100% Success Rate for Reflown Boosters

[ChrisWilson68]

As of right now, reflown first stages of orbital launchers have a 100% success rate. :-)

Will the success rate of launches on reflown boosters ever drop below that of launches using unflown boosters?

How long before insurance rates on flight-proven boosters are lower than insurance rates on unflown boosters?

[wannamoonbase]

As Elon said, it's taken 15 years to get to this milestone.

They've done a lot and hopefully as their launch rate increases they reach their other goals of full and rapid reuse-ability sooner than another 15 years.

There's no reason to doubt they will accomplish these goals.  Just how long.

Congrats SpaceX and reflows boosters everywhere.

[dglow]

This may be an appropriate time to serve up some 'claim chowder' ...

In April of 2015, less than two years ago, some of the discussion looked like this:

How many more attempts before SpaceX gives up on first stage landing?  They've tried twice for the barge and crashed both times, with a third attempt called off by rough waves.  Three prior return tests without the barge also had mixed results.  These experiments are bold and interesting, but they're not free.

 - Ed Kyle

even if they land it, it doesn't mean they can reuse the stage.

[ehb]

This may be an appropriate time to serve up some 'claim chowder' ...

In April of 2015, less than two years ago, some of the discussion looked like this:

How many more attempts before SpaceX gives up on first stage landing?  They've tried twice for the barge and crashed both times, with a third attempt called off by rough waves.  Three prior return tests without the barge also had mixed results.  These experiments are bold and interesting, but they're not free.

 - Ed Kyle

even if they land it, it doesn't mean they can reuse the stage.

They weren't unreasonable opinions.
What we have witnessed today is a testiment to the vision, courage, determination & skill of the SpaceX team.

[Kansan52]

I had the same feelings. Maybe landing just won't work. The F1 was planned to be recovered and they never even tried. Step by step they improved and kept my hopes up.

Even now, with such a success and history being made, there is no promise that they will get to fast relaunch.

Still, I would not bet against them.

[ChrisWilson68]

I was watching the webcast in the office with some coworkers.  A bit before liftoff, a couple of us were expressing high confidence it would work.  Another guy said he was more skeptical.  I offered him a bet with 10-1 odds, but he declined.

[john smith 19]

This is excellent news for SX.

Now the question is what does this do for the customer prices and customer insurance premiums?

We presume the customer did not pay full launch price, but did they settle for a 30% cut?

At the end of the day if the end user price does not drop enough to expand the market (a lot) then SX could have gone on doing what they were doing and saved every cent spent on doing this. Which is the choice every previous ELV mfg has made.

Hopefully the price cut will be big enough to expand the market enough to make this effort worthwhile.

[Lar]

This is excellent news for SX.

Now the question is what does this do for the customer prices and customer insurance premiums?

We presume the customer did not pay full launch price, but did they settle for a 30% cut?

At the end of the day if the end user price does not drop enough to expand the market (a lot) then SX could have gone on doing what they were doing and saved every cent spent on doing this. Which is the choice every previous ELV mfg has made.

Hopefully the price cut will be big enough to expand the market enough to make this effort worthwhile.

No, because they could return to normal hours at Hawthorne production lines by making less S1 components.

But CommsX, if it goes, will lead to a big expansion in number of SpaceX launches.

Economics is off topic for this very narrowly focused thread. So is raw number of launches.  I'm interested to see how low this percentage goes before it starts to climb again, though.

[rpapo]

No, because they could return to normal hours at Hawthorne production lines by making less S1 components.

Somehow I find it hard to imagine any SpaceX facility working "normal" hours.

But this, too, is off topic.

[Kaputnik]

This may be an appropriate time to serve up some 'claim chowder' ...

In April of 2015, less than two years ago, some of the discussion looked like this:

How many more attempts before SpaceX gives up on first stage landing?  They've tried twice for the barge and crashed both times, with a third attempt called off by rough waves.  Three prior return tests without the barge also had mixed results.  These experiments are bold and interesting, but they're not free.

 - Ed Kyle

even if they land it, it doesn't mean they can reuse the stage.

Or my first ever encounter with Jim:

A recoverable stage is not an expendable stage with recovery hardware.

Of course he is is correct, really, but at the time I think everybody expected reusable stages would need far more obvious and integrated recovery hardware. The breakthrough with SpaceX is that they have utilised the MPS already on the stage and added the bare minimum of additional hardware. It's kind of obvious in hindsight, but it wasn't always so!

[john smith 19]

Of course he is is correct, really, but at the time I think everybody expected reusable stages would need far more obvious and integrated recovery hardware. The breakthrough with SpaceX is that they have utilised the MPS already on the stage and added the bare minimum of additional hardware. It's kind of obvious in hindsight, but it wasn't always so!

Anyone aware of the mass tradeoff to do 2nd stage recovery would automatically be trying to minimize what hardware they added due to the 1:1 trade in payload mass.

Using the MPS was always the obvious solution, but the massive difference between fully loaded and returned stage weights meant either multiple engines or very deep throttling.

What wasn't obvious was engine control authority with a high aspect ratio structure was inadequate. It's taken the grid fins and their associated hydraulics to supply enough control authority to make reliable landings possible. BTW since I'm unaware of any previous concept for 1st stage reuse that used grid fins (and there were several touted in the 60's and IIRC the 70's as well) I'd conclude that no one really looked at the problem with enough detail to know they were needed, which suggests all of those proposals were (at best) wishful thinking.

A fact any competitor planning to land a full first (or probably second) stage ignores at their peril.

I suspect (but can't prove) that you can make a stage stiff enough that engine TVC could do the job, and you would not have the complexity of the grid fins and their control system to deal with. However I also suspect that you add a lot more structural weight to do so, unless you go short and wide IE the Bono SSTO concepts. Given you didn't want to add the grid fins to begin with staying with an active system limits the additional weight.

And of course the big landing legs.

[AncientU]

...
Using the MPS was always the obvious solution
...

Shuttle
DoD reusable booster program
Falcon 1/9 early days
NASA inflatables/parachutes program
SMART reuse
New Glenn

Forehead smackingly obvious now

[JasonAW3]

      I'm thinking that most companies will still be cautious until, either 3 or 4 boosters have been reflown at least once, or at least one booster is reflown 4 or 5 times.

      The good thing here is, once a life expectancy of the booster is determined for the number of reflights, the last flight can be an expendable launch, with a relatively low value payload.

[meekGee]

The even bigger misprediction ever since F9 1.1 was that SpaceX should stop "wasting everyone's time and money" with their reusability experiments, and that customers will abandon them because they "can't ​just fly the same configuration".

Both NASA and commercial customers proved very supportive, and clearly the path of self-funding development from revenue of the same flights proved the right way to go.

EDIT
As for the title of the thread, bring tongue in cheek, SpaceX has a record of nailing all the hard things on the first try, and only failing later...

But that's not uncommon in aerospace.

[ChrisWilson68]

The good thing here is, once a life expectancy of the booster is determined for the number of reflights, the last flight can be an expendable launch, with a relatively low value payload.

For some things, like tires, there's something that is integral to that thing that gets used up, and when it's used up, you can't use it any more.  For other things, like cars, there are some parts that get used up, such as tires and brake pads, but then you replace those and continue using the car.

It sounds like you're considering first stages to be like tires, but I think they're like cars.  Cars can keep going indefinitely as long as you replace the things that get used up or broken.

Musk said they're planning for 10 flights with no refurbishment and 100 with light refurbishment, and that they really could do 1,000.  So I think Musk thinks of them more like cars and less like tires.

So, I don't think there will ever be a point at which SpaceX decides a given first stage can't be reused and might as well be thrown away because it has reached the end of its life.  They might still do expendable launches just because it's the only way to get the performance a given payload needs, but not because the booster can't be used any more.

[gospacex]

I had the same feelings. Maybe landing just won't work. The F1 was planned to be recovered and they never even tried. Step by step they improved and kept my hopes up.

Even now, with such a success and history being made, there is no promise that they will get to fast relaunch.

If you look at that with a different question - "Are there laws of physics which say a RTLSed rocket can't possibly be fueled up and launched again in 24 hours?" - the answer is obvious. No such laws exist. Therefore, it can be done. Yes, it will need changes on the rocket and a lot of support machinery to make many operations automatic, but it can be done.

