I'm not sure different historical scenarios with different Shuttle-derived HLVs would have changed the ultimate outcome.It really doesn't matter whether the vehicle is inline or sidemount, how many SSMEs it employs, or whether it uses 4- or 5-segment SRBs. No matter the technical decisions, the vehicle still _must_ fully employ the old STS workforce and fully utilize the old STS infrastructure.And that means we're still stuffing a ~$3-5 billion per year program into a ~$1-2 billion per year bag.And when you try to do that, you wind up with the gross safety compromises, year-for-year delays, programmatic dithering, ground equipment screw-ups, unaffordability, and incompetent flight rate that we see in SLS today and Constellation previously.There are only two ways out of this dilemma:1) Ramp down/phase out/retire/RIF the old STS workforce and infrastructure. (Politically unacceptable as a whole.)2) Redirect the old STS workforce and infrastructure towards deep space human space exploration architecture elements that don't duplicate and compete very poorly with commercial offerings. (More politically possible with a strong Administrator and White House backing.)I suspect the actual way out, if it ever emerges, will be a combination of these two.There is an old military saying that "Amateurs talk about tactics, generals study logistics."The NASA parallel would be something like "Amateurs talk about vehicle configurations and rocket engines, managers change the workforce and infrastructure."There's nothing wrong with armchair aerospace engineering. But we shouldn't kid ourselves either.A serious discussion about fixing NASA's human space flight program would focus on workforce and infrastructure and not fixate on vehicle configurations and rocket engines.
The vehicle we got in SLS is NOT what DIRECT advocated for. It never was. It was far larger, more costly, and more complex than what direct proposed, and by the time all the damage from Griffin and the Obama administration's waffling was undone what we were left with in 2011 was something that had far exceeded the purpose of using SDHLV in the first place. Even for all that, it still could have worked were it not continuously grown in size and the flight rate reduced due to an absolutely piss poor budget and jackass contractors and their friends in the Alabama (sorry, need to stop here for a second and just say that I have to use stupid words to get my point across. I know that means I must have a weak argument, but that's why I use bad words)..
At that time it was literally THE only thing we had. At all. The commercial sector was still nascent and had much to prove, the enemies of any spaceflight funding continuing beyond shuttle were all around, and there was absolutely no possible way to save the abortion that was CXP.
II don't understand why people want to play this game and act like everything was so easy and there was some obvious alternative solution, there were none. Every possible one was considered and at that time SDHLV was about the only thing standing between some very angry goons and the remaining NASA budget post CXP. And that includes the commercial funding, no NASA no commercial funding. The only possible alternative that might have worked out better would have been going with the ULA ACES and expanded EELV proposals, but these would have had major pitfalls of their own and would have required alot of new hardware, and would have leverage exactly none of what CXP had left over.
Quote from: FinalFrontier on 05/14/2018 05:52 amAt that time it was literally THE only thing we had. At all. The commercial sector was still nascent and had much to prove....In 2010 ULA, which was at the time the USA's most credible rocket builder, offered derivatives of the Atlas V and Delta IV with LEO capacities up to 140 tonnes (see 2nd & 3rd attachments to this post)..
At that time it was literally THE only thing we had. At all. The commercial sector was still nascent and had much to prove....
Nasa will do as its told from now on or it will cease to exist. It nearly did this time around. There won't be a second chance. They either stay in budget and on time or they go away: Its that simple.
Quote from: FinalFrontier on 05/14/2018 05:52 amThe vehicle we got in SLS is NOT what DIRECT advocated for. It never was. It was far larger, more costly, and more complex than what direct proposed, and by the time all the damage from Griffin and the Obama administration's waffling was undone what we were left with in 2011 was something that had far exceeded the purpose of using SDHLV in the first place. Even for all that, it still could have worked were it not continuously grown in size and the flight rate reduced due to an absolutely piss poor budget and jackass contractors and their friends in the Alabama (sorry, need to stop here for a second and just say that I have to use stupid words to get my point across. I know that means I must have a weak argument, but that's why I use bad words).. Again you are going from a reusable vehicle to a disposable one. To build the Orbiter Atlantis it took from March of 1980 till April of 1984 according to NASA’s website. A SDHLV is going to need much of the same systems as the shuttle. In addition, most expendable rockets are ordered at least 2 years before the mission. To expect the same flight rate for the same money as the shuttle disposing of expensive shuttle parts is a bit much. And the complexity as well as size have a lot to do with being a SDHLV in the first place. For instance a lox/kerosene first stage ala Saturn V and Falcon 9 and Atlas would make for a smaller more compact first stage as well as eliminate the reason for the SRB and make for a cheaper vehicle to operate but politically that was not viable. To give you an idea of the difference between the Shuttle and Saturn V, the Shuttle system actually masses more dry than the Saturn V. The VAB floor as well as the Crawlers had to be beefed up to handle it. The Saturn V would mass more wet but it wouldn’t do so until it was at the pad and filled with propellant. Not to mention the operational changes as the SRBs are both toxic and potentially explosive(i.e some offices had to be moved out of the VAB). QuoteAt that time it was literally THE only thing we had. At all. The commercial sector was still nascent and had much to prove, the enemies of any spaceflight funding continuing beyond shuttle were all around, and there was absolutely no possible way to save the abortion that was CXP. Atlas V was in existence at the time of CXP and has sent cargo and will soon send crew to the ISS. The first goal of CXP was to send crew and cargo to the ISS not send people to the moon. Ares 1 was not needed and only served the political goal of keeping the shuttle workforce around. Commercial space has existed since the late 80ies\early 90ies. The only difference between humans and cargo is that one is a bit more delicate than the other. QuoteII don't understand why people want to play this game and act like everything was so easy and there was some obvious alternative solution, there were none. Every possible one was considered and at that time SDHLV was about the only thing standing between some very angry goons and the remaining NASA budget post CXP. And that includes the commercial funding, no NASA no commercial funding. The only possible alternative that might have worked out better would have been going with the ULA ACES and expanded EELV proposals, but these would have had major pitfalls of their own and would have required alot of new hardware, and would have leverage exactly none of what CXP had left over. Any SDHLV would have required lots of new hardware and there was little of CXP to leverage.
