ASAP Annual Report Released

[Chris Bergin]

Moan, moan, moan.....

AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL RELEASES ANNUAL REPORT

WASHINGTON -- The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, or ASAP, a
congressionally mandated group of independent experts established
after the 1967 Apollo 1 fire, has released its 2009 annual report.

Following the 2003 space shuttle Columbia accident, Congress directed
the ASAP to submit an annual report to Congress and the NASA
administrator documenting the panel's observations and
recommendations. This year's report advises NASA on issues that have
potential to directly or indirectly impact the safety of astronauts,
NASA personnel, contractors, programs and missions.

"The panel's report provides a summary of key safety-related issues
the agency confronts at this time," ASAP Chairman Joseph W. Dyer
said. "The most important relate to the future of the nation's human
spaceflight program. Critical safety issues the panel reviewed
include human rating requirements for potential commercial and
international entities, extension of the shuttle beyond the current
manifest, the workforce transition from the shuttle to the follow-on
program, the need for candid public communications about the risks of
human spaceflight, and more aggressive use of robots to reduce the
risk of human exploration."

Some of the panel's critical safety findings in the 18-page report
include:

- No manufacturer of Commercial Orbital Transportation Services is
currently qualified for human-rating requirements, despite some
claims and beliefs to the contrary.

-To abandon the program of record as a baseline for an alternative
without demonstrated capability or proven superiority is unwise and
probably not cost-effective.

-Extension of the shuttle program significantly beyond the current
manifest would be ill-advised. The panel is concerned about
discussions regarding possible extension of shuttle operations.

For more information about the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel and to
view the 2009 report, visit:

http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/oer/asap/index.html

[robertross]

To continue a paragraph above:

"-To abandon the program of record as a baseline for an alternative
without demonstrated capability or proven superiority is unwise and
probably not cost-effective."

with:

"The inherent safety of any and all approaches  must be fully assessed to ensure that a level of safety necessary to support human transport is offered. Additionally, there must be a balance and harmony between the size and scope of the undertaking and the budget provided to design, develop and execute it. The Panel stands ready to evaluate the safety aspects of alternative concepts if such a change is considered."


So it's not to say the PoR can't be replaced, they just want NASA to make sure that if they do decide to change, it's for the right reasons.

EDIT: to add following statement in the document relating to this:

"To abandon Ares I as a baseline vehicle for an alternative without demonstrated capability nor proven superiority (or even equivalence) is unwise and probably not cost-effective. The ability of any current COTS design to “close the gap” or even provide an equivalent degree of safety is speculative. Switching from a demonstrated (design approach proven by Apollo, use of heritage hardware, and Ares 1-X flight success), well designed, safety optimized (ESAS) system to one based on nothing more than unsubstantiated claims would seem a poor choice. Before any change is made to another architecture, the inherent safety of that approach must be assessed to ensure that it offers a level of safety equal to or greater than the program of record."

Of course Ares I-X isn't an Ares I.
Also, nice that as we all well know, Ares I couldn't meet NASA's own HR standards, as Jim has always rightly pointed out.

Let's keep an honest and level playing field here. Will (or would) Ares I be subject to the same new HR requirements they are suggesting? Doubtful.

[robertross]

haha..on the Ares I-X test flight...

"It should be noted that Time magazine cited the Ares rocket as the “best invention of 2009.”

Yes, that's so important. (rolls eyes)
though flawed

[Chris Bergin]

haha..on the Ares I-X test flight...

"It should be noted that Time magazine cited the Ares rocket as the “best invention of 2009.”

Yes, that's so important. (rolls eyes)
though flawed

Indeed! Smells of desperation and propoganda, as opposed to an objective report.

[robertross]

haha..on the Ares I-X test flight...

"It should be noted that Time magazine cited the Ares rocket as the “best invention of 2009.”

Yes, that's so important. (rolls eyes)
though flawed

Indeed! Smells of desperation and propoganda, as opposed to an objective report.

Why do I get the feeling that here is yet another document with the scales tipping in favour of a preffered launch architecture, namely the PoR.

[robertross]

I'm not going to touch the shuttle extension portion. Mind numbing nonsense. Some factual, but most is just out there.

[jml]

From pgs 7-8:

NASA has made significant cultural progress evolving and strengthening internal communications as well as communications within the technical community. Internally, the Agency now speaks more plainly, openly discusses risk and risk management, and better ensures dissenting voices are heard. Largely gone is the “spin” noted by the CAIB. External communications has been slower to evolve, and “spin” still remains a part of these communications. The Panel does not believe this practice best serves the Agency.

Seems like parts of this report qualify as "external communication".

