any length of time. And even if SpaceX and Orbital come through with their unmanned supply craft on time (not likely, as they have already experienced delays and cost overruns), full utilization of ISS will be difficult without the space shuttle's unique capabilities.
As for manned spacecraft, the best case scenario is SpaceX fielding the crewed version of Dragon by 2015. History would suggest that the date will continue to move to the right, though. Orion/MPCV might make an unmanned test flight in 2016, but won't carry crew for at least a couple of years beyond that. And we're talking about nothing more than glorified Apollo capsules. Sierra Nevada Corporation is working on its "DreamChaser" lifting body crew transport, based on the old HL-20 design, but this is a company without any track record in building manned systems. It claims to be targeting 2014 for an unmanned orbital test flight, to be launched by an Atlas V. But I'd be willing to put money on that not happening. There is a very real risk that these new craft, with even moderate development problems and delays, won't be ready before the ISS is ready to be de-commissioned in the 2020 timeframe! (Yes, there is some talk of extending ISS to 2028, but that assumes a lot of things go right, and as we throw away the one system capable of providing all the maintenance and logistics support for the US segment, the odds of things going wrong increase greatly.)
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I wonder if Mr Hale supports SLS?
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I wonder if Mr Hale supports SLS?
You just might get an answer...:)
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I don't believe that congressional aides should design rockets. Nor should the OMB design rockets. The leadership of the country needs to set goals, provide resources, and let the engineers do their job. Heck, I'd hate to see the laws that most engineers would write.
Remember that Norm Augustine and his commission said that the (2009) NASA budget was not enough to do anything interesting and that an additional $3B per year would be required to have a significant national space program. Anybody seen that money? Did the President propose it? Did the Congress appropriate it?
Commercial LEO transportation seems to be coming along, albeit slower than we would all like. Exploration is going nowhere as far as I can tell.
Pity, that.
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I don't believe that congressional aides should design rockets. Nor should the OMB design rockets. The leadership of the country needs to set goals, provide resources, and let the engineers do their job. Heck, I'd hate to see the laws that most engineers would write.
Remember that Norm Augustine and his commission said that the (2009) NASA budget was not enough to do anything interesting and that an additional $3B per year would be required to have a significant national space program. Anybody seen that money? Did the President propose it? Did the Congress appropriate it?
Commercial LEO transportation seems to be coming along, albeit slower than we would all like. Exploration is going nowhere as far as I can tell.
Pity, that.
Can I start a Wayne for President? I mean really...he speaks truth. Trusts the right people. I honest (brutely so which is good).
Who is with me?
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http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/08/18/after-the-barn-burned-down/
Mr Hale quoting Churchill - that works :)
Then, as now, a number of folks propose that the current administration reverse the old administration’s decision to stop flying the shuttle. But even in the summer of 2008, it was too late. Not technically impossible, but already past the point of financial feasibility to resurrect the program. Then I wrote “the horse has left the barn”. Now the barn has burned down.
I know - from recent posts - that's going to annoy a number of SSP guys on here, so be careful with your reactions.
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http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/08/18/after-the-barn-burned-down/
Mr Hale quoting Churchill - that works :)
Then, as now, a number of folks propose that the current administration reverse the old administration’s decision to stop flying the shuttle. But even in the summer of 2008, it was too late. Not technically impossible, but already past the point of financial feasibility to resurrect the program. Then I wrote “the horse has left the barn”. Now the barn has burned down.
I know - from recent posts - that's going to annoy a number of SSP guys on here, so be careful with your reactions.
I thought he also wrote what several people here have written:
The plan, such as it is, consists of looking for the entrepreneurial heirs of Henry Ford to produce the Model T. The hope is the genius of free enterprise will move us from the horse and buggy era to the gasoline alley era of space exploration. That is a good hope, but in the meantime personally, I would have kept the horse until the automobile appeared.
My emphasis -- and I agree.
I also find the blog post looking more at the post-Shuttle mess in front of "us" than the proverbial barn we just burned to the ground.
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My point being, we are where we are; regrettable, but true. My essay is not so much about how we got here, its about what do we do about it.
The diaspora of experienced, trained aerospace professionals is regrettable but has the one redeming virtue of populating the newspace companies with expertise they desperately need to succeed.
As far as the SLS and visiting asteroids? Nice idea, timeline is too long, cost is too high. We need to start exploring deep space sooner rather than later and that pragmatically means using existing infrastructure (or small modifications of it) rather than clean sheet designs.
Ugly is ugly forever, but pursuing engineering perfection is the road to cancellation.
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Ugly is ugly forever, but pursuing engineering perfection is the road to cancellation.
Great line - that's going in my hall of engineering aphorisms. So that I may properly credit it, is that an original, or are you quoting?
Noel
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Not exactly a quotation, but definitely not original with me either.
Ugly can change I guess, evolved systems sometimes become a thing of beauty.
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Ugly is ugly forever, but pursuing engineering perfection is the road to cancellation.
Great line - that's going in my hall of engineering aphorisms. So that I may properly credit it, is that an original, or are you quoting?
Noel
Voltaire put it quite succinctly ;)
Perfect is the enemy of good. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perfect_is_the_enemy_of_good)
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I know - from recent posts - that's going to annoy a number of SSP guys on here, so be careful with your reactions.
In that case, I'll decide not to comment about that "burnt down barn" analogy. Other than it is a poor choice of words.
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Not exactly a quotation, but definitely not original with me either.
Ah, OK. I know similar thoughts have been uttered before, about how one has to carefully thread between that particular Scylla and Charybdis, I just liked the flow and pithiness of your particular version.
Noel
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Latest is a link to the AAAS round table video, which includes Mr Hale.
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/09/06/the-future-of-nasa/
Currently watching, very interesting so far.
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Thanks for the bump - I had checked it when the link was private so ignored future posts about it. Cool stuff!
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Thanks for the link! A very enjoyable viewing, and good discussion.
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Latest is up:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/09/20/the-school-of-hard-knocks/
With reference to the recent failures.
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That was a great read. Being honest and admitting your mistake is tough to do in the short run, but is certainly the best way to go for the long run.
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Latest is up:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/09/20/the-school-of-hard-knocks/
With reference to the recent failures.
again, words of wisdom.
(been there, done that in my line of work)
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Latest is up:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/09/20/the-school-of-hard-knocks/
With reference to the recent failures.
again, words of wisdom.
(been there, done that in my line of work)
As somebody who is working in the business of rocket engine testing for nearly 15 years now I can only confirm this!
An example of this is also given in the Apollo 9 episode of "From the Earth to the Moon" when an engineer reports to Tom Kelly that a Lunar Module ground test failed due to his wrong calculations...
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In the high risk, high energy, low margin endeavor that is spaceflight, no matter how hard you try, little things are going to go wrong. What you hope is to learn the lesson before the little things grow into big things.
Well written, as always!
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I reread the "slow trainwreck for commercial " post, and was struck by the description of the requirements for a spacecraft.
NASA must change or this effort will fail. I am reminded that the US Military’s requirements for its first airplane ran 2 and ½ pages; and the requirements for the NASA’s Gemini capsule ran about two dozen pages. Simple, straightforward requirements and the flexibility to use good industry based standards could allow commercial space flight to be as successful as those programs or the NASA Launch Services program. But we are not on that path.
What is it that NASA requires at this time from commercial companies - can I read up on the evolution of requirements from the 12 page to what we currently have? Could it be feasible to try to request a current-day-and-age spacecraft within 12 pages? If not, why not?
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http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/11/04/standards/
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http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/11/04/standards/
Oh that's my favorite so far. Orbiter hardware stories!
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I really hope the folks in the Commercial Crew Program read Mr. Hale's postings - they certainly should do.
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Another good read from Mr. Hale:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2011/11/14/requirements/
Reminded me of this article:
http://grandfather-economic-report.com/regulation.htm
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New post is up:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/01/09/whither-americas-human-space-program/
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Wow, it's already been three years since the Augustine Commission!
I thought it was a good review too, as much as some of it was highly political. Remember the "Who are you guys?" from Dr. Leroy Chiao? Bit of an own goal by him.
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Well, really not quite three years. The report came out around Labor Day (first part of September), but the commission was organized in the early spring; somewhere I have a copy of the original letter and I'll try to look it up.
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Well, really not quite three years. The report came out around Labor Day (first part of September), but the commission was organized in the early spring; somewhere I have a copy of the original letter and I'll try to look it up.
How about the lettter from John Holdren to Chris Scolese (May 7, 2009)
Or the Charter from Chris Scolese (June 1, 2009)
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Thanks Simpl Simon - your files are in more organized than mine!
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From Mr Hale's twitter account.
>@waynehale Wayne Hale
9 yrs ago today 1/17/03 Bob Page burst in my office to report video of debris strike on Columbia. I called SSPO who said 'nothing we can do'<
Forwarded it on when I saw it earlier and the reaction but think it's worth adding to this thread. RIP Columbia.
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From Mr Hale's twitter account.
>@waynehale Wayne Hale
9 yrs ago today 1/17/03 Bob Page burst in my office to report video of debris strike on Columbia. I called SSPO who said 'nothing we can do'<
Forwarded it on when I saw it earlier and the reaction but think it's worth adding to this thread. RIP Columbia.
Who are SSPO?
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From Mr Hale's twitter account.
>@waynehale Wayne Hale
9 yrs ago today 1/17/03 Bob Page burst in my office to report video of debris strike on Columbia. I called SSPO who said 'nothing we can do'<
Forwarded it on when I saw it earlier and the reaction but think it's worth adding to this thread. RIP Columbia.
Who are SSPO?
Space Shuttle Program Office, I believe.
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New post up:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/01/30/what-would-rick-and-gus-and-dick-want/
More food for thought time.
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New post up:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/01/30/what-would-rick-and-gus-and-dick-want/
More food for thought time.
Always love reading Mr. Hale's straight-talking, no-nonsense approach to issues.
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I enjoy his blog very much. I wish he was able to post more often.
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New post up:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/01/30/what-would-rick-and-gus-and-dick-want/
More food for thought time.
A meal I wish some in politics could see as a feast for a nation, not its starvation.
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Wayne is right on the mark here.
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New post up:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/01/30/what-would-rick-and-gus-and-dick-want/
More food for thought time.
Bravo!
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Latest from Mr Hale:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/02/09/a-few-word-about-this-picture/
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Latest from Mr Hale:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/02/09/a-few-word-about-this-picture/
Only time to read through it once, but definitely food for thought on the eve of another budget cycle. Going to have to come back to this again when time permits.
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Latest from Mr Hale:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/02/09/a-few-word-about-this-picture/
He really doesn't mince words, does he. Another good read, and hope it gets to a wider audience, including politicians and the general public.
The politicians want to see value for the tax dollars spent, value as it relates to their constituents in their own 'pond' - sell them on the benefits it provides, currently, and it makes it harder for them to accept cuts in those areas.
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I was just imagining if that photo had some of the people replaced by some of us.
TPS repair overview from Mr Hale: Nothing but wide eyes and big grins! NOAX guns for everyone!! ;D
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Latest from Mr Hale:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/02/09/a-few-word-about-this-picture/
He really doesn't mince words, does he. Another good read, and hope it gets to a wider audience, including politicians and the general public.
The politicians want to see value for the tax dollars spent, value as it relates to their constituents in their own 'pond' - sell them on the benefits it provides, currently, and it makes it harder for them to accept cuts in those areas.
He never disappoints.
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If the constituency is interested in jobs, all government work had better look like a jobs program. Sorry if you don’t like it, but that is the fact of political life in America, then, now, and in the future.
I'll be frank. I don't merely dislike it. I hate it.
Admittedly, that's not exactly the representatives faults. It's our fault as voters.
But we're shoot ourselves in the foot when we choose what we do and who we elect based on jobs instead of needs. We invite growth of government, and therefore taxes, even in (or perhaps especially in) departments that don't need to grow to accomplish their tasks. We look for ways to spend money instead of to achieve results.
Unfortunately, I don't have a clue how to fix it. Mr. Hale is sadly very correct.
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I'll be frank. I don't merely dislike it. I hate it.
Admittedly, that's not exactly the representatives faults. It's our fault as voters.
But we're shoot ourselves in the foot when we choose what we do and who we elect based on jobs instead of needs. We invite growth of government, and therefore taxes, even in (or perhaps especially in) departments that don't need to grow to accomplish their tasks. We look for ways to spend money instead of to achieve results.
Unfortunately, I don't have a clue how to fix it. Mr. Hale is sadly very correct.
It takes rare political leadership, and a good dose of circumstance, to pass an (any) intelligent, coherent policy through the stomach of representational, electoral politics and come out with something fully intelligent and coherent. Mr Hale's excellent point is that it's part of the system, and, to paraphrase Mr Churchill, it's the worst system until you look at all the other systems.
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New article:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/02/26/construction-of-facilities/
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New article:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/02/26/construction-of-facilities/
Quite the laugh!
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US Navy and USAF kept the same designation for several aircraft to get funding for "upgrades" when it really was a new design and they knew they couldn't get funding for a new aircraft.
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Latest post: "Perspective".
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2010/10/11/perspective
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Latest post. Well written.
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/04/18/how-we-nearly-lost-discovery/
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Latest post. Well written.
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/04/18/how-we-nearly-lost-discovery/
That's what he tweeted during the Ferry. Thought it would be about the PAL ramp.
And I think we all remember the MMT presser, where Paul Hill ripped that stupid BBC reporter into shreads! :) Was awesome to see that live, felt like I was at a one sided boxing match and you could only cheer him on.
Not very well written as it was in the very early days of the site, but as a reminder:
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2005/07/hitman-hill-lays-down-the-law/
And if Mr Hale sees this post, he'll remember that presser as he walked it just as Mr Hill had finished with that BBC guy, put his hand on Mr Hill's shoulder as if to say "I think he's dead, you can stop now" and took over.
Loved it.
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Latest post. Well written.
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/04/18/how-we-nearly-lost-discovery/
That's what he tweeted during the Ferry. Thought it would be about the PAL ramp.
And I think we all remember the MMT presser, where Paul Hill ripped that stupid BBC reporter into shreads! :) Was awesome to see that live, felt like I was at a one sided boxing match and you could only cheer him on.
Not very well written as it was in the very early days of the site, but as a reminder:
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2005/07/hitman-hill-lays-down-the-law/
And if Mr Hale sees this post, he'll remember that presser as he walked it just as Mr Hill had finished with that BBC guy, put his hand on Mr Hill's shoulder as if to say "I think he's dead, you can stop now" and took over.
Loved it.
Agreed. Extraordinarily interesting and well written post from Mr. Hale as always.
I personally remember that mission and when they had to actually do a spacewalk to inspect the bottom of the vehicle manually (believe it was this same mission) because of the loose gap fillers.
Always wanted to know more about the return to flight mission.
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Yep. Steve Robinson on the end of the arm. Pulled out the gap filler and said "this big patient is now cured" - which was apt as the filler had some red glue on it, so it looked like an actual operation!
EDIT: Found an image!
(http://blogs.guardian.co.uk/news/archives/shuttleblog.jpg)
And that reminds me of when Endeavour (I think) had a hyd leak on her NLG and the fluid was a red color. There was an image of a bandage type towel over the leaky strut and people noted it looked like blood.
We're going to miss all this with these capsules.
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And I think we all remember the MMT presser, where Paul Hill ripped that stupid BBC reporter into shreads! :) Was awesome to see that live, felt like I was at a one sided boxing match and you could only cheer him on.
Not very well written as it was in the very early days of the site, but as a reminder:
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2005/07/hitman-hill-lays-down-the-law/
And if Mr Hale sees this post, he'll remember that presser as he walked it just as Mr Hill had finished with that BBC guy, put his hand on Mr Hill's shoulder as if to say "I think he's dead, you can stop now" and took over.
Loved it.
I don't remember seeing THAT briefing. I do have some briefings stored on my hard drive, but unless its one of those proprietary real player formated ones, which I couldn't get to play at all, I'm having no luck in finding it.
Which briefing was it?
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Yep. Steve Robinson on the end of the arm. Pulled out the gap filler and said "this big patient is now cured" - which was apt as the filler had some red glue on it, so it looked like an actual operation!
EDIT: Found an image!
(http://blogs.guardian.co.uk/news/archives/shuttleblog.jpg)
And that reminds me of when Endeavour (I think) had a hyd leak on her NLG and the fluid was a red color. There was an image of a bandage type towel over the leaky strut and people noted it looked like blood.
We're going to miss all this with these capsules.
I recall all the discussions on how they were going to remove the protruding gap fillers, special tools (saw) and how much force was going to be needed. It was a highly delicate operation as to not cause any tile damage or loss. As I watched, I held my breath as he reached for the gap filler and then burst out laughing from the ease of removal and the release of the tension built up in me… :)
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KmOp7Ab3Bds
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And I think we all remember the MMT presser, where Paul Hill ripped that stupid BBC reporter into shreads! :) Was awesome to see that live, felt like I was at a one sided boxing match and you could only cheer him on.
Not very well written as it was in the very early days of the site, but as a reminder:
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2005/07/hitman-hill-lays-down-the-law/
And if Mr Hale sees this post, he'll remember that presser as he walked it just as Mr Hill had finished with that BBC guy, put his hand on Mr Hill's shoulder as if to say "I think he's dead, you can stop now" and took over.
Loved it.
I don't remember seeing THAT briefing. I do have some briefings stored on my hard drive, but unless its one of those proprietary real player formated ones, which I couldn't get to play at all, I'm having no luck in finding it.
Which briefing was it?
I know it was at JSC, I'm thinking STS-114 FD2 MSB, as opposed to post-MMT. I'd LOVE to see it again.
Awesome man.
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Yep. Steve Robinson on the end of the arm. Pulled out the gap filler and said "this big patient is now cured" - which was apt as the filler had some red glue on it, so it looked like an actual operation!
EDIT: Found an image!
(http://blogs.guardian.co.uk/news/archives/shuttleblog.jpg)
And that reminds me of when Endeavour (I think) had a hyd leak on her NLG and the fluid was a red color. There was an image of a bandage type towel over the leaky strut and people noted it looked like blood.
We're going to miss all this with these capsules.
I recall the US news media calling the gap-filler EVA as being "...the most dangerous, daring space walk ever..." I guess most of them forgot about Skylab 2 and Conrad and Kerwin's EVA to repair the SAS Wing- THAT was the most dangerous and daring EVA ever- and it remains so.
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I thought the PAL ramp that came off was far less weight than the Columbia ET piece? And was a good time after on the ascent?
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I know it was at JSC, I'm thinking STS-114 FD2 MSB, as opposed to post-MMT. I'd LOVE to see it again.
Awesome man.
I do have these files seemingly from FD2:
mmt_briefing_072705.wmv with Mr. Parsons and Mr. Hale
status_brief_072705.wmv Mr. Engelauf and Mr. Shannon
You wrote your article on July 27th.
The Launch was on July 26th.
Then there is
status_brief_072805.wmv Mr. Hill and Mr. Shannon, and in this one Mr. Hill has different clothes compared to the image in you article.
Do I miss a briefing with Mr. Hill here..
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I thought the PAL ramp that came off was far less weight than the Columbia ET piece? And was a good time after on the ascent?
I'm sure I remember the PAL ramp liberation was less mass, and it was later in ascent, but you still wouldn't want that smacking against her RCC, etc. In other words, the bipod ramp foam liberation on 107 probably wasn't at the bottom end of unacceptable.
So many varables. Mass, time of liberation, what the liberation consisted of.
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I know it was at JSC, I'm thinking STS-114 FD2 MSB, as opposed to post-MMT. I'd LOVE to see it again.
Awesome man.
I do have these files seemingly from FD2:
mmt_briefing_072705.wmv with Mr. Parsons and Mr. Hale
status_brief_072705.wmv Mr. Engelauf and Mr. Shannon
You wrote your article on July 27th.
The Launch was on July 26th.
Then there is
status_brief_072805.wmv Mr. Hill and Mr. Shannon, and in this one Mr. Hill has different clothes compared to the image in you article.
Do I miss a briefing with Mr. Hill here..
It could be "mmt_briefing_072705.wmv with Mr. Parsons and Mr. Hale" - because Mr Hale turned up after Mr Hill had taken some questions, so maybe Mr Hill was standing in?
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It could be "mmt_briefing_072705.wmv with Mr. Parsons and Mr. Hale" - because Mr Hale turned up after Mr Hill had taken some questions, so maybe Mr Hill was standing in?
Its not that either, that one does not have Mr. Hill at all.
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I swear it happened, honest guv'nor! :D
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The apologizing to the MAF people was an interesting part too.
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It could be "mmt_briefing_072705.wmv with Mr. Parsons and Mr. Hale" - because Mr Hale turned up after Mr Hill had taken some questions, so maybe Mr Hill was standing in?
Its not that either, that one does not have Mr. Hill at all.
I believe the briefing you refer to with Mr. Engelauf and Mr. Shannon was a Mission Status Briefing at the end of Flight Day 1, which may have been 27 July in GMT. Mr. Hill was the lead flight director (Orbit 1) for STS-114, so his first shift would have been on Flight Day 2.
I have the FD1 MSB (or most of it) handy, but not necessarily FD2 or FD3.
Edit: the FD1 MSB was at 2100 GMT on 26 July.
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The apologizing to the MAF people was an interesting part too.
Top people. Know a few of them. In fact, on the Katrina reference, I know one of them who lived in an area apparently a lot of them live in, Sidell (spelling) and he completely lost his home. Lived with his parents for two years, caused a lot of personal problems I won't repeat. And then you see the ET mods they worked and the TIMs to get the tank shipping on track to support the manifest (around that period) and you know instantly know what those people are made of right there.
And then you look at how pretty much nothing came off those tanks during the latter missions.....
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I believe the briefing you refer to with Mr. Engelauf and Mr. Shannon was a Mission Status Briefing at the end of Flight Day 1, which may have been 27 July in GMT. Mr. Hill was the lead flight director (Orbit 1) for STS-114, so his first shift would have been on Flight Day 2.
I have the FD1 MSB (or most of it) handy, but not necessarily FD2 or FD3.
Edit: the FD1 MSB was at 2100 GMT on 26 July.
I believe we have now completely derailed the thread! but, yes you might be correct so I miss the correct FD2 briefing too.
The FD2 briefing is listed on "another space news website with subscription options" and its thumbnail has the correct tie on Mr. Hill!
Furthermore, our very own John44 was posting lots of stuff on his old website back then (according to groups.google.com archive of sci.space.shuttle newsgroup).
I'll PM him.