To expect the same flight rate for the same money as the shuttle disposing of expensive shuttle parts is a bit much. And the complexity as well as size have a lot to do with being a SDHLV in the first place.
Ares 1 was not needed and only served the political goal of keeping the shuttle workforce around. Commercial space has existed since the late 80ies\early 90ies.
Not to mention the operational changes as the SRBs are both toxic and potentially explosive(i.e some offices had to be moved out of the VAB).
2) Redirect the old STS workforce and infrastructure towards deep space human space exploration architecture elements that don't duplicate and compete very poorly with commercial offerings. (More politically possible with a strong Administrator and White House backing.)
All this talk of what might have been needs context (then we move on):When the 2010 NASA Authorization Act was passed, what the members of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation committee had in mind for the initial capability was quite literally DIRECT. Senate Bill S.3729, Section 302 stated: "The initial capability of the core elements, without an upper stage, of lifting payloads weighing between 70 tons and 100 tons into low-Earth orbit in preparation for transit for missions beyond low-Earth orbit". This was pulled directly from the team's work and subsequent conversations with prominent committee members. ATK's influence was all over the advanced capability and it was the DIRECT 246 Heavy (modified) that is reflected in the advanced capability requirement. The Senate Bill said: "the capability to carry an integrated upper Earth departure stage bringing the total lift capability of the Space Launch System to 130 tons or more". The Heavy was never the aim of the team, but a concession to the knowledge that by that time the 5-segment SRB was a certain thing. The team believed it could likely use the SRB for the initial capability by simply leaving out the center segment, effectively making it a 4-segment SRB. At that time the SRB's were still to be recovered and reused. Bolden was dragging NASA's feet and slow walking the process so completely (likely at the direction of Obama) that by the time SLS was announced the Alabama (sorry, need to stop here for a second and just say that I have to use stupid words to get my point across. I know that means I must have a weak argument, but that's why I use bad words). and friends had completely redesigned the LV and had effectively resurrected the Ares-V in its place. It even started with 5xRS-26s. At that time there was still enough of the STS infrastructure and personnel left to make it possible for it to actually be a SDHL but that quickly evaporated as the entire program began slipping to the right by a year every year and became a perpetual jobs program rather than a space program that was actually supposed to do anything. And here we are today - a massive federal jobs program called SLS that spends billions of dollars every year without actually doing a damn thing except completely spend the money. Conclusion: The days of DIRECT are long past. That program can never be resurrected so there's no need to rehash what might have been. SLS is what we have for a government program now. It's too big and it's too expensive but it's what we have. I don't want to see it fail like CxP did. The HLV is actually not a bad rocket, if only it could actually be built and flown. Yes there are other things that could be done with the money but it is what it is and after all this time and expense I want to see it fly. Because if it doesn't - well I don't know if NASA could survive another epic failure like CxP. So I hope we can all, even the non-supporters, support a successful program to get SLS/Orion into space. What NASA does with it after that - well that's up to the new vehicle's designers: Congress.
I hope NASA will remain after SLS is canceled, because it would be a shame to lose the other programs. But the fate of SLS is sealed. It can't and shouldn't compete with commercial heavy lift. And commercial heavy lift isn't going away, so it's only a matter of time.
All this talk of what might have been needs context (then we move on):When the 2010 NASA Authorization Act was passed, what the members of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation committee had in mind for the initial capability was quite literally DIRECT.
Conclusion: The days of DIRECT are long past.
SLS is what we have for a government program now. It's too big and it's too expensive but it's what we have. I don't want to see it fail like CxP did. The HLV is actually not a bad rocket, if only it could actually be built and flown.
Yes there are other things that could be done with the money but it is what it is and after all this time and expense I want to see it fly. Because if it doesn't - well I don't know if NASA could survive another epic failure like CxP.
