NASA Deep Space Network: updates and discussion

[russianhalo117]

I monitor the DSN network page fairly regularly (when it's up which is not as often lately) and I've rarely seen every dish at any site active. There are obviously high interest events--like Artemis, the India moon landing, etc that get lots of coverage and stress the steady state capacity but I haven't seen the network consistently "maxed out".  The diversion of assets for the small payloads on Artemis I sounds more like a management problem than a capacity issue.

note that the issues do not necessarily pertain to the dishes but rather the capacity of the rest of the infrastructure across the network and terrestrial and intersatellite relay capacity between the DSN ground stations to the end users location and vice versa. in a related note TDRS-4th gen was shelved to switch to commercial services and is now pushing the TDRSS network to near capacity.

[Hobbes-22]

I'd be surprised if that was the case. It's a lot easier to upgrade the terrestrial infrastructure of the DSN than it is to add antennas. With the modern internet, bandwidth from a DSN station to its end user should have grown by orders of magnitude in the last few decades.

The Ars Technica article links to an OIG report which indicates the antennas (or lack thereof) is the problem.

In 2010, NASA initiated the Deep Space Network Aperture Enhancement Project (DAEP) to provide upgrades and capacity expansion to ensure continued operation and meet new mission needs. The DAEP planned to build six new antennas to replace existing antennas, equip each new antenna with a 20 kW transmitter, and add six additional high power 80 kW transmitters.

NASA’s primary solution to address the DSN’s capacity issues is to construct additional antennas and make upgrades to existing infrastructure. However, the Agency’s efforts to complete the DAEP are behind schedule and over cost. As of the end of fiscal year 2022, NASA had only partially completed the first two phases of construction. Changes to the DAEP’s scope increased the expected costs from $419 million to $706 million, a 68 percent increase. Moreover, the Agency does not expect to have each of the three sites equipped with fully functional antennas until at least 2029, nearly 5 years behind schedule..

[deadman1204]

I'd be surprised if that was the case. It's a lot easier to upgrade the terrestrial infrastructure of the DSN than it is to add antennas. With the modern internet, bandwidth from a DSN station to its end user should have grown by orders of magnitude in the last few decades.

The Ars Technica article links to an OIG report which indicates the antennas (or lack thereof) is the problem.

In 2010, NASA initiated the Deep Space Network Aperture Enhancement Project (DAEP) to provide upgrades and capacity expansion to ensure continued operation and meet new mission needs. The DAEP planned to build six new antennas to replace existing antennas, equip each new antenna with a 20 kW transmitter, and add six additional high power 80 kW transmitters.

NASA’s primary solution to address the DSN’s capacity issues is to construct additional antennas and make upgrades to existing infrastructure. However, the Agency’s efforts to complete the DAEP are behind schedule and over cost. As of the end of fiscal year 2022, NASA had only partially completed the first two phases of construction. Changes to the DAEP’s scope increased the expected costs from $419 million to $706 million, a 68 percent increase. Moreover, the Agency does not expect to have each of the three sites equipped with fully functional antennas until at least 2029, nearly 5 years behind schedule..

Its alot easier to do alot of stuff with the funding.
Don't forget that ars article you quoted mentions that 15 years ago, the DSN had more funding than it has now. Which of course totally ignores inflation adjusted dollars. They had 250 million in 2010, and 200 million now. In inflation adjusted dollars, that 250 million is about 350 million today.

That means DSN has functionally had an almost 50% cut in the last 15 years.

[edzieba]

I monitor the DSN network page fairly regularly (when it's up which is not as often lately) and I've rarely seen every dish at any site active. There are obviously high interest events--like Artemis, the India moon landing, etc that get lots of coverage and stress the steady state capacity but I haven't seen the network consistently "maxed out".  The diversion of assets for the small payloads on Artemis I sounds more like a management problem than a capacity issue.  1 26m terminal at Canberra has been in almost constant contact with TDRS 7/8 since June while the Guam terminal is repaired.