I'd say it can be cut down even to some ~4 hours.

An example where engineers simply had to cut down time to the absolute minimum - Formula 1 refuelings are below 10 seconds, tire changes are below 2 (!!!) seconds.

[sdsds]

Another guy said he was more skeptical.  I offered him a bet with 10-1 odds, but he declined.

What odds would you offer on the next launch?

10-1 odds implies roughly a 90.91% chance of success and a 9.09% chance of failure.
11-1 odds implies roughly a 91.67% chance of success and a 8.33% chance of failure.

But maybe this success cuts their chance of failure on the next attempt in half?

20-1 odds implies roughly a 95.24% chance of success and a 4.76% chance of failure.
[Etc.]

[Kaputnik]

The good thing here is, once a life expectancy of the booster is determined for the number of reflights, the last flight can be an expendable launch, with a relatively low value payload.

For some things, like tires, there's something that is integral to that thing that gets used up, and when it's used up, you can't use it any more.  For other things, like cars, there are some parts that get used up, such as tires and brake pads, but then you replace those and continue using the car.

It sounds like you're considering first stages to be like tires, but I think they're like cars.  Cars can keep going indefinitely as long as you replace the things that get used up or broken.

Musk said they're planning for 10 flights with no refurbishment and 100 with light refurbishment, and that they really could do 1,000.  So I think Musk thinks of them more like cars and less like tires.

So, I don't think there will ever be a point at which SpaceX decides a given first stage can't be reused and might as well be thrown away because it has reached the end of its life.  They might still do expendable launches just because it's the only way to get the performance a given payload needs, but not because the booster can't be used any more.

I agree. Stages will continue to be used until something is found to be unsafe or uneconomical to refurbish, e.g. cracked welds on a tank dome etc. At that point any usable parts- engines, grid fins, avionics, etc- would be stripped off for reuse and the rest scrapped. This is how it works for other vehicles including aircraft.

So there will not be a point at which someone says 'this stage is safe to fly, but only once more'. Would you get on a plane where the technician had told you that??

[Negan]

The good thing here is, once a life expectancy of the booster is determined for the number of reflights, the last flight can be an expendable launch, with a relatively low value payload.

For some things, like tires, there's something that is integral to that thing that gets used up, and when it's used up, you can't use it any more.  For other things, like cars, there are some parts that get used up, such as tires and brake pads, but then you replace those and continue using the car.

It sounds like you're considering first stages to be like tires, but I think they're like cars.  Cars can keep going indefinitely as long as you replace the things that get used up or broken.

Musk said they're planning for 10 flights with no refurbishment and 100 with light refurbishment, and that they really could do 1,000.  So I think Musk thinks of them more like cars and less like tires.

So, I don't think there will ever be a point at which SpaceX decides a given first stage can't be reused and might as well be thrown away because it has reached the end of its life.  They might still do expendable launches just because it's the only way to get the performance a given payload needs, but not because the booster can't be used any more.

I agree. Stages will continue to be used until something is found to be unsafe or uneconomical to refurbish, e.g. cracked welds on a tank dome etc. At that point any usable parts- engines, grid fins, avionics, etc- would be stripped off for reuse and the rest scrapped. This is how it works for other vehicles including aircraft.

So there will not be a point at which someone says 'this stage is safe to fly, but only once more'. Would you get on a plane where the technician had told you that??

Plus what makes it acceptable to dump trash into the ocean once you get to that point.

[Lar]

I don't think we will see "safe to fly, but only one more time". (I agree with Kaputnik)

However I DO think we will see something like "this stage is a block 5, it's due for its 100 flight light overhaul in two flights, which costs X USD, but we really want to also upgrade it to a block 7[1] to be current, which costs 42X[2]... if we expend it, we can charge an FH price  for customer S's 9 tonne[3] GTO mission, but do it with an F9 expendable, It's cheaper than the block 7 upgrade and we haven't shut down the Hawthorne line for the block 8 cutover, so we have enough stages in storage before the cutover...  plus we don't put wear and tear on three FH cores, and save some propellant costs  ... so let's expend it"

Working the trades.

1 - yes, I don't believe Block 5 is last
2 - 42 is a notional number, but you knew I'd use it.
3 - notional mission size

[mme]

I don't think we will see "safe to fly, but only one more time". (I agree with Kaputnik)

However I DO think we will see something like "this stage is a block 5, it's due for its 100 flight light overhaul, which costs X USD, but we really want to also upgrade it to a block 7[1] to be current, which costs 42X[2]... if we expend it, we can charge an FH price  for customer S's 9 tonne[3] GTO mission, but do it with an F9 expendable, so let's expend it. It's cheaper than the block 7 upgrade and we haven't shut down the Hawthorne line for the block 8 cutover, so we have enough stages in storage before the cutover... "

Working the trades.

1 - yes, I don't believe Block 5 is last
2 - 42 is a notional number, but you knew I'd use it.
3 - notional mission size

I had the same thought and it's how I expect them to rotate out many of the current pre-block 5 boosters.

I have no rational reason for this but once block 5 and FH are flying I'd prefer it if they just flew it on an FH and recycled the out of date F9 when the time comes.  This is probably why I am not a billionaire and don't have a secret lair in a volcano.

[ChrisWilson68]

I completely agree with Lar.  While they won't have boosters that are free to expend, some boosters will be less valuable than others, and they'll take that into account when deciding whether to fly expendable or Falcon Heavy, and when flying expendable they'll naturally choose the least-valuable booster to expend, whether that's because it is block 17 instead of the latest block 23 or because it just needs more work.  Piston-driven light-aircraft often need an expensive engine overhaul after 2,000 hours of operation, so a plane with a new engine costs a lot more on the used-plane market than one that is close to needing an engine overhaul.

I also agree with Kaputnik that there will be cases where something is found to be broken and not worth fixing so the stage will be stripped for parts.

[dglow]

What wasn't obvious was engine control authority with a high aspect ratio structure was inadequate. It's taken the grid fins and their associated hydraulics to supply enough control authority to make reliable landings possible. BTW since I'm unaware of any previous concept for 1st stage reuse that used grid fins (and there were several touted in the 60's and IIRC the 70's as well) I'd conclude that no one really looked at the problem with enough detail to know they were needed, which suggests all of those proposals were (at best) wishful thinking.

A fact any competitor planning to land a full first (or probably second) stage ignores at their peril.

In fairness, it seems pretty clear that Blue had this figured out; witness the control vanes atop Shepard and Glenn. It's clear those surfaces are highly integral to their booster designs and, in the case of New Shepard, possibly (likely?) planned well before SpaceX determined its own need for grid fins.

Credit Blue Origin for arriving at their solution with a fully-formed design. Though I'd always trade that for SpaceX's iterative, develop-as-you-fly approach.

[edkyle99]

Plus what makes it acceptable to dump trash into the ocean once you get to that point.

The London Convention attempts to control ocean dumping in international waters to some extent.  The U.S. was a signatory.  It calls for a permitting process.  Presumably, U.S. companies that launch rockets have to get a permit for stage disposal in the open ocean from the U.S. government.  I'm not sure if that is a correct interpretation.  The Convention bans the dumping of certain hazardous materials, but other things, like concrete, metal, etc, are allowed. 

 - Ed Kyle 

[Negan]

Plus what makes it acceptable to dump trash into the ocean once you get to that point.

The London Convention attempts to control ocean dumping in international waters to some extent.  The U.S. was a signatory.  It calls for a permitting process.  Presumably, U.S. companies that launch rockets have to get a permit for stage disposal in the open ocean from the U.S. government.  I'm not sure if that is a correct interpretation.  The Convention bans the dumping of certain hazardous materials, but other things, like concrete, metal, etc, are allowed. 

 - Ed Kyle

Thank you for the information. I just don't like the idea of littering in general, although the practicality of the situation has required it and could still require it for a long time to come. I just hope that it's not done for the sole purpose of wringing the last little bit of profit out of a booster.

[edkyle99]

Plus what makes it acceptable to dump trash into the ocean once you get to that point.

The London Convention attempts to control ocean dumping in international waters to some extent.  The U.S. was a signatory.  It calls for a permitting process.  Presumably, U.S. companies that launch rockets have to get a permit for stage disposal in the open ocean from the U.S. government.  I'm not sure if that is a correct interpretation.  The Convention bans the dumping of certain hazardous materials, but other things, like concrete, metal, etc, are allowed. 

