We can either embrace the horror and get what we get, or shelve it all for another promise of a cheaper launch vehicle (which will just add to the total bill).
https://www.logicallyfallacious.com/tools/lp/Bo/LogicalFallacies/173/Sunk-Cost-Fallacy
What is spent is spent, we cannot get it back. But we are not done shelving out money for SLS. Not even close.
... many of the woes of the SLS program were born out of the chaos that the program emerged from, and I think the IG report fails to adequately highlight those factors. From 2008 to 2010 the constellation program continued development in an environment where, depending on who they listened to (both within and external to the agency), they were either cancelled and going away, or legally required to continue their work.
The post-augustine plan that emerged from the administration appeared to be sufficiently unresponsive to the commission's recommendations
when Neil Armstrong engaged along with Cernan, Stafford, and others, and heck even Neil DeGrasse Tyson was criticizing the Obama admin plan, it got the attention of a lot of members who normally wouldn't really care.
As confirmation of their fears the budget that came out of OMB bared no resemblance to the funding profile the programs needed and submitted.
Of course congress gets and deserves plenty of blame, if for no other reason, because the government was operating on CRs for large parts of every year. Which meant the programs were stuck carrying two sets of books and at least three plans for the years they were already into executing - one plan to the administration's budget, another to the numbers they knew they needed, and a third set of plans for numbers they were expecting to get from congress.
... can you imagine trying to effectively manage a program in the policy environment from the past decade or so? While it doesn't excuse it, it certainly helps explain situations like the mutli-year undefinitized contract for the core stage.
There's plenty of blame to go around - NASA and contractor program mismanagement, the white house, OMB, congress, etc. But the IG report sorely missed some of the "big picture" factors that contributed to the mess, and many messes before it.
It wouldn't really matter. Those who run the show call the shots.
We can either embrace the horror and get what we get, or shelve it all for another promise of a cheaper launch vehicle (which will just add to the total bill). ..
... they couldn't pull earned value figures on bi-weekly or even monthly basis.
The Augustine report basically said either change what you're doing or boost the overall NASA budget by several billion dollars per year if you want to stay the course on Constellation.The Obama Administration chose to change what they were doing. That did not satisfy some, but it was very responsive to the Augustine report.Congress chose to keep the bulk of Constellation going with no budget boost. That was not a recommendation or even an option in the Augustine report, and therefore, unresponsive to the Augustine report.
Quote from: robertross on 10/24/2018 11:00 pmIt wouldn't really matter. Those who run the show call the shots.Are you talking about Boeing?QuoteWe can either embrace the horror and get what we get, or shelve it all for another promise of a cheaper launch vehicle (which will just add to the total bill). ..I am horrified at Boeing's product and management, hope we don't "get what we get" from them, but disagree a change of course couldn't improve the situation.My primary question is "who owns the test data" done on the 22ft barrels and welding? That's about the only thing worthwhile from the entire contract since the manufacturing building may be inadequate and even the jigs are crooked.
You go back through history and you see the same mistakes made over and over. How many IG reports have been done wrt NASA (in this respect - not talking about other departments due to thread constraints, but look at DND for more clues: F22, F35, carriers...). Those same failings have been consistently repeated. Lack of management, mismanagement of funds, schedule out of control, costs out of control. A more recent one is the IG report on JWST as a reminder how wide spread the problem is.
Quote from: robertross on 10/26/2018 02:33 amYou go back through history and you see the same mistakes made over and over. How many IG reports have been done wrt NASA (in this respect - not talking about other departments due to thread constraints, but look at DND for more clues: F22, F35, carriers...). Those same failings have been consistently repeated. Lack of management, mismanagement of funds, schedule out of control, costs out of control. A more recent one is the IG report on JWST as a reminder how wide spread the problem is.Yes, military procurement is just as broken as NASA's is. A famous president once warned about the "military industrial complex". (alternatively the space industrial complex) If he could see how bad things have gotten, the term "spinning in his grave" would certainly apply. We are reaching the natural endpoint of such a system. We pay more and more to get less and less.Thankfully we have several disruptors out there. But the old boys are fighting back, in all sorts of ways. Don't carry water for them.