The problem is that DSN users are clustered: Moon, Mars, ES L2, etc. Those are visible by one or at most two DSN sties at once, so the site(s) out of view cannot contribute to required capacity regardless of available capacity. This is exacerbated for out-of-plane mission (e.g. Voyager 2 can only talk to Canberra regardless of capacity at Goldstone or Madrid).

[Barley]

  1 26m terminal at Canberra has been in almost constant contact with TDRS 7/8 since June while the Guam terminal is repaired.

Is this supposed to be an example of egregious mismanagement?  Because using a steerable 26m dish instead of a COTS Earth station sure looks like it.

[jimvela]

  1 26m terminal at Canberra has been in almost constant contact with TDRS 7/8 since June while the Guam terminal is repaired.

Is this supposed to be an example of egregious mismanagement?  Because using a steerable 26m dish instead of a COTS Earth station sure looks like it.

My understanding is that DSN is augmenting TDRSS ground station coverage because the Guam TDRSS terminal is broken.  TDRSS-8 has been experiencing flight anomalies with its solar arrays, and this is having a significant impact on the overall network.  TDRSS-8's orbital postion makes the Canberra complex the only available complex that can provide replacement ground station coverage.  I'm not aware of a commercial alternative presently available.  My knowledge is limited, though- to be clear.

It's a good thing that DSN is able to backfill this capability that would otherwise have a significant impact on other NASA missions needing TDRSS coverage.

Should there be other lower cost ground stations for TDRSS?  Maybe.  But when you go down that path, you should also ask whether at some point commercial space network coverage might be a better or at least more affordable option for NASA missions.

It's a complex problem but I do not see any of this as a DSN issue.  It's NASA not being up to speed as commercial capabilities have caught up and potentially exceed in some ways what legacy networks can do on a cost per capability basis.

[Blackstar]

It's a complex problem but I do not see any of this as a DSN issue.  It's NASA not being up to speed as commercial capabilities have caught up and potentially exceed in some ways what legacy networks can do on a cost per capability basis.

There's a lot more to it than that. TDRSS is heavily used by classified customers.

[Targeteer]

  1 26m terminal at Canberra has been in almost constant contact with TDRS 7/8 since June while the Guam terminal is repaired.

Is this supposed to be an example of egregious mismanagement?  Because using a steerable 26m dish instead of a COTS Earth station sure looks like it.

My understanding is that DSN is augmenting TDRSS ground station coverage because the Guam TDRSS terminal is broken.  TDRSS-8 has been experiencing flight anomalies with its solar arrays, and this is having a significant impact on the overall network.  TDRSS-8's orbital postion makes the Canberra complex the only available complex that can provide replacement ground station coverage.  I'm not aware of a commercial alternative presently available.  My knowledge is limited, though- to be clear.

It's a good thing that DSN is able to backfill this capability that would otherwise have a significant impact on other NASA missions needing TDRSS coverage.

Should there be other lower cost ground stations for TDRSS?  Maybe.  But when you go down that path, you should also ask whether at some point commercial space network coverage might be a better or at least more affordable option for NASA missions.

It's a complex problem but I do not see any of this as a DSN issue.  It's NASA not being up to speed as commercial capabilities have caught up and potentially exceed in some ways what legacy networks can do on a cost per capability basis.

  1 26m terminal at Canberra has been in almost constant contact with TDRS 7/8 since June while the Guam terminal is repaired.

Is this supposed to be an example of egregious mismanagement?  Because using a steerable 26m dish instead of a COTS Earth station sure looks like it.

My point was that a "deep space" terminal was being used non-standardly to support on a near earth mission due to the typhoon strike.  It's ability to support TDRS-8 is fortuitous but takes time away from intended missions.

[freddo411]

It's a complex problem but I do not see any of this as a DSN issue.  It's NASA not being up to speed as commercial capabilities have caught up and potentially exceed in some ways what legacy networks can do on a cost per capability basis.

There's a lot more to it than that. TDRSS is heavily used by classified customers.

That a pretty brief, seemly dismissive comment. 

