Getting around this OMS-E nozzle would be a piece of cake.
I have a bad feeling about this because Charles Canada was still critical of the decision. Is this the same heat shield from Artemis I?
Charles Camarda responds to the the Eric Berger article on Orion's heat shield.Quote from: Charles Camarda1/9/2026 1:48PM PT - https://www.linkedin.com/posts/charlescamarda_nasa-artemisheatshield-orionheatshield-activity-7415490596121067520-ZtzEMy response to Eric Berger:Sorry Eric, what you perceived were my feelings of "being disrespected" were actually feelings of outrage at what I was witnessing. Some of the exact same people responsible for failing to understand the shortcomings of the Crater Analysis tool (used tiny pieces of foam impacts to Shuttle tiles predict a strike from a piece of foam which was 6000 larger and which caused the Columbia Accident) were on the Artemis Tiger Team now claiming they could predict the outcome of the Orion heatshield using a tool (similar to CRATER) called the Crack Identification Tool (CIT) which was also not physics based and relied on predictions of the key paramenter, permeability, which they claim to be the "root" cause, pressure, to vary by three orders of magnitude (thats over 1000x). I guess the fact that the you, the Artemis Program Tiger Team and the IRT missed this minutiae and the fact that they were using this tool to predict failure and risk was not important to note. You also missed that the only person to create a true multiphysics analysis to try to predict spallation, Dr. Stephen Scotti, stated that his code could only predict cracking and not spallation and could not be used quantatively, only qualitatively (hopefully I dont have to explain to you what that means).The rage you witnessed was my observing the exact behaviors used to construct of risk and flight rationale which caused both Challenger and Columbia Accidents. Using "tools" inappropriately and then claiming results to be "Conservative." Not to mention the reliance on Monte Carlo simulations to predict failure probabilities which were also proven to be innacurate by orders of magnitude in my book "Mission Out of Control" which you claim to have read.I suggest, in the spirit of transparency, you should ask NASA to release just the "Findings" of NESC Report TI-23-01849 Volume I. Finding 1 states the analysis cannot accurately predict crack initiation and propagation at flight conditions. And there was so much more which was conveniently not presented.I hope Jared understands what a challenging job he will have trying to fix the culture at NASA. If those are the people he is relying on to keep our crews safe, our only hope is to have faith in God and pray. I hope Jared sees the issues and will have the courage to do what is necessary.Otherwise, a good attempt at "journalism."
1/9/2026 1:48PM PT - https://www.linkedin.com/posts/charlescamarda_nasa-artemisheatshield-orionheatshield-activity-7415490596121067520-ZtzEMy response to Eric Berger:Sorry Eric, what you perceived were my feelings of "being disrespected" were actually feelings of outrage at what I was witnessing. Some of the exact same people responsible for failing to understand the shortcomings of the Crater Analysis tool (used tiny pieces of foam impacts to Shuttle tiles predict a strike from a piece of foam which was 6000 larger and which caused the Columbia Accident) were on the Artemis Tiger Team now claiming they could predict the outcome of the Orion heatshield using a tool (similar to CRATER) called the Crack Identification Tool (CIT) which was also not physics based and relied on predictions of the key paramenter, permeability, which they claim to be the "root" cause, pressure, to vary by three orders of magnitude (thats over 1000x). I guess the fact that the you, the Artemis Program Tiger Team and the IRT missed this minutiae and the fact that they were using this tool to predict failure and risk was not important to note. You also missed that the only person to create a true multiphysics analysis to try to predict spallation, Dr. Stephen Scotti, stated that his code could only predict cracking and not spallation and could not be used quantatively, only qualitatively (hopefully I dont have to explain to you what that means).The rage you witnessed was my observing the exact behaviors used to construct of risk and flight rationale which caused both Challenger and Columbia Accidents. Using "tools" inappropriately and then claiming results to be "Conservative." Not to mention the reliance on Monte Carlo simulations to predict failure probabilities which were also proven to be innacurate by orders of magnitude in my book "Mission Out of Control" which you claim to have read.I suggest, in the spirit of transparency, you should ask NASA to release just the "Findings" of NESC Report TI-23-01849 Volume I. Finding 1 states the analysis cannot accurately predict crack initiation and propagation at flight conditions. And there was so much more which was conveniently not presented.I hope Jared understands what a challenging job he will have trying to fix the culture at NASA. If those are the people he is relying on to keep our crews safe, our only hope is to have faith in God and pray. I hope Jared sees the issues and will have the courage to do what is necessary.Otherwise, a good attempt at "journalism."
My hunch is that Orion will probably come home just fine, but NASA claims to be aiming for better safety than "probably", so NASA should get an independent team (I mean outside of NASA) with actual funding to investigate this.
