Author Topic: Ariane 5 VA241-SES-14 (with NASA GOLD payload) Al Yah-3 Jan. 25, 2018-DISCUSSION  (Read 112470 times)

Offline russianhalo117

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Range safety and/or public safety is at issue, not ArianeSpace's private interests.
I guess we'll never hear if the vehicle went out of bounds and placed the public at risk (assuming a failure).
It may work that way in the US but private interests in Europe are defined as the entire system's assets not just the launcher. Private interests is defined much differently in Europe. Range and Public safety are not considered public interests during active and closed investigations and this has been the case since the first launch from Kourou. Range and Public safety reports its findings to CNES and when applicable ESA. No other government entity will be involved without special permission granted by the lead agency in the investigation. Consider the parties involved being held to a non-disclosure agreement with no end date. If you really want answers contact any of the involved agencies legal offices for in-depth answers to your questions.

Offline deruch

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Those panning "ESA's decision" to withhold the Independent Enquiry Commission report should reevaluate their position after considering the fact that that Commission didn't consider/discuss/examine the range safety issue at all.  As has been discussed/commented on many times, CNES is solely responsible for the range safety at CSG.  ESA is not involved.  The Independent Equiry was into why the rocket behaved as it did, not the actions of the range during the launch.  CNES performed their own, separate review of the range safety response/actions.  See the quoted comment below.

Quote from bds973:
Quote
<snip>

A la suite de cette anomalie, il a été décidé de mettre en place trois commissions d’enquête :
·        Deux commissions dédiées au lanceur : une commission « indépendante » sous l’égide de l’ESA et une commission ArianeGroup.
·        Une commission interne au CNES dédiée aux aspects sauvegarde et présidée par Lionel Suchet.
Le CNES a été impliqué à différents niveaux dans toutes ces enquêtes. Les commissions ont remis leurs rapports début mars et ont tenu leur Comité Directeur.

Cette anomalie ne remet pas en cause la conception du lanceur mais a créé une situation inédite pour le CSG où un lanceur parfaitement fonctionnel a décollé suivant une mauvaise trajectoire. Cette situation a aussi été inédite pour la sauvegarde vol, ce qui a permis de tirer des enseignements concernant cette fonction essentielle de la base pour les vols futurs.

17 recommandations ont été émises par la commission interne au CNES

De ce fait, la commission interne au CNES (Groupe d’Investigations Sauvegarde) a émis 17 recommandations qui ont été acceptées par le Président du CNES, dont 5 sont bloquantes pour la reprise des vols.

<snip>

http://astronautique.actifforum.com/t19038p525-ariane-5-eca-va241-al-yah-3-ses-14-25-1-2018-anomalie

[Translation per google]
Following this anomaly, it was decided to set up three commissions of inquiry:
· Two commissions dedicated to the launcher: one "independent" commission under the aegis of ESA and one ArianeGroup commission.
· An internal CNES commission dedicated to the safeguarding aspects and chaired by Lionel Suchet.
CNES has been involved at different levels in all these surveys. The commissions submitted their reports at the beginning of March and held their Steering Committee.

This anomaly does not put into question the design of the launcher but created an unprecedented situation for the CSG where a perfectly functional launcher took off in a bad trajectory. This situation was also unprecedented for flight safety, which allowed us to learn about this essential function of the base for future flights.

17 recommendations were issued by CNES internal commission

As a result, the CNES internal commission (Groupe d'Investigations Sauvegarde) issued 17 recommendations that were accepted by the CNES President, 5 of which are blocking the resumption of flights.[/translation]

If you want to know about the range safety stuff, ignore the "Independent Enquiry" which was one of the 2 commissions that was only looking into the vehicle side.  Petition CNES and/or the French Government.  Really, whomever is the relevant French Guianan deputy to the French National Assembly and/or the territory's Senators should probably be pushing for its release if CNES/Paris isn't going to release it "voluntarily".  Regardless, ESA isn't involved.
Shouldn't reality posts be in "Advanced concepts"?  --Nomadd

Offline russianhalo117

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Those panning "ESA's decision" to withhold the Independent Enquiry Commission report should reevaluate their position after considering the fact that that Commission didn't consider/discuss/examine the range safety issue at all.  As has been discussed/commented on many times, CNES is solely responsible for the range safety at CSG.  ESA is not involved.  The Independent Equiry was into why the rocket behaved as it did, not the actions of the range during the launch.  CNES performed their own, separate review of the range safety response/actions.  See the quoted comment below.