So TDRSS has milcomm on it ... that doesn't preclude NASA putting in the work to use commercial providers.

Sounds to me like a (another) really good reason for NASA move comms away from TDRSS

[Blackstar]

It's a complex problem but I do not see any of this as a DSN issue.  It's NASA not being up to speed as commercial capabilities have caught up and potentially exceed in some ways what legacy networks can do on a cost per capability basis.

There's a lot more to it than that. TDRSS is heavily used by classified customers.

That a pretty brief, seemly dismissive comment.  Don't be a Jim

So TDRSS has milcomm on it ... that doesn't preclude NASA putting in the work to use commercial providers.

Sounds to me like a (another) really good reason for NASA move comms away from TDRSS

How familiar are you with TDRSS? I'm trying to determine if you actually understand it, or are applying the simplistic concept of "commercial = good."

Based upon the assumption that you do not know these things: TDRSS has multiple users, some of whom are highly classified (NRO obviously, but maybe others). It also has multiple funding streams, some of which are highly classified. And that makes it difficult to apply the "fix" of "commercialize it," because the accounting is complicated. A few years ago I talked to somebody who was involved in the funding of the system who said that one of the issues they faced was that for most of its lifetime, TDRSS was heavily subsidized by its classified user(s). So NASA was actually getting TDRSS at a discount. Now if one applies the "fix" of "commercialize it," then how exactly does that happen? Does NASA pull out and go to an entirely commercial provider and lose the military subsidy of the system? Does that save money? How do you know it saves money? And do we end up with two data relay systems instead of one? How does that save money?

[Targeteer]

There is no mention of the status of the military infrastructure, including the Ground Terminal.  Not really surprising since AF Times does nothing but fluff pieces for the Air Force--snarky opinion. It would be interesting to learn if those "classified users" will pony up, voluntarily or not, money from their probably considerable and less "monitored" budgets to speed repairs.

 https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2023/09/01/recovery-takes-shape-at-air-forces-typhoon-battered-base-in-guam/?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=air-dnr

Recovery takes shape at Air Force’s typhoon-battered base in Guam
By Rachel S. Cohen
 Sep 1, 6:40 PM
Debris sits outside the passenger terminal at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, May 26 after Typhoon Mawar became one of the strongest typhoons to hit Guam in decades. (Staff Sgt. Aubree Owens/Air Force)

Three months after Typhoon Mawar became the strongest storm to hit Guam since 2002, Andersen Air Force Base is getting back on its feet.

All base services, like stores and the daycare, are operational with regular hours, 36th Wing spokesperson 1st Lt. Ariana Wilkinson said Thursday.

Airmen are again allowed to begin new jobs in Guam, following a 60-day order to stop troops from moving to the U.S. territory. Andersen’s displaced population, which totaled around 400 airmen and their dependents as of early June, has shrunk to zero.

And this weekend, staff at the on-base airport will begin checking in passengers for overseas flights from a cluster of portable trailers — their second temporary office space since the storm wrecked Andersen’s passenger terminal.

It’s the first steps of a process that could take one to two years, if not longer, to return the Air Force’s westernmost outpost in the Pacific to its pre-storm state. The service declined to answer how much the effort may cost, citing a complex web of decisions across multiple branches of the military that have installations on Guam.

Restoring the base that bills itself as America’s “forward edge of the Indo-Pacific” is as critical to global security as it is for the well-being of troops living there, military officials argue.

The Pentagon views China as America’s top competitor in military strength, technology development and global influence. Defense leaders are also wary of Beijing’s growing aggression toward Taiwan, the democratically self-governed island that maintains military and trade ties with the United States but is claimed by China.

That makes Andersen, which sits about 1,900 miles from the Chinese mainland and within reach of U.S. allies in the Pacific, a strategic boon in future emergencies.

