Returning aborted Orbiter to KSC

[spacemuppet]

If an orbiter had to "abort to Europe", how would it get back to the US?  Correct me if I am wrong but the 747-100 carrier can't go very far at all on one "tank" of gas, would they mid-air refuel it?  Also, do they have a crane device at all the abort sites to load the orbiter atop the 747?  Would they have to take it apart and ship it back in pieces?

[Jim]

The SCA can't be inflight refueled.   The orbiter has to be lightened to allow the SCA to make the hop across the Atlantic.  The payloads and engines would have to be removed and the crew cabin gutted.  Crane would rented to make the lift.

[William Graham]

Would they need to shift the tailcone across the Atlantic?

[psloss]

There's probably some holes and questions that will come out of them (i.e., they probably shouldn't be taken verbatim) and they're circa 2001, but these releases might be generally useful:

Table of Contents:
http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/nasafact/taltoc.htm

http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/nasafact/talgrnd.htm

[Rocket Guy]

They took Enterprise across the Atlantic. I know they stopped n Newfoundland. I would think they could do it with no problem going from England-Iceland-Greenland-Newfoundland. Anyone know what other stops Enterprise made?

[SpaceNutz SA]

I've done some research on this.  She made stops at Dulles (13 June 1983),  and Goose Bay in Canada and she was at Stansted (London) during the tour and obviously at Le Bourget for the Airshow.  Would be nice to piece the entire flightplan together and map it out on Google Earth but not much specific info on the web.  Maybe someone at NASA can dig up some old archives?  

An iteresting aside I came across was that the French authorities refused permission to do a fly-over in Paris.  All other European countries were only too Happy.

[gordo]

Jim - 4/7/2007  9:10 PM

The SCA can't be inflight refueled.   The orbiter has to be lightened to allow the SCA to make the hop across the Atlantic.  The payloads and engines would have to be removed and the crew cabin gutted.  Crane would rented to make the lift.

your contradicting what the guys say here

"Payloads and/or airborne support equipment will remain onboard the orbiter for the flight back to Kennedy Space Center unless the capability of the shuttle carrier aircraft (SCA), landing site location or other requirements dictate otherwise."


The limiting factor for the SCA is aerodynamic drag and flying at 15,000ft. the max payload on a 747f is around the same weight as the orbiters max landing weight, so its makes little difference in the scheme of things between enterprise or a space flown orbiter on the back.

Any landing in Europe would not be a problem getting the orbiter home in one piece.  A trip across the atlantic would use the same route as Enterprise took in 1983, up though the Uk, with a stop at Prestwick, then on to Iceland, Gandar and into the US.  this is a similar route flown daily by range challenged light aircraft.

[Rocket Guy]

Jim - 4/7/2007  9:10 PM

The SCA can't be inflight refueled.  

By the way, I believe they considered doing that originally but deemed it too risky and/or unnecessary.

[bobthemonkey]

Risky! - even using the established 747 IFR recepticle above the radome clearence between the tanker and the receiver would be very tight,

[MechTech]

They have also shipped a orbiter by barge before so I guess floating it could happen but I would doubt it .

[Jim]

gordo - 4/7/2007  7:57 PM


The limiting factor for the SCA is aerodynamic drag and flying at 15,000ft. the max payload on a 747f is around the same weight as the orbiters max landing weight, so its makes little difference in the scheme of things between enterprise or a space flown orbiter on the back.

Any landing in Europe would not be a problem getting the orbiter home in one piece.  A trip across the atlantic would use the same route as Enterprise took in 1983, up though the Uk, with a stop at Prestwick, then on to Iceland, Gandar and into the US.  this is a similar route flown daily by range challenged light aircraft.

Enterprise was lighter and it doesn't have the altitude restrictions.  Weight still has an effect on range.  With the lower altitude and increased drag, reduced weight is the only way to increase range.