 - Ed Kyle

Thank you for the information. I just don't like the idea of littering in general, although the practicality of the situation has required it and could still require it for a long time to come. I just hope that it's not done for the sole purpose of wringing the last little bit of profit out of a booster.

If you don't like ocean litter (I'm with you on that), don't read the following article!  A few rocket stages is miniscule compared to the "12.7 million metric tons of plastic" reportedly dumped by a few countries in 2010 alone!
http://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-tons-of-plastic-trash-in-oceans-20150213-story.html

 - Ed Kyle

[Eer]

This may be an appropriate time to serve up some 'claim chowder' ...

In April of 2015, less than two years ago, some of the discussion looked like this:

How many more attempts before SpaceX gives up on first stage landing?  They've tried twice for the barge and crashed both times, with a third attempt called off by rough waves.  Three prior return tests without the barge also had mixed results.  These experiments are bold and interesting, but they're not free.

 - Ed Kyle

even if they land it, it doesn't mean they can reuse the stage.

In a similar vein, I think it's interesting to consider how the measure of success begins to change, from "if we aren't blowing up some grasshopper booster test articles, we aren't pushing hard enough" towards "how many safe launches and landings in a row can we achieve".  That's more than a change in maturity, and reflects a shift towards operational (as opposed to experimental) thinking.  Cool.

[meekGee]

The good thing here is, once a life expectancy of the booster is determined for the number of reflights, the last flight can be an expendable launch, with a relatively low value payload.

For some things, like tires, there's something that is integral to that thing that gets used up, and when it's used up, you can't use it any more.  For other things, like cars, there are some parts that get used up, such as tires and brake pads, but then you replace those and continue using the car.

It sounds like you're considering first stages to be like tires, but I think they're like cars.  Cars can keep going indefinitely as long as you replace the things that get used up or broken.

Musk said they're planning for 10 flights with no refurbishment and 100 with light refurbishment, and that they really could do 1,000.  So I think Musk thinks of them more like cars and less like tires.

So, I don't think there will ever be a point at which SpaceX decides a given first stage can't be reused and might as well be thrown away because it has reached the end of its life.  They might still do expendable launches just because it's the only way to get the performance a given payload needs, but not because the booster can't be used any more.

I agree. Stages will continue to be used until something is found to be unsafe or uneconomical to refurbish, e.g. cracked welds on a tank dome etc. At that point any usable parts- engines, grid fins, avionics, etc- would be stripped off for reuse and the rest scrapped. This is how it works for other vehicles including aircraft.

So there will not be a point at which someone says 'this stage is safe to fly, but only once more'. Would you get on a plane where the technician had told you that??

Technically, every single expendable rocket ever used was "safe to fly but only once more..."

But I know what you mean. 

[john smith 19]

...
Using the MPS was always the obvious solution
...

Shuttle
DoD reusable booster program
Falcon 1/9 early days
NASA inflatables/parachutes program
SMART reuse
New Glenn

Forehead smackingly obvious now

The answer was in the context of reusing an existing first stage. And in fact SX started with the same parachutes and air bags concept as the Kistler 1.

An engine based systems means that you're using something that you already know works, rather than another sub system. The theoretically simpler parachutes/air bags turns out to be operationally complex, lacks control authority and probably needs a structure that is strong in two axes, an issue with the Shuttle as well.

[Nomadd]

The question of deciding when to retire a booster by labeling it expendable isn't just "Is it safe to fly?" It's "Is it worth recovering?" It might be fine to fly 10 more times if you didn't have to worry about re-entry.

[launchwatcher]

Plus what makes it acceptable to dump trash into the ocean once you get to that point.

The London Convention attempts to control ocean dumping in international waters to some extent.  The U.S. was a signatory.  It calls for a permitting process.  Presumably, U.S. companies that launch rockets have to get a permit for stage disposal in the open ocean from the U.S. government.  I'm not sure if that is a correct interpretation.  The Convention bans the dumping of certain hazardous materials, but other things, like concrete, metal, etc, are allowed. 

 - Ed Kyle

Thank you for the information. I just don't like the idea of littering in general, although the practicality of the situation has required it and could still require it for a long time to come. I just hope that it's not done for the sole purpose of wringing the last little bit of profit out of a booster.

It's not always "littering".  It's becoming quite common to sink old ships, subway cars, etc., into shallow water as artificial reefs, creating additional habitat for undersea flora and fauna.

[Negan]

Plus what makes it acceptable to dump trash into the ocean once you get to that point.

The London Convention attempts to control ocean dumping in international waters to some extent.  The U.S. was a signatory.  It calls for a permitting process.  Presumably, U.S. companies that launch rockets have to get a permit for stage disposal in the open ocean from the U.S. government.  I'm not sure if that is a correct interpretation.  The Convention bans the dumping of certain hazardous materials, but other things, like concrete, metal, etc, are allowed. 

 - Ed Kyle

Thank you for the information. I just don't like the idea of littering in general, although the practicality of the situation has required it and could still require it for a long time to come. I just hope that it's not done for the sole purpose of wringing the last little bit of profit out of a booster.

It's not always "littering".  It's becoming quite common to sink old ships, subway cars, etc., into shallow water as artificial reefs, creating additional habitat for undersea flora and fauna.

So that wouldn't be for the sole purpose of profit would it?

Edit: And crashing a stage into shallow water probably wouldn't be the best way to go about it.

[Kaputnik]

The question of deciding when to retire a booster by labeling it expendable isn't just "Is it safe to fly?" It's "Is it worth recovering?" It might be fine to fly 10 more times if you didn't have to worry about re-entry.

Yes it is conceivable that a booster might have toasted its TPS and is perhaps an outdated block, so a decision might be made to strip the grid fins and legs off and expend it. But I don't think it's likely to happen very often, especially once FH is in service and the extra performance of expendable F9 is not required.

Whilst the F9 will probably continue to evolve over time, there will remain large areas of commonality between each iteration. So just because a core is 'last year's model' doesn't mean it's worthless- you might still want to reuse components of it which have not been altered and remain compatible with the newer versions.

[Lar]

The question of deciding when to retire a booster by labeling it expendable isn't just "Is it safe to fly?" It's "Is it worth recovering?" It might be fine to fly 10 more times if you didn't have to worry about re-entry.

Yes it is conceivable that a booster might have toasted its TPS and is perhaps an outdated block, so a decision might be made to strip the grid fins and legs off and expend it. But I don't think it's likely to happen very often, especially once FH is in service and the extra performance of expendable F9 is not required.

Whilst the F9 will probably continue to evolve over time, there will remain large areas of commonality between each iteration. So just because a core is 'last year's model' doesn't mean it's worthless- you might still want to reuse components of it which have not been altered and remain compatible with the newer versions.

Why am I reminded of the Johnny Cash song about a 55-56-57-58-59-60 Cadillac

[macpacheco]

      I'm thinking that most companies will still be cautious until, either 3 or 4 boosters have been reflown at least once, or at least one booster is reflown 4 or 5 times.

      The good thing here is, once a life expectancy of the booster is determined for the number of reflights, the last flight can be an expendable launch, with a relatively low value payload.

You mistakenly assume stages don't have structural margins properly calculated to be relaunched indefinitely, with proper refurbishment. That number is actually 1000.
And if SpaceX falls such a massive life of 1000 flights with refurbs every 10 flights its not going to be a fixed/known number. A booster that just launches to LEO, have extra fuel for a longer re-entry burn and does the single engine land will be worn far less than a GTO mission that lands a very hot profile.
With Block V missions that would require a hot profile won't be accepted for F9, FH reusable will be offered to the customer instead.

So far it appears that the main rocket structures and M1Ds are coming back in excellent shape and just ancillary components like grid fins and other (unreported) components might not be fairing quite as well, and are replaced in refurb.

Its also possible that come components can be replaced to update the booster, say to a Block IV and finally a Block V.

Lets not mix up SpaceX customer's comfort factors with actual SpaceX engineering.

Edit: mixed up some facts, correcting some assumptions.

[hamerad]

Another thing to look at, can SES' competition really afford to let them be the only ones taking advantage of the earlier slots that using a flight proven booster allows?