“Guam is of enormous importance,” Gen. Mike Minihan, the Air Force’s top mobility officer, told Air Force Times during a trip to Andersen in July. “If there were anything from crisis to conflict out here, it’s a place that we would fight from, and it’s a place that we would fight for.”
This Tuesday, May 23, 2023 satellite image released by NASA shows Typhoon Mawar, a powerful storm that could deliver the biggest hit in two decades to the U.S. territory in the Pacific, approaching Guam.

Mawar made landfall at Andersen around 9 p.m. local time on May 24, pelting Guam with 140 mph winds and 28 inches of rain.

The base of more than 8,000 people is home to a unit of RQ-4 Global Hawk reconnaissance drones, but largely supports other military operations across the Pacific. It routinely welcomes bomber squadrons on routine deterrence missions, and is a major hub for training exercises around the region.

Aircraft that could be evacuated were sent away before the storm, and those that weren’t were parked in hangars. Families hunkered down to ride out the howling winds and pounding rain in the dark, without cell phone or radio service.

“It’s very traumatizing,” said April Gerstner, a Key Spouse at Andersen whose husband works for the 734th Air Mobility Squadron. “You’re hearing these full-force winds outside. … You keep hearing these loud thuds outside [of palm trees] hitting the ground.”

Key Spouses are volunteers appointed by the unit commander to serve as conduits of information providing resources to Air Force families.

“It’s a lot of unknown and you have to mentally be OK with it,” she said.

Outbound airmen and their families are transported to Hangar 1 on Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, May 30. Typhoon Mawar caused significant damage to the 734th Air Mobility Squadron's passenger terminal. With the terminal out of commission, the 734th AMS teamed up with the 4th Reconnaissance Squadron and are now using their hangar as a temporary terminal until repairs to the main facility are complete. (Staff Sgt. Pedro Tenorio/Air Force)

In the weeks that followed, the Air Force Civil Engineer Center dispatched a team to assess the damage, estimate the cost of repairs and craft a way forward. About 500 facilities were damaged, the service said.

“Overall, the structures fared really well. We didn’t lose any buildings. We’re able to continue with our mission,” Col. Dustin Born, Andersen’s on-site cleanup director, told Air Force Times in a recent interview. “But we obviously have a lot of facilities that have, now, water infiltration and water damage.”

For multiple reasons, Andersen fared better against Typhoon Mawar than Tyndall AFB did against Hurricane Michael, a Category 5 storm that devastated the Florida base in 2018, said Col. Robert Bartlow, who oversees the Air Force’s natural disaster recovery efforts as part of AFCEC.

Andersen saw slower winds and no storm surge because it sits at a higher elevation than Tyndall, Bartlow said. And the buildings on Guam were built to withstand Category 5 storms, which whip an area with winds in excess of 157 mph.

Unlike at Tyndall, none of Andersen’s facilities suffered structural damage that would require them to be demolished and rebuilt, Born said.

“There’s a couple of facilities that we’re considering possibly doing some new construction on, just because … it would be cost-prohibitive to repair the building,” he said. “We might be better off just … getting new amenities and building it in a better fashion.”

Gerstner’s outlook was less rosy.

“We’re slowly getting there, but it’s gonna take a really long time, because there are buildings that are just completely destroyed,” she said.

An initial damage report is conducted May 26 after Typhoon Mawar, a Category 4 storm, hit the island of Guam and damaged Andersen Air Force Base. (Airman 1st Class Allison Martin/Air Force)

Gerstner added that while sandbags provided by the base helped keep her home from flooding, many at Andersen weren’t as lucky.

“There’s a lot of people that don’t have carpet in their house because their whole house flooded,” she said. “People have mold, especially around their vents.”

Andersen’s on-base airport terminal, where airmen and their families catch rides to the U.S. mainland on contracted jets known as “space-available” flights, was among the worst-hit facilities.

The facility’s water damage and broken roof forced the 734th Air Mobility Squadron, which runs the passenger terminal, to move the jumble of luggage scales and waiting rooms into another squadron’s building.

For several weeks, troops and their families arrived and departed through a massive hangar that typically housed Global Hawk drones, but sat empty while the unit temporarily operated from Japan.