Quote from bds973:
Quote
<snip>

A la suite de cette anomalie, il a été décidé de mettre en place trois commissions d’enquête :
·        Deux commissions dédiées au lanceur : une commission « indépendante » sous l’égide de l’ESA et une commission ArianeGroup.
·        Une commission interne au CNES dédiée aux aspects sauvegarde et présidée par Lionel Suchet.
Le CNES a été impliqué à différents niveaux dans toutes ces enquêtes. Les commissions ont remis leurs rapports début mars et ont tenu leur Comité Directeur.

Cette anomalie ne remet pas en cause la conception du lanceur mais a créé une situation inédite pour le CSG où un lanceur parfaitement fonctionnel a décollé suivant une mauvaise trajectoire. Cette situation a aussi été inédite pour la sauvegarde vol, ce qui a permis de tirer des enseignements concernant cette fonction essentielle de la base pour les vols futurs.

17 recommandations ont été émises par la commission interne au CNES

De ce fait, la commission interne au CNES (Groupe d’Investigations Sauvegarde) a émis 17 recommandations qui ont été acceptées par le Président du CNES, dont 5 sont bloquantes pour la reprise des vols.

<snip>

http://astronautique.actifforum.com/t19038p525-ariane-5-eca-va241-al-yah-3-ses-14-25-1-2018-anomalie

[Translation per google]
Following this anomaly, it was decided to set up three commissions of inquiry:
· Two commissions dedicated to the launcher: one "independent" commission under the aegis of ESA and one ArianeGroup commission.
· An internal CNES commission dedicated to the safeguarding aspects and chaired by Lionel Suchet.
CNES has been involved at different levels in all these surveys. The commissions submitted their reports at the beginning of March and held their Steering Committee.

This anomaly does not put into question the design of the launcher but created an unprecedented situation for the CSG where a perfectly functional launcher took off in a bad trajectory. This situation was also unprecedented for flight safety, which allowed us to learn about this essential function of the base for future flights.

17 recommendations were issued by CNES internal commission

As a result, the CNES internal commission (Groupe d'Investigations Sauvegarde) issued 17 recommendations that were accepted by the CNES President, 5 of which are blocking the resumption of flights.[/translation]

If you want to know about the range safety stuff, ignore the "Independent Enquiry" which was one of the 2 commissions that was only looking into the vehicle side.  Petition CNES and/or the French Government.  Really, whomever is the relevant French Guianan deputy to the French National Assembly and/or the territory's Senators should probably be pushing for its release if CNES/Paris isn't going to release it "voluntarily".  Regardless, ESA isn't involved.
ESA is only involved as an observer as they are a customer.

Offline woods170

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Those panning "ESA's decision" to withhold the Independent Enquiry Commission report should reevaluate their position after considering the fact that that Commission didn't consider/discuss/examine the range safety issue at all.  As has been discussed/commented on many times, CNES is solely responsible for the range safety at CSG.  ESA is not involved.  The Independent Equiry was into why the rocket behaved as it did, not the actions of the range during the launch.  CNES performed their own, separate review of the range safety response/actions.

Very much correct sir. Which is why I explained that ESA regulations prohibit ESA from publically releasing their report into why VA-241 flew an incorrect trajectory. The ESA report contains proprietary information regarding Ariane 5. As such, the report cannot be publically released.

For some strange reason this distinction apparently wasn't clear to some folks here.

Offline eeergo

The relevant information for public safety (technical details, not assurances) needs to be released, I believe that much is clear. So far it has seemed certain sectors controlling the release of such information have been playing legalisms in order to avoid explaining why (or why not) this situation was safe.

If current regulations prevent any release (of the relevant parts concerning range safety, nobody is asking to release what line of code in the IMUs was exactly responsible for the screwup), then IMO they need to be updated, be it on ESA's, Arianespace's, CNES', Government of the Republic's or other's side. Likewise if clarity about situations such as these are allowed to go dwell in an administrative limbo for ages.