Perhaps this will allow them to get over the emotional concern of using flight proven boosters.

[AncientU]

Another thing to look at, can SES' competition really afford to let them be the only ones taking advantage of the earlier slots that using a flight proven booster allows?

Perhaps this will allow them to get over the emotional concern of using flight proven boosters.

I expect the USG to be the hold-out.

As Martin Halliwell stated, in 24 months, it will be irrelevant whether the core is new or flight proven.  I believe that he was referring to the commercial market(SES' competition as you state). 

Several on this forum have suggested that the reliability of flown cores will exceed that of new cores -- possible this will become fact in about this two-year timeframe.

[macpacheco]

Another thing to look at, can SES' competition really afford to let them be the only ones taking advantage of the earlier slots that using a flight proven booster allows?

Perhaps this will allow them to get over the emotional concern of using flight proven boosters.

I expect the USG to be the hold-out.

As Martin Halliwell stated, in 24 months, it will be irrelevant whether the core is new or flight proven.  I believe that he was referring to the commercial market(SES' competition as you state). 

Several on this forum have suggested that the reliability of flown cores will exceed that of new cores -- possible this will become fact in about this two-year timeframe.

NASA already stated they're talking with SX about using reflown boosters. I'm sure NASA will arrive at some process to reuse boosters, but the extra NASA red tape might make it easier for SX to just assign NASA the new boosters and reuse for others.
The ultimate goal is NASA trusts the process and realize reflown boosters are just as safe as new ones, and that SX knows what its doing.

[meekGee]

In the reliability bathtub curve, it takes more than two flights to get passed infant mortality issues.

But there's one exception - starting with flight #2, you already know that you don't have assembly errors, and you have a real life telemetry record.

[BeamRider]

"They might still do expendable launches just because it's the only way to get the performance a given payload needs..."

Or to get rid of the damned thing once they can't give them away as monuments anymore and need the hangar space. ;-)

[AncientU]

In the reliability bathtub curve, it takes more than two flights to get passed infant mortality issues.

But there's one exception - starting with flight #2, you already know that you don't have assembly errors, and you have a real life telemetry record.

Assembly errors can be inserted during refurbishment... another reason to minimize touch work there.

A simplistic view of bathtub curve would indicate failure rate drops from first to second launch, and then continues down(though more slowly) after that.  So, once the design for reusability is proven (which it now essentially is, or soon will be), all first flights should carry higher risk than second... and second to third, until the wear-out failures dominate.

[laszlo]

In the reliability bathtub curve, it takes more than two flights to get passed infant mortality issues.

But there's one exception - starting with flight #2, you already know that you don't have assembly errors, and you have a real life telemetry record.

You only know that if there were no changes between flights, such as refurbishment. Once you change anything, you're in unknown territory and have to test and verify, which also exposes you to the dangers of the test processes, in addition to the results of the changes. That's why "flight proven" is marketing babble. Skilled people and well-developed process controls become indispensable.

Edit - Oops, AncientU types faster than I do

[AncientU]

Didn't think that was possible 

[meekGee]

In the reliability bathtub curve, it takes more than two flights to get passed infant mortality issues.

But there's one exception - starting with flight #2, you already know that you don't have assembly errors, and you have a real life telemetry record.

You only know that if there were no changes between flights, such as refurbishment. Once you change anything, you're in unknown territory and have to test and verify, which also exposes you to the dangers of the test processes, in addition to the results of the changes. That's why "flight proven" is marketing babble. Skilled people and well-developed process controls become indispensable.

Edit - Oops, AncientU types faster than I do

No worse than in the unflown rocket.

It too was assembled and tested.

And we already know that the major systems (engines) remain,  and practically all components in a year's time.

[edkyle99]

This may be an appropriate time to serve up some 'claim chowder' ...

In April of 2015, less than two years ago, some of the discussion looked like this:

How many more attempts before SpaceX gives up on first stage landing?  They've tried twice for the barge and crashed both times, with a third attempt called off by rough waves.  Three prior return tests without the barge also had mixed results.  These experiments are bold and interesting, but they're not free.

 - Ed Kyle

Still looks valid to my eyes.  Those experiments were not free.  $1 billion, according to Elon on March 30 after the SES 10 flight.  That is an extra $10 million per-flight surcharge over 100 flights to recover.   Not free.

 - Ed Kyle

[M.E.T.]

This may be an appropriate time to serve up some 'claim chowder' ...

In April of 2015, less than two years ago, some of the discussion looked like this:

How many more attempts before SpaceX gives up on first stage landing?  They've tried twice for the barge and crashed both times, with a third attempt called off by rough waves.  Three prior return tests without the barge also had mixed results.  These experiments are bold and interesting, but they're not free.

 - Ed Kyle

Still looks valid to my eyes.  Those experiments were not free.  $1 billion, according to Elon on March 30 after the SES 10 flight.  That is an extra $10 million per-flight surcharge over 100 flights to recover.   Not free.

 - Ed Kyle

Surely that should be weighed against the thousands (and probably more like tens of thousands) of future flights where up to 70% of rocket cost can be saved just through first stage recovery?

Not to mention the new opportunities this opens up well beyond merely first stage recovery, such as the ability to land heavy payloads on Mars and so forth.

[jcliving]

Still looks valid to my eyes.  Those experiments were not free.  $1 billion, according to Elon on March 30 after the SES 10 flight.  That is an extra $10 million per-flight surcharge over 100 flights to recover.   Not free.

 - Ed Kyle

This is the same short term, stock oriented thinking that allowed ULA to be so stagnant.  It is not about the 1 billion now.  It is about a sustainable 20-50 launches per year that leads to billions in the future.  When you have 20 stages sitting around in warehouses, production rate is not the determining factor.

[sanman]

What's going to happen to this re-flown booster, now that it's been re-landed? Will it once again be taken apart to have every nook and cranny inspected, like the early recovered boosters were?

At what point will we see the same booster being flown 3 times? We're at 2 right now, so how long will it take to get to 3?

[M.E.T.]

What's going to happen to this re-flown booster, now that it's been re-landed? Will it once again be taken apart to have every nook and cranny inspected, like the early recovered boosters were?

At what point will we see the same booster being flown 3 times? We're at 2 right now, so how long will it take to get to 3?

From what Elon said in the press conference, it seems that the Block 5 rockets by end of this year will be designed for 10 reflights with very minimal refurbishment, and 100 with moderate refurbishment.

So I guess the answer to your question is that the first Block 5 that is successfully landed will likely become the first booster to fly 3 times, if all goes well.

[edkyle99]

Still looks valid to my eyes.  Those experiments were not free.  $1 billion, according to Elon on March 30 after the SES 10 flight.  That is an extra $10 million per-flight surcharge over 100 flights to recover.   Not free.

 - Ed Kyle

Surely that should be weighed against the thousands (and probably more like tens of thousands) of future flights where up to 70% of rocket cost can be saved just through first stage recovery?

Not to mention the new opportunities this opens up well beyond merely first stage recovery, such as the ability to land heavy payloads on Mars and so forth.

"Thousands and tens of thousands"?  The only launch vehicle in Space Age history that has flown more than a few hundred times over its life is R-7, which has been flying for six decades now.  It is approaching 1,900 flights, but is these days only flying about 15 times per year.  The conditions that allowed it to put up its launch numbers - the weekly launches for Soviet film-return reconnaissance, etc., no longer exist. 

During this current decade, the total world-wide average number of annual orbital launch attempts by all launch vehicles combined has been about 83.

 - Ed Kyle

[laszlo]

In the reliability bathtub curve, it takes more than two flights to get passed infant mortality issues.

But there's one exception - starting with flight #2, you already know that you don't have assembly errors, and you have a real life telemetry record.

You only know that if there were no changes between flights, such as refurbishment. Once you change anything, you're in unknown territory and have to test and verify, which also exposes you to the dangers of the test processes, in addition to the results of the changes. That's why "flight proven" is marketing babble. Skilled people and well-developed process controls become indispensable.

Edit - Oops, AncientU types faster than I do

No worse than in the unflown rocket.

It too was assembled and tested.

And we already know that the major systems (engines) remain,  and practically all components in a year's time.

