Author Topic: OIG report on NASA management of Boeing SLS contract  (Read 64794 times)

Offline Lars-J

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Re: OIG report on NASA management of Boeing SLS contract
« Reply #200 on: 10/24/2018 11:23 pm »
We can either embrace the horror and get what we get, or shelve it all for another promise of a cheaper launch vehicle (which will just add to the total bill).

https://www.logicallyfallacious.com/tools/lp/Bo/LogicalFallacies/173/Sunk-Cost-Fallacy

What is spent is spent, we cannot get it back. But we are not done shelving out money for SLS. Not even close.

Offline john smith 19

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Re: OIG report on NASA management of Boeing SLS contract
« Reply #201 on: 10/25/2018 06:32 am »
https://www.logicallyfallacious.com/tools/lp/Bo/LogicalFallacies/173/Sunk-Cost-Fallacy
I like that example.

The $1000 spent is the cost of discovering that investing any more in that plan is a waste of money. That money is spent, but it is well spent. If it saved a company spending $10m I'd call it peanuts. Now what to spend it on instead? That's much more open ended (and hence much harder to answer).

Quote from: Lars-J
What is spent is spent, we cannot get it back. But we are not done shelving out money for SLS. Not even close.
Correct, and it's not Government money, it's taxpayers money.

Which so far has produced remarkably little for what's been spent (I'm not sure how well it qualifies as an "investment").
MCT ITS BFR SS. The worlds first Methane fueled FFSC engined CFRP SS structure A380 sized aerospaceplane tail sitter capable of Earth & Mars atmospheric flight.First flight to Mars by end of 2022 TBC. T&C apply. Trust nothing. Run your own #s "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof" R. Simberg."Competitve" means cheaper ¬cheap SCramjet proposed 1956. First +ve thrust 2004. US R&D spend to date > $10Bn. #deployed designs. Zero.

Offline UltraViolet9

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Re: OIG report on NASA management of Boeing SLS contract
« Reply #202 on: 10/25/2018 08:16 pm »
... many of the woes of the SLS program were born out of the chaos that the program emerged from, and I think the IG report fails to adequately highlight those factors.

From 2008 to 2010 the constellation program continued development in an environment where, depending on who they listened to (both within and external to the agency), they were either cancelled and going away, or legally required to continue their work.

While well-intentioned, I don't think anyone should buy into this line of reasoning.  Constellation was broken.  NASA and its Constellation contractors were given a golden opportunity to fix that with SLS and Orion.  They've had over half a decade to do so.  And they have not.

Fool me once.  Shame on you.  Fool me twice.  Shame on me.

And to be brutally honest, this goes back further than Constellation.  Many of the same actors (JSC/MSFC, Boeing as prime, Gerst as manager, etc.) were present and running ISS during its development.  I personally lived through a $5 billion overrun on that program that they decided to pass along at the beginning of the Bush II Administration.  Not a good way to start with a new White House.  Even after we terminated the hab, centrifuge, CRV, and transhab to get the program back in the box, they didn't get the message.  I visited the program office at JSC, and they couldn't pull earned value figures on bi-weekly or even monthly basis.  Unreal.

And they still have not learned their lessons.  Based on this IG report, no one at NASA has been tracking separate costs for the Core and EUS for years.  Why isn't Gerst getting (or why isn't he demanding) at least a 30-minute briefing every couple weeks that breaks down spending trends for each major SLS component against plan?  Again, unreal.

NASA HSF needs to get some program management and leadership with proven aerospace development experience.  That doesn't mean that NASA's institutional and operational experience with HSF gets thrown out the window.  But they need some people in charge who know how things get built, not just how to fly them.

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The post-augustine plan that emerged from the administration appeared to be sufficiently unresponsive to the commission's recommendations

The Augustine report basically said either change what you're doing or boost the overall NASA budget by several billion dollars per year if you want to stay the course on Constellation.

The Obama Administration chose to change what they were doing.  That did not satisfy some, but it was very responsive to the Augustine report.

Congress chose to keep the bulk of Constellation going with no budget boost.  That was not a recommendation or even an option in the Augustine report, and therefore, unresponsive to the Augustine report.

This is not unusual in Washington.  Much well-intentioned and thoughtful advice from smart experienced people, even when asked for, gets shelved and ignored.