Now, travelers will await their flights at a camp of trailers near the old passenger terminal until its extensive restoration is finished.

“It’ll need to be completely remodeled inside … taking out all the sheetrock, basically, gut it down to the studs, and if those are still good, then it’ll be rebuilt from there,” Born said.

Cleanup is a multi-step process. First, the military works to restore basic utilities like water and power, and moves downed trees that are blocking major roadways and threatening homes. Contractors come in to seal the buildings to ensure that more rain can’t get in during Guam’s frequent tropical showers and any other major storms that follow.

Then buildings get internal makeovers, with new flooring, paint and furniture. Born’s team will look at ways to secure the facilities against stronger storms, like adding roofs that can withstand 200 mph winds and shatter-resistant windows.

The Air Force may add tile to the bottom foot or two of walls to prevent future water damage and mold, Born said.

It’s an “opportunity to make sure that we’re fixing things correctly,” he said. “We’re going to try to find the newest technology that has the best capabilities to withstand another typhoon.”

Large construction projects are made more complicated and expensive by Guam’s distance from the continental U.S. Materials can take up to two months to arrive by ship, Born said.

What’s more, the limited equipment and labor pool must be shared by the island’s public and private sectors, the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Pentagon. The 15-hour time difference between Guam and Bartlow’s office in Florida has created other hurdles for program management.

Juan Mercado, GS-11 duty officer with the 734th Air Mobility Squadron, loads a water tanker, to be distributed to local Guam communities, on Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, June 6. Joint military service members from across U.S. Indo-Pacific Command supported FEMA and worked with Guam and Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands’ officials to recover from the devastating impacts of Typhoon Mawar. (Airman 1st Class Allison Martin/Air Force)

“I think we’ve overcome that,” Bartlow said. “There’s been a great deal of coordination … but it is a challenge.”
Building back better

How much the recovery effort may cost and how long it may take depend on how extensively the Pentagon uses the storm as a chance to build a better base.

Andersen was already in the midst of hundreds of millions of dollars worth of upgrades when Mawar struck. The typhoon has presented more opportunities to improve upon facilities built in the late 1940s.

The Air Force’s fiscal 2024 budget asks Congress to fund a new area on the flight line to fit 14 B-52 Stratofortress bombers and additional tanker aircraft, plus the communications and electrical infrastructure to support those operations.

“Without this apron and the supporting utilities, Andersen AFB will be unable to adequately support the bomber aircraft operations during contingencies, significantly impacting readiness and degrading operational capability,” the service wrote.

Debris litters base housing on Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, May 26. (Screen grab from video by Staff Sgt. Divine Cox/Air Force)

It cautioned that failing to build new parking “may increase the potential for a serious mishap.”

The Air Force in 2021 began work on a new weapons storage complex at Andersen that will house dozens of the long-range missiles seen as crucial in a potential war with China.

“We can rapidly reload bomber aircraft. When they land here, they can get rapidly re-armed and take back off again,” Maj. Timothy Wu, commander of the 36th Munitions Squadron, said last year. “It increases the lethality for a second strike.”

A slew of other air defense projects are poised to turn Guam into the “most densely protected place anywhere on the planet,” defense publication The Drive wrote Aug. 11.

During Minihan’s tour of mobility squadrons at the base, airmen pointed out that certain hangars were built to Navy standards rather than the Air Force’s, making them too small to comfortably move equipment.

That issue and more could be wrapped into the Air Force’s post-storm plan for Andersen.

To pay for it, a first tranche of money could come as part of a stopgap bill to fund the federal government in the early months of fiscal 2024, while Congress hashes out an appropriations package to last the rest of the year.

“We were able to take money from our FY ‘23 … appropriations to start some of the immediate emergency repairs,” Born said. “As we dwindle down to the end of FY ‘23 … we are looking for special appropriations to make ‘24 flow through smoothly so we can continue our repairs.”

Further funding would factor into the Pentagon’s annual budget request in fiscal 2025 and beyond.