[Zpoxy]

bobthemonkey - 4/7/2007  8:32 PM

Risky! - even using the established 747 IFR recepticle above the radome clearence between the tanker and the receiver would be very tight,

Wrong direction. There were tests done in the late '80s or early '90s on this. The SCA would have been the upper plane in an in-flight refueling scheme. There would have been a refueling boom in it's tail and it would be lowered to join up with a tanker. Then the fuel would have been pumped up the boom to the SCA. The reason for this was the turbulence from a tanker above the SCA would cause cracks in the additional vertical stabilizers attach fittings on the ends of the horizontal stabilizer. This was in either Aviation Week or Jenkins book.

[Jim]

Not to mention exposing the orbiter to the tanker turbulence and exhaust

[brahmanknight]

The real question is what they do if it aborts to Austrailia or Hawaii.  I figure you could go up the east side of Asia, hop over to Alaska, then back down the west coast.  But what they do in Hawaii, I have no idea.

[Gary]

brahmanknight - 5/7/2007  1:41 PM

The real question is what they do if it aborts to Austrailia or Hawaii.  I figure you could go up the east side of Asia, hop over to Alaska, then back down the west coast.  But what they do in Hawaii, I have no idea.

Why would they abort to Australia or Hawaii? TAL sites are in Europe. AOA is to EDW and problems on orbit mean a deorbit to EDW, WSSH or KSC at the first opportunity.

[rosbif73]

brahmanknight - 5/7/2007  2:41 PM

The real question is what they do if it aborts to Austrailia or Hawaii.  I figure you could go up the east side of Asia, hop over to Alaska, then back down the west coast.  But what they do in Hawaii, I have no idea.

It would have to be a pretty serious on-orbit incident to require an immediate deorbit; conceivably the sort of incident that, if it occurred at this late stage in the program, would mean that it is financially best to leave the affected orbiter where she is as a museum piece! (pure conjecture on my part!)

[Danny Dot]

brahmanknight - 5/7/2007  7:41 AM

The real question is what they do if it aborts to Austrailia or Hawaii.  I figure you could go up the east side of Asia, hop over to Alaska, then back down the west coast.  But what they do in Hawaii, I have no idea.

They might have to go west at first to island hop to Japan/China then north up to Alaska.

[mkirk]

rosbif73 - 5/7/2007  8:04 AM

brahmanknight - 5/7/2007  2:41 PM

The real question is what they do if it aborts to Austrailia or Hawaii.  I figure you could go up the east side of Asia, hop over to Alaska, then back down the west coast.  But what they do in Hawaii, I have no idea.

It would have to be a pretty serious on-orbit incident to require an immediate deorbit; conceivably the sort of incident that, if it occurred at this late stage in the program, would mean that it is financially best to leave the affected orbiter where she is as a museum piece! (pure conjecture on my part!)

Some situations that would require an Emergency Deorbit include; Loss of both Freon Loops which results in loss of cooling for the vehicle, Loss of both Water Loops, Cabin leaks that are too big to wait for the designated CONUS PLS (primary landing sites), impending loss of fuel cell cryos (hydrogen or oxygen), leaking propellant that diminishes deorbit capability (OMS & RCS), impending loss of APU/Hydraulics.

These are just some of the situations specifically addressed by the flight rules.  There is a basic order of preference for landing sites begining with the CONUS sites (EDW, KSC, NOR), and then addressing the overseas sites.  The nature of the situation will dicate what is the best available site at the time.

Mark Kirkman

[bobthemonkey]

Zpoxy - 5/7/2007  3:39 AM

bobthemonkey - 4/7/2007  8:32 PM

Risky! - even using the established 747 IFR recepticle above the radome clearence between the tanker and the receiver would be very tight,

Wrong direction. There were tests done in the late '80s or early '90s on this. The SCA would have been the upper plane in an in-flight refueling scheme. There would have been a refueling boom in it's tail and it would be lowered to join up with a tanker. Then the fuel would have been pumped up the boom to the SCA. The reason for this was the turbulence from a tanker above the SCA would cause cracks in the additional vertical stabilizers attach fittings on the ends of the horizontal stabilizer. This was in either Aviation Week or Jenkins book.

Thanks for that - I'd never heard of that before.