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when Neil Armstrong engaged along with Cernan, Stafford, and others, and heck even Neil DeGrasse Tyson was criticizing the Obama admin plan, it got the attention of a lot of members who normally wouldn't really care.

As much as I respect their space flight achievements, when a development program like Constellation has to rely on long-retired astronauts with little or no development management experience (and a celebrity scientist to boot) to defend itself, the problem is with the program, not those trying to right the ship.

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As confirmation of their fears the budget that came out of OMB bared no resemblance to the funding profile the programs needed and submitted.

We don't know that.  Agency budget submissions to OMB are embargoed.  We don't know what budget estimates the NASA OCFO sends to OMB on behalf of the Administrator each fiscal year.

When someone claims that they know what the budget submission is, we don't know where their figures come from.  For example, a project manager or center director at a field center talking to congressional staff from his district or state doesn't have the whole picture.  He or she may submit pieces of the SLS or Orion budgets, but they don't necessarily know what deltas were made by the SLS and Orion program managers to their budget requests after the project and center submissions were made.  Similarly, moving up the chain, the SLS and Orion program managers don't necessarily know what deltas were made by the HEOMD AA after they submitted their budget requests to HQ.  And the HEOMD AA may not know what deltas the NASA Administrator made to their budget request until he or she is asked to brief OMB.

In short, anyone high enough in NASA or the Administration to have the full and accurate picture of the agency's annual budget submission to OMB is unlikely to share it with Congress.  They know better regarding budget embargo rules and understand that they exist to keep the Administration's deliberations as free of political influence (like from Congress) as possible.  And anyone who doesn't understand those rules and is foolish enough to risk their career broaching them is probably too low on the totem pole to have a full and accurate picture of NASA's annual budget submission to OMB.

All we can say for certain is that the President's annual budget submission for fiscal years 2011 thru 2013 did not match the 2010 NASA Authorization Act.  Absent other information, to blame OMB or the WH for that doesn't make a lot of sense.  First off, there is the separation of powers between executive and legislative.  The President proposes and Congress disposes, and figures from one do not represent a commitment by the other.  They are supposed to differ and compromises made or vetoes exercised as the founders envisioned.  Second, where did the figures in the 2010 NASA Authorization Act come from?  Did NASA submit an official budget to Congress that was carefully worked up the program and HQ chain and reviewed by OMB and the WH?  (Obviously not.)  Or did some industry lobbyists or center managers offer some best guesses to congressional staff off-the-record?

Without concretely knowing where Congress got its figures from, I'd be inclined to believe the figures in the President's annual budget requests over the 2010 NASA Authorization Act.  The former have been put through a level of review and rigor that the latter have not and probably represent more accurate costs for these programs had they been managed well by NASA and its contractors, which we know, from multiple GAO and OIG reports, they have not.

At the political level, could the WH have been deflating SLS and Orion figures because it was not a high budget priority for them?  Possibly, but there's no way to know, and it's within their rights and responsibilities to do so anyway.  Did OMB career staff do so?  Unlikely in my experience.  Once the decision has been made to pursue a program, staff do their best to fund it appropriately.  That's where the "M" (Management) in OMB comes in.

And on a final note, the President's budget marks for SLS and Orion have not really mattered anyway.  Congress appropriated way above those marks.  If anything, it shows that shoveling more money at NASA HSF programs does not solve their institutional management, contracting, and accounting problems.  The fat seems to just maintain or encourage more sloppiness and lack of attention.  At the very least, NASA would have had an incentive to be a lot more circumspect with Boeing's award fees had the budget been tighter.

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Of course congress gets and deserves plenty of blame, if for no other reason, because the government was operating on CRs for large parts of every year.  Which meant the programs were stuck carrying two sets of books and at least three plans for the years they were already into executing - one plan to the administration's budget, another to the numbers they knew they needed, and a third set of plans for numbers they were expecting to get from congress.

This is a bigger issue in my experience.  But it's not about accounting.  Capital-intensive development projects like NASA's (or DOD's) have a natural, ideal spending curve that ramps up as the project hits peak activity and employment and then ramps down as the hardware/software comes together, employment falls off, and the project transitions out of development.  Do violence to that spending curve -- via CRs, flat funding, etc. -- and you should expect pieces of the project to be out-of-phase with each other, marching armies to stick around longer than necessary, and other problems to emerge that cost time and money and potentially capability or reliability.
 