Never said it was worse, just that you can't take a successful flight as evidence that the next flight will succeed. Challenger had 9 consecutive successful flights before its last one, Columbia had 28.

[meekGee]

In the reliability bathtub curve, it takes more than two flights to get passed infant mortality issues.

But there's one exception - starting with flight #2, you already know that you don't have assembly errors, and you have a real life telemetry record.

You only know that if there were no changes between flights, such as refurbishment. Once you change anything, you're in unknown territory and have to test and verify, which also exposes you to the dangers of the test processes, in addition to the results of the changes. That's why "flight proven" is marketing babble. Skilled people and well-developed process controls become indispensable.

Edit - Oops, AncientU types faster than I do

No worse than in the unflown rocket.

It too was assembled and tested.

And we already know that the major systems (engines) remain,  and practically all components in a year's time.

Never said it was worse, just that you can't take a successful flight as evidence that the next flight will succeed. Challenger had 9 consecutive successful flights before its last one, Columbia had 28.

That's right.

There's a bathtub reliability graph, and you don't get to call "maturity" after one flight.

STS failed twice. Once because of over-extreme operating conditions, the other because of a statistical process that came into play after a change in manufacturing process of a non reusable part.

STS also had some other close calls, also associated with non-reusable hardware.

Back to F9, what I said that after the first flight you have two things working for you: confidence that nothing was assembled in a fatally-bad way, and a first true-flight telemetry record. 

That's a big step compared to what you'll have after flight #3, which is essentially the same.

[mark_m]

...
Using the MPS was always the obvious solution
...

Shuttle
DoD reusable booster program
Falcon 1/9 early days
NASA inflatables/parachutes program
SMART reuse
New Glenn

Forehead smackingly obvious now

Well, it seems to me that the oft-repeated phrase "as Heinlein and God intended" attests to the superficial obviousness. But somewhere along the line it became apparent to those who had a deeper knowledge of the issues that using the MPS was impractical. Then (perhaps as the technology developed to where the reliability, throttle ability, and control of enough engines was workable?) it seems like SpaceX took a fresh look and said, you know, if this hypersonic retropulsion idea works, landing using the MPS might not be impractical after all.

[ChrisWilson68]

Still looks valid to my eyes.  Those experiments were not free.  $1 billion, according to Elon on March 30 after the SES 10 flight.  That is an extra $10 million per-flight surcharge over 100 flights to recover.   Not free.

Surely that should be weighed against the thousands (and probably more like tens of thousands) of future flights where up to 70% of rocket cost can be saved just through first stage recovery?

Not to mention the new opportunities this opens up well beyond merely first stage recovery, such as the ability to land heavy payloads on Mars and so forth.

"Thousands and tens of thousands"?  The only launch vehicle in Space Age history that has flown more than a few hundred times over its life is R-7, which has been flying for six decades now.  It is approaching 1,900 flights, but is these days only flying about 15 times per year.  The conditions that allowed it to put up its launch numbers - the weekly launches for Soviet film-return reconnaissance, etc., no longer exist. 

During this current decade, the total world-wide average number of annual orbital launch attempts by all launch vehicles combined has been about 83.

There's this concept in economics called elasticity.  It says that when prices come down, demand tends to go up.

[ChrisWilson68]

Still looks valid to my eyes.  Those experiments were not free.  $1 billion, according to Elon on March 30 after the SES 10 flight.  That is an extra $10 million per-flight surcharge over 100 flights to recover.   Not free.

Surely that should be weighed against the thousands (and probably more like tens of thousands) of future flights where up to 70% of rocket cost can be saved just through first stage recovery?

Not to mention the new opportunities this opens up well beyond merely first stage recovery, such as the ability to land heavy payloads on Mars and so forth.

"Thousands and tens of thousands"?  The only launch vehicle in Space Age history that has flown more than a few hundred times over its life is R-7, which has been flying for six decades now.  It is approaching 1,900 flights, but is these days only flying about 15 times per year.  The conditions that allowed it to put up its launch numbers - the weekly launches for Soviet film-return reconnaissance, etc., no longer exist. 

During this current decade, the total world-wide average number of annual orbital launch attempts by all launch vehicles combined has been about 83.

There's this concept in economics called elasticity.  It says that when prices come down, demand tends to go up.

Also, the indications are that SpaceX saves around $30 million per flight by reusing the first stage.  So it's only 30 flights to recoup their $1 billion investment.  They'll be able to do that in three years, even without an increase in demand.

[edkyle99]

There's this concept in economics called elasticity.  It says that when prices come down, demand tends to go up.

Also, the indications are that SpaceX saves around $30 million per flight by reusing the first stage.  So it's only 30 flights to recoup their $1 billion investment.  They'll be able to do that in three years, even without an increase in demand.

Doesn't this assume that SpaceX won't pass on any of the savings to the customer?  No elasticity there.

Payload cost, not just of the satellite but of operating a fleet of satellites once orbited, seems a bigger driver of that potential elasticity curve to me.  There is also limited RF bandwidth available, only so many available slots in GEO available, the steady-state nature of the government customer's budgets, and so on. 

 - Ed Kyle 

[ChrisWilson68]

There's this concept in economics called elasticity.  It says that when prices come down, demand tends to go up.

Also, the indications are that SpaceX saves around $30 million per flight by reusing the first stage.  So it's only 30 flights to recoup their $1 billion investment.  They'll be able to do that in three years, even without an increase in demand.

Doesn't this assume that SpaceX won't pass on any of the savings to the customer?  No elasticity there.

I had two separate points: (1) SpaceX can reduce the price and it's likely demand will go up.  (2) Even if we assume there's no elasticity, as you seem to, SpaceX could just charge the exact same price and get back its investment in 3 years.

So charging the same price and getting back its investment in 3 years is the baseline.  SpaceX can choose that option.  If they choose instead to lower the price, that means they think they'll make even more money that way because they'll get more business.

Payload cost, not just of the satellite but of operating a fleet of satellites once orbited, seems a bigger driver of that potential elasticity curve to me.  There is also limited RF bandwidth available, only so many available slots in GEO available, the steady-state nature of the government customer's budgets, and so on.

GEO isn't the only destination available.  See the OneWeb and SpaceX's own CommX plans.

When launch costs are high, payload costs naturally also tend to be high because each kg sent to orbit needs to provide much more value in order to justify the cost of its ride.  Lower launch costs and you can unleash a whole new set of applications nobody thought of before.  That's always how elasticity works -- it tends to be low in the short term because it takes time for the market to adjust to the new realities but high in the long term as innovation comes up with new ways to use the newly-cheap resource.

[Elmar Moelzer]

There's this concept in economics called elasticity.  It says that when prices come down, demand tends to go up.

Also, the indications are that SpaceX saves around $30 million per flight by reusing the first stage.  So it's only 30 flights to recoup their $1 billion investment.  They'll be able to do that in three years, even without an increase in demand.

Doesn't this assume that SpaceX won't pass on any of the savings to the customer?  No elasticity there.

Payload cost, not just of the satellite but of operating a fleet of satellites once orbited, seems a bigger driver of that potential elasticity curve to me.  There is also limited RF bandwidth available, only so many available slots in GEO available, the steady-state nature of the government customer's budgets, and so on. 

 - Ed Kyle

If I understood Musk correctly, it will be both. They will have a very small discount on reused stages until they have recouped their investment, which Musk (optimistically as usual) estimated to be already by next year. After that, the discount for the customer will be larger.

[Semmel]

I don't think the bathtub curve applies here because after each failure the whole fleet is redesigned to eliminate the cause. The bathtub curve applies if you have hundreds of identical items to that fail in a statistical random way and they are not messed with in the meantime.

[edkyle99]

Still looks valid to my eyes.  Those experiments were not free.  $1 billion, according to Elon on March 30 after the SES 10 flight.  That is an extra $10 million per-flight surcharge over 100 flights to recover.   Not free.

 - Ed Kyle

This is the same short term, stock oriented thinking that allowed ULA to be so stagnant.  It is not about the 1 billion now.  It is about a sustainable 20-50 launches per year that leads to billions in the future.  When you have 20 stages sitting around in warehouses, production rate is not the determining factor.

You counter with the same wild-eyed optimistic projections that appeared during the early STS years, during the go-go "Little-LEO" times, etc. 