Note I was very much against finger-pointing toward Arianespace/CSG/affiliates in the beginning of this issue, since it seemed to me some were trying to advance agendas and assigning blames before letting the investigation proceed its due course. Now, however, transparency and clarity is needed, and less playing with the proverbial ball of yarn.
-DaviD-

Offline Jim

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Quote from bds973:
Quote
Les commissions d’enquête mandatées à la suite de l’anomalie VA 241 ont remis leurs rapports permettant ainsi d’autoriser le lancement de VS18
Lors du dernier vol d’Ariane 5 (mission VA 241) effectué le 25 janvier 2018 depuis le CSG, en raison d’une déviation de trajectoire, une perte de la télémesure du lanceur a été constatée après 9 minutes et 26 secondes de vol. A l’issue de la durée prévue de la mission, les deux satellites ont été acquis et confirmés en bonne santé, mais sur une orbite inclinée à 20° au lieu de 3° visés.
A la suite de cette anomalie, il a été décidé de mettre en place trois commissions d’enquête :
·        Deux commissions dédiées au lanceur : une commission « indépendante » sous l’égide de l’ESA et une commission ArianeGroup.
·        Une commission interne au CNES dédiée aux aspects sauvegarde et présidée par Lionel Suchet.
Le CNES a été impliqué à différents niveaux dans toutes ces enquêtes. Les commissions ont remis leurs rapports début mars et ont tenu leur Comité Directeur.
Cette anomalie ne remet pas en cause la conception du lanceur mais a créé une situation inédite pour le CSG où un lanceur parfaitement fonctionnel a décollé suivant une mauvaise trajectoire. Cette situation a aussi été inédite pour la sauvegarde vol, ce qui a permis de tirer des enseignements concernant cette fonction essentielle de la base pour les vols futurs.
17 recommandations ont été émises par la commission interne au CNES
De ce fait, la commission interne au CNES (Groupe d’Investigations Sauvegarde) a émis 17 recommandations qui ont été acceptées par le Président du CNES, dont 5 sont bloquantes pour la reprise des vols.
Pour la prochaine mission Soyouz VS 18 prévue initialement le 6 mars et devant assurer le lancement de 4 satellites O3b, le traitement de ces actions bloquantes a eu pour conséquence de décaler le lancement au 9 mars afin d’adapter un critère de sauvegarde et de vérifier les procédures associées.
Pour la mission suivante (VA 242), lancement Ariane 5 ECA avec son bord une double charge utile, les satellites SuperBird 8/DSN 1 (Japon) et Hylas 4 (Royaume-Uni), les actions sont toujours en cours de traitement et la date de lancement sera fixée une fois que toutes ces actions auront été closes.

http://astronautique.actifforum.com/t19038p525-ariane-5-eca-va241-al-yah-3-ses-14-25-1-2018-anomalie

Summary:

The launch of VA241 resulted in a precedent that a technically sound rocket closed in on inhabitated areas. This situation was unexpected for the range safety and there were no procedures how to deal with such a case. Thats why the rocket was not destroyed

As a result of the investigation by CNES into the safety issues during VA241, 17 recommendations have been proposed and have been accepted by Le Gall. Due to the need to implement 5 recommendations the Soyuz mission had to  be delayed.

---------

So it turns out the analysis by people here in this forum were accurate. Just because CNES doesn't say anything in the public or just because a french minister says everything was safe, doesn't mean it was safe.

I don't think this translation is correct.  Instead of "closed in on inhabited areas", it says "on a bad trajectory", at least according to my high school French.  So not such an obvious admission of guilt.

However, to me, this still sounds like weasel words.  How can "rocket on a bad trajectory" be unprecedented by a range safety organization??  Yes, there is no *specific* rule for "on a bad trajectory, but technically sound", but surely there is a more general rule that applies, namely "on a bad trajectory". And almost surely that rule says "press the red button", and it was not followed.  This is consistent with the above description.


In the US, an off course vehicle can continue to fly as long as it does not violate IIP lines.

Offline Star One

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Those panning "ESA's decision" to withhold the Independent Enquiry Commission report should reevaluate their position after considering the fact that that Commission didn't consider/discuss/examine the range safety issue at all.  As has been discussed/commented on many times, CNES is solely responsible for the range safety at CSG.  ESA is not involved.  The Independent Equiry was into why the rocket behaved as it did, not the actions of the range during the launch.  CNES performed their own, separate review of the range safety response/actions.

Very much correct sir. Which is why I explained that ESA regulations prohibit ESA from publically releasing their report into why VA-241 flew an incorrect trajectory. The ESA report contains proprietary information regarding Ariane 5. As such, the report cannot be publically released.

For some strange reason this distinction apparently wasn't clear to some folks here.