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... can you imagine trying to effectively manage a program in the policy environment from the past decade or so?  While it doesn't excuse it, it certainly helps explain situations like the mutli-year undefinitized contract for the core stage.

It doesn't explain it.  In 2010, there was a tug-of-war between the executive and legislative over the fiscal year 2011 budget.  That largely ended in mid-October when the President signed the 2010 NASA Authorization Act.  CRs probably delayed appropriations a while longer.  (I dont' recall off the top of my head.)  That means by winter 2010/spring 2011, NASA had program authority and budget to go execute SLS and MPCV (later Orion).  Yet NASA and Boeing did not sign the contract for the core until July 2014 -- over three years later.  Even if NASA and Boeing didn't spend 2010 negotiating, drafting, and getting contracts ready to go, three years is just a ridiculous amount of time to renegotiate and redraft a contract (Constellation or otherwise) and an unconscionable amount of time to leave a contract undefinitized.

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There's plenty of blame to go around - NASA and contractor program mismanagement, the white house, OMB, congress, etc.  But the IG report sorely missed some of the "big picture" factors that contributed to the mess, and many messes before it.

The NASA Inspector General is appointed by the President to watch for waste, fraud, and abuse at NASA.  Even if the issues on SLS and Orion were no fault of Boeing and NASA (and they obviously are), it's not in the NASA IG's purview to go critique other government institutions.  They have their own IGs and watchdogs.

Moreover, NASA has an opportunity to respond to the findings and recommendations in an IG (or GAO) report.  If it was true that NASA had no clear program authority and budget for multiple years or that SLS received only some fraction of the budget it needed or if CRs explain the multiple years of delays on SLS, NASA management could (and should) have stated so and defended themselves and their contractor.  They did not.  That should tell us something about where the blame lies and where fixes need to be made.

Hope this helps.
« Last Edit: 10/26/2018 06:37 pm by UltraViolet9 »

Offline Propylox

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Re: OIG report on NASA management of Boeing SLS contract
« Reply #203 on: 10/26/2018 02:09 am »
It wouldn't really matter. Those who run the show call the shots.
Are you talking about Boeing?
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We can either embrace the horror and get what we get, or shelve it all for another promise of a cheaper launch vehicle (which will just add to the total bill). ..
I am horrified at Boeing's product and management, hope we don't "get what we get" from them, but disagree a change of course couldn't improve the situation.

My primary question is "who owns the test data" done on the 22ft barrels and welding? That's about the only thing worthwhile from the entire contract since the manufacturing building may be inadequate and even the jigs are crooked.

Offline Proponent

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Re: OIG report on NASA management of Boeing SLS contract
« Reply #204 on: 10/26/2018 02:13 am »
... they couldn't pull earned value figures on bi-weekly or even monthly basis.

For naifs such as myself, could you please explain what earned-value figures are in this context?

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The Augustine report basically said either change what you're doing or boost the overall NASA budget by several billion dollars per year if you want to stay the course on Constellation.

The Obama Administration chose to change what they were doing.  That did not satisfy some, but it was very responsive to the Augustine report.

Congress chose to keep the bulk of Constellation going with no budget boost.  That was not a recommendation or even an option in the Augustine report, and therefore, unresponsive to the Augustine report.

And then Congress commissioned the NRC report, which, dutifully assuming that SLS was sacrosanct, also concluded that NASA is going nowhere without more money.  And Congress ignored that too!

Online robertross

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Re: OIG report on NASA management of Boeing SLS contract
« Reply #205 on: 10/26/2018 02:33 am »
It wouldn't really matter. Those who run the show call the shots.
Are you talking about Boeing?
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We can either embrace the horror and get what we get, or shelve it all for another promise of a cheaper launch vehicle (which will just add to the total bill). ..
I am horrified at Boeing's product and management, hope we don't "get what we get" from them, but disagree a change of course couldn't improve the situation.

My primary question is "who owns the test data" done on the 22ft barrels and welding? That's about the only thing worthwhile from the entire contract since the manufacturing building may be inadequate and even the jigs are crooked.

No, I'm talking about the politicians, who are (essentially) bought by big business. They know of the problems, but choose to ignore them because of jobs, re-election, and power - all of which involves greasing the money machine which put them there (and keeps them there).