In all history, only two launch vehicles have ever crossed the 20 per year barrier (R-7 and Thor/Delta) over an extended number of years.  Both did so as Cold War machines launching now-obsolete film-return reconnaissance satellites during the 1960s-1980s.  No others have come close since the end of the Cold War.   China's DF-5 based CZ family currently leads the way, flying about 16.9 times per year (annual average since 2010, inclusive).  R-7 is currently logging about 16.1 per year.  Proton is flying 8.6 times per year average.  Atlas 5 is at 6.1 flights per year.  Ariane 5 is at 5.9 annually.

 - Ed Kyle

[dglow]

Still looks valid to my eyes.  Those experiments were not free.  $1 billion, according to Elon on March 30 after the SES 10 flight.  That is an extra $10 million per-flight surcharge over 100 flights to recover.   Not free.

 - Ed Kyle

This is the same short term, stock oriented thinking that allowed ULA to be so stagnant.  It is not about the 1 billion now.  It is about a sustainable 20-50 launches per year that leads to billions in the future.  When you have 20 stages sitting around in warehouses, production rate is not the determining factor.

You counter with the same wild-eyed optimistic projections that appeared during the early STS years, during the go-go "Little-LEO" times, etc.

That's a fair point if one thinks F9's reuse economics will fail in the same way STS's did.

In all history, only two launch vehicles have ever crossed the 20 per year barrier (R-7 and Thor/Delta) over an extended number of years.  Both did so as Cold War machines launching now-obsolete film-return reconnaissance satellites during the 1960s-1980s.  No others have come close since the end of the Cold War.

We'll see. These new commsat constellations are going to need a whole bunch o' launches.

[john smith 19]

There's this concept in economics called elasticity.  It says that when prices come down, demand tends to go up.

There is.

The question is of course at what point the price (and it's the price customers pay that matters) drops enough for the customer base to grow a lot.

Time will tell if the price SX are planning to charge for a launch with a  "launch proven" booster will be low enough to encourage that level of growth.
[EDIT for those of you who are curious about the cost effects here is the current version of my launch vehicle costing game, with updated notes (red dots) on stage reuse.

Going with AFTS lowers costs by about $700k per flight.  the game allows you to specify if profit is a % of costs or a fixed amount. It allows you specify refurb costs either in hours or numbers per year, although it is difficult to decide on what sort of costs you're dealing without an idea of of how big a team they used ]

[meekGee]

Still looks valid to my eyes.  Those experiments were not free.  $1 billion, according to Elon on March 30 after the SES 10 flight.  That is an extra $10 million per-flight surcharge over 100 flights to recover.   Not free.

 - Ed Kyle

This is the same short term, stock oriented thinking that allowed ULA to be so stagnant.  It is not about the 1 billion now.  It is about a sustainable 20-50 launches per year that leads to billions in the future.  When you have 20 stages sitting around in warehouses, production rate is not the determining factor.

You counter with the same wild-eyed optimistic projections that appeared during the early STS years, during the go-go "Little-LEO" times, etc. 

In all history, only two launch vehicles have ever crossed the 20 per year barrier (R-7 and Thor/Delta) over an extended number of years.  Both did so as Cold War machines launching now-obsolete film-return reconnaissance satellites during the 1960s-1980s.  No others have come close since the end of the Cold War.   China's DF-5 based CZ family currently leads the way, flying about 16.9 times per year (annual average since 2010, inclusive).  R-7 is currently logging about 16.1 per year.  Proton is flying 8.6 times per year average.  Atlas 5 is at 6.1 flights per year.  Ariane 5 is at 5.9 annually.

 - Ed Kyle

Ed - STS is just a bad analogy, since using it you can say that all optimism is bound to be futile.

STS was a failure because of many inherent design issues.

The architecture of taking a giant combined-use vehicle all the way to orbit and bringing it back down with wings.

That right there already made the system too heavy and too fragile.

The choice of solids (and other propulsion decisions)

That STS flew so many times is a testament that given enough money and brute force, you can make almost anything work.

But you can't infer from that anything related to a system like F9.

The Spruce Goose was a failure. It didn't follow that the B707 was.

[john smith 19]

Ed - STS is just a bad analogy, since using it you can say that all optimism is bound to be futile.

STS was a failure because of many inherent design issues.

The architecture of taking a giant combined-use vehicle all the way to orbit and bringing it back down with wings.

STS's problems began and ended with it's funding, which bore no resemblance to the patterns of any successful large previous project.

Insofar as STS has any lessons for SX it would make sure you have a decent cash flow for any plans you have. The only other point would be that both Shuttles had crashed failed due to problems with either expendable components or sub systems that had to be completely disassembled and rebuilt before reuse (and which were not the first choice suppliers to begin with).

[meekGee]

Ed - STS is just a bad analogy, since using it you can say that all optimism is bound to be futile.

STS was a failure because of many inherent design issues.

The architecture of taking a giant combined-use vehicle all the way to orbit and bringing it back down with wings.

STS's problems began and ended with it's funding, which bore no resemblance to the patterns of any successful large previous project.

Insofar as STS has any lessons for SX it would make sure you have a decent cash flow for any plans you have. The only other point would be that both Shuttles had crashed failed due to problems with either expendable components or sub systems that had to be completely disassembled and rebuilt before reuse (and which were not the first choice suppliers to begin with).

Began and ended with its funding?!

The only (weak) funding related claim that can be made is that fixed costs got amortized over less flights because it flew so little, but that was only a small part of the problem.

It wasn't lack of funding that caused the two LoCs and the other close calls STS had, and it wasn't lack of funding that caused the work to turn it around to be so extensive.

Otherwise, most other programs would love to have the funding priority STS had.

If anything, blame political intervention in both the design and operations phase - which pretty much defined what STS was.

[llanitedave]

Ed - STS is just a bad analogy, since using it you can say that all optimism is bound to be futile.

STS was a failure because of many inherent design issues.

The architecture of taking a giant combined-use vehicle all the way to orbit and bringing it back down with wings.

STS's problems began and ended with it's funding, which bore no resemblance to the patterns of any successful large previous project.

Insofar as STS has any lessons for SX it would make sure you have a decent cash flow for any plans you have. The only other point would be that both Shuttles had crashed failed due to problems with either expendable components or sub systems that had to be completely disassembled and rebuilt before reuse (and which were not the first choice suppliers to begin with).

Began and ended with its funding?!

The only (weak) funding related claim that can be made is that fixed costs got amortized over less flights because it flew so little, but that was only a small part of the problem.

It wasn't lack of funding that caused the two LoCs and the other close calls STS had, and it wasn't lack of funding that caused the work to turn it around to be so extensive.

Otherwise, most other programs would love to have the funding priority STS had.

If anything, blame political intervention in both the design and operations phase - which pretty much defined what STS was.

Arguably, it was lack of funding at least in part, that forced them to live with chronic issues rather than fixing them with improved designs.

[meekGee]

Ed - STS is just a bad analogy, since using it you can say that all optimism is bound to be futile.

STS was a failure because of many inherent design issues.

The architecture of taking a giant combined-use vehicle all the way to orbit and bringing it back down with wings.

STS's problems began and ended with it's funding, which bore no resemblance to the patterns of any successful large previous project.

Insofar as STS has any lessons for SX it would make sure you have a decent cash flow for any plans you have. The only other point would be that both Shuttles had crashed failed due to problems with either expendable components or sub systems that had to be completely disassembled and rebuilt before reuse (and which were not the first choice suppliers to begin with).

Began and ended with its funding?!

The only (weak) funding related claim that can be made is that fixed costs got amortized over less flights because it flew so little, but that was only a small part of the problem.

It wasn't lack of funding that caused the two LoCs and the other close calls STS had, and it wasn't lack of funding that caused the work to turn it around to be so extensive.

Otherwise, most other programs would love to have the funding priority STS had.

If anything, blame political intervention in both the design and operations phase - which pretty much defined what STS was.

Arguably, it was lack of funding at least in part, that forced them to live with chronic issues rather than fixing them with improved designs.

There was no fixing the core concept. And most chronic issues were a result of that.

Take the infamous foam issue. The orbiter side mount was a result of the decision to built a large winged combined-use vehicle.  (Couldn't stick it on top of a rocket)

This decision also resulted in the very asymmetrical design which added complexity all around.