[Ikelos]

What about an F-18 as a refueler?

http://www1.dfrc.nasa.gov/Gallery/Photo/AAR/Small/EC03-0293-05.jpg

Would take a lot of skills on the pilot of the 747 though since this used the navy refueling method, would also take quite a few refueling shots. But it wouldn't be impossible to use a small jet with large external fuel tanks for refueling. Would also probably be possible to put the probing duty to the backseater in the F-18 with some other method like the AirForce uses.

[Squid.erau]

Ikelos - 5/7/2007  1:38 PM

What about an F-18 as a refueler?

Unless my math is really off, a fully fueled F/A-18E with 4 external tanks has enough fuel to get the SCA about 114 miles.  And that's completely draining the F-18.  So yeah, it would take a lot of refuelings

Matt

[Ikelos]

Even if you give half the F-18's fuel, do four refuels thats ~200 miles, given the altitude and speed it could be done at close to the 747's cruise probably. Plus refueling the F-18 in air is not a problem at all. And 200 extra miles could mean quite a bit, or if need be, you could keep refueling over and over from a tanker to F-18 to 747.  I just think this is a doable situtation, maybe with a different small plane or something though.

[SpaceNutz SA]

Which raises the question - how many of these emergency situations does the crew train for because it seems like there are a lot of them.  Does the shuttle have all of these scenarios on-board or do they get up-linked as the situation unfolds?

[psloss]

Paging Jorge...FWIW, here's something he posted over on Usenet a little while ago (almost 7 years ago):
http://groups.google.com/group/sci.space.shuttle/browse_thread/thread/17c5fbe68003740/bcfb9f0c86220507

[Jorge]

psloss - 5/7/2007  3:02 PM

Paging Jorge...FWIW, here's something he posted over on Usenet a little while ago (almost 7 years ago):
http://groups.google.com/group/sci.space.shuttle/browse_thread/thread/17c5fbe68003740/bcfb9f0c86220507

Some things have changed in the last seven years but the broad outline is similar to what I wrote then.

The biggest change is the availability of CSCS (Contingency Shuttle Crew Support aka "safe haven") on ISS, followed by a LON (Launch On Need) rescue flight, as an alternative to performing a JEUS (Joint Expedited Undocking and Separation) followed by an emergency deorbit and landing.

This is not always a slam-dunk decision. The LON need-date is driven by the CSCS duration, and that duration is in turn driven by the amount of shuttle consumables available. To maximize CSCS duration, the shuttle crew first scavenges all available shuttle consumables, then once the orbiter is depleted (~23 days) performs an unmanned undocking/disposal of the crippled orbiter and relies on ISS consumables until the LON flight arrives. And of course there is the risk of committing a second shuttle/crew to a LON when the root causes of the failure on the original orbiter are unsolved.

Some emergency scenarios limit the shuttle consumables available. For example, loss of both Freon loops will cause the loss of all three fuel cells within a matter of hours, and once that happens, the fuel cells will no longer be able to generate water. That in turn will severely limit the CSCS duration should the shuttle crew stay aboard ISS rather than attempt an immediate JEUS/emergency deorbit. So in this scenario (or anything similar, like an orbiter cabin leak), MCC must make the JEUS vs CSCS/LON decision very quickly, based on limited data.

NASA has largely chosen to mitigate this risk by minimizing exposure. Flight Rules call for terminating the flight at the next Primary Landing Site (PLS) if one of the two Freon loops fails, for example. Radiator bypasses have been installed to prevent a MMOD strike on a radiator from depleting the associated Freon loop, as well.

On the other hand, more complications have arisen as ISS assembly continues. The original shuttle Emergency Separation procedure made no effort to protect the station from RCS plume impingement. That was acceptable in the early days when ISS was unmanned but now it carries the potential of rendering the station uninhabitable while simultaneously damaging the station crew's Soyuz escape vehicle beyond use. So the procedure has been modified to be "station friendly". It turned out to be impossible to do this while allowing safe separation from all combinations of orbiter/ISS stack attitudes, so the procedure was modified to maneuver the stack to one of two analyzed undocking attitudes first. This wound up not to be much of a net time hit since it could be performed in parallel with the Joint Emergency Egress, which requires some time to perform anyway.