You go back through history and you see the same mistakes made over and over. How many IG reports have been done wrt NASA (in this respect - not talking about other departments due to thread constraints, but look at DND for more clues: F22, F35, carriers...). Those same failings have been consistently repeated. Lack of management, mismanagement of funds, schedule out of control, costs out of control. A more recent one is the IG report on JWST as a reminder how wide spread the problem is.

Anyway, such is the state of our 'industrialized' economy and (so-called) 'democracy'.

Offline Lars-J

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Re: OIG report on NASA management of Boeing SLS contract
« Reply #206 on: 10/26/2018 03:30 am »
You go back through history and you see the same mistakes made over and over. How many IG reports have been done wrt NASA (in this respect - not talking about other departments due to thread constraints, but look at DND for more clues: F22, F35, carriers...). Those same failings have been consistently repeated. Lack of management, mismanagement of funds, schedule out of control, costs out of control. A more recent one is the IG report on JWST as a reminder how wide spread the problem is.

Yes, military procurement is just as broken as NASA's is. A famous president once warned about the "military industrial complex". (alternatively the space industrial complex)  If he could see how bad things have gotten, the term "spinning in his grave" would certainly apply. We are reaching the natural endpoint of such a system. We pay more and more to get less and less.

Thankfully we have several disruptors out there. But the old boys are fighting back, in all sorts of ways. Don't carry water for them.
« Last Edit: 10/26/2018 03:32 am by Lars-J »

Offline Eric Hedman

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Re: OIG report on NASA management of Boeing SLS contract
« Reply #207 on: 10/26/2018 03:53 am »
You go back through history and you see the same mistakes made over and over. How many IG reports have been done wrt NASA (in this respect - not talking about other departments due to thread constraints, but look at DND for more clues: F22, F35, carriers...). Those same failings have been consistently repeated. Lack of management, mismanagement of funds, schedule out of control, costs out of control. A more recent one is the IG report on JWST as a reminder how wide spread the problem is.

Yes, military procurement is just as broken as NASA's is. A famous president once warned about the "military industrial complex". (alternatively the space industrial complex)  If he could see how bad things have gotten, the term "spinning in his grave" would certainly apply. We are reaching the natural endpoint of such a system. We pay more and more to get less and less.

Thankfully we have several disruptors out there. But the old boys are fighting back, in all sorts of ways. Don't carry water for them.
A couple of points: Eisenhower had originally intended to say "military industrial congressional complex."  He was talked out of including "congressional" in his speech.  On Aviation Week's website I remember a comment from an engineer who had worked on the F-35.  He said that a few weeks after Lockheed had won the F-35 development contract, the Air Force delivered new specs on what the variants of the aircraft were supposed to be capable of.  He said it was so different from the prototype that it was practically a new aircraft.  I suspect that the Air Force intentionally under specified what the F-35 was supposed to be able to do during the prototype through fly-off stage to get it through Congress and then changed it once the program was too far under way to cancel.  When these programs go off the rails. there are often many legitimate ways to point fingers.

Offline Lars-J

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Re: OIG report on NASA management of Boeing SLS contract
« Reply #208 on: 10/26/2018 06:35 am »
A couple of points: Eisenhower had originally intended to say "military industrial congressional complex."  He was talked out of including "congressional" in his speech.
Oh certainly. Congress is a critical part of the “military-industrial complex”, that has always been my understanding, and I think most people would agree. Congress, NASA/DoD, and Contractors all benefit from their arrangement to our detriment.

Offline UltraViolet9

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Re: OIG report on NASA management of Boeing SLS contract
« Reply #209 on: 10/26/2018 01:35 pm »
could you please explain what earned-value figures are in this context?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earned_value_management

Earned value management (EVM) is earned value management.  There's no unique context here requiring a different application in SLS or at NASA.

The SLS and Orion program managers should be getting weekly EVM reports on each of their program's major components, and HQ should be looking over their shoulder using the same reports on a bi-weekly or monthly basis.

Those reports should contain graphs like those in that wiki article.  They're a great warning signal of cost and schedule variances that threaten to drive a program off track.

EVM alone doesn't keep a program on track.  When a cost or schedule variance is emerging, good managers will then drill down to find out where the problem lies and address it.

But a good accounting system that pulls EVM figures on a frequent and regular basis and good program managers that pay attention to and act on those figures will head off a lot of problems on development projects. 