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found this (http://naca.larc.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20050212105&qs=Ns%3DPublication-Date|0%26N%3D4294903262%26No%3D60) on NASA Technical Reports Server
STS-114: Discovery Mission Status Briefing
July 27, 2005
Paul Hill, STS-114 Lead Shuttle Flight Director and Wayne Hale, Space Shuttle Deputy Program Director is shown during this mission status briefing. Hill talks about the first 24 hours of the Space Shuttle Discovery in orbit. He expresses that he has acquired data from the launch through imagery and hand held photographs of the external tank. Hale answers questions from the news media about how the engineers may be managing this data and if there is an overwhelming amount of data. Live downlink television pictures from the end-effectors camera on the Robotic Arm as it has completed its reberthing of the Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS) are shown.
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The apologizing to the MAF people was an interesting part too.
Top people. Know a few of them. In fact, on the Katrina reference, I know one of them who lived in an area apparently a lot of them live in, Sidell (spelling) and he completely lost his home. Lived with his parents for two years, caused a lot of personal problems I won't repeat. And then you see the ET mods they worked and the TIMs to get the tank shipping on track to support the manifest (around that period) and you know instantly know what those people are made of right there.
And then you look at home pretty much nothing came off those tanks during the latter missions.....
Chris it's Slidell we are located about 20 miles north of Maf and about 15 miles west of Stennis.
I read Mr Hale's article. I know he apoligized but I am still bothered that at that time that they were willing to blame the accident on a Maf technician.
I will say that the bipod foam spray in the old configuration not could leave MAF with any repairs what so ever.
Any out of tolerance or damage condition required a complete return to drawing configuration. Meaning strip it and respray it. Also the bipods were installed at KSC. this is another chance at damaging the foam.
Then you have to mate the shuttle to the bipods, another oppurtinity for possiable damage to the foam.
The tech that sprayed the foam is very close friend of mine and one of the top TPS techs at MAF. I was relevied to find out that I had not done the final shakedown of the bipods on this ET. I hate rehashing this stuff but lets not forget the Orbiter made it to orbit and the foam strike was known.
Just to be clear I am a fan and follwer of Mr. Hale. But to people that lived through this accident it's just a little upsetting.
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I swear it happened, honest guv'nor! :D
I remember the chewing out too, so I can back that up.
Despite the feelings it brings back, hearing about these little events that might have passed without coming to light is so important. I'm glad this site has so much condensed into one area for reference.
Good or bad, they are all memories we carry.
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Great blog Mr Hale! I feel so much for DDG40, but I won't go into that.
I will also say I have a lot of respect for MAF. Chris has written about 100 articles on that center, I think. Got to admire the workforce.
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Latest post. Well written.
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/04/18/how-we-nearly-lost-discovery/
That's what he tweeted during the Ferry. Thought it would be about the PAL ramp.
And I think we all remember the MMT presser, where Paul Hill ripped that stupid BBC reporter into shreads! :) Was awesome to see that live, felt like I was at a one sided boxing match and you could only cheer him on.
Not very well written as it was in the very early days of the site, but as a reminder:
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2005/07/hitman-hill-lays-down-the-law/
And if Mr Hale sees this post, he'll remember that presser as he walked it just as Mr Hill had finished with that BBC guy, put his hand on Mr Hill's shoulder as if to say "I think he's dead, you can stop now" and took over.
Loved it.
Here's the post in question from the STS-114 FD2 MSB: http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=219.msg1855#msg1855
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Thank you Mr Hale & everybody who serviced and took care of the space shuttles. I think Return To Flight pitched a perfect game and completed the International Space Station.
And for my favorite space shuttle forever, Discovery--
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HgbYZ3F4DjM
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Latest post. Well written.
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/04/18/how-we-nearly-lost-discovery/
That's what he tweeted during the Ferry. Thought it would be about the PAL ramp.
And I think we all remember the MMT presser, where Paul Hill ripped that stupid BBC reporter into shreads! :) Was awesome to see that live, felt like I was at a one sided boxing match and you could only cheer him on.
Not very well written as it was in the very early days of the site, but as a reminder:
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2005/07/hitman-hill-lays-down-the-law/
And if Mr Hale sees this post, he'll remember that presser as he walked it just as Mr Hill had finished with that BBC guy, put his hand on Mr Hill's shoulder as if to say "I think he's dead, you can stop now" and took over.
Loved it.
Here's the post in question from the STS-114 FD2 MSB: http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=219.msg1855#msg1855
Wow, that takes me back. The site wasn't even six months old (in fact, we've just entered year 8 here. Need to do a thread for that). The forum had about 100 members, we now have over 24,000.
Anyway, we are still on STS-114 here, per Mr Hale's blog, as much as this is going off on a tangent now, so we can drag it back hopefully! :)
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I used this entire situation as a teaching event at the NASA Project Management Challenge Conference in 2007. You can find the powerpoint charts over on L2 at http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=11379.0
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"A conversation with Wayne Hale"
http://vimeo.com/40816299 (http://vimeo.com/40816299)
(slightly "off-topic", i.e. not the blog, but it nicely fits the context)
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New post from Mr Hale:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/05/17/jfm-to-the-rescue/
John Muratore with the big mentions.
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The two comments already there are... interesting.
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great blog update by Mr Hale.. relevant to Saturdays launch too
jb
edit:@Malderi you are correct about the comments..
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Great kudos for John Muratore, he deserves it! I remember the “pirate” patch on top of the X-38… ;D
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I have this image of SpaceX as all young guns. Very timely reminder that they're leavened with people who've been doing this for a long time, too.
...and another interesting story, to boot. Especially to me, since my day job is programming the IBM z/Series mainframes. These are 64-bit evolutions of the 24-bit S/370, in the same way today's Intel Core processor is the 64-bit evolution of the old 8-bit 8080 from the original IBM PC.
Thanks for the story.
cheers, Martin
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Latest post from Mr. Hale: http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/05/28/ground-up-rendezvous/
Wonderful history from early STS and MCC challenges plus tribute to SpaceX's accomplishments so far all in one. Thanks Wayne!
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Latest post from Mr. Hale: http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/05/28/ground-up-rendezvous/
Wonderful history from early STS and MCC challenges plus tribute to SpaceX's accomplishments so far all in one. Thanks Wayne!
Love those old stories!
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That was an excellent post. I don't really have anything else to add other than that I would happily buy a book of collected war stories like that :-)
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Mr Hale has starting writing again. And this upcoming series promises to be really interesting for us shuttle fans!! http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/08/14/after-ten-years-why-write-now/
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Part 1 is up - lots of important names and background. http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/08/19/after-ten-years-dramatis-personae-part-1/
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http://www.huffingtonpost.com/wayne-hale/space-exploration_b_1836619.html?utm_hp_ref=elections-2012
Wayne Hale calls on the candidates to support space exploration and expansion. I thought this was an appropriate quote:
Armchair space policy causes divisive debates about which destination to pursue, which results in paralysis. The real destination goal for America's space program should encompass all of the potential destinations, with the priority and order set by the needs and capabilities of the developing infrastructure.
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Part 2 is posted: http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/09/19/ten-years-after-columbia-balancing-life-and-work/
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Part 4 is now posted: http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/10/07/after-ten-years-the-tyranny-of-requirements/
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New Entry from Mr Hale!
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/11/06/after-ten-years-flying-a-mature-vehicle-or-not/
"We remembered Challenger, but with the wrong lens: a bad manager made one bad decision, that was what caused Challenger."
Was the manager Jud Lovingood?
I remember "learning" about Challenger (it was my first experience of Shuttle as a kid and what ultimately got me interested) via many badly scripted documentaries, etc. But one, "Challenger: Go for launch" was the most hard-hitting, including Mr Lovingood saying you "don't stand in front of a moving train" at a readiness meeting. Surprisingly frank and dare I say honest quotes from him during that documentary.
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a little off-topic, but mentioning first experiences, Challenger was the only space event that I remember from childood. Next one was the Hubble repair mission. Tells a lot about press reports etc here in Finland. And I only became a space fan in the year 2001.
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Mr. Hale did not use the word "arrogance" when discussing the culture of the tribe he was referring to.
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So many people use that term in so many derogatory ways that it has lost its true meaning and nuance. "Arrogance" becomes a shorthand way out of explaining complex cultural situations.
As a learning tool, I try to stay away from words that are loaded with connotations which could lead to simplistic understandings.
Nobody thinks they are arrogant; we all are arrogant in some ways. It is more important to understand why good people are blind to critical analysis.
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Wayne, I want to congratulate you on your last article. You didn't ended in ad hominem fallacies, you didn't went pointing to anybody in general. You recognize that complex systems tend to break due to complexity. And that complexity is not solvable with one big change but millions of little things. Yes, those little things have to start with a humble attitude that "we don't really know" and "no matter how much experience you have complex systems always find new ways to surprise you". A bit like Intel's Andy Grove phrase "Only the paranoid survive".
It's been a long time since I've seen such intellectual humbleness to accept that we don't know. Thanks.
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Please allow me to add my congratulations to baldusi's. It's an amazing thing that after devoting so much for so long to the Shuttle, Wayne Hale can still view it with humility and perspective. The world needs more people like that.
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More insights into Columbia: http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/11/12/after-ten-years-a-few-words-from-admiral-gehman/
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More insights into Columbia: http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/11/12/after-ten-years-a-few-words-from-admiral-gehman/
Very sobering read.
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Sobering is the right word for that :(
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Amazing read again from Wayne Hale.
That leads me to a question about this site too. I know this site didn't start until STS-114, but had it been around during STS-107, and given the deeper nature of this site's shuttle reporting, would we have heard of big concerns about the foam strike?
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Amazing read again from Wayne Hale.
That leads me to a question about this site too. I know this site didn't start until STS-114, but had it been around during STS-107, and given the deeper nature of this site's shuttle reporting, would we have heard of big concerns about the foam strike?
I honestly don't know, but it's highly likely our coverage would have matched the official line, such as the e-mail sent up to the crew about the incident not being a safety concern.
I can imagine the forum might have been discussing it, but again - foam strikes were not unique and shuttle people would have been pointing that out, per the style of the forum.
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What if a source had told you he was very concerned about Columbia's health, to the point of her getting back to the ground safely?
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What if a source had told you he was very concerned about Columbia's health, to the point of her getting back to the ground safely?
We'd be talking deep into post-RTF, as it took years to get to know enough of the right people to get a good level of help in reporting on Shuttle.....
So, assuming that, the source (I don't really have "sources" - I just know some people and they are friends) shouldn't be telling me, he should be telling his supervisor or boss. So I can only imagine something like that would come to me because he wasn't being listened to.
However, IF something seriously was "leaked" to me, I did have a hyperthetical process set up as to what I'd do.
1) I wouldn't report it, on site, forum or L2. This is where you forget about a "scoop" and get it to the right people to deal with.
2) I'd phone the main Shuttle manager I knew at the time, immedaitely (his words were "day or night"), and he'd contact the person who had talked to me, directly.
I never had to do it, thankfully.
Incidentally, we did see someone raise a flag once, but you can see their own process worked well for it....
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2007/08/endeavour-dissent-from-engineer-a-sign-of-post-columbia-changes/
Wanda Sigur....one of the heroes of the ETs there.
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That leads me to a question about this site too. I know this site didn't start until STS-114, but had it been around during STS-107, and given the deeper nature of this site's shuttle reporting, would we have heard of big concerns about the foam strike?
Consider that the concern was public prior to re-entry, albeit indirectly -- Jim Oberg memorably asked about it on Usenet a few days prior to entry and a question came up in the mission status briefing with Entry Flight Director Leroy Cain after the team's standard EOM-1 shift.
What degree of concern was expressed publicly is more speculative, but I don't think it reached that far into the mainstream.
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New Entry
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/12/03/ten-years-after-columbia-sts-112-the-harbinger/
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Latest!
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/12/11/after-ten-years-sts-113-the-calm-before-the-storm/
And this thread is about to go over 50,000 reads. Says a lot about the interest and admiration for Mr Hale.
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I know Mr. Hale is here from time to time, and I hope he knows how meaningful his blogging is to so many of us. I grew up during the shuttle program--STS-1 was my first launch; I saw Challenger's wing hit the water as I came out of the shower in college, and Columbia was lost as I drove my son to a party.
Mr. Hale is one of the most thoughtful speakers/writers I've ever heard. His blog should be required reading for anybody who has to deal with or communicate complex technical ideas.
I wish he would write a book.
Jeff
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I wish he would write a book.
He did (well, sort of) http://www.nasa.gov/centers/johnson/wingsinorbit/index.html (http://www.nasa.gov/centers/johnson/wingsinorbit/index.html)
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I wish he would write a book.
Yes, please! I'd buy it immediately... ;D
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I know the type of people who visit this site will digest every word of this one:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/12/29/after-ten-years-the-fateful-frr/
I must have written about 200 FRR related articles since STS-114, but this is far more interesting...
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The latest blog post really describes the cultural issues that existed back then. And the improvement after that is most evidently shown by those FRR articles and great L2 FRR briefing content.
The style of writing is really good. I wonder if Wayne will write a book of his very own...
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New post up.
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2013/01/04/after-ten-years-counting-down-to-disaster/
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Did NASA PAO ever publish a video clip from inside an actual FRR....be it SSP at JSC or Agency level at KSC?
I can only think of this photo (I think from a SSP FRR), which is from a Friends and Family presentation (great photo by the way).
(http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/A319.jpg)
I know people here can name each person in the photo, but you can see Mr Hale behind Mr Cain and Mr Shannon.
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How many do you want? At my retirement party they gave me a disk with about a million PAO shots, many in the new MMT room. This one shows me chairing an STS-114 meeting with Bill Parsons and Bill Readdy (my one-two bosses) sitting behind, looking not entirely pleased.
I know the PAO folks shot some video from time to time but don't recall seeing it on NASA TV.
Pictures from the old MMT room (Columbia and before) are rare.
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How many do you want? At my retirement party they gave me a disk with about a million PAO shots, many in the new MMT room. This one shows me chairing an STS-114 meeting with Bill Parsons and Bill Readdy (my one-two bosses) sitting behind, looking not entirely pleased.
I know the PAO folks shot some video from time to time but don't recall seeing it on NASA TV.
Pictures from the old MMT room (Columbia and before) are rare.
Now that's a great photo, especially with it being 114. I personally find pre-launch - from MOD planning, to orbiter processing through to FRR/MMT etc - completely fascinating, probably more than when the vehicle's on orbit.
I would have sold my right arm to sit in on a FRR!
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Did NASA PAO ever publish a video clip from inside an actual FRR....be it SSP at JSC or Agency level at KSC?
NASA TV broadcast some footage taken at the last one -- probably before the formalities began or early in the meeting. (Probably a link in a thread here somewhere.)
Based on different published works over the years (including Mr. Hale's blog entries), it sounds like different aspects evolved (like the setting) over the thirty-year span of flight operations.
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I would have sold my right arm to sit in on a FRR!
In the 80's, they were boring as hell. Same for early nineties.
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I would have sold my right arm to sit in on a FRR!
In the 80's, they were boring as hell. Same for early nineties.
:) You know you're a Shuttle hugger when...
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Anything for an exclusive, eh Chris? :)
How many do you want? At my retirement party they gave me a disk with about a million PAO shots, many in the new MMT room. This one shows me chairing an STS-114 meeting with Bill Parsons and Bill Readdy (my one-two bosses) sitting behind, looking not entirely pleased.
I know the PAO folks shot some video from time to time but don't recall seeing it on NASA TV.
Pictures from the old MMT room (Columbia and before) are rare.
Now that's a great photo, especially with it being 114. I personally find pre-launch - from MOD planning, to orbiter processing through to FRR/MMT etc - completely fascinating, probably more than when the vehicle's on orbit.
I would have sold my right arm to sit in on a FRR!
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http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2013/01/07/after-ten-years-death-never-takes-a-holiday/
"You know, if there was any real damage done to the wing, there is nothing we can do about it."
- Linda Ham - MMT Chair.
Makes you thankful in stages, in no particular order.....potential repair kits, ISS Safe Haven, LON, OBSS, WLEIDS, DAT, SE&I Ascent Imagery.....better behaving ETs on the foam liberation side.
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Nothing they could do? But didn't they have Atlantis already stacking in the VAB? Couldn't they got her up as a LON?
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Nothing they could do? But didn't they have Atlantis already stacking in the VAB? Couldn't they got her up as a LON?
I don't think Atlantis was in the VAB, I think the stack was, so the flow would have been rediculously accelerated.
You'd be talking a very rushed flow, Columbia powered down (Group C powerdown?). Risking Atlantis to the same damage during ascent....
....and all based on confirming damage they couldn't confirm on Columbia.
Way too many ifs and buts - and risks, but the point is they didn't know Columbia was badly damaged.
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Nothing they could do? But didn't they have Atlantis already stacking in the VAB? Couldn't they got her up as a LON?
Read the blog; the CAIB report also covers it exhaustively.
Launch On Need mission support was a result of the STS-107 accident; it didn't exist prior to it.
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The thing that struck me repeatedly during that... difficult read was the repeated impression Wayne gives that the STS-107 team (and he laudably admits that he shared that malady to a certain degree) were literally psychologically incapable of admitting to themselves that there was a serious problem. Because of that, no serous attempt was made to consider mitigating action because no-one honestly thought it would be necessary.
History records the rest.
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The latest blog post really describes the cultural issues that existed back then. And the improvement after that is most evidently shown by those FRR articles and great L2 FRR briefing content.
The style of writing is really good. I wonder if Wayne will write a book of his very own...
I hope he does.
Danny Deger
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The thing that struck me repeatedly during that... difficult read was the repeated impression Wayne gives that the STS-107 team (and he laudably admits that he shared that malady to a certain degree) were literally psychologically incapable of admitting to themselves that there was a serious problem. Because of that, no serous attempt was made to consider mitigating action because no-one honestly thought it would be necessary.
History records the rest.
I rather read it that they didn't got the extra mile because they considered that there was no possibility of solving the sort of issue that they ended up having. As the saying goes "if you can't solve it, the it's not a problem, it's a fact".
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Problems re-occur. Inquests allow you to work out what to do next time.
A spacecraft with a damaged heatshield cannot re-enter.
Manned spacecraft are normally equipped with a docking or berthing port.
COTS has given NASA the ability to launch cargo resupply missions using spacecraft with a berthing port.
When manned missions restart can a Launch On Need (LON) cargo vehicle be ready for launch with food, water and air?
It will probably need fitting with an NDS docking port.
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No
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No
Come on Jim. At least quote what you're responding to, because posting two letters really isn't worth it. This thread is too high a quality for it to become a Jim yes or no thread.
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A spacecraft with a damaged heatshield cannot re-enter.
Manned spacecraft are normally equipped with a docking or berthing port.
COTS has given NASA the ability to launch cargo resupply missions using spacecraft with a berthing port.
The thing worth remembering is that, with the exception of Dreamchaser, all currently under-development spacecraft are ballistic capsules with some form of protection over the main heat-shield on the blunt end. Because of this, it would require a statistically far more extreme failure to damage the heat shield sufficiently to rule out a safe re-entry (so extreme that it would probably be an automatic LOC anyway).
FWIW, I think that having a quick-response rescue vehicle (say, CST-100 on top of an all-solid launcher), that would launch uncrewed to an Earth-orbiting spacecraft for crew recovery in the event of a return vehicle failure is something that should at least be considered. However, I don't think that the pressure to develop such a thing would exist until there are multiple LEO space-stations with non-Governmental crews and residents.
I suspect that, should CCDev/CCiCAP (or whatever you want to call it this week) reach its optimum conclusion, there could be multiple crewed vehicles available. In that event, NASA probably would want to solicit proposals for such a capability to be developed as part of a sort of 'space coast guard' rescue capability. NASA would probably not develop or deploy such a spacecraft but encouraging the development of space technology and capabilities does fall into the agency's role. Nonetheless, I think it would be hard to get such a vehicle funded unless there were a lot more lives on the line, hence my point about multiple commercial stations.
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When manned missions restart can a Launch On Need (LON) cargo vehicle be ready for launch with food, water and air?
It will probably need fitting with an NDS docking port.
My guess to what Jim's 'no' is referring is the lack of power. Food, water and air won't get you far enough as the Shuttle fuel cells deplete and cannot be refueled on-orbit. No power = no heating + no life support. The latter might work in emergency situations without but not the first..
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When manned missions restart can a Launch On Need (LON) cargo vehicle be ready for launch with food, water and air?
It will probably need fitting with an NDS docking port.
My guess to what Jim's 'no' is referring is the lack of power. Food, water and air won't get you far enough as the Shuttle fuel cells deplete and cannot be refueled on-orbit. No power = no heating + no life support. The latter might work in emergency situations without but not the first..
The Shuttle possibly could not support in flight refuelling of the fuel cells, but the Dragons have solar panels.
This year is 2013. It is not too late for NASA to introduce a new safety rule that says e.g. "By no later that 2020, manned spacecraft shall support in flight refuelling of all consumables used by life support systems, including electrical power".
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This year is 2013. It is not too late for NASA to introduce a new safety rule that says e.g. "By no later that 2020, manned spacecraft shall support in flight refuelling of all consumables used by life support systems, including electrical power".
That is not within NASA's responsibilities. NASA does not control or license access to space. That is for the FAA to do. Commercial vehicles do not have to answer to NASA requirements, if they are not under NASA contract.
And the FAA is not going to make such rules.
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Latest part:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2013/01/12/after-ten-years-too-little-too-late/
Without being presumptuous, I've got a feeling the hardest reads are yet to come on these recollections.
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Sorry for the dumb questions. But why does Wayne Hale say that the DOD images wouldn't have made a difference? Couldn't the astronauts have stayed at the ISS or return on an emergency Soyuz?
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Sorry for the dumb questions. But why does Wayne Hale say that the DOD images wouldn't have made a difference? Couldn't the astronauts have stayed at the ISS or return on an emergency Soyuz?
STS-107 did not go ISS as it was not an ISS assembly mission. It was a stand-alone micro-g research mission.
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Thanks.
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Remember, Columbia was "too heavy in the rear end" as Bob Crippen said at the STS-107 memorial for a flight to the ISS.
Columbia was too heavy to fly to the high inclination of the ISS with a usefull payload. Thus, STS-107 was the many-times delayed science mission.
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Remember, Columbia was "too heavy in the rear end" as Bob Crippen said at the STS-107 memorial for a flight to the ISS.
This is a myth really. She was to have flown STS-118 in November 2003, a mission to deliver and install the S5 Short Spacer ITS along with a SpaceHAB SLM with supplies to ISS.
What she couldn't launch was the big heavy trusses.
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Latest part:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2013/01/12/after-ten-years-too-little-too-late/
Without being presumptuous, I've got a feeling the hardest reads are yet to come on these recollections.