His social skills leave something to be desired right now,
Quote from: deltaV on 01/10/2026 01:48 amHis social skills leave something to be desired right now, How so?
Quote from: Oberon_Command on 01/10/2026 03:08 amQuote from: deltaV on 01/10/2026 01:48 amHis social skills leave something to be desired right now, How so?"(hopefully I dont have to explain to you what that means)", "which you claim to have read", and "Otherwise, a good attempt at "journalism."" were undiplomatic, insulting Eric Berger for no reason.
He also claims there is "so much more which was conveniently not presented". I'm wondering how Camarda had so much more information if the agency is keeping him at arm's length.
Quote from: tigerdude9 on 01/09/2026 08:31 pmI have a bad feeling about this because Charles Canada was still critical of the decision. Is this the same heat shield from Artemis I?This is a new item, not reused, although it features the same design. The flight dynamics are being modified during reentry to prevent (or at least mitigate) this issue. This matter has been discussed earlier in this thread.Start here and proceed down to the end of the thread.https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=38410.msg2589059#msg2589059
Totally agree with taking risks and the importance of exploration. But when you do not even understand the “failure mechanism”, cannot predict failure quantatively by analysis/test correlation, and cannot even bound the problem; you cannot make unfounded claims like your results are “conservative” and your “operational workarounds” actually mitigate the problems. I was able to find major technical issues and false statements in a short 3-hour briefing presenting only the program side of the story and 1 day being allowed to review some of the technical issues that made me very troubled. I can prove how much the program does not know and how similar simplified analysis methods caused Challenger and Columbia. Only one retired research engineer attempted to develop a coupled full physics-based analysis and he could not predict spallation. If I had time, I would use AI to digest as much information as I was allowed to skim through and it would have given a much better risk posture and assessment of flight rationale than what is being foisted on the unknowing public. Not to mention that the very little we learn about the Heatshield on the Artemis II mission will be of very little use for Artemis III. We will be flying a different material system (porous AVCOAT), possibly a different trajectory, and who knows what else is different! And we are not even sure SLS will be part of the new Lunar architecture. So the question is, why do we have to have a crew? Or, more importantly was not having a crew even an option. There are other inexpensive ways to flight test without a crew.
Charlie, wrote a second article on his linkedin, on the nasa's orion heat shield deficiencies issue.https://x.com/CharlieCamarda/status/2011770140690468906?s=20QuoteTotally agree with taking risks and the importance of exploration. But when you do not even understand the “failure mechanism”, cannot predict failure quantatively by analysis/test correlation, and cannot even bound the problem; you cannot make unfounded claims like your results are “conservative” and your “operational workarounds” actually mitigate the problems. I was able to find major technical issues and false statements in a short 3-hour briefing presenting only the program side of the story and 1 day being allowed to review some of the technical issues that made me very troubled. I can prove how much the program does not know and how similar simplified analysis methods caused Challenger and Columbia. Only one retired research engineer attempted to develop a coupled full physics-based analysis and he could not predict spallation. If I had time, I would use AI to digest as much information as I was allowed to skim through and it would have given a much better risk posture and assessment of flight rationale than what is being foisted on the unknowing public. Not to mention that the very little we learn about the Heatshield on the Artemis II mission will be of very little use for Artemis III. We will be flying a different material system (porous AVCOAT), possibly a different trajectory, and who knows what else is different! And we are not even sure SLS will be part of the new Lunar architecture. So the question is, why do we have to have a crew? Or, more importantly was not having a crew even an option. There are other inexpensive ways to flight test without a crew. I think, charlie , is right. We shouldnt fly crew on artemis II. The day and age of workarounds after 2 years of study are over. SpaceX showed that they can resolve issues in 6 months. Nasa, should have done the same.
Why didn"t NASA use a new THICKER heat shield ?
Excellent CNN article on the Artemis II heat shield decision. This is the best article I have seen in the general press and is a better overview than I have seen even in the more space-oriented press. https://www.cnn.com/2026/01/23/science/artemis-2-orion-capsule-heat-shield
NASA said in its Friday statement. And the adjusted return path is designed to create “a steeper descent angle to reduce exposure time at peak heating, thus minimizing further char loss.”“This thorough testing, analysis, simulation, and expert validation collectively formed NASA’s official flight rationale providing sufficient justification to proceed without redesigning the heat shield,” the statement reads.Other experts, however, disagree that changing Orion’s flight path is enough to guarantee that the crew will make it home safely.“The reason this is such a big deal is that when the heat shield is spalling — or you have big chunks coming off — even if the vehicle isn’t destroyed, you’re right at the point of incipient failure now,” said Dr. Dan Rasky, an expert on advanced entry systems and thermal protection materials who worked at NASA for more than 30 years.“It’s like you’re at the edge of the cliff on a foggy day,” Rasky said.Rasky, like Camarda, does not believe that NASA should allow astronauts to fly on board the Artemis II Orion capsule.