Some technical problems are obvious without EVM (like the tilted foundation for the SLS core weld structure), but other problems affecting cost and schedule are more subtle and hard to detect without EVM.

Managing development programs is like playing whack-a-mole.  Problems crop up and the manager's team's job is to go in and push them back down.  Managing development programs without EVM is like playing whack-a-mole blindfolded.  If a manager doesn't have a system to warn them where problems are cropping up, then they can't address those problems until it is too late to save cost and schedule.  At that point, you might as well not have a program manager and just pass along the cost and schedule overruns to the stakeholders, as has regularly happened on SLS, Orion, and ISS before them.

NASA may or may not be using EVM on SLS.  (They should be, but that's almost beside the point now.)  But what boggles my mind is that no one at NASA, from Gerst on down, was asking that SLS cost data (EVM or otherwise) be broken out for major components like the core and EUS.  That's like being the head contractor for a house build and not having separate budgets for the foundation and the frame.  How the heck are you supposed to know whether you're coming in on budget or not -- and where you're running over budget -- without that kind of breakdown?

That is an unfathomable and unconscionable dereliction of management duty (and just plain common sense) on NASA's part.  George Abbey was forced out of the JSC director's chair for similar issues on ISS.  While holding Boeing's feet to the fire on fee, team, renegotiation, and performance from here on, the current Administrator and WH should be making wholesale changes in the NASA management chain and structure for SLS.

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And then Congress commissioned the NRC report, which, dutifully assuming that SLS was sacrosanct, also concluded that NASA is going nowhere without more money.  And Congress ignored that too!

I've helped staff the NRC (but not during the time period of that study).

I've seen major decadal review recommendations get misinterpreted and missions started early that were supposed to be later in the decadal queue for no other reason than HQ staff couldn't read for comprehension and didn't bother to confirm their misguided interpretations.

I've then had my mid-decade study leads (who are experts from the relevant technical community volunteering their time) yelled at by the same HQ staff when those queuing errors were pointed out in a subsequent report.

Not a general indictment of NASA HQ staff (which I've also been.)  But another example that this stuff happens on independent advice reports.

« Last Edit: 10/26/2018 01:52 pm by UltraViolet9 »

Offline Lar

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Re: OIG report on NASA management of Boeing SLS contract
« Reply #210 on: 10/26/2018 02:22 pm »
I'm so glad you're here and posting UltraViolet9. I try to like every one of your posts[1]. The views on how the sausage is actually made are awesome....

I'll present one minor critique, which is that just giving the Wikipedia link for Earned Value might be asking a lot of your readers. That is a very dense article with a lot of info. If you don't already have a project management background, it might be a bit much to take on board.

I'd define earned value in the project management context as the notion that you should have some idea what tasks are in your project, and what each task is worth to you (by some set of metrics), and you should be collecting progress and completion on your tasks. Armed with this you can determine if your project is on track, not just from time, but also from budget.

It is possible for a project to be ahead (over) on value (has accomplished a lot) and behind (under) on budget (has spent less)... that's awesome, if it holds to the end you come in on time or early and under budget. This DOES happen, but it's rare.

It is possible to be ahead on value AND on budget (spent more than planned, got more done than planned)... this is something to worry about and track closely. Might still finish ok, but might not.

It's also possible to be behind on value but also behind on budget. That's not necessarily as bad as being over budget but it bodes poorly for completion on time.

It's also possible to be behind on value (less accomplished) but over budget. That's usually a really bad sign that your project is going to crater, and probably should be cancelled or extensively reorganized.

This is the situation that SLS (probably) is in... but we don't know for sure because crappy management at the PM level and at the executive level.

Feel free to correct me but that's my layman's take[2].

1 - this gets you exactly nothing except egoboo but it's worth doing. Handing out likes is free and easy

2 - I've been a project manager and even a program manager with several project managers reporting to me, I was in PMI for a while, I have a copy of the PMBOK.... but I fled back to being a techie

« Last Edit: 10/26/2018 02:25 pm by Lar »
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Offline Coastal Ron

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Re: OIG report on NASA management of Boeing SLS contract
« Reply #211 on: 10/26/2018 04:21 pm »
I'm so glad you're here and posting UltraViolet9. I try to like every one of your posts[1]. The views on how the sausage is actually made are awesome....