Well in that case it should be the case that it’s release should be petitioned for from the relevant authorities in France. If that fails it sounds like it needs to be taken before the French & then if necessary the EU courts. I imagine that would though need to be done either by a French national or French organisation.
« Last Edit: 03/12/2018 03:09 pm by Star One »

Offline LouScheffer

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However, to me, this still sounds like weasel words.  How can "rocket on a bad trajectory" be unprecedented by a range safety organization??  Yes, there is no *specific* rule for "on a bad trajectory, but technically sound", but surely there is a more general rule that applies, namely "on a bad trajectory". And almost surely that rule says "press the red button", and it was not followed.  This is consistent with the above description.


In the US, an off course vehicle can continue to fly as long as it does not violate IIP lines.
I agree with you 100%.  If the IIP stayed out in the ocean, then there was no danger posed by the off-course rocket, and no reason for range safety to do anything.   If this is the case, it may have *looked* awful close, but it was perfectly safe.

In this case CNES should surely release the report.  It would show the safety procedures where being followed correctly and there was no danger to the town.  There would be no need to change procedures since they were already preserving safety.

But CNES is not releasing the report, and they did say the report issued 17 recommendations, 5 of which were mandatory before the next flight, and caused the flight to be delayed.  If the rules where already good enough, why would they need 17 changes?  In particular, why would 5 of them be neeed before any other flight?  This leads to suspicion (not proof) that the off-course rocket was indeed a danger, that range safety was not sure what to do, and the rules need to be clarified.  In any case, the public (in particular the population of Kourou) would like to know how the rules (new or old) preserve their safety, and not just take CNES's word for it, particularly if they have made mistakes in this area in the past. 




Offline envy887

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I find it rather difficult to believe that the launch did not violate IIP lines - or that if it did not violate them, to believe that the boundaries are sufficiently far from unrestricted areas. It flew almost directly over the beach which was open to the public, and boundaries need to have margins to account for explosive and atmospheric debris dispersal. If the already malfunctioning guidance system had turned the vehicle sideways at the wrong time like 501, it would have dispersed flaming chunks of SRB over a large area.

Offline Space Ghost 1962

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It was not likely to do so given the known vehicle health.

And they are sufficiently embarrassed by the event. (You'll note the eventual stand down for next flight.) It comes at a time when they have to be more professional, with less cost/time per launch, as they attempt to become more competitive for missions, because they have to. (Among other things, it's quite galling to have been selling customers on your unique advantages in reliable launch against upstarts, and have this occur in plain sight.)

Some of us here are uncomfortable with the way this flight was handled before/during/after flight, and that gets commingled with comments that go too far into impugning - that's unacceptable, but understandable, because of the obvious fact of gross flight error of a very potent vehicle. (Myself don't like a government action to assure downrange safety (drop zones) that they miss by large margins, although am with Antares view that for launch to become routine, any departure from flight path constitutes unacceptable standard of conduct of launch.)

The boundary here is how the provider conducts itself internally and externally. They do appear to be doing that, and that's all that matters in the end. Having dealt with proud government institutions in the past, see no surprises here, and always you can find considerable ways they can improve upon "how to communicate" externally better, but that's not what they are concerned with.

In subsequent launches they'll deal with this and more. Perhaps we should let this go, and perhaps will hear more later about this.

Wish them well on the next flight, and back to being the relentless launch professionals/competitors that they are.

Offline envy887

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It was not likely to do so given the known vehicle health.
...

Not likely to explode? Agreed, but that has nothing to do with health or whether it should be allowed outside IIP boundaries. 501 was perfectly healthy until suddenly wasn't. Guidance is perfectly capable of blowing up a rocket in midair, and they knew the guidance was not performing as expected.

IMO the range authority should report what the limiting IIP bounds were, and how close the vehicle came to them.

Offline woods170

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I find it rather difficult to believe that the launch did not violate IIP lines - or that if it did not violate them, to believe that the boundaries are sufficiently far from unrestricted areas. It flew almost directly over the beach which was open to the public, and boundaries need to have margins to account for explosive and atmospheric debris dispersal. If the already malfunctioning guidance system had turned the vehicle sideways at the wrong time like 501, it would have dispersed flaming chunks of SRB over a large area.

Emphasis mine.

You show a complete lack of understanding what happened. The guidance system was not malfunctioning. It was working exactly as it was programmed to do.
What happened is that someone entered an incorrect parameter value (initial azimuth) into the guidance system parameter repository.
« Last Edit: 03/18/2018 10:11 am by woods170 »

Offline woods170

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It was not likely to do so given the known vehicle health.
...