You could have sunk more money into fixing the foam (which was exacerbated by foam 2.0) but you'd have been fighting a symptom again.

Same with tiles, etc.

Now let's bring it back to the topic.

The optimism about SpaceX reusability is founded in many ways by an appreciation of the design.  That's why we were optimistic even before this last flight.

If you don't get that, then you naturally stand by the sidelines thinking "why the optimism?  Look at STS".  But that's because you're not looking deep enough.

[AncientU]

Still looks valid to my eyes.  Those experiments were not free.  $1 billion, according to Elon on March 30 after the SES 10 flight.  That is an extra $10 million per-flight surcharge over 100 flights to recover.   Not free.

 - Ed Kyle

This is the same short term, stock oriented thinking that allowed ULA to be so stagnant.  It is not about the 1 billion now.  It is about a sustainable 20-50 launches per year that leads to billions in the future.  When you have 20 stages sitting around in warehouses, production rate is not the determining factor.

You counter with the same wild-eyed optimistic projections that appeared during the early STS years, during the go-go "Little-LEO" times, etc. 

In all history, only two launch vehicles have ever crossed the 20 per year barrier (R-7 and Thor/Delta) over an extended number of years.  Both did so as Cold War machines launching now-obsolete film-return reconnaissance satellites during the 1960s-1980s.  No others have come close since the end of the Cold War.   China's DF-5 based CZ family currently leads the way, flying about 16.9 times per year (annual average since 2010, inclusive).  R-7 is currently logging about 16.1 per year.  Proton is flying 8.6 times per year average.  Atlas 5 is at 6.1 flights per year.  Ariane 5 is at 5.9 annually.

 - Ed Kyle

20 per year for several years sounds like a benchmark that will persuade you of Falcon's potential.
We'll come back to this in a few years...

What was the highest single year for any launcher in history?
Would topping that (in a non Cold War environment) be a more significant benchmark?

[Lar]

How are we doing on the questions the OP posed:

Will the success rate of launches on reflown boosters ever drop below that of launches using unflown boosters?

How long before insurance rates on flight-proven boosters are lower than insurance rates on unflown boosters?

I'm seeing a lot of talk about why STS was a failure and launch rates of R7 and stuff and not a lot on the actual topic. Let's maybe not rehash all of rocket economics and just work on the OP's questions.

[dglow]

How are we doing on the questions the OP posed:

Thoroughly digressed as is our wont. Though Ed's flight rate numbers are certainly pertinent.

As of right now, reflown first stages of orbital launchers have a 100% success rate. :-)

Will the success rate of launches on reflown boosters ever drop below that of launches using unflown boosters?

This question is tongue-in-cheek, but comes with a warning: let no one gathered here endeavor to compare SpaceX's flown to unflown booster success rate. Soon enough this will be like asking: which car accumulates the most accidents, one newly-purchased or one on the road for five years?

How long before insurance rates on flight-proven boosters are lower than insurance rates on unflown boosters?

For SpaceX launchers, I'll guess it occurs within 12 months of reflown flights exceeding the number single-use flights.

[AncientU]

How long before insurance rates on flight-proven boosters are lower than insurance rates on unflown boosters?

For SpaceX launchers, I'll guess it occurs within 12 months of reflown flights exceeding the number single-use flights.

Since the first re-launch was on parity (0.01% higher) with new, this could be lost in the noise of insurers and their internal competition -- which is uninteresting.

As I understand it, Falcon rates are on par with Ariane et al whose reliability is higher than Falcon, so absolute reliability is not a clean discriminator for insurance rates (or vise versa).  Ed's statistics will be better.

[john smith 19]

Since the first re-launch was on parity (0.01% higher) with new, this could be lost in the noise of insurers and their internal competition -- which is uninteresting.

As I understand it, Falcon rates are on par with Ariane et al whose reliability is higher than Falcon, so absolute reliability is not a clean discriminator for insurance rates (or vise versa).  Ed's statistics will be better.

Let's say that sounds quite doubtful given that A5 has now launched 70+ launches in a row without a mishap and SX is on it's 2nd F9 RTF.

I'd be very surprised if that didn't have quite a lot of bearing on insurance premiums.

Now as flight data on re-flown booster stages accumulates I would also expect that to have a strong bearing on insurance rates, provided there are no US mishaps.

[Lar]

Since the first re-launch was on parity (0.01% higher) with new, this could be lost in the noise of insurers and their internal competition -- which is uninteresting.

As I understand it, Falcon rates are on par with Ariane et al whose reliability is higher than Falcon, so absolute reliability is not a clean discriminator for insurance rates (or vise versa).  Ed's statistics will be better.

Let's say that sounds quite doubtful given that A5 has now launched 70+ launches in a row without a mishap and SX is on it's 2nd F9 RTF.

I'd be very surprised if that didn't have quite a lot of bearing on insurance premiums.

Now as flight data on re-flown booster stages accumulates I would also expect that to have a strong bearing on insurance rates, provided there are no US mishaps.

I was surprised to see "on par" but maybe what is equal is the total insurance cost, not the cost as a percentage.

Suppose you have a 300MM bird (with economic value included, using NPV calculations for the revenue stream) and you use competitor U to launch for a launch cost of 150MM. They don't offer free relaunches.
So you insure 450MM... say that costs you 15 MM

Now you take the same bird to competitor X, which charges 60MM for your launch and offers free relaunches. Your insured cost is now 300MM (don't need to insure the launch)... if you pay 15MM for that insurance, et voila, the "rates" are the same... sort of.

But that wasn't the comment by Martin, he said their insurance rate from one launch to the next **with SpaceX** didn't change measurably.

The above is REALLY simplified because it doesn't work that way, as we found out with AMOS-6, it was a weird hole in coverage that got covered anyway I think....

[AncientU]

Since the first re-launch was on parity (0.01% higher) with new, this could be lost in the noise of insurers and their internal competition -- which is uninteresting.

As I understand it, Falcon rates are on par with Ariane et al whose reliability is higher than Falcon, so absolute reliability is not a clean discriminator for insurance rates (or vise versa).  Ed's statistics will be better.

Let's say that sounds quite doubtful given that A5 has now launched 70+ launches in a row without a mishap and SX is on it's 2nd F9 RTF.

I'd be very surprised if that didn't have quite a lot of bearing on insurance premiums.

Now as flight data on re-flown booster stages accumulates I would also expect that to have a strong bearing on insurance rates, provided there are no US mishaps.

The absolute string of successes has been shown to not be necessary to get low insurance rates.  SpaceX had similar rates to Ariane 5 after the first dozen or so flights... and reflown booster rate was same (0.01% higher) as new according to Martin Halliwell of SES.  I don't think the strict engineering or statistical margin is what insurance rate is based upon.

It may sound quite doubtful based on your perspective, but SES is a reliable source -- and they paid the tab.

[Robotbeat]

Since the first re-launch was on parity (0.01% higher) with new, this could be lost in the noise of insurers and their internal competition -- which is uninteresting.

As I understand it, Falcon rates are on par with Ariane et al whose reliability is higher than Falcon, so absolute reliability is not a clean discriminator for insurance rates (or vise versa).  Ed's statistics will be better.

Let's say that sounds quite doubtful given that A5 has now launched 70+ launches in a row without a mishap and SX is on it's 2nd F9 RTF.

I'd be very surprised if that didn't have quite a lot of bearing on insurance premiums.

Now as flight data on re-flown booster stages accumulates I would also expect that to have a strong bearing on insurance rates, provided there are no US mishaps.

Ariane 5 had several failures in its early years, both partial and complete failures.

[Jim]

How long before insurance rates on flight-proven boosters are lower than insurance rates on unflown boosters?

Meaningless point, since the second stage is expendable and operates 3 times longer than the first stage.

[dglow]

How long before insurance rates on flight-proven boosters are lower than insurance rates on unflown boosters?

Meaningless point, since the second stage is expendable and operates 3 times longer than the first stage.

Meaningless... o, rly?

Ed Kyle, do you have any breakdown for launch failures, across the stage of flight during which they occurred; roughly 'boost' vs. 'upper'?

[Jim]

Ed Kyle, do you have any breakdown for launch failures, across the stage of flight during which they occurred; roughly 'boost' vs. 'upper'?