Completely agree. The hardware side of things is geeky, fun and important, but sometimes it's the money issues that determine the fate of a project or program.

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I'll present one minor critique, which is that just giving the Wikipedia link for Earned Value might be asking a lot of your readers. That is a very dense article with a lot of info. If you don't already have a project management background, it might be a bit much to take on board.

I'd define earned value in the project management context as the notion that you should have some idea what tasks are in your project, and what each task is worth to you (by some set of metrics), and you should be collecting progress and completion on your tasks. Armed with this you can determine if your project is on track, not just from time, but also from budget.

I'll add a little more perspective on why it's a head scratcher as to why large government contractors appear to be unable to provide such detail.

Back in the late 80's and early 90's I was a Operations Program Manager, which was the program manager within the manufacturing group. My focus was on tracking everything physical within a program, which went from authorizing parts procurement to watching the final product ship to the customer.

While there were MRP systems that handled the material requirements for manufacturing, enterprise resource planning (ERP) was not yet available. We would do Gantt and PERT charts for bidding and program kickoff, but only really large programs could afford to have the staff to maintain that level of data collection to keep them up to date and producing usable data. Instead we would do quarterly ETC's, or Estimates To Complete that relied on manually collected and collated snapshots of data that would be fed to our finance department so they could calculate where the program stood financially. You can see how imprecise such systems were.

Fast forward to today and every large manufacturing company uses modern systems to manage all aspects of the engineering, procurement and manufacturing process. And you know that those companies are tracking - to the penny - what their costs are, not only for purchased material but also the accumulated value for "work in process", which is product that has had work done in manufacturing. They have a pretty much realtime picture of where the program is at.

The SLS program is not the complex compared to it's total contract value.

For instance, the largest cruise ship in the world costs ~$1.4B, and can carry and keep busy up to 6,680 passenger for 7 nights. It took 2.5 years to build, and they only build them one at a time.

The SLS is big for a rocket, but otherwise it's a pretty simple design - the majority of it's bulk during manufacturing is taken up by empty space, and compared to a cruise ship the bill of materials is not that complex either. Even engineering-wise the costs can be rolled up quite easily, since there are distinct subassemblies that can be tracked.

Boeing knows how much they are spending on the SLS. They may not know how much more they need to do, but they will always know how much time and material they have expended on a monthly basis. They can't plead ignorance, otherwise they would have to admit incompetence.

But Boeing has playbooks to go by for shaping contract negotiations, and unfortunately Congress did not give NASA any negotiating power over Boeing, since Congress mandated Boeing as the contractor and did not mandate any total program cost numbers.

So the bottom line is that without mandated program cost goals, and without any leverage over the contractor, NASA has been in a poor negotiating position to shape and enforce the SLS contract. And so far Congress has not cared...
If we don't continuously lower the cost to access space, how are we ever going to afford to expand humanity out into space?

Offline UltraViolet9

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Re: OIG report on NASA management of Boeing SLS contract
« Reply #212 on: 10/26/2018 04:25 pm »
I'll present one minor critique, which is that just giving the Wikipedia link for Earned Value might be asking a lot of your readers. That is a very dense article with a lot of info. If you don't already have a project management background, it might be a bit much to take on board.

No worries.  Appreciate the assist.

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It's also possible to be behind on value (less accomplished) but over budget. That's usually a really bad sign that your project is going to crater, and probably should be cancelled or extensively reorganized.

This is the situation that SLS (probably) is in... but we don't know for sure because crappy management at the PM level and at the executive level.

Even without EVM data, just based on publicly available information, we now know that SLS is in this worst-of-all-worlds, being both behind on value and over budget. 

SLS is years behind schedule.  That means SLS is behind on value.

The SLS core is also running out of spending room on its current contract, forcing a return to an undefinitized contract, and renegotiation of a new contract with additional spending room.  That means SLS is over budget.

I keep refining my thinking on this, but to save SLS, I think two things need to happen:

1) The NASA side of the SLS leadership and program management chain needs to be replaced with experienced aerospace development managers.  I think this needs to start at HQ and HEOMD split into an operations directorate and a development and technology directorate.  The former would inherit ISS, CRS, and Soyuz and could still be led by Gerst.  The latter would take over SLS, Orion, CCDev, and whatever is going on with LOP-G, the small commercial lunar landers, and the current technology restructure.  This needs to flow down to the program and project management.  The current SLS managers can be retained in deputy and advisory positions so that NASA's institutional knowledge is not lost.  But proven aerospace development managers need to be brought in and put in charge of SLS.  And by put in charge, that means they report to the development and technology directorate at HQ, not to the directors of the centers where they are located.  Where necessary, these managers also need to bring in some proven procurement and accounting personnel that they can rely on.