Quote from: envy887 on 05/14/2018 08:05 pmI hope NASA will remain after SLS is canceled, because it would be a shame to lose the other programs. But the fate of SLS is sealed. It can't and shouldn't compete with commercial heavy lift. And commercial heavy lift isn't going away, so it's only a matter of time.NASA is already prohibited by law from competing with commercial companies. If anything it is commercial that is allowed to compete with NASA for payloads. Cancellation of SLS is not a sure bet. It is a proven money maker for the Senators and Congressmen to feed federal funds back to their home districts. So assuming it survives, the US Gov is going to want to keep its own HSF program to fly US Gov payloads, crew and probes on US Gov vehicles. Remember, the government does not have to show any black ink. If it runs short it just taxes more, prints more, or both.
SLS doesn't have to show a profit, but it does have to show a public benefit, or the public will stop funding it.
And here we are today - a massive federal jobs program called SLS that spends billions of dollars every year without actually doing a damn thing except completely spend the money.
I really wish that Jim would do a myths of direct or what ever thread like he did myths of CXP but I doubt he can at the moment due to working on SLS .*snip*And would require just about as much work as SLS does. Those studies like direct were at best first order. It is like saying if I put a more powerful engine in my car it would go faster. Well true, but can the engine fit under the hood and can the body support it? What about the power train, braking, center of gravity, suspension, wheel base, fuel economy(or millage per tank)and so forth. The shuttle was designed with a different purpose in mind reusable space plane not HLV. It was designed using technology and assembly methods from the 70ies and to expect it to be easy to mold into a rocket appropriate for the 21st centaury is wishful thinking.
The rocket would need new avionics as the shuttle's avionics are mostly in the shuttle itself and were reused.
Without a mission no one can say what is or is not a useless piece of information. LEO is perfectly good spot to stage a Mars mission, an NEO mission, or an moon mission that would make the Saturn V look about as powerful as an model rocket. But with no mission(at the time) driving the requirements of the rocket well any old number will do I guess.
Between SLS, Exploration Ground Systems, and Orion, the Exploration Systems Development budget is a solid $3-$4 billion per year, not the $1-$2 billion that you posit.
Shuttle functioned well enough on that kind of budget, and actually flew missions to boot.
If all the rant about DIRECT proves anything, it's this: It's entirely possible to kill a major NASA program, fire tons of people, and junk all the previous infrastructure, as long as you have someone devious enough to arrange the whole thing with congress and there is something else to replace said program.
All this talk of what might have been needs context (then we move on):When the 2010 NASA Authorization Act was passed, what the members of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation committee had in mind for the initial capability was quite literally DIRECT. Senate Bill S.3729, Section 302 stated: "The initial capability of the core elements, without an upper stage, of lifting payloads weighing between 70 tons and 100 tons into low-Earth orbit in preparation for transit for missions beyond low-Earth orbit". This was pulled directly from the team's work and subsequent conversations with prominent committee members. ATK's influence was all over the advanced capability and it was the DIRECT 246 Heavy (modified) that is reflected in the advanced capability requirement. The Senate Bill said: "the capability to carry an integrated upper Earth departure stage bringing the total lift capability of the Space Launch System to 130 tons or more". The Heavy was never the aim of the team, but a concession to the knowledge that by that time the 5-segment SRB was a certain thing. The team believed it could likely use the SRB for the initial capability by simply leaving out the center segment, effectively making it a 4-segment SRB. At that time the SRB's were still to be recovered and reused. Bolden was dragging NASA's feet and slow walking the process so completely (likely at the direction of Obama) that by the time SLS was announced the Alabama mafioso and friends had completely redesigned the LV and had effectively resurrected the Ares-V in its place. It even started with 5xRS-26s. At that time there was still enough of the STS infrastructure and personnel left to make it possible for it to actually be a SDHL but that quickly evaporated as the entire program began slipping to the right by a year every year and became a perpetual jobs program rather than a space program that was actually supposed to do anything. And here we are today - a massive federal jobs program called SLS that spends billions of dollars every year without actually doing a damn thing except completely spend the money. Conclusion: The days of DIRECT are long past. That program can never be resurrected so there's no need to rehash what might have been. SLS is what we have for a government program now. It's too big and it's too expensive but it's what we have. I don't want to see it fail like CxP did. The HLV is actually not a bad rocket, if only it could actually be built and flown. Yes there are other things that could be done with the money but it is what it is and after all this time and expense I want to see it fly. Because if it doesn't - well I don't know if NASA could survive another epic failure like CxP. So I hope we can all, even the non-supporters, support a successful program to get SLS/Orion into space. What NASA does with it after that - well that's up to the new vehicle's designers: Congress.
Quote from: su27k on 05/15/2018 04:56 amIf all the rant about DIRECT proves anything, it's this: It's entirely possible to kill a major NASA program, fire tons of people, and junk all the previous infrastructure, as long as you have someone devious enough to arrange the whole thing with congress and there is something else to replace said program. The likely big projects over the next few years are the Mars Transfer Vehicle, various space stations, the Moon base, the Mars base and rovers. In situ resource utilization (IRSU) on the Moon, Mars and asteroids will exist but requires a different skill set from making rockets. The rocket side of lunar landers is already under way but its cabin is not. IMHO Those are the areas that the SLS NASA sites should enter.