Would Endeavour exist if Challenger had not been destroyed?

[SpaceAndrew25]

This week marked the end of the Orbiter Endeavour, which I find to be a spectacular spacecraft. She has served her country brilliantly. Her landing got me thinking about this: Would she have been built if Challenger did not get destroyed in 1986? This is a question that has been on my mind for sometime.

[Phillip Clark]

No.

Endeavour was built as a relacement for Challenger.

[Jeff Bingham]

This week marked the end of the Orbiter Endeavour, which I find to be a spectacular spacecraft. She has served her country brilliantly. Her landing got me thinking about this: Would she have been built if Challenger did not get destroyed in 1986? This is a question that has been on my mind for sometime.

Most likely not. Though there was discussion and some sentiment in Congress even before Challenger's accident for a fifth Orbiter, nothing came from that, other than the knowledge that there were some spare structural elements available that would provide a "head start" on building an additional Orbiter, as I recall. She was, as has been noted, built as a replacement vehicle after the loss of Challenger.

[Phillip Clark]

Originally the orbiter fleet was going to comprise five vehicles.   Then it was decided that Enterprise would not be modified for orbital missions after the drop tests - it was too heavy and the modificaions would have been too expensive.

This left Columbia, Challenger, Discovery and Atlantis as the four-shuttle fleet with a further orbiter being on the "wanted but unfunded" list.   It was only after the loss of Challenger that a further orbiter was authorised, using the spares which were already available as its basis.

Since the spares were already usd up, there was no chance that a repacement for Columbia could have been considered, irrespective of George W Bush's administration's decision to close down shuttle operations.

[mmeijeri]

Since the spares were already usd up, there was no chance that a repacement for Columbia could have been considered, irrespective of George W Bush's administration's decision to close down shuttle operations.

Didn't they again consider upgrading Enterprise?

[Phillip Clark]

Since the spares were already usd up, there was no chance that a repacement for Columbia could have been considered, irrespective of George W Bush's administration's decision to close down shuttle operations.

Didn't they again consider upgrading Enterprise?

Not that I can remember.   As I recall Challenger was originally a test vehicle which was modified to be come a full orbiter because that was a cheaper route than modifying Enterprise.

[psloss]

This left Columbia, Challenger, Discovery and Atlantis as the four-shuttle fleet with a further orbiter being on the "wanted but unfunded" list.   It was only after the loss of Challenger that a further orbiter was authorised, using the spares which were already available as its basis.

Since the spares were already usd up, there was no chance that a repacement for Columbia could have been considered, irrespective of George W Bush's administration's decision to close down shuttle operations.

Even the appropriations to build OV-105 after 51-L did not necessarily sail smoothly through Congress.  (51D posted about this here...Link.)  I don't believe the money to fund the structural spares was necessarily easy to get, either.

FWIW, in that period of time ("Post-Challenger") Rockwell was given a little bit of money to start a second set of structural spares, but that project (money) ended very quickly with little or no hardware to show for it.

[jeff122670]

I say yes, because it was either Challenger or another orbiter that was going to get destroyed.....and very quickly (in the mid-80's).  Given the NASA management thought processes and the way they were doing business, it was just a matter of time before we had an accident.  So, regardless of which orbiter was destroyed in the first accident, I think Endeavour was a fore-gone conclusion.

I have all of the 1st 25 missions on DVD and it is EXTREMELY interesting to watch the world and the media "turn" on the program.  It is almost like it started around STS-9 when they had the nozzle issue.  VERY interesting to watch the flip and to see how their reporting changed.

But you gotta wonder how the program would have been with large budgets and no accidents......i can only think, WOW!

Jeff

(please dont take this post as a flame against ANY NASA Mgmt or anything like that, i just think we were going to have an accident....it was just a matter of when) 

[psloss]

So, regardless of which orbiter was destroyed in the first accident, I think Endeavour was a fore-gone conclusion.