A couple of points: Eisenhower had originally intended to say "military industrial congressional complex." He was talked out of including "congressional" in his speech.
could you please explain what earned-value figures are in this context?
And then Congress commissioned the NRC report, which, dutifully assuming that SLS was sacrosanct, also concluded that NASA is going nowhere without more money. And Congress ignored that too!
I'm so glad you're here and posting UltraViolet9. I try to like every one of your posts[1]. The views on how the sausage is actually made are awesome....
I'll present one minor critique, which is that just giving the Wikipedia link for Earned Value might be asking a lot of your readers. That is a very dense article with a lot of info. If you don't already have a project management background, it might be a bit much to take on board.I'd define earned value in the project management context as the notion that you should have some idea what tasks are in your project, and what each task is worth to you (by some set of metrics), and you should be collecting progress and completion on your tasks. Armed with this you can determine if your project is on track, not just from time, but also from budget.
I'll present one minor critique, which is that just giving the Wikipedia link for Earned Value might be asking a lot of your readers. That is a very dense article with a lot of info. If you don't already have a project management background, it might be a bit much to take on board.
It's also possible to be behind on value (less accomplished) but over budget. That's usually a really bad sign that your project is going to crater, and probably should be cancelled or extensively reorganized.This is the situation that SLS (probably) is in... but we don't know for sure because crappy management at the PM level and at the executive level.
Congress will use the old stand-by excuse of "maintaining the industrial base"...
Quote from: Lar on 10/26/2018 02:22 pmI'll present one minor critique, which is that just giving the Wikipedia link for Earned Value might be asking a lot of your readers. That is a very dense article with a lot of info. If you don't already have a project management background, it might be a bit much to take on board.No worries. Appreciate the assist.
Quote from: Rocket Science on 10/26/2018 04:43 pmCongress will use the old stand-by excuse of "maintaining the industrial base"...There are several arguments to that:1) The US launch industry base is thriving. Even in the most demanding area of heavy lift, the nation has two existing operational heavy launchers from two different domestic providers, and four more heavy launchers from three different domestic providers that are in various stages of design and development. 2) If we are serious about deep space exploration with humans, then the US human space flight base needs to reorient from ETO and Earth orbit towards deep space. JSC mission expertise is needed most on long-duration mission, lander, and surface stages, not ETO capsules. MSFC liquid engine expertise is most needed on transfer stages, not ETO launchers. KSC cryogenic expertise is most needed on long-duration propellant storage in space, not fueling ETO launchers. LaRC entry and descent expertise is most needed for bigger landers at Mars, not capsules in Earth's atmosphere. GRC at some point needs to develop and test some deep space power sources at an appropriate scale. There are scores of things that the NASA HSF workforce and budget need to do if we're serious about deep space exploration with humans and could do if so much talent and money wasn't being expended on SLS and Orion.3) If by "industrial base", we mean "military industrial base", that is not in NASA's charter and is a fool's errand anyway when we compare the size of NASA's budget to the DOD budget. For example, if we need to maintain the solid rocket base for future Minuteman replacements, then DOD should give NG/ATK a contract to build Minuteman replacements, not rely on NASA to maintain that capability through the SRBs.
All great arguments, but that won't stop them playing the card...
What's the betting the the OIG's report will even get a mention in congressional hearings? That any action will be taken as a result in, say, the next year?
Quote from: Proponent on 10/26/2018 08:18 pmWhat's the betting the the OIG's report will even get a mention in congressional hearings? That any action will be taken as a result in, say, the next year?In fairness to Congress, there's an election in less than two weeks, the remaining lame duck session will last until December/January, and the new Congress won't really get rolling until February/March.