Probably depends on one's perspective; I definitely appreciate Wayne sharing his recollections and perspective. (Also interesting little bit at the end.)
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Remember, Columbia was "too heavy in the rear end" as Bob Crippen said at the STS-107 memorial for a flight to the ISS.
This is a myth really. She was to have flown STS-118 in November 2003, a mission to deliver and install the S5 Short Spacer ITS along with a SpaceHAB SLM with supplies to ISS.
What she couldn't launch was the big heavy trusses.
A recent thread covers this tangent (mostly):
http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=26653.0
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New update:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2013/01/13/after-ten-years-working-on-the-wrong-problem/
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It's starting to look like the killer, at least in terms of identifying the problem correctly, was the lack of good ascent imagery. Because no-one knew that the leading edge moulding had been hit but rather thought that the damage was to the underside of the wing, none of the risk analyses were even in the right ballpark. All those words were just that - words. None of the analyses or confident assertions had any relevance to STS-107's actual situation.
And no-one knew that until it was too late.
Hindsight is a horrible thing.
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Ben,
The more pertinent question for the future is why was there not better ascent imagery?
Keep digging.
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From the CAIB report:
The image analysis was hampered by the lack of high resolution and high speed ground-based cameras. The existing camera locations are a legacy of earlier NASA programs, and are not optimum for the high-inclination Space Shuttle missions to the International Space Station and oftentimes cameras are not operating or, as in the case of STS-107, out of focus. Launch Commit Criteria should include that sufficient cameras are operating to track the Shuttle from liftoff to Solid Rocket Booster separation.
Similarly, a developmental vehicle like the Shuttle should be equipped with high resolution cameras that monitor potential hazard areas.
Even with what we did have, I'm amazed at the detail that is visible from 17 miles away.
I'm not sure if you were hinting at more than the above, but at a minimum the last couple posts have a consistent theme of a limited will (at first I typed "interest" but "will" fits better with what you wrote) to investigate further, endemic throughout the organization. Imagery during launch was not made a priority, previous foam loss didn't raise alarms, there was little challenge to the damage scenarios presented, and even though on-orbit imagery might have been too little and too late, the request for it was discouraged.
We are never ever going to say that there is nothing we can do.
Good quote.
I often wonder about the two contingency scenarios outlined in the CAIB report. They seem like longshots, but they're something and the only way to know would have been to try.
I noticed you dismissed the repair option, but if I remember right, the CAIB report refused to make a determination either way. I personally lean towards it for the advantage of not placing another crew at risk with a rushed rescue flight, but it probably would have been a tough call had the hypothetical debate taken place.
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Mr Hale has done an excellent job of pointing at the fundamental issue, which transcends specifics like ascent imagery. I'd sum it up as, "Before you rely on a system to function properly, be confident you know what state the system is in."
One way to be confident is to have an immediate measure of the system. (E.g.: for TPS, the Shuttle program developed the OBSS.) Another way is to have a previous measure, and to maintain control of the environment to which the system is exposed. (E.g.: for Apollo, the re-entry heat shield was inspected before flight and protected throughout the mission.) Either way you're reasonably confident your information about the current state of the system is correct.
There's a saying, "Garbage in; garbage out." In the context of decision-making, lack of state information is the garbage going in.
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Ben,
The more pertinent question for the future is why was there not better ascent imagery?
Keep digging.
After seeing the video from the fore and aft SRB cameras in addition to the ET camera, I found myself wondering why these were not a requirement for the program since STS-1. Of all the technical challenges STS presented during its development, I can't believe that adding cameras would have ranked highly among them. Apollo boosters even had cameras in the cryo tanks!
There is no substitute for knowledge. Knowledge is power.
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After seeing the video from the fore and aft SRB cameras in addition to the ET camera, I found myself wondering why these were not a requirement for the program since STS-1. Of all the technical challenges STS presented during its development, I can't believe that adding cameras would have ranked highly among them. Apollo boosters even had cameras in the cryo tanks!
There is no substitute for knowledge. Knowledge is power.
technology. The Apollo cameras were film, which were jettisoned. You didn't see video cameras on ELV's until the 90's. Size and bandwidth downlink were issues.
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Right then....grim reading, but this is where this was all heading:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2013/01/17/after-ten-years-the-moment-of-truth/
Couple of really obvious areas of interest, such as the ground track had they waved off the first deorbit burn opportunity. I didn't know the potential outcome of one rev late, only what the USA guys said about Columbia burning her RCS right through until the prop ran out, which may have helped change the debris path away from population.
I don't want anyone asking about more on the crew, as much as I would expect our crowd to be respectful on that.
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The toe of the ellipse – where the heaviest pieces would come down – cut across the southwestern suburbs of Houston. My home – my wife – would have been in the target zone where the 2 ton steel main engine combustion chambers would have hit the ground at supersonic speeds. JSC would have been at ground zero for the debris; the MCC would likely have been struck. That is a scenario that is just too implausible for words.
I read this and think - if that happened it would eradicate space shuttle from existence in a heart beat.
No?
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The toe of the ellipse – where the heaviest pieces would come down – cut across the southwestern suburbs of Houston. My home – my wife – would have been in the target zone where the 2 ton steel main engine combustion chambers would have hit the ground at supersonic speeds. JSC would have been at ground zero for the debris; the MCC would likely have been struck. That is a scenario that is just too implausible for words.
I read this and think - if that happened it would eradicate space shuttle from existence in a heart beat.
No?
This is incredible. Sounds like the scenario of a very bad disaster movie of the 70's, the kind loaded with heavy symbolism (the bad shuttle fails and destroys the bad organization that designed it).
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The video of the inside of the MCC at that moment is one of the most powerful bits of factual footage that I've ever seen - the dawning horror on the controllers' faces as CAPCOM's calls to Columbia go unanswered. This is the first time that I realised just how horrible the experience must have been for the team at KSC who, lacking consoles, probably didn't know anything until JSC called them to warn that they had lost comms.
Tiny insights on a type of experience that, thankfully, most of us will never have to experience first-hand.
Still, as Wayne pointed out, as astonishing as it seems it could have been horrendously worse. I'm not sure if NASA as we know it could have survived if Columbia had crashed onto Houston.
Interesting question from one of Wayne's readers on his blog:
Quick question; do new flight controllers in any way review the Apollo-1, Challenger and Columbia accident histories for historical and lessons learned perspectives as part of their training activities?
I'm not sure about flight controllers. In all cases, those LOCs were engineering rather than mission control failures so there is little to be 'learnt' other than how a trainee team would handle a catastrophic loss of vehicle and crew with (in the case of Columbia) a potential knock-on hazard to the population centres along the ground track.
However, I would imagine that all of these tragedies form part of the primers for engineers, mission planners, safety team members, managers and in-flight data analysts. There are things that can be learnt from all three events of things not to do, things that you must do and attitudes that cannot ever be allowed to develop in your team.
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The video of the inside of the MCC at that moment is one of the most powerful bits of factual footage that I've ever seen - the dawning horror on the controllers' faces as CAPCOM's calls to Columbia go unanswered.
You train for that, but in reality, you can't really train for that.
I'm in that video.
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However, I would imagine that all of these tragedies form part of the primers for engineers, mission planners, safety team members, managers and in-flight data analysts. There are things that can be learnt from all three events of things not to do, things that you must do and attitudes that cannot ever be allowed to develop in your team.
Not really. Projects reviewed the CAIB report for applicability to their projects when it came out and not much since then.
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This is the first time that I realised just how horrible the experience must have been for the team at KSC who, lacking consoles, probably didn't know anything until JSC called them to warn that they had lost comms.
It would have depended on whether they could hear the air-to-ground audio (there was certainly tension that could be inferred from it). Published recollections from others at the SLF implied some were aware they hadn't got tracking from MILA, probably before it was hinted at in the PAO commentary.
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New part:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2013/01/29/after-ten-years-picking-up-the-pieces/
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Just to note, Chris Gebhardt has written a 6,000 word article for the 10th Anniversary....not a usual STS-107 anniversary article, as it's a full mission review, focusing on that element of the mission.
It's amazing.
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http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2013/01/31/after-ten-years-enduring-lessons/
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New part:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2013/01/29/after-ten-years-picking-up-the-pieces/
I was reading the comments and the part with payload bay doors found make me want to see them. Not only them but is there archive where I can find pictures of debris being field recovered?
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http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2013/01/31/after-ten-years-enduring-lessons/
Important lessons to be remembered and acted upon by engineers of all types, whether in aerospace, nuc, chem, mech, bio-, civil or what every human does: life engineer!
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Interesting question from one of Wayne's readers on his blog:
Quick question; do new flight controllers in any way review the Apollo-1, Challenger and Columbia accident histories for historical and lessons learned perspectives as part of their training activities?
I'm not sure about flight controllers.
It is part of their training. In particular, issues of resource management (leadership, situational awareness, communication, and decision-making) are emphasized. That is a change from how Apollo 1 and Challenger were handled in training pre-Columbia; those earlier training lessons were more just recaps of the history.
CAIB report is required reading. And people still regularly reference it. Apollo 1 and Challenger not trained that much. Apollo 13 is more relevant to flight controllers.
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AP's gone after a sensationalist angle relating to informing the crew, per his blog posts.
AP, being the big wire feed, means this story will be in pretty much every mainstream paper and news site on the planet (we're talking 1000s buy into their feed as it's cheaper to run AP feed than hire writers), and some will not hold back on a snappy headline.
And I've just seen one of the news stations here run 20 seconds saying NASA knew the crew were already dead, but decided to keep it secret. Oh dear.
Phone call from me in two mins to correct.
EDIT: And that's complete, as I know the copy editor on shift at Sky News, so that's all toned down :)
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Here is a link including video footage of how the story was presented on the news in Houston.
http://www.click2houston.com/news/Ex-employee-NASA-knew-about-possible-problem-on-Columbia/-/1735978/18361090/-/kx63x7/-/index.html
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...
And I've just seen one of the news stations here run 20 seconds saying NASA knew the crew were already dead, but decided to keep it secret. Oh dear.
Phone call from me in two mins to correct.
EDIT: And that's complete, as I know the copy editor on shift at Sky News, so that's all toned down :)
Another 2 points to Gryffindor.
Kudos Chris.
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If the press keeps asking NASA can say that after Columbia's accident NASA learnt to inspect Space Shuttles when they arrive at the ISS and to have a second spacecraft ready to fly as a LON (Launch On Need). In future similar procedures can be applied to other spacecraft.
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AP's gone after a sensationalist angle relating to informing the crew, per his blog posts.
Rick Husband was emailed a video clip of the foam strike. Multiple facets of this are too subtle for headline writers (and subtlety is bad for sales), but not surprising as these misunderstandings went on post-loss ten years ago, too.
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Just had a phone call from a news media staff person who was so clueless about space, the shuttle, or the loss of Columbia. No wonder the media gets so much wrong; no sense of history, no research, just zip out a half thought through sensationalist headline.
There are plenty of responsible journalists, the goofballs make their job harder.
Thanks for letting me vent.
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In future similar procedures can be applied to other spacecraft.
Don't want to keep going OT, but I think it is a very bad idea to always require a backup spacecraft ready to fly every time we send a manned mission up. Do any of the current visiting vehicles to the ISS get full vehicle exterior reviews before docking?
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If the press keeps asking NASA can say that after Columbia's accident NASA learnt to inspect Space Shuttles when they arrive at the ISS and to have a second spacecraft ready to fly as a LON (Launch On Need). In future similar procedures can be applied to other spacecraft.
not applicable to other spacecraft
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Jim Oberg: "Top 10 myths surrounding NASA's Columbia space shuttle disaster"
http://science.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/01/16804343-top-10-myths-surrounding-nasas-columbia-space-shuttle-disaster?lite
(See #9.)
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http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2013/02/sts-107-remembering-columbia-crew/
An amazing 5,000+ word feature by Chris Gebhardt covering STS-107's actual mission, as opposed to a focus on the EOM.
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Just had a phone call from a news media staff person who was so incorrect about space, the shuttle, or the loss of Columbia. No wonder the media gets so much wrong; no sense of history, no research, just zip out a half thought through sensationalist headline.
There are plenty of responsible journalists, the goofballs make their job harder.
Thanks for letting me vent.
Our local news website just ran the AP feed, if that's what you're talking about.
If it's any consolation, I've written AP about that particular writer in the past. Namely for misspelling the names of just about all of ISS Expedition 31 and calling Falcon 9 a spacecraft.
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https://twitter.com/waynehale/statuses/297149802481844225
Wayne Hale @waynehale
Sensationalist media have misunderstood some of my blog posts and now I get to try to clean up the mess. Oy vey!
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https://twitter.com/waynehale/statuses/297149802481844225
Wayne Hale @waynehale
Sensationalist media have misunderstood some of my blog posts and now I get to try to clean up the mess. Oy vey!
And then retweets the AP article that's causing this mass media frenzy, which is a green light to media as they will assume he's supportive of it.
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AP's gone after a sensationalist angle relating to informing the crew, per his blog posts.
AP, being the big wire feed, means this story will be in pretty much every mainstream paper and news site on the planet (we're talking 1000s buy into their feed as it's cheaper to run AP feed than hire writers), and some will not hold back on a snappy headline.
And I've just seen one of the news stations here run 20 seconds saying NASA knew the crew were already dead, but decided to keep it secret. Oh dear.
Phone call from me in two mins to correct.
EDIT: And that's complete, as I know the copy editor on shift at Sky News, so that's all toned down :)
That's why you are a breath of fresh air.
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2013/02/sts-107-remembering-columbia-crew/
An amazing 5,000+ word feature by Chris Gebhardt covering STS-107's actual mission, as opposed to a focus on the EOM.
That's why this site is a breath of fresh air.
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PBS ran an excellent show, titled simply Space Shuttle, about STS-107 focusing on Ilan Roman's participation today (very oddly at 0200 locally) that I recommend to everyone. I've only seen it listed once in my Dishnetwork program guide that forecasts about a week so I don't know if or when it will be re-broadcast. Hopefully PBS will make it available online.
PBS then re-aired the 2008 NOVA episode on the accident, a sobering watch.
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Our local news website just ran the AP feed, if that's what you're talking about.
If it's any consolation, I've written AP about that particular writer in the past. Namely for misspelling the names of just about all of ISS Expedition 31 and calling Falcon 9 a spacecraft.
I regret to point out that even if the AP editors are capable of understanding basics like the difference between a spacecraft and a launch vehicle, you are assuming they care.
Here is a link including video footage of how the story was presented on the news in Houston.
http://www.click2houston.com/news/Ex-employee-NASA-knew-about-possible-problem-on-Columbia/-/1735978/18361090/-/kx63x7/-/index.html
Holy ****! Even beyond the serious misinterpretation of Mr. Hale's post, they've paired quotes by both Wayne and JimO out of context to make it sound like they disagree fundamentally with each other.
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Jim Oberg: "Top 10 myths surrounding NASA's Columbia space shuttle disaster"
http://science.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/01/16804343-top-10-myths-surrounding-nasas-columbia-space-shuttle-disaster?lite
(See #9.)
1. The vehicle blew up when it hit the atmosphere.
Columbia was lost when the air drag across its left wing, created by turbulence around a growing hole on the leading edge, jerked its nose to the left too strongly for steering rockets to overcome. It then turned end over end at least once before aerodynamic braking broke its back and tore it into pieces. The crew cabin was then crushed and torn apart by the severe deceleration.
Didn't the CAIB tie the loss of control to the hydraulic system going dry and the APUs shutting down (with the resulting loss of aerodynamic control)? The crew apparently attempted to restart the APUs according to data before it was lost.
I do remember the report stating that the steering jets were continuously firing, at their control limit, and almost out of fuel as control was lost as Jim stated .
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From my recollection of the report, the sequence was:
The hole in the wing leading edge allowed plasma to progressively destroy the inner structure of the wing, including some hydraulic lines.
Normal operation of the hydraulic system (to move aerodynamic surfaces) leaked hydraulic fluid until the system was empty.
This loss of hydraulic power meant the vehicle could no longer maintain a controlled attitude, and it pitched up, breaking up not long after.
I think the APU's were working fine for some time after hydraulic power was lost, and were not a contributing cause.
There is a full report on L2.
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Ben,
The more pertinent question for the future is why was there not better ascent imagery?
Keep digging.
You know, I still don't think this point has been addressed or answered by anyone here, at least to any satisfaction I have seen.
I think it requires more than just NASA. It requires the backing of all involved to understand just what is at stake here. The people think a program is great, or that it isn't, yet in the end they love to see those rockets go up, or those footprints on another body in our universe. So they get the enjoyment they seek, and I believe that is why NASA has been backed very well over the years.
No, I think it requires the 100% backing of the politicians, and the funding they allow NASA to have to fullfill certain requirements. And that seems to be the crux of it, in my mind, after reading Wayne's comments on his blog. Even from the early days of shuttle & the loss of Challenger, the pressures were there, not for prestige or advancement, or even relavence, but for keeping costs in line so there is a perception that there is value for the money spent.
And now the swing: we are going down the same road again. Look at congress: funding levels that have been held constant (which when put in terms of annual inflation, especially in aerospace) means NASA is under-funded (especially/specifically with regards to HSF) for the workscope initially presented and aspired to. Throw in a lack of direction, and program cancellations (which often leads to loss of great talent), and you are no longer working to maximum potential.
I truly fear NASA is facing a re-hash of the very same problems that caused all that grief over the years. This is a cutting-edge field, and demands the understanding that significant resources are required if you wish to reap any of the benefits, especially ones that are as yet unknown.
I wish NASA well, and hope that congress & the appropriations commitee & the POTUS can see that those things which are key drivers of the economy are given the proper respect they deserve.
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From my recollection of the report, the sequence was:
The hole in the wing leading edge allowed plasma to progressively destroy the inner structure of the wing, including some hydraulic lines.
Normal operation of the hydraulic system (to move aerodynamic surfaces) leaked hydraulic fluid until the system was empty.
This loss of hydraulic power meant the vehicle could no longer maintain a controlled attitude, and it pitched up, breaking up not long after.
I think the APU's were working fine for some time after hydraulic power was lost, and were not a contributing cause.
There is a full report on L2.
At the moment of break-up (altitude and velocity), and considering the amount of asymetric drag due to left wing disintegration.
Which played a larger role in vehicle control; the RCS or the aero surfaces?
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RCS
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From my recollection of the report, the sequence was:
The hole in the wing leading edge allowed plasma to progressively destroy the inner structure of the wing, including some hydraulic lines.
Normal operation of the hydraulic system (to move aerodynamic surfaces) leaked hydraulic fluid until the system was empty.
This loss of hydraulic power meant the vehicle could no longer maintain a controlled attitude, and it pitched up, breaking up not long after.
I think the APU's were working fine for some time after hydraulic power was lost, and were not a contributing cause.
There is a full report on L2.
The APUs provided the hydraulic power. If there was no fluid, there was no hydraulic system and the APUs shut down because they had nothing to pump to prevent failure from trying to do so. The APUs didn't contribute to the loss. They were victims of the chain of the events started by the leading edge breach.
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In addition to the resources on L2, the CAIB report is publicly available. Page 65 of this part of the report is a good place to start:
http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/caib/PDFS/VOL1/PART01.PDF
I don't see or recall reading about loss of hydraulics, except articles from the first few weeks after the accident. Sensors related to some of the hydraulics were the first things to fail, but the conclusion was that was due to burn-through of the sensor wiring, not actual loss of hydraulics..
The report section referenced above discusses the telemetry that indicates the shuttle was experiencing progressively increasing drag on the left wing as it shed pieces that altered the aerodynamics, and then in the later stages, began to deform in bulk.
There was initially a tendency to yaw left, and roll left, shifting later to a stronger left yaw, but RIGHT roll tendency. Reading that, my first speculation was the weakening forward spars allowed the leading edge of the wing to begin to deflect upwards, effectively increasing the angle of attack of the left wing. The CAIB working scenario (http://"http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/caib/PDFS/VOL2/D07.PDF") (page 196 onward), however, suggested a large dimple-like "recession" of the lower wing skin due to failure of some of the forward ribs, with a comparable aerodynamic effect (increased left wing AOA).
This left yaw, right roll effect abruptly increased a couple seconds before telemetry was lost. The RCS jets were still firing to counter the yaw, and the ailerons were countering the roll, which suggests hydraulics were still working, but at this point were losing ground.
42 seconds after radioed telemetry was lost, the onboard data recorder stopped. 5 seconds later, the breakup of the airframe occurred.
I'm having trouble finding any clear info in the reports about what happened in those 47 seconds. I had the impression Columbia was in a tumble or spin, but I've never even seen a confirmation NASA knows what happened in that window.
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In future similar procedures can be applied to other spacecraft.
Don't want to keep going OT, but I think it is a very bad idea to always require a backup spacecraft ready to fly every time we send a manned mission up. Do any of the current visiting vehicles to the ISS get full vehicle exterior reviews before docking?
Colombia was destroyed by a special case of the general problem called hull breach. It does not matter whether the hull was breached by foam, iceberg or bird strike people onboard frequently get killed.
The story of Titanic's hull breach, including similarities.
http://www.cuug.ab.ca/~branderr/risk_essay/titanic.html (http://www.cuug.ab.ca/~branderr/risk_essay/titanic.html)
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In future similar procedures can be applied to other spacecraft.
Don't want to keep going OT, but I think it is a very bad idea to always require a backup spacecraft ready to fly every time we send a manned mission up. Do any of the current visiting vehicles to the ISS get full vehicle exterior reviews before docking?
Colombia was destroyed by a special case of the general problem called hull breach. It does not matter whether the hull was breached by foam, iceberg or bird strike people onboard frequently get killed.
The story of Titanic's hull breach, including similarities.
http://www.cuug.ab.ca/~branderr/risk_essay/titanic.html (http://www.cuug.ab.ca/~branderr/risk_essay/titanic.html)
And that has nothing to do with spacecraft orbital post launch inspection or having a LON spacecraft.
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Ben,
The more pertinent question for the future is why was there not better ascent imagery?
Keep digging.
You know, I still don't think this point has been addressed or answered by anyone here, at least to any satisfaction I have seen.
I think it requires more than just NASA.
I was a CAIB investigator. I didn't deal with the ascent imagery issue, but during the investigation I hung out with the people who did. I don't remember if this made it into the report and I'm too lazy to look it up, but we did look into the issue of ascent imagery and why it wasn't so great, and we developed a timeline of what tracking cameras were available over the years and how they went away.