That's a slightly different question.  I can't agree with that certainty, especially in hindsight; even changing the timing could change the outcome.  There are many variables in a decision like that, including the political ones...for example, the Senate changed hands after the 1986 midterms (with both houses controlled by the Democrats).

[Skylon]

FWIW, in that period of time ("Post-Challenger") Rockwell was given a little bit of money to start a second set of structural spares, but that project (money) ended very quickly with little or no hardware to show for it.

I always wondered how feasible it would have been to utilize any structural spares to repair a damaged orbiter. The Rudder/speed break and payload bay doors stand out as easy fixes if you needed to replace them. But anything liable to cause severe damage, would probably result in the orbiter not coming back (unless you have something like the main gear failing at wheel stop, resulting in severe damage to the crew compartment...or something like that, or if by some miracle Columbia managed to limp home with a mangled wing on STS-107).

The spares clearly stand out as a backdoor way to build another vehicle, and after Challenger, when NASA tried to get a second set built, congress saw it for what it was. On the plus side though, assembling spares would have preserved the shuttle work force a bit longer.

[Blackstar]

I have all of the 1st 25 missions on DVD and it is EXTREMELY interesting to watch the world and the media "turn" on the program.  It is almost like it started around STS-9 when they had the nozzle issue.  VERY interesting to watch the flip and to see how their reporting changed.

To get a good sense of this you actually need to go back earlier, and you won't really find it on video.  You'd have to look in print (notice to all the youngsters reading this--"print" was an ancient form of communication consisting of words written on pieces of paper, which was made from trees).

By the late 1970s the shuttle program had earned a bad reputation.  The program slipped by several years (I think first flight was originally scheduled for 1978) due to problems with the engines and the tiles.  Each issue caused about a one-year slip. 

What really hurt the program was a photo that ran in at least two of the three big news weekly magazines, Time and Newsweek, that showed a shuttle on the back of a 747 SCA missing a lot of tiles.  (I have included a photo, but it is not the one that appeared in the magazines and a lot of newspapers.).  I cannot remember if it was shipped that way or if they fell off during flight.  But there were quite a few articles in the press in the late 1970s that implied that shuttle was a massive boondoggle.

Once the shuttle started flying, the reputation of the program changed for awhile.  The press got caught up in the patriotism and boosterism of the event--even jaded reporters who saw a shuttle launch thought it was cool--and so they were enthusiastic, especially since Americans were back flying in space after several years absence.

I actually think that this positive publicity was misplaced, because STS-1 had suffered a number of problems that the media was unaware of, and few members of the press bothered to examine NASA's claims about how often they were going to fly.

Your observation that things changed around STS-9 is interesting.  It would be worth looking at print articles around that time as well.  I think that by that time it had become clear to many people that the shuttle was not going to fly 24 or 50 times a year, as NASA had claimed.  It was a complex machine and had problems. 

But you gotta wonder how the program would have been with large budgets and no accidents......i can only think, WOW!

They had large budgets.  The problem was that the shuttle was a complex, first-generation machine.  It was never going to operate as smoothly as people had originally predicted/expected/hoped/dreamed/fantasized.  NASA was already over-strained when they were flying eight times a year.  They would have needed a major increase in budget and personnel to safely get above that number of flights.  There was no way that they could have doubled or tripled it.

[DaveS]

What really hurt the program was a photo that ran in at least two of the three big news weekly magazines, Time and Newsweek, that showed a shuttle on the back of a 747 SCA missing a lot of tiles.  (I have included a photo, but it is not the one that appeared in the magazines and a lot of newspapers.).  I cannot remember if it was shipped that way or if they fell off during flight.

That's Columbia being ferried to KSC. Due to a tile strength issue discovered late in the assembly process of Columbia, they had to strengthen them by a process called "densification". But they ran out time to that in Rockwell's facility at Palmdale.