Not likely to explode? Agreed, but that has nothing to do with health or whether it should be allowed outside IIP boundaries. 501 was perfectly healthy until suddenly wasn't. Guidance is perfectly capable of blowing up a rocket in midair, and they knew the guidance was not performing as expected.

IMO the range authority should report what the limiting IIP bounds were, and how close the vehicle came to them.

Emphasis mine.

501 was not perfectly healthy. It had a design flaw in its guidance computer software. It was doomed from the second the "GO for launch" was given.
That was not the case on VA-241. The revised guidance system flown on Ariane 5 ECA has been in service for 13 years and has functioned flawlessly for 64 launches (out of 64).

And what you think the range should report with regards to the VA-241 mishap is of no importance to anyone except (perhaps) yourself.

Offline saliva_sweet

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What happened is that someone entered an incorrect parameter value (initial azimuth) into the guidance system parameter repository.

Causing the guidance system to provide incorrect guidance i.e. malfunction.
« Last Edit: 03/18/2018 12:25 pm by saliva_sweet »

Offline shooltz

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You show a complete lack of understanding what happened. The guidance system was not malfunctioning. It was working exactly as it was programmed to do.
What happened is that someone entered an incorrect parameter value (initial azimuth) into the guidance system parameter repository.

We know this now. The range safety did not know about the initial settings of the guidance system. The question still stands - did the launcher cross the safety lines? If not, how close it was from crossing?

Offline speedevil

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You show a complete lack of understanding what happened. The guidance system was not malfunctioning. It was working exactly as it was programmed to do.
What happened is that someone entered an incorrect parameter value (initial azimuth) into the guidance system parameter repository.

We know this now. The range safety did not know about the initial settings of the guidance system. The question still stands - did the launcher cross the safety lines? If not, how close it was from crossing?

And what did the RSO know not at a couple of minutes into the flight, but at perhaps 20s in, when the potential IIP given having to destroy the vehicle was about to cross Kurou.
Even if the RSO was told immediately 'oops, my bad' 5s after launch and someone confessed to fat-fingering the trajectory, he has no time to process and verify this information.

Offline woods170

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What happened is that someone entered an incorrect parameter value (initial azimuth) into the guidance system parameter repository.

Causing the guidance system to provide incorrect guidance i.e. malfunction.

No. The guidance system flew the trajectory exactly as it had been programmed to do. Unfortunately, this deviated from what the trajectory was designed to be. Classic parameter input error.

The guidance system in itself did not fail. It flew exactly what it was told to fly, to the best of its ability. What it had been told to do was incorrect.
That is malfunction, but not of the guidance system. It is malfunction of the quality control system.
« Last Edit: 03/18/2018 04:34 pm by woods170 »

Offline Space Ghost 1962

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That is malfunction, but not of the guidance system. It is malfunction of the quality control system.
Minor nit.

Launch coordination and processes, part of which is quality control. (Humans actually have to work together for the entire effect to check correctly for the quality control to be effective, because otherwise the check can be made improperly as well, which has happened elsewhere as well, which is why the "system" is part of "process".)

Offline Lars-J

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I find it rather difficult to believe that the launch did not violate IIP lines - or that if it did not violate them, to believe that the boundaries are sufficiently far from unrestricted areas. It flew almost directly over the beach which was open to the public, and boundaries need to have margins to account for explosive and atmospheric debris dispersal. If the already malfunctioning guidance system had turned the vehicle sideways at the wrong time like 501, it would have dispersed flaming chunks of SRB over a large area.

Emphasis mine.

You show a complete lack of understanding what happened. The guidance system was not malfunctioning. It was working exactly as it was programmed to do.
What happened is that someone entered an incorrect parameter value (initial azimuth) into the guidance system parameter repository.

The health of the 'rocket guidance system as programmed' is irrelevant here. It was programmed wrong. But what if it had been programmed even more wrong, to go due south or in the opposite direction?

Clearly there is far more to take into effect here than just the rocket thought it was doing the right thing.

Offline Jim

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The health of the 'rocket guidance system as programmed' is irrelevant here. It was programmed wrong. But what if it had been programmed even more wrong, to go due south or in the opposite direction?

Clearly there is far more to take into effect here than just the rocket thought it was doing the right thing.

Not really.  Doesn't matter. Range safety knew it was off course from the beginning. 

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