Another complication has been the added requirement for "critical feathering" of ISS solar arrays as part of the JEUS. As solar arrays have been added outside the alpha joints on recent assembly flights, the station's vulnerability to RCS plume impingement has increased. Excessive RCS structural loads on unfeathered arrays can cause the SAW masts to buckle, turning the outboard blanket boxes/mast cannisters into something akin to a sledgehammer that could swing around and strike the pressurized modules. When the JEUS was first modified to accommodate this, the time required to get to undocking shot up to nearly 50 minutes. This was unacceptable and resulted in some serious negotiations about what was truly "critical". In the end, the feathering was split into three categories: that required prior to maneuvering to undock attitude, that required prior to undocking itself, and finally the nice-to-have. That last really caused some teeth-gnashing - of course it was all "critical", otherwise the ISS folks wouldn't have put it in the procedure in the first place, would they? - but eventually things got sorted out. Careful optimization of the procedure to allow maximum parallel activity by the ISS crew, shuttle MSes, and shuttle CDR/PLT got the time required to undock back down into the low 20s, and that with an untrained two-man shuttle crew. A full trained (and highly motivated, on the real day!) crew could of course do better.

In the end, JEUS/emergency deorbit vs CSCS/LON is a risk-vs-risk tradeoff that will require a lot of real-time decision making if one of these scenarios ever occurs. Flight Rules can reduce the amount of real-time rationalization but there are simply too many scenarios to try to write rules to cover them all. The Flight Rules provide a good playbook but MCC and the crew will still wind up doing a lot of improvised broken-field running when the play breaks down.

[brahmanknight]

Wow, Jorge!  That is the kind of analysis that I joined this site for.  I had no idea the SAWs could bend that far.  So does this mean that we are looking at about about an hour between decision and landing?  Somewhere around 20-30 minutes to undock, and 45 for deorbit?

[sbt]

Briefly returning to the original subject...

Would it be possible and/or advantageous to use the An-225 to retrieve a 'Landed Away' Orbiter? I'm presuming an adaptor for the Buran mounting points would be required which might reduce range unacceptably.

Rick

[Jim]

sbt - 8/7/2007  11:15 AM

Briefly returning to the original subject...

Would it be possible and/or advantageous to use the An-225 to retrieve a 'Landed Away' Orbiter? I'm presuming an adaptor for the Buran mounting points would be required which might reduce range unacceptably.

Rick

What says the range on the An-225 is any better (even without an adaptor)?  Also how would the combination be flight tested?  Buran tests would not be enough.

And why bother, the chances are remote

[Jorge]

brahmanknight - 8/7/2007  9:59 AM

Wow, Jorge!  That is the kind of analysis that I joined this site for.  I had no idea the SAWs could bend that far.  So does this mean that we are looking at about about an hour between decision and landing?  Somewhere around 20-30 minutes to undock, and 45 for deorbit?

About 2 hours. 20-30 from decision to undock, 30 from undock to deorbit TIG, and 60 from deorbit TIG to wheels stop.

That doesn't allow much of a deorbit window, so in the 2-hour case it's probably going to end in bailout rather than wheels stop.

OTOH, two hours to the ground is just the design case for the JEUS/Emergency Sep/Emergency Deorbit, driven by the "simultaneous loss of both Freon loops" scenario. Most scenarios allow more time.

[sbt]

Jim - 8/7/2007  4:42 PM

sbt - 8/7/2007  11:15 AM

Briefly returning to the original subject...

Would it be possible and/or advantageous to use the An-225 to retrieve a 'Landed Away' Orbiter? I'm presuming an adaptor for the Buran mounting points would be required which might reduce range unacceptably.

Rick

What says the range on the An-225 is any better (even without an adaptor)?  Also how would the combination be flight tested?  Buran tests would not be enough.

And why bother, the chances are remote

Well the payload at longer ranges (TBH, at any range) is significantly greater for the An-225 vs a B747. Whilst such things depend on the exact shapes of the payload range curves and the weight involved, at high payload weight that usually translates into greater range, although in this case drag might negate the advantage.