So alot of the new densified tiles had not yet been installed when they ferried Columbia from Edwards to KSC. So they had to complete the tile installation process in the OPF which lead to record long first stay in OPF.

[Blackstar]

So alot of the new densified tiles had not yet been installed when they ferried Columbia from Edwards to KSC. So they had to complete the tile installation process in the OPF which lead to record long first stay in OPF.

Thanks for the info.  I imagine that after that incident, NASA regretted shipping the orbiter like that.  It was a major publicity hit for them, because the photo (not the one I included, but a better one that really showed the missing tiles quite well) appeared in articles with titles like "America's flying boondoggle."  If there had been no photo, I doubt that there would have been as many articles.

[JayP]

Thanks for the info.  I imagine that after that incident, NASA regretted shipping the orbiter like that.  It was a major publicity hit for them, because the photo (not the one I included, but a better one that really showed the missing tiles quite well) appeared in articles with titles like "America's flying boondoggle."  If there had been no photo, I doubt that there would have been as many articles.

NASA knew what they were doing. They were already catching flack for schedule delays and overruns. They were faced with the choice of moving back the delivery and publicly missing another date or shipping on time but with the missing tiles. They obviuosly chose the latter.

[edkyle99]

Though there was discussion and some sentiment in Congress even before Challenger's accident for a fifth Orbiter, nothing came from that, other than the knowledge that there were some spare structural elements available that would provide a "head start" on building an additional Orbiter, as I recall. She was, as has been noted, built as a replacement vehicle after the loss of Challenger.

If I remember correctly, there was a bit of a fight to fund the spares that were eventually used to build Endeavour.  This fight occurred sometime during 1983-85, prior to the Challenger disaster.  Atlantis was being finished and Palmdale was going to go dark, so some Congresspeople got money to build the spares.  They included the basic structural elements of the vehicle's body and wings.

 - Ed Kyle     

[Blackstar]

NASA knew what they were doing. They were already catching flack for schedule delays and overruns. They were faced with the choice of moving back the delivery and publicly missing another date or shipping on time but with the missing tiles. They obviuosly chose the latter.

Maybe.  But this provided a visual.  Without it, it was just words.  With the pictures, it had a bigger negative impact.

I found a thread with some pictures:

http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=1545.0

These are close ups.  But at the time there was one really famous photo that hit all the print media.  It was an in-flight picture.

There's also a pretty good thread here:

http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=15959.msg367467#msg367467

It's about early shuttle criticism.  I wrote lots of wonderfully insightful things.

[psloss]

These are close ups.  But at the time there was one really famous photo that hit all the print media.  It was an in-flight picture.

Those look familiar (my Dad took them).

Re: widely distributed in-flight picture, it may have been in California, as they had issues with flight and dummy tiles coming off in a test flight prior to starting the "real" ferry.  ChrisG summarized that in the first of the two-parter back in February:
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2011/02/space-shuttle-columbia-a-new-beginning-and-vision/

[nathan.moeller]

I always wondered how feasible it would have been to utilize any structural spares to repair a damaged orbiter. The Rudder/speed break and payload bay doors stand out as easy fixes if you needed to replace them. But anything liable to cause severe damage, would probably result in the orbiter not coming back (unless you have something like the main gear failing at wheel stop, resulting in severe damage to the crew compartment...or something like that, or if by some miracle Columbia managed to limp home with a mangled wing on STS-107).

If I recall, they were thinking more in terms if an orbiter crashed on landing as opposed to damage during launch or in orbit.

[Namechange User]

While alternate realities may be fun for some to speculate on what could have/would have happened, it was the capabilities of the orbiter that allowed Hubble to be fixed.

As for structural spares, yes Endeavour was partially constructed from some.  Just recently, we scrapped some additional spares which were designated to OV-106 or could have been used in the event of damage from landing or whatever reason (within reasonalbe limits). 