“It’s complicated by the fact that we’ve got multiple services and installations, and a U.S. territory involved here,” Bartlow said. “I think there’s differing approaches on how … you fund this, recognizing the fact that it’s got to be coordinated.”

Guam’s status as a U.S. territory gives it a smaller congressional delegation than states — one nonvoting member in the House of Representatives — which can hamper its ability to advocate for more funds and attention.

But Guam’s strategic importance in the Pacific has made it a prime destination for federal investment and garnered more interest from U.S. politicians. It has welcomed a growing number of federal lawmakers and military leaders on official visits, and recently hosted its first congressional field hearing since 2007.

“I think they’re able to see pretty clearly the level of impact, and the need for making sure that our strategic interests are repaired and aligned with what the nation needs,” Born said.

Airmen assigned to the 734th Air Mobility Squadron assist with cargo of Federal Emergency Management Agency personnel on Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, 26 May. (Staff Sgt. Divine Cox/Air Force)
‘Just a normal day’

While the Pentagon mounts its recovery effort, airmen are contending with the realities of daily life after a natural disaster.

Finding fresh, good-quality food has been difficult, Gerstner said, as have periodic power outages as the island repairs its electrical grid.

Typhoon Mawar exacerbated the longstanding difficulties that military spouses have with finding jobs on Guam, and stretched mental health services even thinner. And the order barring new airmen from arriving at Andersen also strained squadrons that are perennially short-staffed, Gerstner said.

Some airmen have taken to social media to complain about food prices, moldy dormitories and other housing problems.

An anonymous complaint posted Aug. 15 on the unofficial “Air Force amn/nco/snco” Facebook page appears to show nearly bare shelves at a military-run grocery store.

“Just a normal day at the commissary here in Guam,” the post read. “Off to the grocery store out in town where I’ll pay $15+ dollars for a gallon of milk alone.”

Ahead of the storm, the Pentagon shrank its cost-of-living allowance for troops stationed overseas, arguing that the price of goods and services was on par with those in the continental U.S.

That left Andersen airmen with less in their wallets amid post-typhoon spikes in food and gas prices. Gerstner said it has forced her family to think twice about their purchases and buy lower-quality food than they might otherwise eat.

On Aug. 1, Joint Region Marianas announced the Pentagon had canceled another planned cut to the allowance of those stationed in Guam. The second decrease was scheduled for November.

Gerstner praised the responsiveness of base leaders and the Andersen community throughout the crisis, and wants to see more typhoon-preparation classes for airmen and their families to keep people safer in the future.

But healing emotional wounds from the storm will take time.

“Some days I have good days, where it’s like, ‘Oh, we’re getting back to normal. Things are looking great,’” Gerstner said. “Then I see something — it could be a post, or it could be a part of the island that still looks really bad — and it feels like it’s the week after the typhoon again.”

An initial damage report is conducted and cleanup gets underway May 26 after a typhoon hit the island of Guam and damaged Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. (Screen grab from video by Airman 1st Class Spencer Perkins)
About Rachel S. Cohen

[Don2]

I'm a little skeptical about claims that load on the DSN is increasing. Many of the missions that DSN currently supports are ageing, and will likely shut down in the next 10 years. The missions I have in mind are the Voyagers, SOHO and the Mars orbiters. Much of the budget is going into Mars Sample Return. That doesn't need a lot of communication capacity because the science is done on Earth.

As for the Artemis cubesats, those didn't produce much science and didn't work well. NASA probably won't do that again.

One of the biggest challenges for DSN in future will be Dragonfly. The combination of a small antenna aperture, limited power, great distance and potentially lots of data including imagery will require a lot of support from DSN. However, Dragonfly is also an example of how a robust DSN can enable missions and save money. A Titan orbiting relay would add hundreds of millions to the cost of the mission. Earth based DSN antennas with a $60 million cost and a 50 year lifespan are relatively cheap.

Another big challenge will be the Uranus orbiter. Adding Earth antennas means that more data can be moved with less spacecraft power. That could mean a cheaper spacecraft with fewer RTGs and less plutonium.