If you go back to STS-1 you may be able to dig through archives and find ascent imagery and you'd find that it was taken by a bunch of tracking cameras. Then jump ahead to, say, STS-50, and you would find that there were fewer cameras pointed at the launch. Then jump to STS-100 and you'd find that there were fewer cameras pointed at that launch. Or you'd discover that somebody had put up a building in beautiful downtown Cocoa Beach and it now obscured part of the ascent, but rather than moving the camera, NASA had simply accepted the limitation.
The launches were routine. Money was finite. Equipment had aged and replacing it would be expensive. So there was less ascent imagery of STS-107 than there was of earlier flights. That's just the way it happened. (And it may have been more complicated than that. Which cameras were owned by NASA and which were owned by USAF? Who is responsible for funding them?)
Now in any organization you have to make trade-offs on budget, even on safety issues. There's not enough money to fully fund everything. Do you buy better tracking cameras or do you buy an X-ray machine for examining the TPS on the orbiter?
There were other similar issues. We had a Nobel Prize winner on the board who was really into digital cameras and he was really peeved to learn that NASA was operating film cameras both on the orbiter and on the ground when digital technology was available. Yeah, there's a cost issue, but he did have a point that for things like tracking and vehicle health assessment you want the data as soon as possible. But again, it's money. And it's also management. They go hand in hand.
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In addition to the resources on L2, the CAIB report is publicly available. Page 65 of this part of the report is a good place to start:
http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/caib/PDFS/VOL1/PART01.PDF
I don't see or recall reading about loss of hydraulics, except articles from the first few weeks after the accident. Sensors related to some of the hydraulics were the first things to fail, but the conclusion was that was due to burn-through of the sensor wiring, not actual loss of hydraulics..
The report section referenced above discusses the telemetry that indicates the shuttle was experiencing progressively increasing drag on the left wing as it shed pieces that altered the aerodynamics, and then in the later stages, began to deform in bulk.
There was initially a tendency to yaw left, and roll left, shifting later to a stronger left yaw, but RIGHT roll tendency. Reading that, my first speculation was the weakening forward spars allowed the leading edge of the wing to begin to deflect upwards, effectively increasing the angle of attack of the left wing. The CAIB working scenario (http://"http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/caib/PDFS/VOL2/D07.PDF") (page 196 onward), however, suggested a large dimple-like "recession" of the lower wing skin due to failure of some of the forward ribs, with a comparable aerodynamic effect (increased left wing AOA).
This left yaw, right roll effect abruptly increased a couple seconds before telemetry was lost. The RCS jets were still firing to counter the yaw, and the ailerons were countering the roll, which suggests hydraulics were still working, but at this point were losing ground.
42 seconds after radioed telemetry was lost, the onboard data recorder stopped. 5 seconds later, the breakup of the airframe occurred.
I'm having trouble finding any clear info in the reports about what happened in those 47 seconds. I had the impression Columbia was in a tumble or spin, but I've never even seen a confirmation NASA knows what happened in that window.
Read the Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report.
http://history.nasa.gov/columbia/columbiacrewsurvival.pdf
Thanks to Jorge for the link to the report. That is where I saw the reference to depletion of the hydraulics system, not in the CAIB.
From page 56
"A complete loss of hydraulics would cause the elevons and body flap to move to a floating position, resulting in an uncontrolled pitch-up. RGPC-2 data (approximately 25 seconds later) showed that the hydraulics systems failed, but no time signature was available to confirm when the loss occurred. Video data supported this time for LOC (loss of control). The Spacecraft Crew Survival Integration Investigation Team (SCSIIT) concluded that the LOC occurred as a result of the loss of hydraulics at GMT 13:59:37 (EI+928). The loss of hydraulics likely occurred when all three redundant hydraulic systems lost pressure due to breaches in the hydraulic lines from thermal damage in the left wing. "
and page 60
"The RGPC-2 data also indicate that while all three auxiliary power units (APUs)31 were running, all three hy- draulic systems had zero pressure and zero quantities in the reservoirs. With the loss of hydraulic pressures and the vehicle LOC, the crew likely assumed a generic problem with the APUs. A crew module panel was recovered with switch configurations indicating an attempt by the PLT to recover the hydraulic systems and hydraulic pressure by performing steps to initiate a restart of two of the three APUs. Switches for the same two of the three system hydraulic circulation pumps were also in the “On” position..."
I hadn't read this report in some time and it is still as sobering.
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Ben,
The more pertinent question for the future is why was there not better ascent imagery?
Keep digging.
You know, I still don't think this point has been addressed or answered by anyone here, at least to any satisfaction I have seen.
From page 60-61 of the CAIB pdf.
Imaging Issues
The image analysis was hampered by the lack of high resolution and high speed ground-based cameras. The existing camera locations are a legacy of earlier NASA programs, and are not optimum for the high-inclination Space Shuttle missions to the International Space Station and oftentimes
cameras are not operating or, as in the case of STS-107, out of focus. Launch Commit Criteria should include that sufficient cameras are operating to track the Shuttle from liftoff to Solid Rocket Booster separation.
Similarly, a developmental vehicle like the Shuttle should be equipped with high resolution cameras that monitor potential hazard areas. The wing leading edge system, the area around the landing gear doors, and other critical Thermal Protection System elements need to be imaged to check for damage. Debris sources, such as the External Tank, also need to be monitored. Such critical images need to be downlinked so that potential problems are identified as soon as possible.
Wayne Hale also posted a blog titled, "After Ten Years: Counting Down to Disaster".
He had this to say about the long range tracking cameras.
During those days, a crew of photo/TV people went down to a little concrete building about a block from Ron John’s Surf Shop on Cocoa Beach. They loaded film in the long range tracking cameras in preparation for the STS-107 launch. Maintenance had been cut way back on the photo/TV equipment and checking the focus and operations of the cameras was not a “requirement.” The short staffed team loaded the film, locked the building up, and hurried to the next camera location. We were going to sorely miss the pictures that long range tracking camera could have made for us.
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Ben,
The more pertinent question for the future is why was there not better ascent imagery?
Keep digging.
You know, I still don't think this point has been addressed or answered by anyone here, at least to any satisfaction I have seen.
I think it requires more than just NASA.
...
Now in any organization you have to make trade-offs on budget, even on safety issues. There's not enough money to fully fund everything. Do you buy better tracking cameras or do you buy an X-ray machine for examining the TPS on the orbiter?
There were other similar issues. We had a Nobel Prize winner on the board who was really into digital cameras and he was really peeved to learn that NASA was operating film cameras both on the orbiter and on the ground when digital technology was available. Yeah, there's a cost issue, but he did have a point that for things like tracking and vehicle health assessment you want the data as soon as possible. But again, it's money. And it's also management. They go hand in hand.
I agree with all you say (and grateful for your work with CAIB, no doubt a diffcult task).
The way I see Mr. Hale's point, as (I believe he is attempting to do) he is trying to make us aware of what we are faced with going forward into America's next foray into (human) space exploration: he specifically calls out 'the future'. And it may very well be the tradeoffs as you put it. So maybe the approach shouldn't be hardware to meet the tasks and designing a (fairly) robust analysis 'envelope' around the new capability, but to see what the limitations of our capabilities for analysis & 'rescue', and working around them to either develop new ones, or modify our approach to ensure we don't put ourselves in that situation until that capability exists (or is developed enough). And of course that trail leads to the (lack of) money.
So our (NASA's) approach may need to be more incremental than it typically has been, to realize we aren't as smart as we think, and cover more of the bases before we put a human in harm's way. That doesn't necessarily mean we never get off the ground, but simply that if we plan to put man (a person) on the moon again, there is at least a way for that person to survive until a rescue attempt (with suffiicient margin) can be mounted. As for imagery, maybe it requires the full resources of the military as wel go forward, with the understanding that only certain individuals have access to that data (images), and become the direct conduit to NASA. Costly, yes - but perhaps just prudent.
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Ben,
The more pertinent question for the future is why was there not better ascent imagery?
Keep digging.
You know, I still don't think this point has been addressed or answered by anyone here, at least to any satisfaction I have seen.
From page 60-61 of the CAIB pdf.
Imaging Issues
The image analysis was hampered by the lack of high resolution and high speed ground-based cameras. The existing camera locations are a legacy of earlier NASA programs, and are not optimum for the high-inclination Space Shuttle missions to the International Space Station and oftentimes
cameras are not operating or, as in the case of STS-107, out of focus. Launch Commit Criteria should include that sufficient cameras are operating to track the Shuttle from liftoff to Solid Rocket Booster separation.
Similarly, a developmental vehicle like the Shuttle should be equipped with high resolution cameras that monitor potential hazard areas. The wing leading edge system, the area around the landing gear doors, and other critical Thermal Protection System elements need to be imaged to check for damage. Debris sources, such as the External Tank, also need to be monitored. Such critical images need to be downlinked so that potential problems are identified as soon as possible.
...
See, I take exception to the statement(s) above. It's only a hazard that is bound by the known quantities/qualities and the limitations of the materials in use. A heat shield is exposed, considered vital, and should be examined. Yet many other aspects are overlooked, or not considered 'critical', until they come back and bite you.
In the future, Orion (along with Dragon, and Dream Chaser, and the others) will likely be crewed and rely on more than just a heat shield to protect its crew. If we focus on the critical areas, we feel confident and become blinded by all other aspects of the spacecraft's vulnerabilities, we may simply face a different failure mode. Then we do a review, implement more changes, spend money (that should have been spent from the start), to make us feel safe yet again.
I'm seeing safety tradeoffs, with money at its center, as a big hole in the 'plan' to flying a safe vehicle.
I'll stop my line of thought now. Mr. Hale's insight has probably brought me way off base, but it's simply what I see as a re-curring issue time and again as these 'investigations' have played out. One was too much (Apollo 1).
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The image analysis was hampered by the lack of high resolution and high speed ground-based cameras. The existing camera locations are a legacy of earlier NASA programs, and are not optimum for the high-inclination Space Shuttle missions to the International Space Station and oftentimes cameras are not operating or, as in the case of STS-107, out of focus.
As a photographer I understand that you can never have the perfect picture, but the imagery wasn't entirely lacking. To me, this stuff is quite remarkable, even if it isn't optimal. This is really difficult photography.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IgQ3ekcvyRA
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I agree with all you say (and grateful for your work with CAIB, no doubt a diffcult task).
Not sure what you mean by "difficult." It was a good job, they paid me well, and it was important work. I'm glad I was there.
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I'm seeing safety tradeoffs, with money at its center, as a big hole in the 'plan' to flying a safe vehicle.
Safety tradeoffs, with money as a variable, is ALWAYS the case. Somebody has to make judgements about where to spend limited resources, and there is always too much to do and not enough money to do it. That doesn't mean that you cannot make really bad mistakes and spend the resources badly. But this stuff is never black and white.
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That's not the original. It was a highly enhanced version, made painstakingly during the months after the accident.
I know that. All I'm saying is that the out-of-focus tracking camera wasn't the only one shooting the launch with high resolving power.
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I agree with all you say (and grateful for your work with CAIB, no doubt a diffcult task).
Not sure what you mean by "difficult." It was a good job, they paid me well, and it was important work. I'm glad I was there.
The emotional aspect.
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That's not the original. It was a highly enhanced version, made painstakingly during the months after the accident.
I know that. All I'm saying is that the out-of-focus tracking camera wasn't the only one shooting the launch with high resolving power.
What was the veiwing angle of the out of focus camera?
Was it filming the underside of the wing?
Wouldn't that have been the best possible perspective to analyze the point of impact and the clocking angle?
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I agree with all you say (and grateful for your work with CAIB, no doubt a diffcult task).
Not sure what you mean by "difficult." It was a good job, they paid me well, and it was important work. I'm glad I was there.
The emotional aspect.
People died, they shouldn't have, our job was to figure out what happened and hopefully make sure that it didn't happen again. Our work had a purpose. We thought we were doing good. We didn't have a problem with motivation.
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Many, if not all, of the existing cameras were replaced by digital, Hi-Def versions post Columbia. Are they still maintained and used (unmanned launches) and planned to be available for resumption of manned launches from the Cape--whenever that occurs?
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Could the long range tracking cameras at Vandenberg and Edwards have been used for the 107 re-entry?
Vandenberg may have been too far north but this re-entry was somewhat unique in overflying California while re-entering--as opposed to landing-- and using those assets for possible scientific/engineering or purely PAO purposes seems like it might have generated some interest.
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I don't see or recall reading about loss of hydraulics, except articles from the first few weeks after the accident...
Read the Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report.
http://history.nasa.gov/columbia/columbiacrewsurvival.pdf
Thank you Jorge. I didn't realize that report had not been appended to the CAIB report.
Ciscodad is basically correct; Final loss of control apparently coincided with the loss of hydraulics.
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That's not the original. It was a highly enhanced version, made painstakingly during the months after the accident.
I know that. All I'm saying is that the out-of-focus tracking camera wasn't the only one shooting the launch with high resolving power.
What was the veiwing angle of the out of focus camera?
Was it filming the underside of the wing?
Wouldn't that have been the best possible perspective to analyze the point of impact and the clocking angle?
I don't know but the video I posted has such imagery.
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That's not the original. It was a highly enhanced version, made painstakingly during the months after the accident.
I know that. All I'm saying is that the out-of-focus tracking camera wasn't the only one shooting the launch with high resolving power.
What was the veiwing angle of the out of focus camera?
Was it filming the underside of the wing?
Wouldn't that have been the best possible perspective to analyze the point of impact and the clocking angle?
The attached photo is a comparison from the CAIB report of the views of each of the three long-range tracking cameras.
ET208 is from an analog video camera co-located with the out-of-focus film camera, and the debris was visible before and after impact. It was 26 miles away at the moment of impact.
E212 is a film camera similar to the out-of-focus camera. It was 17 miles away and had the best resolution and frame timing of the foam event.
E204 and ET204 were attached to smaller telescopes and far enough away the imagery was not considered useful.
Based on distance, E208, had it been in focus, would presumably have provided about 2/3 the resolution of E212. The analog video from ET208 was taken through a smaller telescope than the E208 film camera, and NTSC format video is lower in resolution than 35mm film in the first place.
It's uncertain if the damage would have been discernible on E208, partially because the exact damage that occurred isn't certain.
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The out of focus camera would have had a view of the underside of the wing and shown where the foam debris impacted; perhaps even shown resulting damage. This view is fine but it doesn't show what we needed to know.
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The out of focus camera would have had a view of the underside of the wing and shown where the foam debris impacted; perhaps even shown resulting damage. This view is fine but it doesn't show what we needed to know.
This is what I was getting at by posting the rhetorical questions....
What was the viewing angle of the out of focus camera?
Was it filming the underside of the wing?
Wouldn't that have been the best possible perspective to analyze the point of impact and the clocking angle?
Thanks Mr. Hale
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- NASA is not a regulatory agency.
- But NASA has set up a set of "human rating" requirements for vehicles that NASA personnel will fly on.
- Possibly ported over to FAA regs but not a good idea. Portions are too conservative and rigid.
http://www.newspacewatch.com/articles/faa-conf-wed-morning-notes.html
Mr. Hale,
Out of curiosity. which portions of the commercial crew human ratings requirements do you think are overly conservative and rigid? Thanks.
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The lasts posts are the exact reason why I enjoy this forum so much.
Over the last two weeks I spent lot of time and energy digging the web for informations on that E-208 camera, trying to understand (and figure) what it would have showed had it been not out-of-focus.
Now thanks to this forum I have a clearer understanding of the issue.
To try and imagine what E-208 would have showed, one has to look at the ET-208 picture and try to figure more details (by how much, incidentally ?)
Thank you all !
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The lasts posts are the exact reason why I enjoy this forum so much.
Over the last two weeks I spent lot of time and energy digging the web for informations on that E-208 camera, trying to understand (and figure) what it would have showed had it been not out-of-focus.
Now thanks to this forum I have a clearer understanding of the issue.
To try and imagine what E-208 would have showed, one has to look at the ET-208 picture and try to figure more details (by how much, incidentally ?)
Thank you all !
I was doing the same - educating myself in more detail on the issues Mr. Hale has been discussing.
Since I had the info fresh at hand as a result, I'm glad to be able to add it to the discussion.
As I mentioned above, based solely on distance, E208 probably would have provided about 2/3 of the resolution as E212, which looks like it would have been modestly better than ET208, the video camera colocated with the out-of-focus camera.
In theory, between its larger telescope and higher resolution format, E208 could have had on the order of 8 times the resolution as ET208, but in reality, it looks like atmospheric effects limit the resolution as the distance increases.
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So our (NASA's) approach may need to be more incremental than it typically has been, to realize we aren't as smart as we think, and cover more of the bases before we put a human in harm's way. That doesn't necessarily mean we never get off the ground, but simply that if we plan to put man (a person) on the moon again, there is at least a way for that person to survive until a rescue attempt (with sufficient margin) can be mounted.
I have to disagree. As we know, that was not the case with Apollo. There's no question but that survival on the Moon is the key factor for success and that such a survival mechanism as you sketch out should be a high priority.
However, if that prioritization, 100% human survival is made the first priority, then we will literally never get off of the ground.
Mr Hale has done an excellent job of pointing at the fundamental issue, which transcends specifics like ascent imagery. I'd sum it up as, "Before you rely on a system to function properly, be confident you know what state the system is in."
I'd have to say, "be confident that you've designed a good system", from the o-rings on up.
The fundamental issue was relying on external foam without an external skin, or a kevlar reinforcing net, or something other than only the tensile strength of the foam at max-Q. The foam for the ET was the final design, not the initial design.
All the big rockets before shuttle had skins, and all the big rockets planned for today have skins.
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I'd have to say, "be confident that you've designed a good system", from the o-rings on up.
The fundamental issue was relying on external foam without an external skin, or a kevlar reinforcing net, or something other than only the tensile strength of the foam at max-Q. The foam for the ET was the final design, not the initial design.
All the big rockets before shuttle had skins, and all the big rockets planned for today have skins.
It isn't a 'big' rocket issue, it's a 'what's in the debris path' issue. The foam wouldn't have been an issue if criticality-0 components weren't immediately down-stream in the air-flow. Delta-IV uses the same foam and will continue to do so without problems. Why? No re-entry TPS components down-stream.
It sounds like a 'duh' realisation but it wouldn't surprise me if no-one at all had thought of this issue until the first strikes started showing up and everyone seemed confident that they weren't dangerous enough to justify a stand-down, an ET redesign and the consequential loss of lifting capability because of the heavier ET.
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I would bet my last dollar someone spoke or wrote of the foam danger but was ignored. Engineers are a sharp group.
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The danger of debris from the ET was documented in a hazard report approved by the shuttle program. The error there was the categorization that there were strong controls for the hazard. Does that constitute engineering documentation? I think it does. Does that mean that everybody was completely satisfied? Of course not. But you could say that about the thousand other hazard analysis reports on all the other parts the shuttle as well. The point is not that somebody was dissatisfied but that nobody was dissatisfied enough to make an issue of it.
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This document has some clues about the decision process.
http://www.spaceflightnow.com/columbia/report/inflight.html
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This document has some clues about the decision process.
http://www.spaceflightnow.com/columbia/report/inflight.html
That's a section of the CAIB report, Section 6.3. The decision process predates the STS-107 launch -- significantly. Note that Chapter 6 begins some nineteen pages prior to this point.
The short-term, mainstream attention span understandably focuses on what happened in-flight in large part due to the fate of the crew; however, there was still a large price to pay beyond the lives of the crew and that could only have been prevented before launch.
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I'd have to say, "be confident that you've designed a good system", from the o-rings on up.
The fundamental issue was relying on external foam without an external skin, or a kevlar reinforcing net, or something other than only the tensile strength of the foam at max-Q. ...
All the ... rockets before shuttle had skins, and all the ... rockets planned for today have skins.
It isn't a 'big' rocket issue, it's a 'what's in the debris path' issue.
It's not "bigness". It's about the "skin". I modified your quote of my post to remove the size of the rocket. Size does come into the issue when the manratedness of Delta is considered, and when the throw weight of the LV is considered.
The foam wouldn't have been an issue if criticality-0 components weren't immediately down-stream in the air-flow.
Even so, you must admit that having removable foam could have, in principle, informed the design of the downstream components. (D'oh?) And even supposing that they could not have modeled this in the wind tunnel, the foam hits had been going on for years, yet they persisted in flying. The only solution they could impose on the faulty skinless or netless design was to pay more attention to the foam installation. The trade always was safety versus lifting capability.
Delta-IV uses the same foam and will continue to do so without problems. Why? No re-entry TPS components down-stream.
It sounds like a 'duh' realisation but it wouldn't surprise me if no-one at all had thought of this issue until the first strikes started showing up and everyone seemed confident that they weren't dangerous enough to justify a stand-down, an ET redesign and the consequential loss of lifting capability because of the heavier ET.
Otherwise, I pretty much agree.
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@waynehale (march 1st)
25 years ago today, Tom Holloway selected 3 new Flight Directors: Bob Castle, Rob Kelso, and me. The Three Amigos! Seems like yesterday.
Couldn't find anything from 1988.....
STS030-S-118 (8 May 1989 ) --- The landing phase of the space shuttle Atlantis is monitored by three flight directors in the Flight Control Room (FCR) of the Johnson Space Center's (JSC) Mission Control Center (MCC). Studying the data at the Flight Director Console are Ronald D. Dittemore, Alan L. (Lee) Briscoe and N. Wayne Hale. Moments earlier, Atlantis touched down on Runway 22 at Edwards Air Force Bakse (Note monitor).
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@waynehale (march 1st)
25 years ago today, Tom Holloway selected 3 new Flight Directors: Bob Castle, Rob Kelso, and me. The Three Amigos! Seems like yesterday.
Couldn't find anything from 1988.....
FWIW, the public news release was on March 10; "88-007 -- THREE NEW FLIGHT DIRECTORS NAMED".
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Out of interest - to either Mr Hale or the other FDs on here - how do you get selected?
Is there some sort of FD Exam to qualify? Natural promotion within MOD after being a controller, etc?
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Nothing mysterious. Position openings are announced in the Civil Service system (used to be paper, now its web based); applications are accepted using a standard form; a committee reviews all the applications and certifies those that meet the acceptable level; the selecting official interviews the applicants; makes his picks; reviews the selections with his superiors; makes the announcement and does more paperwork to get the transfers. Standard civil service procedure. Of course they will screen you out if you don't have the qualifications - which includes previous experience in mission control . . . .
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I'm not sure how I acquired it but I have a document here called:
Flight Controller Interviewing & Hiring Guidelines (Rev B).pdf
Seriously can't remember where I downloaded it, probably from some forum. Should I post it? :)
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I'm not sure how I acquired it but I have a document here called:
Flight Controller Interviewing & Hiring Guidelines (Rev B).pdf
Seriously can't remember where I downloaded it, probably from some forum. Should I post it? :)
it's on L2
http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=4089.0
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No blog entry for quite some time?