2) The development and operations directorate, with the backing of the Administrator and WH as necessary, needs to give Boeing a choice.  Either Boeing sets aside their past and future fees (as NG offered on JWST) pending: a) acceptance of new and more detailed cost and other data reporting requirements, b) management changes at Boeing to A-team players; c) good faith contract renegotiations to get off the undefinitized contract as soon as possible, and d) technical/schedule/budget performance against the new contract from here on; or the current contracts are allowed to run out and NASA seeks other heavy lift solutions for its future needs.

Alternately, just based on the low safety thresholds for SLS (no better than STS), its incompetent launch rate, and the industrial landscape with multiple heavy lift providers existing or emerging, the Administrator and WH could make the case for termination now, one that actually could have been made years ago.  To satisfy Congress, this argument needs to include other clearly thought out projects (ideally deep space, not ETO) to keep NASA's HSF workforce occupied.

The case for termination is only stronger now that the gross mismanagement of SLS is coming into focus.  There's never been a solid case that the program was worth pursuing, but there is certainly a solid case now for cancelling it.

« Last Edit: 10/26/2018 05:46 pm by UltraViolet9 »

Offline Rocket Science

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Re: OIG report on NASA management of Boeing SLS contract
« Reply #213 on: 10/26/2018 04:43 pm »
Congress will use the old stand-by excuse of "maintaining the industrial base"...
"The laws of physics are unforgiving"
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Offline Lar

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Re: OIG report on NASA management of Boeing SLS contract
« Reply #214 on: 10/26/2018 05:48 pm »
Congress will use the old stand-by excuse of "maintaining the industrial base"...

This argument won't work with Congress but there's a path for solids available already, and the industrial base can otherwise be repurposed to do landers, habs, ECLSS, ISRU, surface equipment, etc etc....

I'll present one minor critique, which is that just giving the Wikipedia link for Earned Value might be asking a lot of your readers. That is a very dense article with a lot of info. If you don't already have a project management background, it might be a bit much to take on board.

No worries.  Appreciate the assist.
 
Happy to help. And the WP article IS a great resource. It's just a hard slog. But worth it if you have any interest in this at all...
« Last Edit: 10/26/2018 05:50 pm by Lar »
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Offline UltraViolet9

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Re: OIG report on NASA management of Boeing SLS contract
« Reply #215 on: 10/26/2018 06:15 pm »
Congress will use the old stand-by excuse of "maintaining the industrial base"...

There are several arguments to that:

1) The US launch industry base is thriving.  Even in the most demanding area of heavy lift, the nation has two existing operational heavy launchers from two different domestic providers, and four more heavy launchers from three different domestic providers that are in various stages of design and development.

2) If we are serious about deep space exploration with humans, then the US human space flight base needs to reorient from ETO and Earth orbit towards deep space.  JSC mission expertise is needed most on long-duration mission, lander, and surface stages, not ETO capsules.  MSFC liquid engine expertise is most needed on transfer stages, not ETO launchers.  KSC cryogenic expertise is most needed on long-duration propellant storage in space, not fueling ETO launchers.  LaRC entry and descent expertise is most needed for bigger landers at Mars, not capsules in Earth's atmosphere.  GRC at some point needs to develop and test some deep space power sources at an appropriate scale.  There are scores of things that the NASA HSF workforce and budget need to do if we're serious about deep space exploration with humans and could do if so much talent and money wasn't being expended on SLS and Orion.

3) If by "industrial base", we mean "military industrial base", that is not in NASA's charter and is a fool's errand anyway when we compare the size of NASA's budget to the DOD budget.  For example, if we need to maintain the solid rocket base for future Minuteman replacements, then DOD should give NG/ATK a contract to build Minuteman replacements, not rely on NASA to maintain that capability through the SRBs.


Offline Rocket Science

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Re: OIG report on NASA management of Boeing SLS contract
« Reply #216 on: 10/26/2018 06:18 pm »
Congress will use the old stand-by excuse of "maintaining the industrial base"...