Another question is Artemis. Does NASA want 4K UHD 60-frames per second video of the landing? Can DSN cope with that?

[tbellman]

Based upon the assumption that you do not know these things: TDRSS has multiple users, some of whom are highly classified (NRO obviously, but maybe others). It also has multiple funding streams, some of which are highly classified. And that makes it difficult to apply the "fix" of "commercialize it," because the accounting is complicated. A few years ago I talked to somebody who was involved in the funding of the system who said that one of the issues they faced was that for most of its lifetime, TDRSS was heavily subsidized by its classified user(s). So NASA was actually getting TDRSS at a discount. Now if one applies the "fix" of "commercialize it," then how exactly does that happen? Does NASA pull out and go to an entirely commercial provider and lose the military subsidy of the system? Does that save money? How do you know it saves money? And do we end up with two data relay systems instead of one? How does that save money?

I don't know the answers to your questions, but it seems that NASA at least intends to retire TDRSS and procure it as a commercial service in the future (by 2030).  So far they have awarded contracts for "technology development and in-space demonstrations" to six companies.

• NASA press release: NASA, Industry to Collaborate on Space Communications by 2025

• NSF forum thread: Communications Services Project: commercial successor to TDRSS

[Barley]

There's a lot more to it than that. TDRSS is heavily used by classified customers.

It's a radio.  It's worth making an adversary build a spy ship and have a few shmoos pretend to be fishermen while they circle in the Pacific, that will cost them a few million and they might get seasick.  But if national security depends on them not doing that, then you're doing something wrong.

[jimvela]

It's a complex problem but I do not see any of this as a DSN issue.  It's NASA not being up to speed as commercial capabilities have caught up and potentially exceed in some ways what legacy networks can do on a cost per capability basis.

There's a lot more to it than that. TDRSS is heavily used by classified customers.

I'm familiar with the other users on TDRSS.  But, I (perhaps naively) didn't believe that any of the DSN stations in the Canberra complex was able to pass that other traffic due to specific requirements on supporting that particular traffic.  I had ASSumed that the DSN element at play and being discussed here in this thread was specifically for ensuring NASA mission TDRSS continuity and not black program access.

Do you, Blackstar, conclusively know that the Canberra complex is properly equipped, with all required personnel and data security requirements needed?  Can you state definitively that this classified traffic is passing through Canberra?
I can believe that if you have credible sources for it, but no way I was going to make that assertion based on my (non) knowledge of it.

Edited to add this 2nd quote and reply:

Based upon the assumption that you do not know these things: TDRSS has multiple users, some of whom are highly classified (NRO obviously, but maybe others). It also has multiple funding streams, some of which are highly classified. And that makes it difficult to apply the "fix" of "commercialize it," because the accounting is complicated. A few years ago I talked to somebody who was involved in the funding of the system who said that one of the issues they faced was that for most of its lifetime, TDRSS was heavily subsidized by its classified user(s). So NASA was actually getting TDRSS at a discount. Now if one applies the "fix" of "commercialize it," then how exactly does that happen? Does NASA pull out and go to an entirely commercial provider and lose the military subsidy of the system? Does that save money? How do you know it saves money? And do we end up with two data relay systems instead of one? How does that save money?

Is that in the same way that there are claims that NASA was subsidized by black program use of the space shuttle?  That was a disaster for all that were involved.  The point being that claiming you're getting a good deal by sharing a defense network with defence program funding sources does NOT mean you are getting the best possible solution in terms of actual cost/capability.

The counterexample is the present worldwide jaw dropping at the apparently near total inability of a major military power to stop via military means a commercial satellite internet provider's COTS networking product from effective combat usage by their adversary. The capabilities and costs of those military communications networks are about to get much much better because a provider came along and poked a giant stick in the eye of the prevailing cost plus providers.  (And to note-  I'm well known for not liking that particular "chief engineer" of that COTS product)

[Zed_Noir]

It's a complex problem but I do not see any of this as a DSN issue.  It's NASA not being up to speed as commercial capabilities have caught up and potentially exceed in some ways what legacy networks can do on a cost per capability basis.