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Correct. Here is the link - http://waynehale.wordpress.com/
You can also follow him on Twitter.
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Mr Hale requires some advice ahead of Thursday.
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2013/05/14/breaking-a-rule/
(PS If you do have something to say per the above, probably best to post in his comment section so he has everything in one place).
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Thanks for all those who made inputs - I read them all and it was a big help.
My written testimony is turned in and I have had to work really hard to get my opening remarks down to the 5 minutes that the rules allow. Think about what to say about the importance of space exploration in 5 minute!
Heading out to the airport shortly for my flight to Washington. Wish me luck - and a clear mind to answer whatever questions come my way!
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Thanks for all those who made inputs - I read them all and it was a big help.
My written testimony is turned in and I have had to work really hard to get my opening remarks down to the 5 minutes that the rules allow. Think about what to say about the importance of space exploration in 5 minute!
Heading out to the airport shortly for my flight to Washington. Wish me luck - and a clear mind to answer whatever questions come my way!
Clear skies, hot jets, and good luck!
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Thanks for all those who made inputs - I read them all and it was a big help.
My written testimony is turned in and I have had to work really hard to get my opening remarks down to the 5 minutes that the rules allow. Think about what to say about the importance of space exploration in 5 minute!
Heading out to the airport shortly for my flight to Washington. Wish me luck - and a clear mind to answer whatever questions come my way!
Best of luck Sir! Hoping for a smooth and safe flight.
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I look forward to you testimony Wayne. Just be yourself, authentic, genuine and sincere, it has worked out for you so far in my eyes...
Happy Landings! :)
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Thanks for all those who made inputs - I read them all and it was a big help.
My written testimony is turned in and I have had to work really hard to get my opening remarks down to the 5 minutes that the rules allow. Think about what to say about the importance of space exploration in 5 minute!
Heading out to the airport shortly for my flight to Washington. Wish me luck - and a clear mind to answer whatever questions come my way!
You'll walk it. We've all seen you in front of the media, calming explaining some hugely technical part of the Shuttle in a way we can all understand.
I know it's not the same thing for going in front of lawmakers, but that ability to make people want to listen to you is a God given gift.
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Partnerships to advance the business of space
Subcommittee on Science and Space
Date: Thursday, May 16, 2013
Hearing Start Time: 10:00 a.m.
Location: 253 Russell Senate Office Building
Please note the hearing will be webcast live via the Senate Commerce Committee website. Refresh the Commerce Committee homepage 10 minutes prior to the scheduled start time to automatically begin streaming the webcast.
Witness Panel 1
Mr. N. Wayne Hale Jr.
Director of Human Spaceflight, Special Aerospace Services
NASA Flight Director & Program Manager (ret.)
Ms. Patti Grace Smith
Aerospace Consultant/Advisor
Patti Grace Smith Consulting, L.L.C.
Captain Michael Lopez-Alegria USN (ret.)
President
Commercial Spaceflight Federation
Dr. Steven H. Collicott
Professor, School of Aeronautics and Astronautics
College of Engineering, Purdue University
http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=Hearings&ContentRecord_id=93f78807-737f-4354-9141-e5d728c0ecfe&ContentType_id=14f995b9-dfa5-407a-9d35-56cc7152a7ed&Group_id=a06730c4-d875-4fde-97db-9e2be611840e
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Partnerships to advance the business of space
Subcommittee on Science and Space
Date: Thursday, May 16, 2013
Hearing Start Time: 10:00 a.m.
Location: 253 Russell Senate Office Building
Please note the hearing will be webcast live via the Senate Commerce Committee website. Refresh the Commerce Committee homepage 10 minutes prior to the scheduled start time to automatically begin streaming the webcast.
Witness Panel 1
Mr. N. Wayne Hale Jr.
Director of Human Spaceflight, Special Aerospace Services
NASA Flight Director & Program Manager (ret.)
Ms. Patti Grace Smith
Aerospace Consultant/Advisor
Patti Grace Smith Consulting, L.L.C.
Captain Michael Lopez-Alegria USN (ret.)
President
Commercial Spaceflight Federation
Dr. Steven H. Collicott
Professor, School of Aeronautics and Astronautics
College of Engineering, Purdue University
The Commerce, Science and Transportation homepage with viewer is located here:
http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=Home
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Just watched the live webcast, thanks for posting the link!
Wayne Hale did a really nice job articulating a need for full funding of commercial crew. Two other issues that were highlighted were ITAR reform and long-term continuation of Insurance Indemnification.
I thought the other witnesses did well, though I was annoyed by Dr. Collicott (CASIS Boardmember) spending over 1/2 his time talking about his accomplishments & career instead of the topic at hand.
Thank you Wayne for your advocacy and help. Hopefully, Commercial crew will get full funding as you asked.
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Just watched the live webcast, thanks for posting the link!
Wayne Hale did a really nice job articulating a need for full funding of commercial crew. Two other issues that were highlighted were ITAR reform and long-term continuation of Insurance Indemnification.
I thought the other witnesses did well, though I was annoyed by Dr. Collicott (CASIS Boardmember) spending over 1/2 his time talking about his accomplishments & career instead of the topic at hand.
Thank you Wayne for your advocacy and help. Hopefully, Commercial crew will get full funding as you asked.
Agreed. Had it on in the background. Senator Nelson noted he was impressed with the witnesses.
Mr Hale was great, but we knew he would be.
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Merged the posts specific to Mr Hale's hearing into the dedicated thread:
http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=31875.0
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http://www.c-span.org/Events/Space-Shuttle-Columbia-Disaster-Remembered/10737438661-4/
edit
(OK this is not news, the event was flashed here in the Historical Spaceflight section and I was unaware of that until now)
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http://www.c-span.org/Events/Space-Shuttle-Columbia-Disaster-Remembered/10737438661-4/
http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=31320.msg1025498#msg1025498
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There are several formidable moments in that recording.
Like W.H. saying (at ~50:50) that when they did that test... "we all knew that nothing was gonna happen... they would fire the foam - at the wing - and you could have won a million dollars in that room with the betting that something was gonna happen because we were all convinced - and I put myself in that category - that *nothing* was gonna happen at our RCC when they shot the foam at the wing" [my transcript may be imperfect in a few places] That came as a big surprise to me.
{ off topic, another shocking statement was by adm. G at ~50:00 with checking the underside of his car in the morning because we're dealing with some big boys here, huh... I would like a comment from Wayne on that - I know, won't gonna happen }
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Just to keep this thread ticking over, this made me laugh:
Wayne Hale @waynehale 1h
To Eldest Grandson: 'Will you design rocket ships when you grow up?' He: 'Oh Grandpa, I've already designed several'. Accomplished lad at 8!
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New post is up! Glad you're back at it Mr. Hale!
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2013/09/25/monuments-and-birthdays/
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And looks like a great new series on STS-93!
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2013/09/30/sts-93-and-the-flight-director-office/
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And looks like a great new series on STS-93!
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2013/09/30/sts-93-and-the-flight-director-office/
I wish I'd kept more of the mission status briefings over the years, but this one was hard to forget because of that "all-eventful" ascent. I guess since Wayne was MOD for the ascent/entry shifts he got to sit next to Mr. Austin in the briefing, too.
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For those on L2
http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=6817.0
The all-eventful STS-93 launch - with MCC loop and overview video and graphics
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For those on L2
http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=6817.0
The all-eventful STS-93 launch - with MCC loop and overview video and graphics
My all-time favorite item on all of L2.
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Oh yes! Mr Hale on STS-93....starting with this first attempt that pretty much everyone's seen on youtube:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2013/10/27/sts-93-keeping-eileen-on-the-ground-part-1/
The launch itself was dramatic. Mr Hale and L2 members may want to check out this video they started to use for training purposes. Amazing MCC loop showing how well they can work issues.
http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=6817.0
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jcopella's post is also relevant to the first launch attempt (in a thread about another "eventful" countdown):
http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=2078.msg51803#msg51803
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Pre-launch STS-93!
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2013/10/31/keeping-eileen-on-the-ground-part-ii-or-how-i-got-launch-fever/
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Mr Hale is writing here again! Yeah! http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2014/02/01/finding-columbia/
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I'd love to see the next part of STS-93, if you're reading this Wayne :)
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Started up again . . .
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Thanks Wayne! I especially enjoyed the http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2014/09/18/manifest-destiny-or-pipe-dream/ (http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2014/09/18/manifest-destiny-or-pipe-dream/) entry, as you revealed more of yourself, your history, motivations, aspirations and dreams. I, for one (among many, it appears), share so much of that too. I grew up consuming huge quantities of SF. I became an engineer in similar purpose (~8 years behind you), though was deflected from space in my early career and never returned, except for eagerly watching, following you and your comrades, and cheering (and crying) for the accomplishments and the losses too. I too believe in our human destiny to explore, to take risks, and eventually to occupy the entire solar system, and hopefully beyond. But I also enjoy studies of history and realize it took a hundred plus years, and uncountable lives lost, after 1492 before Europeans were able to live out their natural lives in the 'new world'; and there were people, and fuel, and food, and water, and breathable air here already in that case. So yes, I agree whole-heartily, it is the "young people with their enthusiasm and creativity [that] are our future." Thanks so much for sharing and passing along your lessons learned to the next generations. We are all depending upon them!
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Started up again . . .
Thanks -- especially like the additional detail about the STS-78 case, which as you noted hasn't been elaborated on in public that much. There was one online reference I stumbled over a couple of years ago in one of the STS-106 FRR presentation slides, but "Powerpoint" slides always make me think of cue cards rather than the full, delivered presentation:
http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/news/columbia/frr/sts-106/03_integration.pdf
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Another!
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2014/10/21/practicing-for-disaster/
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Thanks for the heads up -- I was two posts behind. This last post reminds me it's been five years (give or take a few weeks) since STS-129 (http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2009/11/sts-129-practising-launch-flight-controllers-put-to-the-test/). One of the distinct memories was falling behind trying to take notes during each run while listening to the flight director loop. (And I only had to listen to one channel of communications.)
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Mandatory STS-93 reading for the weekend:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2014/10/08/understanding-sts-93-the-key-is-mixture-ratio/ (http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2014/10/08/understanding-sts-93-the-key-is-mixture-ratio/)
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2014/10/11/sts-93-dodging-golden-bullets/ (http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2014/10/11/sts-93-dodging-golden-bullets/)
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2014/10/17/sts-93-dualing-computers/ (http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2014/10/17/sts-93-dualing-computers/)
and more is coming ;)
Wayne Hale @waynehale 18h18 hours ago
Reliving STS-93 through video recordings so I can blog about it. Drives my heart rate up as always. 15 fps underspeed, OMS -1 not required.
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As STS-78 came up, I pulled the MER IFA (rest on L2) for 2 points:
Title: MDM FA1 BITE During Ascent
Summary: At approximately 172:14:54 G.m.t. (00:00:05 MET), a built-in test equipment (BITE) bit was set on multiplexer-demultiplexer (MDM) flight critical aft (FA) 1
card 14. This bit is indicative of a problem in the analog to digital (A/D) converter in the sequence control unit (SCU) or a problem in card 14. However,
simultaneous with this BITE, the Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) 1 liquid hydrogen (LH2) inlet pressure failed off-scale high (OSH) (reference MER-02).
This pressure measurement is channelized through card 14 (channel 16). Analysis of the BITE logic indicates that an OSH voltage from this sensor will cause
the BITE indication on MDM FA 1. Thus, this BITE is an explained condition. A similar failure was observed on STS-51 [SSME 2 liquid oxygen pressure (LO2)
inlet pressure] that resulted in the same BITE indication on MDM FA2.
MER
Title: SSME 1 LH2 Inlet Pressure Failed OSH
Summary: At 172:14:54 G.m.t. (00:00:05 MET), the Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) 1 liquid hydrogen (LH2) inlet pressure (V41P1100C) failed off-scale high. This
failure resulted in the MDM FA1 BITE (MER-01). The failure could be caused by the sensor, wiring between the sensor and the dedicated signal conditioner
(DSC), or the DSC. The other three measurements on the DSC card did not exhibit anomalous behavior.
A similar malfunction occurred on SSME 2/FA2 during STS-51, and was caused by a generic failure mode that occurred in the transducer. The transducer
that failed during STS-51 was an older design than the one installed this flight. The new design should have this particular failure mode corrected.
KSC troubleshooting isolated the problem to a failed pressure transducer. The transducer was removed and replaced.
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And on the STS-93 screw/wire mentioned here: http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2014/10/17/sts-93-dualing-computers
Title: AC1 Phase A Short
Summary: At approximately 5 seconds into the launch of STS-93, a momentary short occurred on AC1 phase A. The duration of the short was approximately 500 ms. A
current spike in excess of 20 amps and a voltage drop from 114 to 21 VAC was observed on AC1 phase phase A. Coincident with the short, the SSME 1
(center) controller A and SSME 3 (right) controller B failed. Additionally, the H2O loop light on the C/W F7 panel was momentarily activated and a FC 1 pH
BFS message was received. After MECO, the crew looked at the circuit breakers on panel L4 and reported that no circuit breakers were out of position.
Data evaluation determined that there was no loss of function in any of the Orbiter equipment that was powered by AC1 during ascent. Both the H2O loop
light and the FC 1 pH message were determined to be symptoms of the undervoltage on AC1 phase A resulting from the short. There was no restriction on
the use of AC1 for the remainder of the mission.
During flight day 3, the crew reported that the AC1 phase A circuit breaker for SSME 1 controller A was actually open. With this information, the source of the
short could be isolated between the circuit breaker and the SSME 1 controller A. The AC1 phase B and C circuit breakers for SSME 1 controller A were
opened for entry to protect against an inadvertent powering of the controller.
A postflight troubleshooting plan was developed and it was determined early on that the short was on the Orbiter side of the SSME 1 interface panel. The
short was isolated to a damaged wire in the port wire tray at the midbody bay 11/12 frame. Analysis of the damaged wire indicated that the damage was the
result of a single mechanical event. It was initially suspected that the damage was caused by vibration induced chaffing against the head of a torque-set
screw used to secure the wire tray to the frame. At the short location, the screw head showed obvious signs of arcing. Wire damage at a second screw head
(about 2 inches away) was also observed, but there was no evidence of arcing.
Additional inspections found damage on a wire at the same location in the starboard wire tray. This damage appeared to be caused by wear. As a result of
this failure, the decision was made to inspect and protect the wire harnesses in the vehicles throughout the fleet.
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Those above MER IFA are on L2 here:
http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=6108.0
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Wayne has written up STS-93.
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2014/10/26/sts-93-we-dont-need-any-more-of-those/
I highly recommend the L2 video with the FCR loops including the Booster and other backroom loops, including John's "We don't need any more of these" comment.
http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=6817.0
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I really wanted to refer to the L2 integrated video of the MCC calls during the STS-93 ascent, but it is still behind the NSF paywall . . . any chance you could put that on the free part of the site?
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I really wanted to refer to the L2 integrated video of the MCC calls during the STS-93 ascent, but it is still behind the NSF paywall . . . any chance you could put that on the free part of the site?
Sure. I'll upload it to youtube in 10 minutes.
PS It's not a paywall, it's a place where supporters of the site gain access to access to all our database (which would bankrupt us if everyone could use it).
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All the while with 50,224 pounds of Chandra and it's Inertial Upper Stage in the payload bay.
Its amazing what was occuring from the moment the SRB's lit.
One issue ended up helping to avoid the consequences of another. Simply fascinating, and a great display of teamwork by all.
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I really wanted to refer to the L2 integrated video of the MCC calls during the STS-93 ascent, but it is still behind the NSF paywall . . . any chance you could put that on the free part of the site?
Sure. I'll upload it to youtube in 10 minutes.
PS It's not a paywall, it's a place where supporters of the site gain access to access to all our database (which would bankrupt us if everyone could use it).
And here it is. One of my favorite videos of all time as it shows the team work so well. I've locked the L2 thread, although it has some amazingly technical posts in there about this.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O9WjCyWq-iA
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Wow! I'm thinking that, in that first sixty seconds, with the shuttle in what we now know to be more-or-less a black zone and data on two of the SSMEs that suggested that they were... well, gone... must have been like that MCC team's worst nightmare happening right in front of them! It's to their credit that they didn't panic but kept working the problem rather than commit Columbia to a risky and untried RTLS abort as soon after launch as possible.
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Thanks Chris!
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Well written. Closure on the STS-93 story you started.
Can't wait for next engineering stories!
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to add to the STS-93 story by Mr. Hale:
"The bullet shaped LOX post pin hit the side of the right engine nozzle extension about two thirds of the way to the end with great force. Just by sheer luck, three nozzle tubes were breached. Three adjacent nozzle tubes lost cooling and started leaking hydrogen into the hot stream of gas coming out of the engine. Three tubes, not five. The adjacent cooling tubes kept the nozzle from failing during the eight and a half minutes the engines operated."
Here are 2 images taken after landing showing the 3 damaged tubes.
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Hey Wayne, really glad you got around to posting about this in more detail finally, it's much appreciated, if a little over my head at times!
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Aaron Cohen who, among other things, was the JSC center director and before that Director of Engineering at JSC told a story about the early days of shuttle development when the SSMEs were having real problems:
"I thought, if someone would just develop an anti-gravity machine we could bypass all the difficulties that come with rocket engines. Then I realized that any anti-gravity machine that we would make would likely have braze welds and EEE parts and then we would still have headaches from those sorts of things"
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Thanks for these last several posts, Wayne -- they helped shorten a couple of cross-country flights this past week.
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"As it turns out, there was a LOX shortfall of 405 lbs. The LOX low level sensors detected depletion of the LOX, commanded main engine shutdown approximately 0.15 seconds earlier than guidance would have wanted, and the final shuttle velocity was about 15 feet per second short of what was desired; out of more than 25,500 feet per second. There was enough margin in the Orbital Maneuvering System load to make up about 300 lbs, and the flight proceeded normally."
I don't understand this point. 300fps maybe? That seems like a lot. Otherwise, it implies a shortfall compared to the LOX shortfall.
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LOX shortfall of 405 lbs was backed out by post flight analysis. The engines were shut down by the LOX Engine Cutoff sensors in the Orbiter MPS plumbing showing 'dry'. The resulting underspeed (shortfall from what guidance wanted) was 15 fps. The orbital maneuvering system uses about 20 lbs of hypergols per fps (maybe a tad more since this orbiter/payload combination was heavy), ergo my estimate that about 300 lbs of OMS propellant made up the shortfall.
Remember the SSMEs were pushing not only the orbiter and payload but also the ET and whatever residuals (hydrogen) remained in the tank.
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So was the LOX shortfall due to more being used to compensate for the loss of H2 leaking from the nozzle tubes?
If 5 and not 3 tubes had been breached, when you refer to the nozzle failing, what would have been the outcome? Would the vehicle have survived for an RTLS or TAL?
Thanks.
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So was the LOX shortfall due to more being used to compensate for the loss of H2 leaking from the nozzle tubes?
If 5 and not 3 tubes had been breached, when you refer to the nozzle failing, what would have been the outcome? Would the vehicle have survived for an RTLS or TAL?
Thanks.
Basically you are correct.
Initially, both man and machine knew nothing of a hydrogen leak, only that the MCC pressures were low, this caused the SSME controller to increase Oxidizer delivery to increase MCC pressure. The controller is "thinking" "Hmm, the engine is getting enough fuel, yet, we arent maintaining proper MCC pressure, lets increase Oxygen flow to compensate".
But in reality, the MCC was already "burning" less fuel than usual(closer to stoich), then the SSME controllers command even more Oxidizer to be introduced thus compounding the issue(by running even closer to stoich).
From Mr Hale's Understanding STS-93: the key is Mixture Ratio
we know that the closer the SSME is run to stoich the hotter the reaction becomes. In essence, the MCC is operated fuel rich(oxidizer lean) to control MCC temps/pressures.
It wasnt until after a minute into the flight, that the Booster Officer/team realized that a nozzle leak was a possibility, the other possibility was the Oxidizer pump was losing efficiency. The SSME would continue to increase Oxidizer ratios until the turbines reached their upper temperature limit. Once the turbine temp. limit was reached, teh engine would have to be throttled down in order to prevent a shutwdown. This throttle down occurance is called "thrust limiting". Until the SSME entered Thrust Limiting the Booster team could not tell the difference between an oxidizer turbine/pump efficiency loss and a nozzle leak. The instrumentation just wasn’t precise enough to know what was going on.
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2014/10/08/understanding-sts-93-the-key-is-mixture-ratio/
On the Nozzle Coolant Tubes
Wayne writes:
Someone had calculated that if 5 adjacent cooling tubes split or were otherwise ruptured, there would not be enough local area cooling and a burn through would occur, causing a cascading failure of the nozzle and . . . a CRIT 1 failure.
Earlier in the same piece of writing Wayne defines a CRIT-1 failure.
a CRIT 1 failure – loss of vehicle and crew ‘promptly’.
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LOX shortfall of 405 lbs was backed out by post flight analysis. The engines were shut down by the LOX Engine Cutoff sensors in the Orbiter MPS plumbing showing 'dry'. The resulting underspeed (shortfall from what guidance wanted) was 15 fps. The orbital maneuvering system uses about 20 lbs of hypergols per fps (maybe a tad more since this orbiter/payload combination was heavy), ergo my estimate that about 300 lbs of OMS propellant made up the shortfall.
Remember the SSMEs were pushing not only the orbiter and payload but also the ET and whatever residuals (hydrogen) remained in the tank.
Ah...300lbs of OMS propellant. Somehow, I missed that. Makes sense.
Thanks for the great posts!
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In essence, the MCC is operated fuel rich(oxidizer lean) to control MCC temps/pressures.
Isn't that also done to increase ISP?
It wasnt until after a minute into the flight, that the Booster Officer/team realized that a nozzle leak was a possibility, ...
Was I the only one that was amazed when Booster figured that out and said so on the loop audio posted above? I thought that was pretty amazing.
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In essence, the MCC is operated fuel rich(oxidizer lean) to control MCC temps/pressures.
Isn't that also done to increase ISP?
It wasnt until after a minute into the flight, that the Booster Officer/team realized that a nozzle leak was a possibility, ...
Was I the only one that was amazed when Booster figured that out and said so on the loop audio posted above? I thought that was pretty amazing.
ISP could be a side benefit, but in my common opine, the SSME guys would take a small ISP hit to keep the machinery and MCC in 1 piece.
No you were not the only person impressed when the Booster team came up with that call.(Although now retrospective of me typing out some of the calls on the loop, it APPEARS that MAIN ENGINES didnt relay their possible diagnoses of a nozzle leak until almost 3:30 MET. Regardless, thats damn speedy work considering the issues that began seconds after liftoff!
