PMN1 - 17/5/2007 1:16 PMWere there any other potential bidders for the SRB contract for STS?
PMN1 - 17/5/2007 1:16 PMIf the Challenger accident had been the same as the Columbia accident, damage during launch causing a break up on return, would that have seen an orbiter replacement looked at sooner?
GncDude - 17/5/2007 7:04 PMTiming yes, but just because they're old, or is it that Columbia was the 2nd accident?
OV-106 - 17/5/2007 7:56 PMIt's a combination of things. Just because you have an accident once does not mean you necessarily scrap everything and start from scratch. Should Challenger have happened? No, it was a managerial failure just as much as it was a hardware failure. The Space Shuttle is a hugely complicated machine and asked to perform a number of requirements, which drives a large part of the complexity. When it comes to programs like this, their are politics, national priorities, employees effect on various local economies and lots of money on hardware involved that ultimately drive the decision. Lets go back to 1986 and you have 3 orbiters left, one of which is essentially brand new at the time. The decision made then was the design, while dangerous, still is relatively sound and that changes can be made on the managerial process. You have structural spare parts that can be used to assemble a replacement orbiter. What do you think would be done? Exactly what happened. Redesign as necessary to make the SRB joint changes, change the managerial process/structure and use your spare parts to build what would become Endeavour. Now, it's 2003 and we loose Columbia. You still have the same issue as far as politics, economics, etc that I mentioned before. However what is different this time is a potential to change national priorities. Before we lost Columbia the plan was to fly until 2020 or so. The ISS was going to be completed long before then so the orbiters were going to be nothing more than taxis and logistics transports. There was no focus in what we would do other than that during flights but we knew we needed to figure out how we could make it happen. The vehicles were aging and as technology evolved it was harder and harder to get replacements, make upgrades where today's equipment could talk to yesterday's equipment, etc. This was the perfect time to introduce the VSE, which many of these elements also being found in the CAIB report. Let the Space Shuttle finish the job it was always intended to do, station construction. This was also a political compromise in order to deliver on our international obligations but it will allow the shuttle to go out on a high note. I submit that the loss of Columbia and her crew allowed for the nessecary political forces to make the radical changes that are now happening between Space Shuttle and Constellation transition. If we did not loose Columbia then I highly doubt we would be talking about going beyond LEO right now. It's up to all of us to make sure this is indeed a worthy legacy.
Jim - 17/5/2007 12:35 PMIt wasn't the type of accident that is 'causing" orbiter retirement. It is the timing (they are old)
Jim - 17/5/2007 12:35 PMQuotePMN1 - 17/5/2007 1:16 PMIf the Challenger accident had been the same as the Columbia accident, damage during launch causing a break up on return, would that have seen an orbiter replacement looked at sooner?It wasn't the type of accident that is 'causing" orbiter retirement. It is the timing (they are old)
Blackstar - 17/5/2007 4:16 PMQuoteJim - 17/5/2007 12:35 PMIThey were not nuts in thinking this, considering that most of the B-52s flying today were built in the early 1960s and are planned to serve until around 2020 or so.Only because there is nothing to replace them and like the STS, keeping those few B52 that are still flying going is taking a lot of money not to mention having a few hundred (or bits of a few hundred) stored at the Desert Boneyard over the years - admittedly not all the parts from the various versions are interchangable but enough have been to date.
Jim - 17/5/2007 12:35 PMIThey were not nuts in thinking this, considering that most of the B-52s flying today were built in the early 1960s and are planned to serve until around 2020 or so.
PMN1 - 17/5/2007 4:22 PMOnly because there is nothing to replace them and like the STS, keeping those few B52 that are still flying going is taking a lot of money not to mention having a few hundred (or bits of a few hundred) stored at the Desert Boneyard over the years - admittedly not all the parts from the various versions are interchangable but enough have been to date.
PMN1 - 17/5/2007 4:17 PMQuoteJim - 17/5/2007 12:35 PMQuotePMN1 - 17/5/2007 1:16 PMIf the Challenger accident had been the same as the Columbia accident, damage during launch causing a break up on return, would that have seen an orbiter replacement looked at sooner?It wasn't the type of accident that is 'causing" orbiter retirement. It is the timing (they are old)But is 1986 too soon for anyone to be openly suggesting replacing the orbiter with a capsule?
Chris Bergin - 17/5/2007 3:38 PMQuoteOV-106 - 17/5/2007 7:56 PMIt's a combination of things. Just because you have an accident once does not mean you necessarily scrap everything and start from scratch. Should Challenger have happened? No, it was a managerial failure just as much as it was a hardware failure. The Space Shuttle is a hugely complicated machine and asked to perform a number of requirements, which drives a large part of the complexity. When it comes to programs like this, their are politics, national priorities, employees effect on various local economies and lots of money on hardware involved that ultimately drive the decision. Lets go back to 1986 and you have 3 orbiters left, one of which is essentially brand new at the time. The decision made then was the design, while dangerous, still is relatively sound and that changes can be made on the managerial process. You have structural spare parts that can be used to assemble a replacement orbiter. What do you think would be done? Exactly what happened. Redesign as necessary to make the SRB joint changes, change the managerial process/structure and use your spare parts to build what would become Endeavour. Now, it's 2003 and we loose Columbia. You still have the same issue as far as politics, economics, etc that I mentioned before. However what is different this time is a potential to change national priorities. Before we lost Columbia the plan was to fly until 2020 or so. The ISS was going to be completed long before then so the orbiters were going to be nothing more than taxis and logistics transports. There was no focus in what we would do other than that during flights but we knew we needed to figure out how we could make it happen. The vehicles were aging and as technology evolved it was harder and harder to get replacements, make upgrades where today's equipment could talk to yesterday's equipment, etc. This was the perfect time to introduce the VSE, which many of these elements also being found in the CAIB report. Let the Space Shuttle finish the job it was always intended to do, station construction. This was also a political compromise in order to deliver on our international obligations but it will allow the shuttle to go out on a high note. I submit that the loss of Columbia and her crew allowed for the nessecary political forces to make the radical changes that are now happening between Space Shuttle and Constellation transition. If we did not loose Columbia then I highly doubt we would be talking about going beyond LEO right now. It's up to all of us to make sure this is indeed a worthy legacy.That is a brilliant post.For those of us on the outside, trying to learn about shuttle - their background and place in space flight history - burn that one into memory.