On STS-9, the issue was with the APU GG injector stem and issue with corrosion.  They were chromised in a subsequent mod and have performed exceptionally ever since. 

[stefan1138]

While alternate realities may be fun for some to speculate on what could have/would have happened, it was the capabilities of the orbiter that allowed Hubble to be fixed.

As for structural spares, yes Endeavour was partially constructed from some.  Just recently, we scrapped some additional spares which were designated to OV-106 or could have been used in the event of damage from landing or whatever reason (within reasonalbe limits). 

On STS-9, the issue was with the APU GG injector stem and issue with corrosion.  They were chromised in a subsequent mod and have performed exceptionally ever since. 

I am curious to know what kind of spares designated as OV-106 were still in storage and could they not also possibly have been displayed at a museum?

[simonbp]

While alternate realities may be fun for some to speculate on what could have/would have happened, it was the capabilities of the orbiter that allowed Hubble to be fixed.

And the delay caused by the Challenger explosion that caused the Gallieo High-Gain Antenna to fail, resulting in only about 10% of the planned science return, and the need to send Juno now to plug the gaps. And while something the size of Shuttle was needed to launch HST, a Dragon or CST-100 is plenty capable of doing a servicing mission.

Reading Riding Rockets by Mike Mullane is downright scary when he gets to the mid-1980s. He definitely seems of the camp that had 51L not exploded, another flight that year would have. Considering Mullane was supposed to be on the next launch (from VAFB), I'll take his word for it...

[Namechange User]

While alternate realities may be fun for some to speculate on what could have/would have happened, it was the capabilities of the orbiter that allowed Hubble to be fixed.

And the delay caused by the Challenger explosion that caused the Gallieo High-Gain Antenna to fail, resulting in only about 10% of the planned science return, and the need to send Juno now to plug the gaps. And while something the size of Shuttle was needed to launch HST, a Dragon or CST-100 is plenty capable of doing a servicing mission.

Reading Riding Rockets by Mike Mullane is downright scary when he gets to the mid-1980s. He definitely seems of the camp that had 51L not exploded, another flight that year would have. Considering Mullane was supposed to be on the next launch (from VAFB), I'll take his word for it...

What the frack does this have anything to do with Dragon and CST-100?  Nothing.  And no, quite likely, they are not.

Yet, you claim they are, even though they do not really exist yet, are hardly operational, all the while comparing it to another system that was barely operational at the time being "scary".  Odd. 

[Sarah]

Reading Riding Rockets by Mike Mullane is downright scary when he gets to the mid-1980s. He definitely seems of the camp that had 51L not exploded, another flight that year would have. Considering Mullane was supposed to be on the next launch (from VAFB), I'll take his word for it...

A little OT but it depends on the circumstances. Had Challenger not encountered the vertical wind shear it did and held together, I would have liked to have seen NASA's response after recovering the right SRB and analyzing it. I bet it would have scared the *blank* out of them. Maybe the flights would have been halted and Thiokol would have been redesigning the SRB's.

[bholt]

I suspect NASA really wanted another orbiter in the mid-80s since they were effectively losing one in 1986 when Discovery was scheduled to to be transferred to VAFB and become a military shuttle so to speak.

Unfortunately, it sometimes taken an accident to wake people up to the fact that spaceflight is far from routine. Even if Challenger had managed to make it back from 51-L with at least one field joint that basically failed (but held together by sheer luck from the aluminium oxide residue from the SRB exhaust) it may have grounded them for awhile, but would not have had the same impact as actually losing an orbiter and crew.

The memories of old promises lingered even after RTF. I can remember CNN being vicious in 1990 due to shuttle delays and the Hubble debacle.

I do seem to remember serious discussion for awhile around 1991 about building an OV-106, but plans were scrapped when it was decided that the shuttle would be "replaced" soon. We all now how that went.