There are several arguments to that:

1) The US launch industry base is thriving.  Even in the most demanding area of heavy lift, the nation has two existing operational heavy launchers from two different domestic providers, and four more heavy launchers from three different domestic providers that are in various stages of design and development.

2) If we are serious about deep space exploration with humans, then the US human space flight base needs to reorient from ETO and Earth orbit towards deep space.  JSC mission expertise is needed most on long-duration mission, lander, and surface stages, not ETO capsules.  MSFC liquid engine expertise is most needed on transfer stages, not ETO launchers.  KSC cryogenic expertise is most needed on long-duration propellant storage in space, not fueling ETO launchers.  LaRC entry and descent expertise is most needed for bigger landers at Mars, not capsules in Earth's atmosphere.  GRC at some point needs to develop and test some deep space power sources at an appropriate scale.  There are scores of things that the NASA HSF workforce and budget need to do if we're serious about deep space exploration with humans and could do if so much talent and money wasn't being expended on SLS and Orion.

3) If by "industrial base", we mean "military industrial base", that is not in NASA's charter and is a fool's errand anyway when we compare the size of NASA's budget to the DOD budget.  For example, if we need to maintain the solid rocket base for future Minuteman replacements, then DOD should give NG/ATK a contract to build Minuteman replacements, not rely on NASA to maintain that capability through the SRBs.
All great arguments, but that won't stop them playing the card...
"The laws of physics are unforgiving"
~Rob: Physics instructor, Aviator

Offline Proponent

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Re: OIG report on NASA management of Boeing SLS contract
« Reply #217 on: 10/26/2018 08:18 pm »
What's the betting the the OIG's report will even get a mention in congressional hearings?  That any action will be taken as a result in, say, the next year?  That such action would be more than window dressing?

Offline UltraViolet9

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Re: OIG report on NASA management of Boeing SLS contract
« Reply #218 on: 10/26/2018 09:51 pm »
All great arguments, but that won't stop them playing the card...

Of course, but a well-informed NASA Administrator with spine can make all the difference when Congress tries to play these cards.  He's the expert.  They're not.

What's the betting the the OIG's report will even get a mention in congressional hearings?  That any action will be taken as a result in, say, the next year?

In fairness to Congress, there's an election in less than two weeks, the remaining lame duck session will last until December/January, and the new Congress won't really get rolling until February/March.

That said, this kind of reform -- management structure, who sits in what positions, contract renegotiations -- really has to come from the executive branch.  It largely can't be legislated.

Given the existing culture and what we've seen so far, I would not expect much from HEOMD on down.

But an effective Administrator and WH would be knocking heads and making changes as the Bush II Administration did after they inherited a $5B overrun on ISS.  (That's why Abbey lost his center directorship and NASA got O'Keefe for Administrator.)  Not sure we have the right leadership in the Administrator's office or WH for that now.

Shannon's op-ed on the IG report showed up on the SpaceNews site.  He talks mostly about achievements from 50 years ago and popular films (?!) featuring astronauts instead of addressing the report.  When he does address the report, Shannon speaks in generalities and sweeps specifics under the rug when he should be humbly and directly explaining how Boeing has addressed each issue in the report and what Boeing is going to do beyond the report's recommendations to put and keep the SLS program on track.  Tone deaf, in my opinion, and exactly what Boeing does not need in terms of leadership on this program at this time.

https://spacenews.com/op-ed-a-bright-future-for-sls-production/

Boeing needs an experienced and proven development A-team on this program soon, or they're eventually going to lose it.  Shannon brings operational experience and knowledge of NASA HSF that Boeing should retain.  But based on the IG report and this op-ed, he should not be calling the shots on SLS anymore.
« Last Edit: 10/26/2018 10:52 pm by UltraViolet9 »

Offline Proponent

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Re: OIG report on NASA management of Boeing SLS contract
« Reply #219 on: 10/27/2018 05:10 am »
What's the betting the the OIG's report will even get a mention in congressional hearings?  That any action will be taken as a result in, say, the next year?

In fairness to Congress, there's an election in less than two weeks, the remaining lame duck session will last until December/January, and the new Congress won't really get rolling until February/March.

That's why I give them a year (I thought it was mighty generous of me!).

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