Video Elapsed Time/Mission Elapsed Time(VET vs MET gets a bit screwy at the end as the video displays the MET counter and it "floats" along with the VET)
VET/MET
1:05/0:00 Liftoff
2:11/1:07 MAIN ENGINES: "3 at 104"
2:34/1:29 PROPULSION: "Right SRB hyd. pressures look "Interesting".
2:50/1:45 MAIN ENGINES: "We see higher fuel and oxidizer temps. on the right engine. Doesnt look like a perfromance case at this time, but I'm verifying."
3:10/2:05 "SRB Sep."
3:20 /2:15 FLIGHT DYNAMICS OFFICER: "Performance Nominal"
4:32/3:27 MAIN ENGINES:"Possible pre-thrust limiting nozzle leak, the fuel temps. and the HPOT temps and OPOV is open, the fuel discharge pressure is low. But we're not meeting all cues. We're not meeting the HPOT turbine temps.............
4:48/3:43 BOOSTER (steps on ME): "Ya we're not, we're only half way towards the turbine temps. on the HPOT for that.
4:55/3:50 FDO:"Negative Return"
5:04/3:59 BOOSTER: "And the OPOV hasnt moved nearly enough for that."
5:07/4:02 FDO:"Flight we took a thrust update of Plus 6.
5:10/4:05 FLIGHT:"Plus Six, copy that. Booster, how;s your engines looking?"
5:12/4:07 BOOSTER: "Engines looking good flight. The right looks like the tags are off of the right, doesn"t line up with anything."
5:44/4:39 MAIN ENGINES:"And Booster, Main Engines with sensitivities."
6:13/5:08 FDO "Press to ATO"
6:21/5:16 GUIDANCE PROCEDIRES OFFICER "Single Engine OPS-3"
6:53/5:48 FDO "Single engine Bajul 104"
7:04/5:59 FDO "Press to MECO"
8:01/6:56 FDO "Single engine Press 104"
8:32/7:32 MAIN ENGINES: "3-G throttles'
8:49/7:48 FDO:"23 K"
8:50/7:49 MPS"LOX at 5"
9:00/7:59 MPF "Fuel at 5"
9:12/8:11 MPS:"Arm."
9:16/8:15 GUIDANCE:"Fine count."
9:22/8:22 MAIN ENGINES: "MECO,MECO confirmed."
9:22/8:22 MIN PROPULSION SYSTEM: "LOX low level cut."
9:38/8:37: FDO: "15 foot per second underspeed, OMS-1 not required"
9:42/8:41 BOOSTER: "Flight it looks like it was a low LOX level cut-off."
10:12/9:11 FLIGHT: "Booster, did you see the flash on the low level sensors prior to MECO?"
10:14/9:13 BOOSTER: "Ya, we saw the low level sensors all 4 of them dry right at MECO and with teh underspeed there, it looks like it was a LOX low level cutoff".
10:21/9:20 FLIGHT: "YIKES!
10:22/9:21 MAIN ENGINES: "You bet!"
10:22/9:21 BOOSTER;"Concur."
10:23/9:22 FLIGHT:"We dont need any more of these!"
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Very "interesting" launch to say the least!
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If I win the Lottery, I'm going to pay Mr. Hale silly money to just talk to me about Shuttle for an afternoon. It would money well spent! ;D
Wow:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2014/11/02/significant-conversations/
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If I win the Lottery, I'm going to pay Mr. Hale silly money to just talk to me about Shuttle for an afternoon. It would money well spent! ;D
Wow:
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2014/11/02/significant-conversations/
Indeed, WOW.
I don't think there's another person more qualified to make such statements.
Thanks Mr. Hale, I think we all needed that.
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Its a tough business and I have been really irritated at the blather from some elements of the news media I should know better, but the speculation presented as fact and the shear ignorance are overwhelming. Makes me wonder about the rest of the news I hear.
Keep up the good work guys.
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From twitter:
@waynehale
Off to Virginia for a solid week of engineering work!
From http://www.orbital.com/NewsInfo/MissionUpdates/Orb-3/
The composition of the AIB is as follows: [...]
Members
[...]
Wayne Hale, Independent Consultant and Former NASA Space Shuttle Program Manager
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With Mr. Hale on the AIB, we know one thing - sloppy or wasteful thinking will be met with resistance!
Hmmm...not sure if I'd want to be on that team or not!!!
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I would. He'll bring the best out of everybody.
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That bit of info just raised my trust in the AIB to properly get to the bottom of this by about 500%.
(...not to mean that I didn't trust any AIB they'd select, just that I trust one with Wayne Hale on it a lot more)
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I know it was at JSC, I'm thinking STS-114 FD2 MSB, as opposed to post-MMT. I'd LOVE to see it again.
Awesome man.
I do have these files seemingly from FD2:
mmt_briefing_072705.wmv with Mr. Parsons and Mr. Hale
status_brief_072705.wmv Mr. Engelauf and Mr. Shannon
You wrote your article on July 27th.
The Launch was on July 26th.
Then there is
status_brief_072805.wmv Mr. Hill and Mr. Shannon, and in this one Mr. Hill has different clothes compared to the image in you article.
Do I miss a briefing with Mr. Hill here..
A flash from the past.
I've now found a copy of the missing STS-114 MSB.
http://www.c-span.org/video/?187981-2/space-shuttle-discovery-mission-status
To save you some time, its at 33min 10s in.
Mr. Hill really is Hitman.
edit:
A small rundown:
In 2012 the video was not available on C-Span, I remember looking for it everywhere. Now found it, when looking at other stuff on my HDD, and then deciding on to googling a bit....
In video, Mr. Hill gets hammered with all kinds of questions, and a BBC reporter then asks a lengthy question, asking things all over again in vague way. Mr. Hill then answers that, and during that answer, Mr. Hale enters the room. Legendary. I remember seeing this live, now that I think of it. Quoting Chris B: "It's the most epic thing!"
edit2: I've done what Chris asked below - he has the clip now. Not really worth to post it in a new post.
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I know it was at JSC, I'm thinking STS-114 FD2 MSB, as opposed to post-MMT. I'd LOVE to see it again.
Awesome man.
I do have these files seemingly from FD2:
mmt_briefing_072705.wmv with Mr. Parsons and Mr. Hale
status_brief_072705.wmv Mr. Engelauf and Mr. Shannon
You wrote your article on July 27th.
The Launch was on July 26th.
Then there is
status_brief_072805.wmv Mr. Hill and Mr. Shannon, and in this one Mr. Hill has different clothes compared to the image in you article.
Do I miss a briefing with Mr. Hill here..
A flash from the past.
I've now found a copy of the missing STS-114 MSB.
http://www.c-span.org/video/?187981-2/space-shuttle-discovery-mission-status
To save you some time, its at 33min 10s in.
Mr. Hill really is Hitman.
So, so happy that's been found again.
He had everything in there. Technical, concise, passion, firmness - it's so brilliant.
Was the focus of one of the first articles I wrote on the site 10 years ago! (messy format, as it was from about three versions of the CMS ago)
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2005/07/hitman-hill-lays-down-the-law/
If someone can edit out that question and answer from that point in the video (and through to Mr. Hale's first answer), please find a way. I want to share it on youtube.
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I know it was at JSC, I'm thinking STS-114 FD2 MSB, as opposed to post-MMT. I'd LOVE to see it again.
Awesome man.
I do have these files seemingly from FD2:
mmt_briefing_072705.wmv with Mr. Parsons and Mr. Hale
status_brief_072705.wmv Mr. Engelauf and Mr. Shannon
You wrote your article on July 27th.
The Launch was on July 26th.
Then there is
status_brief_072805.wmv Mr. Hill and Mr. Shannon, and in this one Mr. Hill has different clothes compared to the image in you article.
Do I miss a briefing with Mr. Hill here..
A flash from the past.
I've now found a copy of the missing STS-114 MSB.
http://www.c-span.org/video/?187981-2/space-shuttle-discovery-mission-status
To save you some time, its at 33min 10s in.
Mr. Hill really is Hitman.
Thats a play through, thanks for posting. Can never have enough Shuttle.
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I know it was at JSC, I'm thinking STS-114 FD2 MSB, as opposed to post-MMT. I'd LOVE to see it again.
Awesome man.
I do have these files seemingly from FD2:
mmt_briefing_072705.wmv with Mr. Parsons and Mr. Hale
status_brief_072705.wmv Mr. Engelauf and Mr. Shannon
You wrote your article on July 27th.
The Launch was on July 26th.
Then there is
status_brief_072805.wmv Mr. Hill and Mr. Shannon, and in this one Mr. Hill has different clothes compared to the image in you article.
Do I miss a briefing with Mr. Hill here..
A flash from the past.
I've now found a copy of the missing STS-114 MSB.
http://www.c-span.org/video/?187981-2/space-shuttle-discovery-mission-status
To save you some time, its at 33min 10s in.
Mr. Hill really is Hitman.
So, so happy that's been found again.
He had everything in there. Technical, concise, passion, firmness - it's so brilliant.
Was the focus of one of the first articles I wrote on the site 10 years ago! (messy format, as it was from about three versions of the CMS ago)
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2005/07/hitman-hill-lays-down-the-law/
If someone can edit out that question and answer from that point in the video (and through to Mr. Hale's first answer), please find a way. I want to share it on youtube.
I'd love a photocopy of Mr Hills handwritten notes. There would be a lot more message than the actual words he wrote.
Loved Mr Hills response. And love the wink Mr Hale gets when he arrives in the room. Mr Hale is exhibiting hyper-calmness, and support for the team.
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From twitter:
@waynehale
Off to Virginia for a solid week of engineering work!
From http://www.orbital.com/NewsInfo/MissionUpdates/Orb-3/
The composition of the AIB is as follows: [...]
Members
[...]
Wayne Hale, Independent Consultant and Former NASA Space Shuttle Program Manager
It is interesting, that currently this string is:
Wayne Hale, Director of Human Spaceflight, Special Aerospace Services
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And many thanks to mtakala24's skills, here's the edited part of that MSB, with Mr. Hill in top form and Mr. Hale joining mid-way.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L0xe-fEqgyQ
I'm going to hard link this, so some explanations some folks may have missed earlier in the thread.
This features the brilliant Paul Hill - then Flight Director for STS-114, and went on to become MOD Director - dealing with a reporter during the the STS-114 Flight Day 2 (I believe it was FD2) MSB.
I remember watching this live as it was the first mission the site covered when we started it 10 years ago.
We know Flight Directors sometimes have to deal with these briefings after a very busy shift, so it's usually best - and usually the case - that reporters should ask short, specific questions. That was very much the case for later flights, as it was mainly space beat reporters and they knew their stuff, you know, like Bill, Robert, Mark and so on.....
Given this was RTF, there was a lot of media attention and a lot of reporters not from the space beat asking questions.
The reporter asking this question was somewhat all over the place and asking Mr. Hill something he had already addressed.
How he dealt with it was wondrous in my eyes, even if it probably wasn't "how to deal with bad questions, 101" (I'm guessing there's a media training module in the MOD classes). However, I thought this was professional, to the point, passionate and just downright brilliant.
His answer said more about MOD and SSP to me than a 1000 books ever could. I dare say he - via this one answer - shaped how I reported things on this site over the coming years.
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And many thanks to mtakala24's skills, here's the edited part of that MSB, with Mr. Hill in top form and Mr. Hale joining mid-way.
http://youtu.be/L0xe-fEqgyQ
I'm going to hard link this, so some explanations some folks may have missed earlier in the thread.
This features the brilliant Paul Hill - then Flight Director for STS-114, and went on to become MOD Director - dealing with a reporter during the the STS-114 Flight Day 2 (I believe it was FD2) MSB.
I remember watching this live as it was the first mission the site covered when we started it 10 years ago.
We know Flight Directors sometimes have to deal with these briefings after a very busy shift, so it's usually best - and usually the case - that reporters should ask short, specific questions. That was very much the case for later flights, as it was mainly space beat reporters and they knew their stuff, you know, like Bill, Robert, Mark and so on.....
Given this was RTF, there was a lot of media attention and a lot of reporters not from the space beat asking questions.
The reporter asking this question was somewhat all over the place and asking Mr. Hill something he had already addressed.
How he dealt with it was wondrous in my eyes, even if it probably wasn't "how to deal with bad questions, 101" (I'm guessing there's a media training module in the MOD classes). However, I thought this was professional, to the point, passionate and just downright brilliant.
His answer said more about MOD and SSP to me than a 1000 books ever could. I dare say he - via this one answer - shaped how I reported things on this site over the coming years.
Great video and post. You're right, the "space beat" reporters usually show the right tone in their questions. This reporter tries, but there's an obvious feel he was looking for an angle. Not sure why that is?
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Wow. It took over a minute and a half to ask the question. Mr BBC got owned.
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Looks like we're going to get a series on RTF!
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2015/02/01/february-first-again/
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Maybe I'm reading (hoping) too much in this Twitter post today: "Back in Denver for space work again. Hope to get Americans flying into space on American craft soon!"
but isn't SNC the only spaceflight show in town in Denver? Is Mr. Hale working with SNC on DC?
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Maybe I'm reading (hoping) too much in this Twitter post today: "Back in Denver for space work again. Hope to get Americans flying into space on American craft soon!"
but isn't SNC the only spaceflight show in town in Denver? Is Mr. Hale working with SNC on DC?
ULA is headquartered in Denver, Colo.
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Maybe I'm reading (hoping) too much in this Twitter post today: "Back in Denver for space work again. Hope to get Americans flying into space on American craft soon!"
but isn't SNC the only spaceflight show in town in Denver? Is Mr. Hale working with SNC on DC?
ULA is headquartered in Denver, Colo.
Special Aerospace Services is also in the area -- headquarters in Boulder.
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A new series in the offing:
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2015/02/16/peeking-behind-the-curtain/
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New post -- "Pilot Error is Never Root Cause"
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2015/07/29/pilot-error-is-never-root-cause/
For what it's worth, one little nitpick -- I believe STS-28 was Brewster Shaw's second command of a Shuttle mission. His first was STS-61B on Atlantis in late 1985.
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New post -- "Pilot Error is Never Root Cause"
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2015/07/29/pilot-error-is-never-root-cause/
For what it's worth, one little nitpick -- I believe STS-28 was Brewster Shaw's second command of a Shuttle mission. His first was STS-61B on Atlantis in late 1985.
In the new post, Wayne makes reference to something called "Hochstein's Law", which he notes is discussed in an older post. Turns out the older post is on his old nasa.gov blog, not his current WordPress blog - the link to it is https://blogs.nasa.gov/waynehalesblog/2009/08/21/post_1250882977865/
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Another blog entry, "hot off the press". Titled "Specific Plans".
Thank you Mr Hale.
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/
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Another blog entry, "hot off the press". Titled "Specific Plans".
Thank you Mr Hale.
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/
Mr. Hale mentioning Zephram Cockrane is rather epic! ;D
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Mr Hale does have several very valid points. Often, solutions to intractable problems come in unexpected often totally-upredictable forms (to use the Star Trek metaphor, the discovery of a previously-unknown energy state of space called 'subspace' that allowed the circumvention of General Relativity - I'm pretty sure it is the hope of just such a thing that drives the EM Drive believers).
Also, bosses don't want to hear what the big flagship project will cost. They want to hear that it will cost what they want to pay and then will grumble mildly and pay up when there are 'unforeseen cost overruns'. It's sort of an unspoken but entirely routine and expected element of the project management game.
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Another installation from Mr Hale.
How to Avoid Train Wrecks
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2015/10/05/how-to-avoid-train-wrecks/
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Another entry with the subject being the: Von Braun Symposium speech Oct. 29, 2015
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2015/11/04/von-braun-symposium-speech-oct-29-2015/
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Great speech. An impassioned plea, really, that says a lot of important things.
It feels so frustrating, even heartbreaking, to see NASA set itself up for failure, again and again, while it acts like there is only one way to get something done. True change seems out of the realm of possibility, which engenders (in me) even more feelings of hopelessness. Space exploration being a huge passion of mine, I can't help but watch the current slow motion disaster and still hope for a positive outcome, somehow.
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An excellent speech by the man who might be speaking clearer about space these days than any other citizen. I wish he was in charge of NASA, frankly.
I do want to re-post one of his assertions for pondering. Mr. Hale said "If we are to conquer the universe then we have got to change our tactics. We must steal the playbook from those disruptive forces who can get things done IN THE EXISTING ENVIRONMENT."
We all know who those "disruptive forces" are, and we all know what they have achieved so far, but it is also important to note that two of them are dead in the water right now, offering no ability whatsoever to "get things done". One of them has been offline for a full year and won't fly again for many more months, while the other hopes to get back to serving NASA within a year of its failure, but we'll see.
I get Mr. Hale's point, and even agree with it to some extent, but the reality of this past year shows, I believe, that "disruptive forces" are no panacea.
- Ed Kyle
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I picked up on the same thing as Ed, and would point out that THE EXISTING ENVIRONMENT is also changing. That is, even the "disruptive forces" are planning to make it work with BIG ROCKETS and BIG ENGINES (at least off the surface of this planet)--not using existing (currently flying) rockets. As for the existing FUNDING environment, well...
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I understand and appreciate these points. I would note that yes, two of the disruptive forces are dead in the water now, but the status quo force has had several stand-down, dead-in-the-water periods as well, so all players have and probably will continue to experience these unfortunate periods from time to time. Just part of the deal I guess. And while at least one of the disruptive forces plans to utilize big rockets with big engines to execute its long term plan, I feel where I super duper agree with Wayne Hale is that we need to launch manned exploration missions very soon, and very often. That would be the opposite of waiting over a decade for a big rocket to come on line. I interpret that as more pointing toward looking at the LVs we currently have and figuring out how to create meaningful missions by stringing together approximately 1 to 3 launches to enable putting astronauts in places where they haven't gone before. Under current funding levels that seems 100% doable.
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I don't disagree with anything Mr Hale says, but I do wonder why he bothered to say anything at all. SLS has enough inertia behind it that it will continue down its path to cancellation (or at best, a short program of unsustainable flights), and no amount of impassioned speeches will change that. It's spaceX or nothing at this point.
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I don't disagree with anything Mr Hale says, but I do wonder why he bothered to say anything at all. SLS has enough inertia behind it that it will continue down its path to cancellation (or at best, a short program of unsustainable flights), and no amount of impassioned speeches will change that.
I think he is speaking to the people inside space industry who still believe SLS is the answer and business as usual can solve everything.
It's spaceX or nothing at this point.
SpaceX can't be expected to carry the torch alone, I hope among Blue Origin, the small launcher companies and suborbital companies will rise a 2nd SpaceX.
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I'd love to see y'all SLS haters go and say those things to Mr. Hale -- to his face. See how long that discussion would last...
;)
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An excellent speech by the man who might be speaking clearer about space these days than any other citizen. I wish he was in charge of NASA, frankly.
Agree.
I do want to re-post one of his assertions for pondering. Mr. Hale said "If we are to conquer the universe then we have got to change our tactics. We must steal the playbook from those disruptive forces who can get things done IN THE EXISTING ENVIRONMENT."
An earlier slide was this:
slide: piper cub
If we can build an affordable big rocket, then by all means do so; if not, then we need to start dividing the mission up into piper cub sized packages and get on with it.
So I don't see that his "existing" comment supports the SLS per se. Especially since the SLS is not yet existing, nor proven. Nor is he advocating that a transportation system should be used regardless of the economics of it.
What I interpret what he is saying is "stop trying to build the perfect way". That we should look around at what we have that works, and start using that.
We all know who those "disruptive forces" are, and we all know what they have achieved so far, but it is also important to note that two of them are dead in the water right now...
I think that is an overly melodramatic point of view, especially considering that for SpaceX at least they have a huge backlog that has only increased during their downtime. Orbital ATK already had a tough road for the Antares even before their accident due to the marketspace they are in, but for SpaceX they have already proven the demand for their service.
I get Mr. Hale's point, and even agree with it to some extent, but the reality of this past year shows, I believe, that "disruptive forces" are no panacea.
I don't see that at all, and I don't think anyone thought SpaceX was a panacea anyways.
What exists today is a world-wide fleet of EELV-sized launchers that are capable of putting 15-20mT to LEO. The 450mT ISS was built from such components, so I'd say that is what "existing" means. Available today and proven. The "disruptive force" that SpaceX brings to bear with the Falcon 9 is with the pricing, not the capability.
What doesn't yet exist, in proven forms, are the next round of "disruptive forces". One is the Falcon Heavy, which will provide a massive increase in payload mass to LEO and beyond for prices that are far below what is available today. Another is the SLS, which is a government experiment to see whether an HLV is needed - and so far there are no positive indications to indicate that it will be needed (desire doesn't count, or funding does).
So will the SLS be the panacea that many hope it will be for exploration? Unknown.
But we have a large fleet of very capable launchers that could be used TODAY if we truly desired to leave LEO, and near-term technologies like IVF and ACES would increase their capabilities.
And that is, what I believe, the existing environment Hale is talking about. That every new exploration plan should not depend on starting from scratch by building a new rocket. Leverage what we have, which is the key to disruptive innovation.
My $0.02
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But we have a large fleet of very capable launchers that could be used TODAY if we truly desired to leave LEO, and near-term technologies like IVF and ACES would increase their capabilities.
And that is, what I believe, the existing environment Hale is talking about. That every new exploration plan should not depend on starting from scratch by building a new rocket. Leverage what we have, which is the key to disruptive innovation.
My $0.02
While I tend to agree with much of what you (and others) say, I think it important to note that existing launchers today:
Existing Delta IV fleet slated to be decommissioned (ostensibly due to price).
Existing Atlas V slated to be decommissioned (due to politics).
Antares does not yet have a flight history (the version that is next set to fly).
Falcon Heavy does not yet have a flight history.
Falcon 9 is what is left, at least in the United States.*
(I won't go in to international LVs, but I think we see the end of various existing international LVs such as Proton coming).
Vulcan new engine under development. New rocket under development.
Blue Origin engine (see above). Rocket?
*SpaceX even envisions a large rocket to do their Mars (and one would assume) BLEO missions.
So what existing (affordable, available) systems can be leveraged for BLEO missions?
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Depends on what you want to do BLEO, I suppose. SpaceX is hoping to make a BFR because their ambitions onars are silimarly big. I have to believe that if you can build the ISS in less than 20 ton segments, you can construct interplanetary craft in a similar fashion. It won't happen, because SLS. People will say that launching things in one chunk is the most practical solution, which I agree with, except when that perfect solution precludes any development of the rest of the exploration architecture. That's what's happening now, and it will kill MASA when the political winds change.