Brent

[gordo]

Where the programme failed was not taking the core OV-100 design and evolving into a new fleet of OV-200 spacecraft, with technology and aerospace upgrades that were 25 years on from the original ideas.

We had 3 main evolutions of the ET in this time, why did the next generation orbiter development for the "NSTS" programme stand still?

That's the fail.

[Mark Dave]

Who knows what would happen. I could see Challenger with the same look as the shuttles have today with the present logos on it.  The drag chute......? It probably would have come later than we saw with Endeavour. *shrugs*

Yeah, many speculated after Columbia is NASA will build a new orbiter to replace OV-102.  Hmm, that did give me an idea for my current shuttle model kit.  Any ideas for a good name for  OV-106 in 1/72 scale?  

[Jorge]

Where the programme failed was not taking the core OV-100 design and evolving into a new fleet of OV-200 spacecraft, with technology and aerospace upgrades that were 25 years on from the original ideas.

We had 3 main evolutions of the ET in this time, why did the next generation orbiter development for the "NSTS" programme stand still?

Money.

That's the fail.

That's called "playing the hand you're dealt."

[Downix]

Who knows what would happen. I could see Challenger with the same look as the shuttles have today with the present logos on it.  The drag chute......? It probably would have come later than we saw with Endeavour. *shrugs*

Yeah, many speculated after Columbia is NASA will build a new orbiter to replace OV-102.  Hmm, that did give me an idea for my current shuttle model kit.  Any ideas for a good name for  OV-106 in 1/72 scale?  

I heard that the original plan for OV-106 was to be named Enterprise, but OV-101 Constitution got renamed to that.  Why not return the favor?

Incidentally, does anyone have the original proposed list of ship names?  I used to have a copy but it long ago vanished.

[Blackstar]

Just acquired this. It is a December 1982 document about internal US government discussions about purchasing a fifth orbiter. I don't know if there is anything new here.

Note in particular page 5 on the Office of Science and Technology Policy position: "Purchase of a fifth orbiter now would produce a large overcapacity of U.S. Government launch services, resulting in a reduction of U.S. space capability and technology, and higher costs of doing both government and commercial business in space. This will reduce the utility of space to the U.S. Government and discourage private sector investment.

The U.S. Government therefore should not commit to a fifth orbiter, but should maintain adequate support for a four-orbiter fleet."


Keep in mind that this is just a snapshot of a discussion that was going on. There were undoubtedly other inputs and opinions.

[psloss]

Keep in mind that this is just a snapshot of a discussion that was going on. There were undoubtedly other inputs and opinions.

Still interesting information, including the amplification on the next page.  Thanks for sharing.

[Jeff Bingham]

Just acquired this. It is a December 1982 document about internal US government discussions about purchasing a fifth orbiter. I don't know if there is anything new here.

Note in particular page 5 on the Office of Science and Technology Policy position: "Purchase of a fifth orbiter now would produce a large overcapacity of U.S. Government launch services, resulting in a reduction of U.S. space capability and technology, and higher costs of doing both government and commercial business in space. This will reduce the utility of space to the U.S. Government and discourage private sector investment.

The U.S. Government therefore should not commit to a fifth orbiter, but should maintain adequate support for a four-orbiter fleet."


Keep in mind that this is just a snapshot of a discussion that was going on. There were undoubtedly other inputs and opinions.

Very interesting..thanks for sharing it. In a quick glance at some OLD notes, I came across the following:

“Discussion of  fifth orbiter, possible block buy of 104/105, etc….” (pp. 28-30)
Reference for above:
U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1983, Hearings, February 23, 25, March 16, 18, 30, and April 1, 1982, Serial No. 97-112.

[Blackstar]

The document is from a newly declassified collection that includes some material from the Reagan-era space policy-making body called the Senior Interagency Group (SIG) Space, or SIG-Space for short.