The link it a letter I wrote to NASA Administrator, Jared Isaacman. it was an impassioned plea to reverse couse, show true leadership and do what is necessary to return to a true research culture at NASA:
A Letter to NASA Administrator Jared IsaacmanSubject: Opportunity to Save Astronaut Lives, NASA, and the U.S. Space ProgramBy Dr. Charles CamardaI have slept very little since the Artemis heat shield meeting in Washington, D.C., on January 8, 2025. What I observed during that meeting was significantly worse than I had anticipated, even prior to receiving detailed information and relying only on my professional intuition, my background in research engineering, and more than fifteen years of study in organizational behavior and accident-causation mechanisms.My concerns were intensified by the extremely limited time available to review the NESC and IRT reports, followed by a three-hour data exchange that was largely framed and presented by the Artemis Program Tiger Team. These constraints prevented a truly independent technical assessment and reinforced organizational patterns I have seen repeatedly in the lead-up to past aerospace failures.More than three years ago, I formally requested a proper and truly independent external tiger team review—composed of researchers and scientists from NASA, government laboratories like Sandia, and academia. That request was denied by then-senior NASA Leadership. I therefore appreciate your decision to allow me to be briefed by the Artemis team this past Thursday.I am writing to provide you with this assessment because we are rapidly approaching the launch of Artemis II, and the technical and organizational issues associated with the Orion heat shield represent a serious risk.Based on the information available to me, I can state the following with high confidence:1. The Artemis Program does not understand the root cause or true failure mechanisms that led to heat shield spallation on Artemis I.The program cannot predict failure for even small arc-jet and radiant heating test samples (12- to 24-inch scale), let alone for the full-scale 16.5-foot diameter Orion heat shield because it is not using a validated, integrated multi-physics analysis.The Crack Indicator Tool (CIT), which has not been thoroughly reviewed and validated by external subject matter experts, is claimed to be physics-based and conservative. In my judgment, it is neither. Its predictive capability lies somewhere between the crude CRATER tool used to predict damage for the Columbia accident and the slightly betterMark Salita model used for the Challenger accident and may be inaccurate by orders of magnitude. As such, it cannot predict the true failure mechanism, which is most likely related to crack initiation, crack propagation, and other mechanisms that lead to spallation.If you cannot validate the failure mechanism , as stated above, you cannot predict with any certainty that the steps you claim will mitigate the problem (e.g., the trajectory modification) aren’t actually exacerbating the problem and/or causing other unintended consequences.2. Decision-making has relied on a single internally controlled narrative.The briefing and supporting material reflected almost exclusively the Artemis Program Tiger Team’s perspective. I place very little confidence in the IRT report, as it did not perform any independent analysis and did not even recognize or challenge the claim that root cause had been demonstrated through physics-based methods.3. NASA lacks sufficient independent multi-physics expertise applied to this problem.Only one individual at NASA conducted a true multi-physics analysis, he stated at the meeting for all to hear, that it was only qualitative and not able to predict the failure mechanism, spallation. Three years ago, I proposed forming a multidisciplinary team across Sandia and NASA centers to address this. That proposal was denied by NASA leadership.4. The NESC itself acknowledges how little is known about the true failure mechanism which is the first step in the flight rationale logic .NESC Finding 1 states:AVCOAT material response is dependent on time history of heating, sample dimensions, and manufacturing variability (e.g., local permeability/porosity, tamp planes) so its behavior cannot be characterized in ground testing to a degree that permits precise prediction of crack initiation and propagation at flight conditions.When the “technical” managers in the NESC and NASA HQ could not understand what I was telling them post Columbia, I had to simplify my message and give them some warning signs to calibrate the narrative they were hearing from their internal teams. I saw many signals of dysfunctional teams during that heatshield meeting in D.C. that were related to both Shuttle accidents and the inability to understand the true failure mechanism of both prior accidents and the 8R RCC wing leading edge anomaly during and following my mission as explained in Chapter 4 of my book1.<snip; paragraphs from his book about the shuttle accidents i couldnt cut@paste>ConclusionHistory shows accidents occur when organizations convince themselves they understand problems they do not. This issue exhibits the same patterns that preceded past catastrophes. NASA can still choose a different outcome. This is a defining moment which can set the tone for the transformation that is necessary. Every prior Administrator has passed on this opportunity!