Regarding my belief that it's SpaceX or nothing, I share a previous posters hope that other players come on the scene. I just haven't seen enough evidence that Blue Origin can get things done, nor have they shown the bold-faced ambition to go to Mars, which is, I firmly believe, the best way mankind can secure a long term future.
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Yeah, we don't need SLS or BFR sized rockets if we're just going for a quick visit and a small base. If we want colonization, then something larger is more optimal just due to the economies of scale. But there are several orders of magnitude difference in IMLEO between these scenarios, and well before you get to the "megarocket" size, you'll be developing reusable systems.
But "piper cubs" is the wrong analogy entirely. Something like Vulcan can launch about 50 tons in heavy configuration and can support an 8m diameter fairing, same as what SLS is capable of (as the baseline). The only difference there would be refueling in orbit, the actual payloads to Mars would be the same.
More important than the size-of-rocket debate is cost. We can't afford SLS/Orion as well as the actual hardware of going to Mars without an increase in NASA's budget that is not likely to happen. So that's why WBY1984 is probably right: either SpaceX or we don't end up going for the foreseeable future (~30 years), given that SLS/Orion stick around.
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While I tend to agree with much of what you (and others) say, I think it important to note that existing launchers today:
Existing Delta IV fleet slated to be decommissioned (ostensibly due to price).
Existing Atlas V slated to be decommissioned (due to politics).
Antares does not yet have a flight history (the version that is next set to fly).
Falcon Heavy does not yet have a flight history.
Falcon 9 is what is left, at least in the United States.*
(I won't go in to international LVs, but I think we see the end of various existing international LVs such as Proton coming).
Vulcan new engine under development. New rocket under development.
Blue Origin engine (see above). Rocket?
*SpaceX even envisions a large rocket to do their Mars (and one would assume) BLEO missions.
ULA, as long as they plan to be in business, will have launch capability for up to 20mT to LEO, either through the existing Delta IV Heavy, the existing Atlas V 551 (still usable for non-DOD payloads) or the upcoming Vulcan.
And since I think our future in space will be, and should be, international in nature, we'll be able to leverage Ariane 5/6, Proton, Angara, H-IIB, Long March 5 and whatever other future launchers come online that can carry more than 15mT to LEO (Falcon Heavy, SpaceX BFR, BO's ??, etc.).
So what existing (affordable, available) systems can be leveraged for BLEO missions?
If we're talking affordable then we're already eliminating the SLS, which means existing world fleet of EELV class launchers are the only alternative.
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While I tend to agree with much of what you (and others) say, I think it important to note that existing launchers today:
Existing Delta IV fleet slated to be decommissioned (ostensibly due to price).
Existing Atlas V slated to be decommissioned (due to politics).
Antares does not yet have a flight history (the version that is next set to fly).
Falcon Heavy does not yet have a flight history.
Falcon 9 is what is left, at least in the United States.*
(I won't go in to international LVs, but I think we see the end of various existing international LVs such as Proton coming).
Vulcan new engine under development. New rocket under development.
Blue Origin engine (see above). Rocket?
*SpaceX even envisions a large rocket to do their Mars (and one would assume) BLEO missions.
ULA, as long as they plan to be in business, will have launch capability for up to 20mT to LEO, either through the existing Delta IV Heavy, the existing Atlas V 551 (still usable for non-DOD payloads) or the upcoming Vulcan.
And since I think our future in space will be, and should be, international in nature, we'll be able to leverage Ariane 5/6, Proton, Angara, H-IIB, Long March 5 and whatever other future launchers come online that can carry more than 15mT to LEO (Falcon Heavy, SpaceX BFR, BO's ??, etc.).
Actually, a bit more. The current Delta IV Heavy does at least 26 tonnes to LEO and 24 to ISS. A Vulcan 56x with ACES should do at least that (if not more), and a Vulcan heavy would probably be closer to 32tonnes. Then you have Falcon Heavy (probably over 40 tonnes), Angara-5 (24 tonnes), Long March 5B (over 25 tonnes). So there you have at least a few options over 20tonnes. I know, save for the FH seems just a 20%~30% extra, but all those could probably evolve a bit more performance should the need for it arise. I believe that if a credible need arises 30 and upto 40 tonnes is realistic.
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Yeah, we don't need SLS or BFR sized rockets if we're just going for a quick visit and a small base. If we want colonization, then something larger is more optimal just due to the economies of scale. But there are several orders of magnitude difference in IMLEO between these scenarios, and well before you get to the "megarocket" size, you'll be developing reusable systems.
But "piper cubs" is the wrong analogy entirely. Something like Vulcan can launch about 50 tons in heavy configuration and can support an 8m diameter fairing, same as what SLS is capable of (as the baseline). The only difference there would be refueling in orbit, the actual payloads to Mars would be the same.
More important than the size-of-rocket debate is cost. We can't afford SLS/Orion as well as the actual hardware of going to Mars without an increase in NASA's budget that is not likely to happen. So that's why WBY1984 is probably right: either SpaceX or we don't end up going for the foreseeable future (~30 years), given that SLS/Orion stick around.
Once the ISS funds are freed up, you can build the MTV. MTV is just a smaller space station than ISS with a propulsion system. Cost of MTV can therefore fit within the ISS funding profile. Since the MTV does not have to be continuously manned with 6 or 7 astronauts, the cost profile could actually be lower. Add in that you don't have to fund separate earth - LEO cargo/crew capabilities, those funds can be redirected to Mars - LMO capabilities for the landing segment of the architecture. The current NASA budget is sufficient for Mars orbit(easily) and Mars landing(just barely). Using COTS style procurement for the landing portion could be done. Landing isn't absolutely required for a human Mars campaign (tele-operating robotics from orbit) and so the higher risk of that style of procurement might be acceptable. I'm almost positive SpaceX would prefer to be paid for mars surface cargo/crew services than for LEO delivery.
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Love this:
We have got to be able to figure out how to be safe and successful enough and go fly. [...] But in exploration, safety is not the most important thing. In exploration, the most important thing is to actually go.
But "piper cubs" is the wrong analogy entirely. [...] More important than the size-of-rocket debate is cost. We can't afford SLS/Orion as well as the actual hardware of going to Mars without an increase in NASA's budget that is not likely to happen.
More important than absolute cost is "fundability." NASA isn't going to Mars unless its budget can be approved by Congress.
Like Hale said:
Once you ask for public money you have to play the political game
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Actually, a bit more. The current Delta IV Heavy does at least 26 tonnes to LEO and 24 to ISS. A Vulcan 56x with ACES should do at least that (if not more)... I believe that if a credible need arises 30 and upto 40 tonnes is realistic.
All true. Although if you're having an international effort and you want as much redundancy as possible, you'd want to standardize payload sizes and mass as much as possible so that they can be lifted by all the participating partners. That could include more than one size/mass payload though, so you could have some that fit the low end (i.e. Falcon 9, H-IIB), and some that fit the higher end (Falcon Heavy, Vulcan + ACES, etc.).
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The current NASA budget is sufficient for Mars orbit(easily) and Mars landing(just barely).
There are many that would disagree:
In a 2013 House hearing, Thomas Young (https://www.nasa.gov/offices/nac/members/Young-bio.html) was asked how long it would take the Agency to put a human on Mars with its current budget. His response was unambiguous: “Never.”
I think your estimates are too simplistic to take into account the complexities of what needs to be solved, built and proven before we go to Mars. And it's not all hardware, quite a bit of it is medical related, which is not necessarily a money issue.
I'm almost positive SpaceX would prefer to be paid for mars surface cargo/crew services than for LEO delivery.
I'm sure they would choose both if given the chance, and I'm sure they would be capable of doing both at the same time.
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The current NASA budget is sufficient for Mars orbit(easily) and Mars landing(just barely).
There are many that would disagree:
In a 2013 House hearing, Thomas Young (https://www.nasa.gov/offices/nac/members/Young-bio.html) was asked how long it would take the Agency to put a human on Mars with its current budget. His response was unambiguous: “Never.”
I think your estimates are too simplistic to take into account the complexities of what needs to be solved, built and proven before we go to Mars. And it's not all hardware, quite a bit of it is medical related, which is not necessarily a money issue.
I'm almost positive SpaceX would prefer to be paid for mars surface cargo/crew services than for LEO delivery.
I'm sure they would choose both if given the chance, and I'm sure they would be capable of doing both at the same time.
It is debatable what he meant by that. I think he meant that the current budget outline they were talking about would never get to Mars surface. I agree with him somewhat(but don't make predictions more than a few decades out). You can't fund a Mars campaign with the funds allotted to Orion & SLS. If ISS eats 3 billion indefinitely, it is not happening with the same top line budget. A different budget with the same top line level would be able to though with a high risk/ low cost commercial Mars to Mars orbit system. We are splitting hairs here. I think Mars surface is barely doable while Young (maybe) thinks it isn't. The difference could be as little as 1 billion/ year. Regardless, Mars orbit/free return flyby/Mars moons are almost unquestionably doable. Medical isn't a show stopper depending on what the arbitrary acceptable level of risk is.
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https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2015/11/16/the-ancient-and-honorables/
New post from Mr. Hale.
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"This story takes during STS-33, a classified flight space shuttle Discovery in November 1989. This story is retold by Wade Hale who was serving as Orbit 1 team Flight Director with a shift starting at noon on Thanksgiving day, and he swears it was “mostly true.”
A Broken Toilet in Space is a Special Brand of Horror
http://space.io9.com/is-a-broken-toilet-in-space-the-worst-thanksgiving-ever-1744841910
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Glad they got my name wrong . . .
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Glad they got my name wrong . . .
I wonder if they will make this story into
Science Channel series tells of close calls in space
http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=38775.0
Sure Hollywood would need to be creative on the events ;D
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Wayne's original version of the story is at https://blogs.nasa.gov/waynehalesblog/2009/11/24/post_1259077518292/
It's a better read than the io9.com paraphrase.
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New Blog is up
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2015/12/17/messy-accidents/
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New one:
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2016/01/27/remembrance-is-not-enough/
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This one strikes a chord with me.
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/01/30/what-would-rick-and-gus-and-dick-want/
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Another blog post is up:
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2016/02/29/test-like-you-fly/
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Today's post, "Gravity"
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2016/06/13/gravity/
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I really like this one, seeing as how Wayne is capturing the gravity debacle square in the middle of the process.
He's right in that Einstein was able to demonstrate mathematically that gravity is nothing more than the warping of space-time by mass -- all moving objects still move in straight lines, it's space that curves. However, we have a large establishment of particle physicists who cannot let go of gravity as a force equivalent to all other forces in the Universe, generated by the exchange of elementary particles. To them, Einstein's math simply describes an effect that must be the result of the exchange of gravitons -- without explaining how gravitons have not been detected and no one has been able to generate a theory that predicts how and where one might detect gravitons. Heck, we've been able to determine how particles acquire mass, we've found the particles that control this (Higgs bosons) -- and yet, still no progress on finding gravitons, or predicting at what energy levels they may come into detectable existence.
So, even though Einstein had a great insight more than a century ago, and his math has been embraced as describing the overall observable effects of gravity, there is still a large part of the scientific community that can only see the Universe as the expression of the interaction of the particles they've spent their lives looking at. When they're likely all chasing a chimera, as well.
And, as Wayne says, don't even start with time -- I'm looking forward (not) to the next paper that attempts to define the properties of a chroniton particle...
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New entry
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2016/08/07/running-for-president/
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New entry
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2016/08/07/running-for-president/
I was class president for a year on a ticket that included hiring the Outrun video game you could sit down in - and a pool table - for the social room.
Controversial, but before people were bored with the facilities and going into the town and rolling back into class late. Punctuality was improved under my stewardship, as were driving skills! ;D
(True Story!)
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New entry
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2016/08/07/running-for-president/
I was class president for a year on a ticket that included hiring the Outrun video game you could sit down in - and a pool table - for the social room.
Controversial, but before people were bored with the facilities and going into the town and rolling back into class late. Punctuality was improved under my stewardship, as were driving skills! ;D
(True Story!)
Good old SEGA :)
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New entry
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2016/08/07/running-for-president/
I was class president for a year on a ticket that included hiring the Outrun video game you could sit down in - and a pool table - for the social room.
Controversial, but before people were bored with the facilities and going into the town and rolling back into class late. Punctuality was improved under my stewardship, as were driving skills! ;D
(True Story!)
I liked that one, and also the game called Afterburner. Many a quarters were swallowed by that machine.
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I loved all of the old scaled sprite Sega arcade games. They were really quite a revelation at the time. Loved Afterburner and Outrun, but my favorite was easily Space Harrier. At my best I was able to complete the game on a single quarter (once or twice).
Memories...
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New one from Mr. Hale.
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2017/01/01/the-road-not-taken/
And for the record; I really don’t want to work in Washington.
;D
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I loved all of the old scaled sprite Sega arcade games. They were really quite a revelation at the time. Loved Afterburner and Outrun, but my favorite was easily Space Harrier. At my best I was able to complete the game on a single quarter (once or twice).
Memories...
Thanks to the immense power of today's desktops and emulation:
OutRun, in your browser: https://archive.org/details/arcade_outrun
After Burner: https://archive.org/details/arcade_aburner2
Space Harrier: https://archive.org/details/arcade_sharrier
bit clumsy to play on the keyboard, but...
...aaand we're heavily off-topic too... Sorry :)
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Looks like there is a new one, just today: https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2017/01/14/the-triumph-of-the-flexible-path/
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Mr Hale just tweeted the link to this (an earlier article).
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2016/01/27/remembrance-is-not-enough/
The lesson to take away here is not to give up. If it is unsafe say so. If overruled, appeal. If denied appeal, make your case to the highest level manager you can find. Do not give up until you have been heard at the very top.
Because you might be the only one that sees what no one else can.
There was a good example (likely only one of many) that I got to see during Shuttle. Won't link as it's a very old article that I wrote and the formatting is off, but:
A contractor at Lockheed Martin was able to voice his concerns over the state of Endeavour's damaged TPS (Thermal Protection System) - all the way to Mission Management Team (MMT) chairman John Shannon - within a matter of hours.
The engineer's concerns, with both re-entering as-is and repairing via T-RAD/STA-54, were addressed via the arsenal of analysis that gave rationale to the decision that will see Endeavour come home - now likely on Tuesday - without a repair being required on her tile damage.
Officially, only the highly conservative JSC Engineering department dissented as a group against the MMT decision, although Shannon didn't note - or wasn't asked - about individual cases of dissent/concern.
While it appears the vast majority of the engineering community concurred with the in-depth analysis and testing that took place in the days after the small gouge was spotted near Endeavour's landing gear door, it also appears that everyone felt safe to give their input, and could rely on the backing of their own management.
The engineer in question - an expert in foam impact testing - voiced his concerns on Wednesday to his boss, Wanda Sigur, Vice President of Lockheed Martin's External Tank project at the Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF) in New Orleans.
While the engineer did not demand to speak to the MMT, Sigur immediately passed on his concerns to John Chapman, head of the External Tank project at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), effectively Sigur's NASA boss.
'I received an email from one of our engineers expressing concern with the potential decision to re-enter the orbiter - either as is or with a putty repair,' Sigur wrote to Chapman, forwarding the e-mail she had received from the engineer. 'Notes from his email are below:'
'The damage could be worst than what it appears,' wrote the engineer. 'During some of the impacts tests, we have what we called shear-out failures, where some of the impacts failed the tile at the densification layer, which it is designed to do. The problem is that not all of the failures lifted the tile out of place, but only cracked it 25-75 percent through that layer, leaving a tile partially attached.
'With re-entry loads, it could fail the remaining portion and become dislodged during entry, leaving a large cavity, thus creating a more severe thermal issue. A repair to putty this area could also be detrimental, in that this could also aggravate the situation, making it worse.
'I know they are performing re-entry testing on the tiles that mimic the shape of the damage area at JSC (tiles were CNC machined to the damage profile based on the 3D laser imagery taken of the damaged site) but not on a tile out scenario.'
Sigur - herself a mechanical engineer by trade - highlighted the engineer's recommendation, before asking: 'What are the appropriate channels to identify this?'
Her answer would come just seven minutes later, as Chapman wrote back: 'I'd send it straight to John Shannon ASAP with a copy to Steve Poulos and Bill McArthur. Be sure to include contact info for your engineer so they can get more info / clarification if needed. If possible, he needs to attend this afternoon's MMT meeting.'
Just over an hour later, the concern had reached the inbox of Shannon and other key shuttle management, with the original e-mail and contact details of the engineer, should they wish to call him.
Ten minutes later, the e-mail had been forwarded to other members of shuttle management, with a response on what was now becoming a chain e-mail, noting: 'Please handle this as a Shuttle Safety Hotline submission.'
Ultimately, the initial note of concern, forwarded from Sigur, had made it all the way up the chain of command to all of the shuttle management, within 90 minutes, with JSC manager Robert Doremus confirming to all on the chain e-mail: 'We will bring this up at today's MMT.'
While it is not known how the engineer's concerns were abated by the MMT, the ultimate decision that Endeavour was clear to come home, was taken the following day, with only the minor dissent of JSC Engineering noted.
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It's a great post, but it's from a year ago.
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Ah yes. Mr Hale tweeted it out that day I posted the above. A reminder, obviously.
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New post:
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2017/02/22/king-for-a-day/
found via Marcia Smith's comment:
https://twitter.com/SpcPlcyOnline/status/834430315573673985
Very thought provoking essay by @waynehale. NASA "hobbled by three structural and cultural problems." Need to "transform" agency,
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https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2017/02/09/flying-with-the-window-shades-down/
This one was pretty good and funny.
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Watch out! Mr. Hale's bringing Cromwell (God Save The King) into it. ;)
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2017/03/12/blame-it-on-oliver-cromwell/
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Cromwell! Interesting read, but didn't expect to see his name in a Wayne Hale blog.
God Save The King!
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https://twitter.com/waynehale/status/847774460933439488
"Congratulations SpaceX. It's been nearly six years since we've seen the launch of a reused rocket. #spaceshuttle"
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https://twitter.com/waynehale/status/847774460933439488
"Congratulations SpaceX. It's been nearly six years since we've seen the launch of a reused rocket. #spaceshuttle"
And that, ladies and gentlemen, is how you throw shade.
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The comments are pretty disgusting what a lack of respect from the SpaceX amazing peoples. :(
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Watch out! Mr. Hale's bringing Cromwell (God Save The King) into it. ;)
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2017/03/12/blame-it-on-oliver-cromwell/
So long as he doesn't bring up Lincoln, we should be ok. Every time someone is going to get us into trouble, they start quoting Lincoln...
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Another from Wayne Hale.
Waivers, Deviations, and Exceptions
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2017/04/03/waivers-deviations-and-exceptions/
Thanks Wayne!
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And another blog post from Mr. Wayne Hale.
Basically a clarification of why he writes his blog entries, and the purpose of such entries. He mentions his fruitless attempts to gain access to the expansive NASA archives related to the SSP/STS and other projects, access which was lost upon his retirement from NASA. As such, his blog entries are sculpted solely on his personal memories garnered during his career at NASA.
It must be frustrating to not be able to peruse archived information, of a program of which he held positions such as:
1. head of the Integrated Communications Section, Systems Division, Mission Operations
2. head of the Propulsion Systems Section, Systems Division, Mission Operations
3. flight director in Mission Control for forty-one Space Shuttle missions
4. deputy chief of the Flight Director Office for Shuttle Operations
5. launch integration manager of the Space Shuttle Program (his 1st official day in this position was Feb 1, 2003 which of course was the same day that Columbia STS-107 failed to return to KSC--Wayne was outside waiting for Columbia to announce herself with 2 sonic booms, which of course never came to Florida.-Wayne talks about this exact moment is covered here: https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2013/01/17/after-ten-years-the-moment-of-truth/
6. deputy manager of Space Shuttle Program
7. manager of Space Shuttle Program
I sure hope that one day, NASA allows Wayne to access what he seeks. After all he does/did hold a security clearance.
Posted on April 10, 2017:
Administrivia
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2017/04/10/administrivia/
Thank you Mr. Hale!
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Another from Wayne Hale.
Waivers, Deviations, and Exceptions
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2017/04/03/waivers-deviations-and-exceptions/
Thanks Wayne!
Always enjoy his blogs. This one really helped me understand the waiver process.
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Hot off the presses, a new installation of Mr Hales blog.
STS-121: The Hardest Launch – part 1
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2017/04/27/sts-121-the-hardest-launch-part-1/
Thanks Wayne!
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There is an story on NPR's Story Lab about Wayne Hale and the day of the Columbia Shuttle accident:
Total Failure: When The Space Shuttle Didn't Come Home (http://www.npr.org/2017/05/17/527052122/total-failure-when-the-space-shuttle-didnt-come-home) : NPR
The first paragraph:
"The morning that the space shuttle Columbia was supposed to return home, Wayne Hale was at the landing site. At age 48, Hale was an up-and-coming manager with NASA. He'd just taken a job overseeing shuttle launches. But since this was a landing day, he didn't have much to do."
About the story:
"This story is the first in a four-part series on the experience of failure and how people deal with it. It was developed in NPR's Story Lab."
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NPR started a series called "Total Failure" today. The first story features Wayne Hale talking about Columbia and the STS-107 mission.
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The story can be found at:
http://www.npr.org/2017/05/17/527052122/total-failure-when-the-space-shuttle-didnt-come-home
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Good info. His blogs are great as well.
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I heard this on the radio yesterday and was a bit perplexed. They left out an important part of the story, which distorted things.
What happened after the Columbia launch was that Hale was informed about the debris strike, was concerned about it, and then sought to get better information about what happened. His attempts were rejected by higher management, and so that inquiry stopped. Then Columbia was destroyed. In the aftermath, Hale was one of the few people who actually had a good reputation. Also, he was honest and humble about the whole thing. That's why he got promoted to run the program.
But the NPR story never mentioned his effort to obtain better imagery of the damage and how it was stopped. The narrative makes it sound like he messed up and then surprisingly got promoted later. And that's not what happened. I don't know if they edited out part of the story, or if Hale did not discuss that in the interview. But whoever produced that segment really did not do their homework. There are plenty of sources about what happened back then. It's not that hard to find them. Here's one:
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/709/1
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It's a good reminder to view the media with a healthy degree of skepticism...
Briefly stated, the Gell-Mann Amnesia effect works as follows. You open the newspaper to an article on some subject you know well. In Murray’s case, physics. In mine, show business. You read the article and see the journalist has absolutely no understanding of either the facts or the issues. Often, the article is so wrong it actually presents the story backward-reversing cause and effect. I call these the “wet streets cause rain” stories. Paper’s full of them.