SIG-Space was part of Reagan's National Security Council. It annoyed the heck out of a number of Democrats and some Republicans during this time, because everything that SIG-Space did was classified and hidden from scrutiny, even when they were discussing civil space policy. It was because of anger over SIG-Space that Congress started to pass legislation that created the Space Council, and Reagan kept threatening to veto it, or (I think on one occasion) actually did veto it. Eventually when Reagan left and George H.W. Bush became president he agreed to the creation of the National Space Council, which lasted for only four years until eliminated by Clinton.

SIG-Space's activities have never been closely examined. Some of the documents are declassified at the Reagan Library, but I don't know how much remains classified.

As for the fifth orbiter issue, I imagine that this is extensively discussed by Jenkins and Heppenheimer in their respective books.

[wolfpack]

Reading Riding Rockets by Mike Mullane is downright scary when he gets to the mid-1980s. He definitely seems of the camp that had 51L not exploded, another flight that year would have. Considering Mullane was supposed to be on the next launch (from VAFB), I'll take his word for it...

A little OT but it depends on the circumstances. Had Challenger not encountered the vertical wind shear it did and held together, I would have liked to have seen NASA's response after recovering the right SRB and analyzing it. I bet it would have scared the *blank* out of them. Maybe the flights would have been halted and Thiokol would have been redesigning the SRB's.

From what I've read, the safety culture at that time was pretty seriously flawed. They probably would have just added a low temperature constraint to the launch commit criteria and kept on flying with the old boosters. That's all that Thiokol had asked for at the time of 51-L anyway. Don't fly outside of the temperature database.

[Airlock]

While alternate realities may be fun for some to speculate on what could have/would have happened, it was the capabilities of the orbiter that allowed Hubble to be fixed.

And the delay caused by the Challenger explosion that caused the Gallieo High-Gain Antenna to fail, resulting in only about 10% of the planned science return, and the need to send Juno now to plug the gaps. And while something the size of Shuttle was needed to launch HST, a Dragon or CST-100 is plenty capable of doing a servicing mission.

Reading Riding Rockets by Mike Mullane is downright scary when he gets to the mid-1980s. He definitely seems of the camp that had 51L not exploded, another flight that year would have. Considering Mullane was supposed to be on the next launch (from VAFB), I'll take his word for it...

As far as the Gallieo mission is concerned, the only way the high-gain antenna problem could have been avoided was if the plans to load a fully fueled Centaur booster in the payload bay had continued on.  Even if Challenger hadn't have happened, I'm not convinced a centaur in the Shuttle payload bay would have ever flown.  If it ever did fly, it very well could have caused an accident similar in nature to Challenger.

[Jim]

1.  As far as the Gallieo mission is concerned, the only way the high-gain antenna problem could have been avoided was if the plans to load a fully fueled Centaur booster in the payload bay had continued on.

2.   Even if Challenger hadn't have happened, I'm not convinced a centaur in the Shuttle payload bay would have ever flown.

3.  If it ever did fly, it very well could have caused an accident similar in nature to Challenger.

1.  Not true.  As it was suspected that the cross country trips of the spacecraft is what caused the antenna failure but it was not known which one.

2.  The Centaur missions were  after the Astro missions which was next in line.

3.  It would not have been similar to Challenger.  A explosion in the payload bay would be much different than what happened to Challenger.  Also, those missions carried RTG's which would have changed the SAR efforts.

[Archibald]

They probably would have just added a low temperature constraint to the launch commit criteria and kept on flying with the old boosters.

Well said. The writting was on the wall; sooner or later there was to be an accident, one way or another.  NASA was ramping up the shuttle flight rate to 24 a year, the holy grail, where the shuttle started to make economic sense, as promised to Congress 15 years earlier. It was like a steamroller; no way they stopped for weeks or months. Not when they were proving the (economic) soundness of the vehicle...

[wolfpack]

They probably would have just added a low temperature constraint to the launch commit criteria and kept on flying with the old boosters.