51D Mascot - 17/5/2007 8:48 PMQuoteChris Bergin - 17/5/2007 3:38 PMQuoteOV-106 - 17/5/2007 7:56 PMIt's a combination of things. Just because you have an accident once does not mean you necessarily scrap everything and start from scratch. Should Challenger have happened? No, it was a managerial failure just as much as it was a hardware failure. The Space Shuttle is a hugely complicated machine and asked to perform a number of requirements, which drives a large part of the complexity. When it comes to programs like this, their are politics, national priorities, employees effect on various local economies and lots of money on hardware involved that ultimately drive the decision. Lets go back to 1986 and you have 3 orbiters left, one of which is essentially brand new at the time. The decision made then was the design, while dangerous, still is relatively sound and that changes can be made on the managerial process. You have structural spare parts that can be used to assemble a replacement orbiter. What do you think would be done? Exactly what happened. Redesign as necessary to make the SRB joint changes, change the managerial process/structure and use your spare parts to build what would become Endeavour. Now, it's 2003 and we loose Columbia. You still have the same issue as far as politics, economics, etc that I mentioned before. However what is different this time is a potential to change national priorities. Before we lost Columbia the plan was to fly until 2020 or so. The ISS was going to be completed long before then so the orbiters were going to be nothing more than taxis and logistics transports. There was no focus in what we would do other than that during flights but we knew we needed to figure out how we could make it happen. The vehicles were aging and as technology evolved it was harder and harder to get replacements, make upgrades where today's equipment could talk to yesterday's equipment, etc. This was the perfect time to introduce the VSE, which many of these elements also being found in the CAIB report. Let the Space Shuttle finish the job it was always intended to do, station construction. This was also a political compromise in order to deliver on our international obligations but it will allow the shuttle to go out on a high note. I submit that the loss of Columbia and her crew allowed for the nessecary political forces to make the radical changes that are now happening between Space Shuttle and Constellation transition. If we did not loose Columbia then I highly doubt we would be talking about going beyond LEO right now. It's up to all of us to make sure this is indeed a worthy legacy.That is a brilliant post.For those of us on the outside, trying to learn about shuttle - their background and place in space flight history - burn that one into memory.Couldn't agree more, Chris...well done, OV106!!!!
OV-106 - 17/5/2007 8:56 PMI submit that the loss of Columbia and her crew allowed for the nessecary political forces to make the radical changes that are now happening between Space Shuttle and Constellation transition. If we did not loose Columbia then I highly doubt we would be talking about going beyond LEO right now. It's up to all of us to make sure this is indeed a worthy legacy.
Jim - 17/5/2007 12:33 PMQuotePMN1 - 17/5/2007 1:16 PMWere there any other potential bidders for the SRB contract for STS?Areojet and CSD
PMN1 - 18/5/2007 9:59 AMAgreed, great post by OV-106.By the time of Challenger, the STS had been abandoned by the USAF who were responsible in part for they way it ended up and it must have been apparent how much time was taken up checking out an orbitter after every mission.I would be a bit surprised if the possibility of the 'something else' wasn't being talked about in private.
Jim - 18/5/2007 10:20 AMQuotePMN1 - 18/5/2007 9:59 AMAgreed, great post by OV-106.By the time of Challenger, the STS had been abandoned by the USAF who were responsible in part for they way it ended up and it must have been apparent how much time was taken up checking out an orbitter after every mission.I would be a bit surprised if the possibility of the 'something else' wasn't being talked about in private.It wasn't until after Challenger, not before
51D Mascot - 18/5/2007 1:07 PMQuoteJim - 18/5/2007 10:20 AMQuotePMN1 - 18/5/2007 9:59 AMAgreed, great post by OV-106.By the time of Challenger, the STS had been abandoned by the USAF who were responsible in part for they way it ended up and it must have been apparent how much time was taken up checking out an orbitter after every mission.I would be a bit surprised if the possibility of the 'something else' wasn't being talked about in private.It wasn't until after Challenger, not beforeRight, in fact, as I recall, Bob Crippin was in training with a crew for the first flight out of SLCC-6 out at Vandenberg; and I also think that then Deputy or Under Secretary of the Air Force Pete Aldridge was a part of that DoD crew.
Gary - 18/5/2007 12:48 PMDidn't DOD still have a few satellites that had to be launched on the shuttle after Challenger simply because it would have been to hard to convert to them to be flown on EELV's?