In an impossible situation range-wise for the SCA the An-225 MIGHT be an option.

Why not any other aircraft? - The An-225 was designed to carry external loads, not just Buran (specifically Launcher Stages but it has carried non-aerospace loads) and the SCA and the old Bison carrier are the only other aircraft set up for this.

As for flight test, I would presume that this would be a unique flight (or flights) cleared by analysis and with basic handling checks carried out within range of the departure airfield and appropriate manoeuvre limits imposed. I assume the analysis would be less onerous than for the SCA due to there being no fin or rudder behind the load on the An-225 and less difficult than from scratch due to the previous work on Buran and other loads.

As to why? - Because the remote chance had happened. Or are you saying NASA would just leave the Orbiter where it was rather than consider using a non-US asset?

To be clear, I was asking for more informed opinion on the pro and cons of this remote chance and hoping that I might thereby learn something.

BTW, thinking about the shipping option I briefly considered the implications of vessels other than a CVN before realising that this was the best option with regard to speed and power to avoid weather issues and to, if this failed, to limit accelerations on the Orbiter[1] (somewhere I encountered a source for accelerations on the contents of a container when the ship 'slams' - not good!). OTOH a (pretty solid) deck shelter would probably have to be constructed. I presume that salt water corrosion would not be much of an issue as dry air would be rigged up and the Orbiter was designed to survive the salt laden atmosphere on the pad.

Rick

[1] Size reduces motion due to weather in ships, plus Carriers are designed to have have long roll and pitch periods which eases flying operations and reduces the accelerations due to rapid righting seen in 'stiff' ships.

[Jim]

There are no impossible range solutions.
It isn't the weight that is the issue, it is the max altitude restriction imposed by the fluids on the orbiter.  This is what limits the SCA range.  A fully loaded B747 weighs more than the SCA with orbiter on it

"As for flight test, I would presume that this would be a unique flight (or flights) cleared by analysis and with basic handling checks carried out within range of the departure airfield and appropriate manoeuvre limits imposed"
Still wouldn't happen, still too much risk, and there would be other work arounds

And considering that such an event would end the shuttle program, it might be left there.

Also by the time an adapter could be built, the orbiter would moved by other means

[Jorge]

sbt - 8/7/2007  6:37 PM

Jim - 8/7/2007  4:42 PM

sbt - 8/7/2007  11:15 AM

Briefly returning to the original subject...

Would it be possible and/or advantageous to use the An-225 to retrieve a 'Landed Away' Orbiter? I'm presuming an adaptor for the Buran mounting points would be required which might reduce range unacceptably.

Rick

What says the range on the An-225 is any better (even without an adaptor)?  Also how would the combination be flight tested?  Buran tests would not be enough.

And why bother, the chances are remote

As to why? - Because the remote chance had happened. Or are you saying NASA would just leave the Orbiter where it was rather than consider using a non-US asset?

No, I think what he's saying (and if it is what he's saying, I agree) is that if an orbiter ever had to perform a TAL or otherwise non-CONUS landing, at this point in the program, it would be the last flight of that orbiter. So the orbiter would be returned to the US, but there is no need to return it quickly in one piece, since it is going to a museum anyway. Disassemble it at the TAL site, barge the pieces back by slow boat, and reassemble the orbiter at the museum.

[elmarko]

Speaking of elaborate refuelling in the air, this would seem to be a fun thing to post, although very off-topic:

http://www.raf.mod.uk/falklands/bb.html

The ridiculously well-planned refueling operation for the first bombing raids during the Falklands War. Those Vulcans were hungry beasts...

[Danny Dot]

Jim - 8/7/2007  7:46 PM

There are no impossible range solutions.
It isn't the weight that is the issue, it is the max altitude restriction imposed by the fluids on the orbiter.  

snip

Is it the water in the orbiter that doesn't like the altitude?  I assume the problem is the fluid freezes.  I have often wondered about the altitude restriction on the SCA.  I find it ironic that a vehicle designed to go into space, has to be ferried at a low altitude.

Danny Deger
http://www.dannydeger.net