Well said. The writting was on the wall; sooner or later there was to be an accident, one way or another.  NASA was ramping up the shuttle flight rate to 24 a year, the holy grail, where the shuttle started to make economic sense, as promised to Congress 15 years earlier. It was like a steamroller; no way they stopped for weeks or months. Not when they were proving the (economic) soundness of the vehicle...

I could have said "stop waiving the low temperature constraint", because there probably already was one in place.

[brad2007a]

[/quote]

1.  Not true.  As it was suspected that the cross country trips of the spacecraft is what caused the antenna failure but it was not known which one.

[/quote]

I thought the failure had something to do with the lubricants used on bearings to deploy the antenna - it was stored for all that time without being re-lubricated, resulting in enough drying out so that the antenna stuck (bearings literally grinding to a halt) during the deployment...

[Jim]

I thought the failure had something to do with the lubricants used on bearings to deploy the antenna - it was stored for all that time without being re-lubricated, resulting in enough drying out so that the antenna stuck (bearings literally grinding to a halt) during the deployment...

The trips "used up"/"wore out" the lubricants.

[Downix]

Reading Riding Rockets by Mike Mullane is downright scary when he gets to the mid-1980s. He definitely seems of the camp that had 51L not exploded, another flight that year would have. Considering Mullane was supposed to be on the next launch (from VAFB), I'll take his word for it...

A little OT but it depends on the circumstances. Had Challenger not encountered the vertical wind shear it did and held together, I would have liked to have seen NASA's response after recovering the right SRB and analyzing it. I bet it would have scared the *blank* out of them. Maybe the flights would have been halted and Thiokol would have been redesigning the SRB's.

I would imagine the filament wound SRB's (which had the new o-ring design on them) would have been rushed out while the legacy SRB's were retrofitted, to avoid the black-eye.

[stefan1138]

While alternate realities may be fun for some to speculate on what could have/would have happened, it was the capabilities of the orbiter that allowed Hubble to be fixed.

As for structural spares, yes Endeavour was partially constructed from some.  Just recently, we scrapped some additional spares which were designated to OV-106 or could have been used in the event of damage from landing or whatever reason (within reasonalbe limits). 

On STS-9, the issue was with the APU GG injector stem and issue with corrosion.  They were chromised in a subsequent mod and have performed exceptionally ever since. 

I am curious to know what kind of spares designated as OV-106 were still in storage and could they not also possibly have been displayed at a museum?

Just found this old threat. Still it is not completely clear to me, which parts of OV-106 were finished, which parts were begun and which parts were at least planned? And what was the fate of those parts? Thanks for any insights.

[MATTBLAK]

Somebody like Dennis Jenkins - known Shuttle expert and chronicler - would have to be consulted to perhaps clear up some of these questions about an 'OV-106'.

[stefan1138]

Somebody like Dennis Jenkins - known Shuttle expert and chronicler - would have to be consulted to perhaps clear up some of these questions about an 'OV-106'.

Do we know any contact details of Mr. Jenkins (maybe published in his newer shuttle books, I only have the old one from 2000)? Is he open to e-mail exchange with readers/space afficionados?

[Vahe231991]

Somebody like Dennis Jenkins - known Shuttle expert and chronicler - would have to be consulted to perhaps clear up some of these questions about an 'OV-106'.

Do we know any contact details of Mr. Jenkins (maybe published in his newer shuttle books, I only have the old one from 2000)? Is he open to e-mail exchange with readers/space afficionados?

Dennis Jenkins discussed the fate of the OV-106 in an e-mail from 1996 at this link:
https://groups.google.com/g/sci.space.shuttle/c/mNuWjk2_y78/m/GJTxG8dNYggJ

[Jim]

Just found this old threat. Still it is not completely clear to me, which parts of OV-106 were finished, which parts were begun and which parts were at least planned? And what was the fate of those parts? Thanks for any insights.

There were no major structural spares for OV-106