In any case, you read with exasperation or amusement the multiple errors in a story-and then turn the page to national or international affairs, and read with renewed interest as if the rest of the newspaper was somehow more accurate about far-off Palestine than it was about the story you just read. You turn the page, and forget what you know.
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Another entry.
Game Changing Technology
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2017/07/28/game-changing-technology/
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Another entry.
Game Changing Technology
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2017/07/28/game-changing-technology/
Such a weird article.
USS Monitor vs. CSS Virginia was the first battle between ironclads, but the French and British navies were already operating ironclads for years at the time. Hardly a game changing invention by a "truly crazy revolutionary".
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Another entry.
Game Changing Technology
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2017/07/28/game-changing-technology/
Such a weird article.
USS Monitor vs. CSS Virginia was the first battle between ironclads, but the French and British navies were already operating ironclads for years at the time. Hardly a game changing invention by a "truly crazy revolutionary".
The article is about defining what a game changing technology is, and used the example of the USS Monitor.
John Ericsson’s design of the USS Monitor was innovative in the way it combined existing technologies.
Of course, it was also in the right place at the right time to cause the entire world to take notice.
Timing is perhaps an important element of that definition.
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Another entry.
Game Changing Technology
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2017/07/28/game-changing-technology/ (https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2017/07/28/game-changing-technology/)
Such a weird article.
USS Monitor vs. CSS Virginia was the first battle between ironclads, but the French and British navies were already operating ironclads for years at the time. Hardly a game changing invention by a "truly crazy revolutionary".
The article is about defining what a game changing technology is, and used the example of the USS Monitor.
John Ericsson’s design of the USS Monitor was innovative in the way it combined existing technologies.
Of course, it was also in the right place at the right time to cause the entire world to take notice.
Timing is perhaps an important element of that definition.
You could also say the Monitor was a failed application of game changing technology. IIRC, there were no viewports in the rotating turret and no orientating markings inside, and despite communication from the pilothouse, they were reduced to guessing when to fire.
If you ever get the chance to visit Newport News, make sure you visit the USS Monitor Center. http://www.monitorcenter.org/ (http://www.monitorcenter.org/)
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Another entry.
Game Changing Technology
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2017/07/28/game-changing-technology/
Such a weird article.
USS Monitor vs. CSS Virginia was the first battle between ironclads, but the French and British navies were already operating ironclads for years at the time. Hardly a game changing invention by a "truly crazy revolutionary".
Just goes by the info on wikipedia, this "years" is actually 2 years 4 months, a pretty short time. Ironclads themselves are game changing, they may not be invented by a "truly crazy revolutionary" but a "truly crazy revolutionary" demonstrated their effectiveness, something to think about...
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Another entry.
Game Changing Technology
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2017/07/28/game-changing-technology/
Such a weird article.
USS Monitor vs. CSS Virginia was the first battle between ironclads, but the French and British navies were already operating ironclads for years at the time. Hardly a game changing invention by a "truly crazy revolutionary".
The article is about defining what a game changing technology is, and used the example of the USS Monitor.
John Ericsson’s design of the USS Monitor was innovative in the way it combined existing technologies.
Of course, it was also in the right place at the right time to cause the entire world to take notice.
Timing is perhaps an important element of that definition.
The British and French ironclads were a lot more conservative; conventional hull designs with incremental armour, propulsion and weapons upgrades compared to all-timber designs. IIRC, Monitor and Virginia were both so innovative that they didn't even look like ships as they were typically visualised at the time. Wayne is probably referring to that when he is talking about game-changing.
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It was later found out that the Monitor's guns could have handled twice the powder load in the standard charge it was using. Had the captain known this and ordered double charges be loaded the shells would have had enough momentum to penetrate the Virginia's armor easily. There is a lesion there in failing to fully maximize the advantages of new game changing technology because it is not fully understood.
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It was later found out that the Monitor's guns could have handled twice the powder load in the standard charge it was using. Had the captain known this and ordered double charges be loaded the shells would have had enough momentum to penetrate the Virginia's armor easily. There is a lesion there in failing to fully maximize the advantages of new game changing technology because it is not fully understood.
I don't know much about nineteenth century naval technology--but couldn't the USN have been wary of testing cannon to their ultimate failure limits after the "Peacemaker" accident in 1844, aboard the USS Princeton? (Or, Monitor designer John Ericsson?--He also designed the Princeton.)
(The failed demonstration aboard the Princeton killed Secretary of the State Abel Upshur, Secretary of the Navy Thomas Walker Gilmer, Virgil Maxcy, former Solicitor of the U.S Treasury and charge d'affaires to Belgium, Captain Beverley Kennon, Chief of the Navy's Bureau of Construction, Equipment and Repairs, David Gardiner, New York lawyer and politician, and President John Tyler's slave valet, Armistead. Other guests were injured. President Tyler was delayed below deck from attending the demonstration and escaped injury.)
http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NH_0905_Cruise-P1,00.html
Was it even possible back then to test smooth-bore muzzle-loading cannon to determine maximum powder charge or other interesting facts?
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We are heading way OT. That said...
In the aftermath of the above incident on the Princeton, a regulation had been put in place that no gun could be fired with a full charge until it had been proof-tested.
LT Worden knew the guns had not yet been proof-tested. They simply had not had time - the guns had been delivered straight from the arsenal to the builders. The 1st LT/Gunnery Officer asked permission before the battle to use full charges. Worden cited the reg and said no. The Monitor thus fought the battle using half-charges.
After the battle, it was fairly obvious that Worden blamed himself for being too pedantic. During his tenure as CO of Montauk, he was much more aggressive.
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Wayne twitted a congrats on the SpaceX launch and then said time to get busy launching humans. Someone replied ir was Elon’s top priority. Wayne replied, apparently injured, that he was talking about his work.
What is he talking about? He doesn’t work for SLS or blue origin and certainly not Elon and I don’t think Boeing.
For whom and with what is he launching humans into space? Sorry if it’s in the thread, but the thread seems more focused on 19th century naval technology.
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He now does consulting work for a number of aerospace companies. I've seen him floating around my building from time to time.
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He now does consulting work for a number of aerospace companies. I've seen him floating around my building from time to time.
He's part-time for Special Aerospace Services: https://specialaerospaceservices.com/
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He now does consulting work for a number of aerospace companies. I've seen him floating around my building from time to time.
He's part-time for Special Aerospace Services: https://specialaerospaceservices.com/
From https://specialaerospaceservices.com/newsroom/business-expansion/
Special Aerospace Services provides engineering, safety and propulsion research expertise to its space and defense customers. The company is currently working on projects including NASA's Space Launch System (SLS).
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He now does consulting work for a number of aerospace companies. I've seen him floating around my building from time to time.
He's part-time for Special Aerospace Services: https://specialaerospaceservices.com/
SAS has pictures of SLS on its front page, and mentions commercial crew on the space section of its website. So that still leaves it unclear exactly what project he was referring to when he said "I was talking about what I'm doing." (Only thing clear from the context is not Dragon 2.)
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News (http://tucson.com/news/local/world-view-balloon-blast-did-in-damage-to-pima-county/article_af80f817-6a7b-5658-90d4-73286759f890.html) from earlier this week stated that he will be leading accident investigation into December's World View hydrogen balloon explosion, but I doubt that was what he was referring to.
This afternoon he tweeted (https://twitter.com/waynehale/status/962042860689285120):I missed all the excitement, press, and VIPs this week but I had a satisfying time helping commercial crew efforts succeed
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New post:
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2018/02/14/fifteen-years/
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New post 10 March 2018
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/
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STS-121 and those ECO Sensors we all won't forget in a hurry!
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STS-121 and those ECO Sensors pin connectors we all won't forget in a hurry!
There, fixed that for ya.
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STS-121 and those ECO Sensors pin connectors we all won't forget in a hurry!
There, fixed that for ya.
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2018/03/16/sts-121-the-hardest-launch-part-2-electrical-problems/
Two blog posts in one week!
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Newest Installment from Mr Hale's Blog
Careful What You Ask For
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2018/06/19/careful-what-you-ask-for/
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Another post: Launch Fever (beans and cornbread)
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2019/03/03/launch-fever/
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Yet another installment of Wayne Hale's blog.
Miracle Workers
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2019/04/12/miracle-workers/
Thank you Mr Hale.
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new post:
STS-121: The Hardest Launch – Part 3 Wing Leading Edge
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2019/05/07/sts-121-the-hardest-launch-part-3-wing-leading-edge/?fbclid=IwAR3zbHmF0EGNXZisj-yWbAffvgAFie94Fr8jTWaxgNXDSnS3TMuHY8PmP3g
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New post
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2019/05/20/advising-nasa/
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New post
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2019/05/20/advising-nasa/
Yes, his next big step in life. It's good to have someone who had to made tough decisions on these advisory committees.
I found his concern about the committees not hearing from the public enough interesting.
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New post
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2019/05/20/advising-nasa/
Yes, his next big step in life. It's good to have someone who had to made tough decisions on these advisory committees.
I found his concern about the committees not hearing from the public enough interesting.
I suppose if they keep having their meetings in Washington, that makes it difficult for a large number of people to provide input. Do they ever rotate their locations?
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I suppose if they keep having their meetings in Washington, that makes it difficult for a large number of people to provide input. Do they ever rotate their locations?
From Mr. Hale's blog--location rotates:
"
But three times a year I get to gather with the group of ‘graybeards’ at some NASA center (meetings rotate around), listen to all the interesting projects the agency is doing or planning to do, get a tour, and give our ‘advice’ in the form of observations, findings, and recommendations.
"
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Just published:
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2019/06/19/blood-and-money/
Blood and Money
“The popular mind often pictures gigantic flying machines speeding across the Atlantic carrying innumerable passengers in a way analogous to our modern steam ships . . . it seems safe to say that such ideas are wholly visionary and even if the machine could get across with one or two passengers, the expense would be prohibitive to any but the capitalist who could use his own yacht.” –W. H. Pickering, 1910
The news in the aerospace business is abuzz with discussion about the cost of spaceflight: new studies on what Apollo actually cost back in the day, rumored estimates of the potential cost of the Artemis program through first landing, reports about cost overruns on some NASA activities. All this stimulated my thoughts about costs and finance.
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He's right about the cost in blood. It is one we should, with open eyes, be willing to pay for a worthwhile endeavour. But I'm not sure that Artemis enables space commerce1. Not at those prices.
1 - I mean more than the commerce of selling NASA the vehicles, equipment, and services to make it happen.
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And yet another installment by Wayne Hale to his blog. This one titled "STS-121 The Hardest Launch Part 4: Damage to the Heatshield", published June 24, 2019.
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2019/06/24/sts-121-the-hardest-launch-part-4-damage-to-the-heatshield/
Thank you Mr Hale.
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He's right about the cost in blood. It is one we should, with open eyes, be willing to pay for a worthwhile endeavour.
I think he's right that the risk to astronauts' lives should be recognized and accepted. It would help if the politicos supporting these things could periodically remind the public of the risk. But the real problem is deeper. People won't like this, but why do we value astronauts' lives so highly? Many people die prematurely every day. Those deaths are catastrophes for the families and close friends of the deceased, but society as a whole simply moves on. Consider the contrast, for example, between Pres. Nixon's anxiety over the fate of Apollo 13's all-volunteer crew and his willingness to send hundreds of conscripted young men to die in obscurity every week in the meat grinder that was America's war in Vietnam.
Let's get over this. Astronauts are just people.
EDIT: "closed friends" -> "close friends"
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Another treat from Mr Hale.
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2019/07/11/sts-121-the-hardest-launch-part-5-what-can-we-learn/
Thank you!
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Another tasty morsel from the literary smorgasboard of spaceflight knowledge/experience a la Mr Wayne Hale.
Finding meaning in Apollo. August 20, 2019
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2019/08/20/finding-meaning-in-apollo/
Thank you!
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I rarely post, but the words of Mr. Hale about his experience struck a familiar chord in me. I am 4 years older than him, but nonetheless, I experienced some of the same things he did in order to follow human spaceflight back then. Thank you Mr Hale, for a reminder of the reality of those days.
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Mr Wayne Hale again puts his thoughts into words.
Calculating the Risk August 27, 2019
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2019/08/27/660/
Thank you!
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And another excerpt from Mr Hale's blog
Night Flying
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2019/09/03/night-flying/
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New one......
https://twitter.com/waynehale/status/1176883947558584320
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That would have been pretty nasty to handle if they landed in California.
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Another blog entry from Mr Hale.
"Definition of Terms"
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2019/10/16/definition-of-terms/
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Another entry into Wayne Hale's Blog.
"What figure did you have in mind?" November 9/2019
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2019/11/09/what-figure-did-you-have-in-mind/
This posts picture of Mr Hale was used in this article written bu NSF.com's own Blackstar.
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/709/1
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Another entry into Wayne Hale's Blog.
"What figure did you have in mind?" November 9/2019
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2019/11/09/what-figure-did-you-have-in-mind/
This posts picture of Mr Hale was used in this article written bu NSF.com's own Blackstar.
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/709/1
I’m guessing this was inspired by the recent discussion of SLS (and Starship) launch costs.
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another installment in Wayne Hales blog.
Tracking down ghosts
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2019/12/19/tracking-down-ghosts/
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Will the world go back to normal?
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2020/04/19/will-the-world-go-back-to-normal/
(https://tse3.mm.bing.net/th?id=OIP.mA5QpJZcmfU3AaYVKRhivgAAAA&pid=Api&P=0&w=300&h=300)
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I missed this tweet on May 1. Mr Hale - is the supporting analysis available?
F=ma
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I missed this tweet on May 1. Mr Hale - is the supporting analysis available?
F=ma
I've attached three documents which hopefully will give some insight into how Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) was applied to the shuttle.
Two of the documents show how risk has changed over shuttle missions by applying the most recent risk models.
Risk models have evolved over the lifetime of the shuttle program. The presentation includes a chart showing how estimate of risk has changed since 1987 for models up to iteration 3.2 from 2010 (the most recent is iteration 3.3)
For STS-1 the 1 in 9 figure excludes consideration of the ejection seats - if this is included present models estimate risk improves slightly to 1 in 12.
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Wow - brilliant! Thank you Analog Man.
F=ma
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I'm wondering what the PRA is for the launch next week. Somebody must have a calculation.
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Since you're on the loop sir - Why is the RSB closed at 15 percent?
F=ma
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Crossposted in a Starship/BFS thread. I missed this in 2011.
https://www.npr.org/2011/03/04/134265291/early-space-shuttle-flights-riskier-than-estimated
"A retrospective risk analysis by the Space Shuttle Safety and Mission Assurance Office finds that the first nine shuttle flights had a 1 in 9 chance of catastrophic failure — 10 times the risk of flights today."
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The question was: "Since you're on the loop sir - Why is the RSB closed at 15 percent?"
At about 15% open, the speedbrake generated no more drag (its purpose) than at 0%. At settings above 15% the speedbrake generated increasingly more drag. Settings above about 50% could degrade the rudder effectiveness and thus handling qualities during aerodynamic flight.
As a side note, the rudder/speedbrake was aerodynamically blanked at high angles of attack so for most of the hypersonic part of entry when alpha was held at 40deg (+/-2) it did not matter. Only after alpha ramped down (starting about M=8) did the RSB get into the airflow and become a useful control surface.
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Thank you for this insight Mr. Hale!
F=ma
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One of the reasons I revere this site is the signal to noise ratio and the quality of the people providing input.
We are fortunate to have you here Mr. Hale.
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New post from Mr. Hale:
The Changing of the Guard
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2020/09/02/the-changing-of-the-guard/ (https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2020/09/02/the-changing-of-the-guard/)
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New post from Mr. Hale:
The Changing of the Guard
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2020/09/02/the-changing-of-the-guard/ (https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2020/09/02/the-changing-of-the-guard/)
I had the pleasure of meeting Wayne Hale at the Presidential Commission on the Future of Human Spaceflight back in 2009 at the Cocoa Beach Hilton. We had an extended conversation about the future of the ISS post-shuttle and other things before the meeting started. After the session, he held a round table discussion with several of us NASASpaceflight members before he went out to dinner with Norm Augustine, Chair of the Commission. He was most generous with his time and enthusiastic about the future of human spaceflight. I am an avid follower of his blog, and mentioned to him that I had posted on his blog site.
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Another blog post is out from Mr. Hale.
"So, grasshopper, what can we learn? I have a few lessons and you may be able to glean more."
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2020/12/02/exploding-stovepipes/ (https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2020/12/02/exploding-stovepipes/)
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#2 really resonates with me: "... most failures occur at the interfaces – technical and organizational."
F=ma
Another blog post is out from Mr. Hale.
"So, grasshopper, what can we learn? I have a few lessons and you may be able to glean more."
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2020/12/02/exploding-stovepipes/ (https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2020/12/02/exploding-stovepipes/)
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New post about main engine controllers: https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2021/11/29/main-engine-controllers/
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New blog post about orbital debris https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2021/11/30/everything-i-know-about-orbital-debris-almost/
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STS-108: https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2021/12/09/sts-108/
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Flying New Spacecraft: https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2022/01/05/flying-new-spacecraft/
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Flying New Spacecraft: https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2022/01/05/flying-new-spacecraft/
Love it!
Returning to the propulsion area, during the very first firing of the Orbital Maneuvering System engines a pressure measurement on the inlet of one engine showed a small uptick during the burn. Not enough to cause problems but a funny thing nonetheless. A young back room flight controller on the next shift caught that uptick and kept the data. After the flight he made a presentation to the Orbiter Project manager asking that the fuel line into that engine be inspected – a nontrivial task. After some discussion (a story for another day), the inspection was ordered, and the remains of a plastic bag were found on the filter to the inlet of the engine. Not a good thing. I knew that young flight controller well and wound up working for him later in my career. I hear he’s still working actively at SpaceX; his name is Bill. By the way, those OMS engines are stored for use as the main spacecraft engine for the upcoming Orion missions. Hope we cleaned out those lines well.
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New non-space related blog article: https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2022/04/09/wars-and-rumors-of-wars/
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Don't know if this is mentioned in the thread, but here's Wayne giving Lec 18 | MIT 16.885J Aircraft Systems Engineering, Fall 2005
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FB0pyYTs2mw&t=1s&ab_channel=MITOpenCourseWare (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FB0pyYTs2mw&t=1s&ab_channel=MITOpenCourseWare)
The entire course is pure 100% sugar candy to anyone interested in spaceflight.
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Full circle back to NSF! :)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YxtySvM3iRE
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The View from Mt. Nebo: https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2022/12/30/the-view-from-mt-nebo/
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Another Wayne Hale blog installment. "Lessons Not To Be Forgotten". Tis Remembrance time at NASA.
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2023/01/14/lessons-not-to-be-forgotten/
Edit:title correction
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Another entry of Wayne Hale's Blog.
"Due Consideration"
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2023/04/12/due-consideration/
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Trying to be funny like that today would get them and the NASA Administrator fired and result in Congressional and likely DoJ investigations for civil rights violations... https://twitter.com/waynehale/status/1670553749494935554
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Trying to be funny like that today would get them and the NASA Administrator fired and result in Congressional and likely DoJ investigations for civil rights violations... https://twitter.com/waynehale/status/1670553749494935554
Depends on whether that's a nickname with a story behind it and Sally Ride in on the joke, or something despised but stemming from the culture of the time (with any raised voices risking being accused of 'rocking the boat' 'not being a team player' etc). Statistically, the latter is more likely to be the case, even today.
Asking Sally Ride herself may clarify, possibly with an amusing story if there is one behind it.
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Trying to be funny like that today would get them and the NASA Administrator fired and result in Congressional and likely DoJ investigations for civil rights violations... https://twitter.com/waynehale/status/1670553749494935554
Depends on whether that's a nickname with a story behind it and Sally Ride in on the joke, or something despised but stemming from the culture of the time (with any raised voices risking being accused of 'rocking the boat' 'not being a team player' etc). Statistically, the latter is more likely to be the case, even today.
Asking Sally Ride herself may clarify, possibly with an amusing story if there is one behind it.
Emphasis mine.
That might be a bit of a problem for us mortals here on Earth...
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https://twitter.com/waynehale/status/1670553749494935554
Depends on whether that's a nickname with a story behind it and Sally Ride in on the joke, or something despised but stemming from the culture of the time (with any raised voices risking being accused of 'rocking the boat' 'not being a team player' etc). Statistically, the latter is more likely to be the case, even today.
Asking Sally Ride herself may clarify, possibly with an amusing story if there is one behind it.
Emphasis mine.
That might be a bit of a problem for us mortals here on Earth...
I suspect the joke refers to the press and public's interest in Sally, as the first American woman astronaut in space, to the exclusion of the rest of the crew.
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Another installment of Wayne Hale's blog, "Reading the Pads"
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2023/10/07/reading-the-pads/
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https://twitter.com/waynehale/status/1732530964490850687
New blog post up:
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2023/12/06/protecting-the-bird-sanctuary/
Protecting the Bird Sanctuary
SPACE SHUTTLE FLIGHT RULE A2-62 ET FOOTPRINT CRITERIA
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https://twitter.com/waynehale/status/1733549922018853201
A second blog post this week! Heavens!
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2023/12/09/flight-delay/
Flight Delay
A few days ago, I wrote about ‘Protecting the Bird Sanctuary’. I hope you read it.
Because I told you that story just to be able to tell this one.
I put this story in the ‘mostly true’ category – I was the Ascent Flight Director and can attest to my end of it. But the real story belongs to NASA Astronaut Richard N. “Dick” Richards.
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Another entry with the subject being the: Von Braun Symposium speech Oct. 29, 2015
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2015/11/04/von-braun-symposium-speech-oct-29-2015/
This speech held up pretty well over the years. It's also a good reminder where the "Piper Cubs" analogy actually comes from.
"Remember this: in exploration it is very important to keep safety always in our plans. But in exploration, safety is not the most important thing. In exploration, the most important thing is to actually go.": Yep.
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https://twitter.com/waynehale/status/1745221447708995879
New Blog Post about safety:
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2024/01/10/the-most-important-thing/
The Most Important Thing
I have a good friend who flew helicopters in combat for the US Army.
His number one rule is “Don’t Do Stupid.”
...
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Another installment of Wayne Hale's Blog, entitled "Terminal Count"
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2024/02/17/terminal-count/
I always knew that once the PAO announced that they were "into the 'terminal count'" good things were about to happen.
attachment
1) "A young Flight Director(Mr Hale) on console with the SOO7 document open on the console shelf – red binder."
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Putting Atlantis At Risk
https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2024/03/10/putting-atlantis-at-risk/?fbclid=IwAR3fxMCAza78bstZmD9t5OL87En9PAp8ibp_KyYjPyOQ68_lOZcZalPYCQc