[Paul Adams]

Did someone have these guys locked in a room with no external communications while they wrote this?

This is a really SAD document. If we follow this logic, the best thing to do would be to pack up, go home and do nothing!

How much did this stuff cost - I would strongly suggest the money could more effectively be spent elsewhere.

The 'Time' magazine quote is absolutely incredulous!!

[robertross]

Okay, I got this far, and just HAD to post this part...(bold by me)

"Citing a phrase used by Mr. Frost, Admiral Dyer asked, "How much safety is enough?" Unfortunately, the current human-rating documents offer no answer. Mr. Frost observed that the approach is certainly mission-dependent (i.e., it is less safe to go to Mars than to the ISS), but design criteria can still be established for classes of missions. As the Panel observed on several occasions, NASA should let the rising-star program, Constellation in this case, establish the ground rules for programs that follow because most of NASA's effort, money, and brainpower are applied to Constellation. Furthermore, Mr. Frost confirmed that Constellation personnel conducted a lot of good work based on the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS), past experience, and an understanding of optimizing performance; calculated numbers; and then budgeted them down to the subsystems (per the systems engineering practice).  Mr. Frost cited this as a great starting point for defining a group of design target numbers based on the probability of loss of crew."

EDIT to add: reading past this paragraph (half way through the document) there is a good exchange of pros & cons for this viewpoint. Sort of reminds me of similar discussions on this board...

[robertross]

I hope nobody minds me posting these snips, but I feel they are quite informative. I'll stop if people want me to. This is a follow-on to the HRR issue. Again, bold by me:

"Acknowledging that General Bolden raised an important point, Admiral Dyer commented that the ASAP would recommend almost a new communications genesis.  The ASAP suggested that the new Administration and the in-bound Administrator take time to consider a new approach that would explain not only the level and range of risk associated with space exploration, but also the importance of the work, the reward that justifies the risk, and the acceptance of that risk by willing and knowledgeable astronauts. The public discourse thus would be more direct and clearer, with less interpretation ASAP Public Meeting, First Quarter, 2009  5 required. General Bolden agreed, contending that American citizens can handle difficult issues, so NASA should quit treating them as if they are children who do not understand, instead bringing them in as partners."

[robertross]

Well, I have to say that I'm impressed.

I urge anyone with time this weekend to read this front to back. I'm only 2/3 through, but reading through the public meeting pages, I see a broader scope of what has been going on.

Things like flights to Russia, on 1 Russian aircraft, and concern of losing the plane. Safety and risk matrices. Comments from all sides. I would say that it seems Orion is in good hands: there's clear commitment to make it right.

Clearly there is room for improvement, especially at MSFC by the sounds of it, but maybe they will get that worked out in time.

[Namechange User]

This is all BS, I stopped after a few pages. 

As the "Safety Advisory Panel", one would think that they should be held accountable for actually going into even minor detail on what they believe "recertification" is defined as or what work would be required.  Or, heaven forbid, actually mention the lengths we have gone to in what is called "mid life certification review".

Of course they don't, because they are empty suits with a political agenda.  If anyone happens to be on here that is on the so called "Safety Advisory Panel" or HQ level NASA, I would be interested to hear what you think about the meaning of this report because my thoughts are these people need to be replaced because they offer no value added.  You can PM me if you so choose.

[robertross]

This is all BS, I stopped after a few pages. 

As the "Safety Advisory Panel", one would think that they should be held accountable for actually going into even minor detail on what they believe "recertification" is defined as or what work would be required.  Or, heaven forbid, actually mention the lengths we have gone to in what is called "mid life certification review".

Of course they don't, because they are empty suits with a political agenda.  If anyone happens to be on here that is on the so called "Safety Advisory Panel" or HQ level NASA, I would be interested to hear what you think about the meaning of this report because my thoughts are these people need to be replaced because they offer no value added.  You can PM me if you so choose.

Well, I certainly & decidedly avoided the Shuttle portion...enough said on the uselessness on that.

I would say that there is much to learn of the inner goings-on of NASA though in here. Things we take for granted, things never heard of. I was impressed with that.

I certainly wasn't impressed by the casual acceptance of certain items, it was like they had a separate agenda, but took Constellation (for some parts) on faith.

EDIT to add a snippet of 'proof':

"The ASAP has been following the debate underway regarding the ultimate vehicle for the follow-on to the Shuttle.  The proactive thinking and effort on the Constellation Program is impressive, and several ASAP members commented that it is hard to understand how anyone could walk away from this.  The Panel was very impressed with the effort to transition from Shuttle to Constellation."

[kraisee]

haha..on the Ares I-X test flight...