There's a lot more to it than that. TDRSS is heavily used by classified customers.

I'm familiar with the other users on TDRSS.  But, I (perhaps naively) didn't believe that any of the DSN stations in the Canberra complex was able to pass that other traffic due to specific requirements on supporting that particular traffic.  I had ASSumed that the DSN element at play and being discussed here in this thread was specifically for ensuring NASA mission TDRSS continuity and not black program access.

Do you, Blackstar, conclusively know that the Canberra complex is properly equipped, with all required personnel and data security requirements needed?  Can you state definitively that this classified traffic is passing through Canberra?
I can believe that if you have credible sources for it, but no way I was going to make that assertion based on my (non) knowledge of it.

Edited to add this 2nd quote and reply:

Based upon the assumption that you do not know these things: TDRSS has multiple users, some of whom are highly classified (NRO obviously, but maybe others). It also has multiple funding streams, some of which are highly classified. And that makes it difficult to apply the "fix" of "commercialize it," because the accounting is complicated. A few years ago I talked to somebody who was involved in the funding of the system who said that one of the issues they faced was that for most of its lifetime, TDRSS was heavily subsidized by its classified user(s). So NASA was actually getting TDRSS at a discount. Now if one applies the "fix" of "commercialize it," then how exactly does that happen? Does NASA pull out and go to an entirely commercial provider and lose the military subsidy of the system? Does that save money? How do you know it saves money? And do we end up with two data relay systems instead of one? How does that save money?

Is that in the same way that there are claims that NASA was subsidized by black program use of the space shuttle?  That was a disaster for all that were involved.  The point being that claiming you're getting a good deal by sharing a defense network with defence program funding sources does NOT mean you are getting the best possible solution in terms of actual cost/capability.

The counterexample is the present worldwide jaw dropping at the apparently near total inability of a major military power to stop via military means a commercial satellite internet provider's COTS networking product from effective combat usage by their adversary. The capabilities and costs of those military communications networks are about to get much much better because a provider came along and poked a giant stick in the eye of the prevailing cost plus providers.  (And to note-  I'm well known for not liking that particular "chief engineer" of that COTS product)

I always assume that the TDRSS was a DoD/NRO system that uses NASA operations as a cover. However it is old in system architecture and orbital hardware assets.

As how to commercialized the bandwidth capacity needed with the current sharing arrangement among many users. It could be as simple as pre-booking bandwidth from a certain LEO internet service provider. The current cost sharing arrangement remains more or less the same. It has the advantages of very little development cost and service could be available very soon. However it has the disadvantage of depending on a certain LEO internet service provider until someone else develops and put into operation a comparable service, which is unlikely for a while due to overall cost to match even a fraction of the incumbent service capacity.

[Blackstar]

Do you, Blackstar, conclusively know that the Canberra complex is properly equipped, with all required personnel and data security

I wasn't discussing Canberra. Ask somebody else that.

[Jim]

I always assume that the TDRSS was a DoD/NRO system that uses NASA operations as a cover. However it is old in system architecture and orbital hardware assets.

Nope, just an additional user.

[Jim]

Is that in the same way that there are claims that NASA was subsidized by black program use of the space shuttle?  That was a disaster for all that were involved. 

It wasn't.  That was part of the problem.   NASA wasn't getting money from the military for shuttle development.  Only for the launches it actually flew military payloads.

[Jim]

I'm a little skeptical about claims that load on the DSN is increasing. Many of the missions that DSN currently supports are ageing, and will likely shut down in the next 10 years. The missions I have in mind are the Voyagers, SOHO and the Mars orbiters. Much of the budget is going into Mars Sample Return. That doesn't need a lot of communication capacity because the science is done on Earth.

It is more than those.   Juno, EC, Mars, MMS, Stereo, Psyche, Lucy, AXAF, JWST, TESS, PSP, PNH, RST, etc