"It should be noted that Time magazine cited the Ares rocket as the “best invention of 2009.”

Yeah, and Scott Horowitz isn't close personal friends with any of the VP's for that magazine, oh no...

Ross.

[E.P. Grondine]

The Ares 1/Direct safety issue was carefully responded to by the Direct team when Griffin first tried to raise the safety concerns last year in his attempt to keep Thiokol's architecture.

The longer we dither with Ares 1/Ares 5, the more of a mess we have.
Can we get on with Direct now?

[neilh]

Elon Musk's response to the ASAP report is pretty awesome:

http://spaceflightnow.com/news/n1001/19safety/

Elon Musk, founder and CEO of Space Exploration Technologies Corp., said his company's Falcon 9 rocket and Dragon space capsule were designed to meet NASA's published human-rating standards.

In an interview Monday, Musk responded to the ASAP findings and recommendations.

"I have to say I've lost a lot of respect for the ASAP panel," Musk said. "If they are to say such things, then they ought to say it on the basis of data, not on random speculation."

SpaceX and Orbital Sciences Corp. are developing the Dragon and Cygnus spacecraft, plus new launch vehicles, under a NASA contract to deliver equipment to the International Space Station beginning next year.

The ASAP report said neither company "is [human] qualified, despite some claims and beliefs to the contrary."

According to Musk, the panel's findings are "bizarre." He says the Falcon 9 rocket and Dragon spacecraft "meet all of NASA's published human-rating requirements, apart from the escape systems."

"They've spent almost no time at SpaceX," Musk said. "They've not reviewed our data. They have no idea what what our margins are, and what is and what isn't human-rated."

... "The Ares 1 is a paper rocket that's far off in the future," Musk said. "Falcon 9 is a real rocket, most of which is at Cape Canaveral right now."

[robertross]

Here is CSF's response to ASAP:

Commercial Spaceflight Federation Responds to the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel’s 2009 Annual

http://www.commercialspaceflight.org/?p=1058

"Since the ASAP correctly points out that NASA has not yet developed standards and processes for human-rating commercial vehicles, the Commercial Spaceflight Federation disagrees with ASAP’s implication that safety will be compromised because “no COTS manufacturer is currently HRR qualified,” because, quite simply, it is impossible for companies to meet standards that do not currently exist. Until such time as commercial human-rating standards are determined, industry continues to develop vehicle hardware based on the only standards available: those NASA established for its own vehicles, known as NPR 8705.2B. As no commercial provider has yet been tasked by NASA to begin working through a NASA human-rating process, for the ASAP to state that “no COTS manufacturer is currently HRR qualified” is akin to saying that someone didn’t pass his driver’s test when he’s still waiting in line at the DMV and hasn’t even been given the exam yet."

"The Commercial Spaceflight Federation disagrees with the ASAP’s characterization of a Commercial Crew Program as an “alternative” to Ares I, because these two systems fulfill very different missions – Commercial Crew is not an alternative to systems designed to travel beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO)."

"The ASAP mischaracterized how safety was treated by The Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee (also known as the “Augustine Committee”)."

[kraisee]

This represents the worst of government spending.   It is little more than lobbying dressed up in the "authority" of pseudo-science.

This is just disgraceful and a negligent use of hard earned tax-payers money.   ASAP should be ashamed of themselves.

I would disband the whole group given half a chance.


Well done to Elon Musk for publicly challenging their unfounded assertions.   If I were him, I know I'd find it difficult not to consider legal action given ASAP's disparaging comments about my company and its products.   But that's just me.

Ross.

[edkyle99]

Here is CSF's response to ASAP:

Commercial Spaceflight Federation Responds to the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel’s 2009 Annual

http://www.commercialspaceflight.org/?p=1058

"The Atlas V, for example, has a record of 19 consecutive successful launches..."

That's all I needed to read!*   

 - Ed Kyle

*AV-009 (6/15/07, NRO L-30 (NOSS Gen3)):  Centaur RL10 fuel inlet valve failed to seal after first burn.  LH2 leak during coast, caused premature RL10 shut down during second burn.

[Jim]

Here is CSF's response to ASAP:

Commercial Spaceflight Federation Responds to the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel’s 2009 Annual

http://www.commercialspaceflight.org/?p=1058

"The Atlas V, for example, has a record of 19 consecutive successful launches..."

That's all I needed to read!*   

 - Ed Kyle

*AV-009 (6/15/07, NRO L-30 (NOSS Gen3)):  Centaur RL10 fuel inlet valve failed to seal after first burn.  LH2 leak during coast, caused premature RL10 shut down during second burn.

It wasn't a failure that would have endangered a crew.