For Spacex, 100% upper stage.

[envy887]

Ed Kyle, do you have any breakdown for launch failures, across the stage of flight during which they occurred; roughly 'boost' vs. 'upper'?

For Spacex, 100% upper stage.

Plus a secondary payload failure due to main stage underperformance.

Not that it really matters for insurance at this point, insurance is quite cheap already. Can't see it going down a whole lot for a partially reusable system.

Edit: F1 also had multiple booster-related failures.

[dglow]

Ed Kyle, do you have any breakdown for launch failures, across the stage of flight during which they occurred; roughly 'boost' vs. 'upper'?

For Spacex, 100% upper stage.

You crack me up, Jim!  😂

[john smith 19]

Since the first re-launch was on parity (0.01% higher) with new, this could be lost in the noise of insurers and their internal competition -- which is uninteresting.

As I understand it, Falcon rates are on par with Ariane et al whose reliability is higher than Falcon, so absolute reliability is not a clean discriminator for insurance rates (or vise versa).  Ed's statistics will be better.

Let's say that sounds quite doubtful given that A5 has now launched 70+ launches in a row without a mishap and SX is on it's 2nd F9 RTF.

I'd be very surprised if that didn't have quite a lot of bearing on insurance premiums.

Now as flight data on re-flown booster stages accumulates I would also expect that to have a strong bearing on insurance rates, provided there are no US mishaps.

Ariane 5 had several failures in its early years, both partial and complete failures.

As you never cease to remind us.

Except that A5 is not in it's "early years" any more. A 70+ successful launch history is a significant selling point for a vehicle that only flies once.

Let's hope F9 is starting to come out of it early years and first stage reuse accelerates its maturing process. Fortunately stage reuse should be able to raise the launch rate quite considerably, if there are sufficient payloads to launch at the new price.

[john smith 19]

Ed Kyle, do you have any breakdown for launch failures, across the stage of flight during which they occurred; roughly 'boost' vs. 'upper'?

For Spacex, 100% upper stage.

You crack me up, Jim!  😂

But he does have a point. This is a step change in how we think of TSTO stage reliability.

Historically stage failure typically meant mission failure (unless stage propellant loads were up to the limit of the payload and the target trajectory parameters in case they had to compensate).

How do we measure this increased reliability wrt to expendable stages, given that historically it's been all or nothing? 

[dglow]

You have a point, John Smith, though Jim did not.

How will we measure reliability of expendable stages? At a high level, exactly as we do today. What will change is the tracking of 'lifetime' data for boosters, which boosters are active, which are retired, and the variations between them (block-5, etc.).

Imagine the stats that will result: 'median missions flown for active block-X boosters in the fleet'.

If any first stage failure occurs, expect a lot of attention will be paid, right or wrong, to the stats of that particular booster.

[meekGee]

How long before insurance rates on flight-proven boosters are lower than insurance rates on unflown boosters?

Meaningless point, since the second stage is expendable and operates 3 times longer than the first stage.

What's meaningless?

"How long before insurance rates on flight-proven boosters are lower than insurance rates on unflown boosters?"

The insurers's opinion is what matters, and apparently even on the first re-use, the rates were pretty much the same.

[Kaputnik]

You have a point, John Smith, though Jim did not.

How will we measure reliability of expendable stages? At a high level, exactly as we do today. What will change is the tracking of 'lifetime' data for boosters, which boosters are active, which are retired, and the variations between them (block-5, etc.).

Imagine the stats that will result: 'median missions flown for active block-X boosters in the fleet'.

If any first stage failure occurs, expect a lot of attention will be paid, right or wrong, to the stats of that particular booster.

We didn't find this difficult for STS, which was also a mixture of expendable and reflown components.

[john smith 19]

You have a point, John Smith, though Jim did not.

How will we measure reliability of expendable stages? At a high level, exactly as we do today. What will change is the tracking of 'lifetime' data for boosters, which boosters are active, which are retired, and the variations between them (block-5, etc.).

Imagine the stats that will result: 'median missions flown for active block-X boosters in the fleet'.

If any first stage failure occurs, expect a lot of attention will be paid, right or wrong, to the stats of that particular booster.

Indeed. I expect special attention to wheather the boosters have had regular servicing (which Musk said can give them a 100+ launches) or minimal necessary, in which case Musk thought maybe 10 would be OK.

Obviously a booster with minimal servicing will be cheaper for SX but with statistical variation in things like TPS thickness and quality I'd suggest anyone after say the 8th would start to be pushing the edges of probable failure.

We didn't find this difficult for STS, which was also a mixture of expendable and reflown components.

With a modern ERP system I wouldn't expect collecting and tracking the data will be any problem. I strongly doubt SX has the 100+ individual data bases (some still manual) that Boeing found when it studied Shuttle servicing in the mid 80's

It's the idea of a "full service history" coming to TSTO VTO rockets. I think some who are used to expendables will find it a bit odd, although I'm sure they will get used to it.

[ChrisWilson68]

How long before insurance rates on flight-proven boosters are lower than insurance rates on unflown boosters?

Meaningless point, since the second stage is expendable and operates 3 times longer than the first stage.

It's only meaningless if the risk for the first stage is zero.  Even if the risk from the second stage is higher, if there's any contribution to overall mission risk from the first stage, insurance rates should be different if that risk is higher or lower.

[meekGee]

You have a point, John Smith, though Jim did not.

How will we measure reliability of expendable stages? At a high level, exactly as we do today. What will change is the tracking of 'lifetime' data for boosters, which boosters are active, which are retired, and the variations between them (block-5, etc.).

Imagine the stats that will result: 'median missions flown for active block-X boosters in the fleet'.

If any first stage failure occurs, expect a lot of attention will be paid, right or wrong, to the stats of that particular booster.

Indeed. I expect special attention to wheather the boosters have had regular servicing (which Musk said can give them a 100+ launches) or minimal necessary, in which case Musk thought maybe 10 would be OK.

Obviously a booster with minimal servicing will be cheaper for SX but with statistical variation in things like TPS thickness and quality I'd suggest anyone after say the 8th would start to be pushing the edges of probable failure.

We didn't find this difficult for STS, which was also a mixture of expendable and reflown components.

With a modern ERP system I wouldn't expect collecting and tracking the data will be any problem. I strongly doubt SX has the 100+ individual data bases (some still manual) that Boeing found when it studied Shuttle servicing in the mid 80's

It's the idea of a "full service history" coming to TSTO VTO rockets. I think some who are used to expendables will find it a bit odd, although I'm sure they will get used to it.

How do you know that the "10 flights" doesn't already include your consideration?

So that the actual number is maybe 15, and only flying 10 takes care of statistical variations with sufficient confidence?

[edkyle99]

What was the highest single year for any launcher in history?
Would topping that (in a non Cold War environment) be a more significant benchmark?

The busiest single year by an orbital class launch vehicle would likely be 63 launch attempts (including two failures) by the R-7 family in 1980.  This number does not include the March 18, 1980 pad explosion of 8A92M Vostok-2M at Plestesk, the result of a fueling accident prior to launch, that killed 48.  The breakdown was 45 Soyuz U, six Vostok 2M, and 12 Molniya M (the two failures were Molniya M launches).

I don't think we will see a number like that again for the foreseeable future.

 - Ed Kyle

[meekGee]

What was the highest single year for any launcher in history?
Would topping that (in a non Cold War environment) be a more significant benchmark?

The busiest single year by an orbital class launch vehicle would likely be 63 launch attempts (including two failures) by the R-7 family in 1980.  This number does not include the March 18, 1980 pad explosion of 8A92M Vostok-2M at Plestesk, the result of a fueling accident prior to launch, that killed 48.  The breakdown was 45 Soyuz U, six Vostok 2M, and 12 Molniya M (the two failures were Molniya M launches).

I don't think we will see a number like that again for the foreseeable future.

 - Ed Kyle

Of course we will.  Unless by "foreseeable" you mean "2018".

By all accounts, the constellations will require multiple launches per week.

Which brings up a new disparity:

The time to recover from a launch failure remains more or less constant.  But with a launch tempo like this, the impact of an offline pad will be huge.  This argues for more pads.  I bet we'll hear about those in the next year.

[JamesH65]

What was the highest single year for any launcher in history?
Would topping that (in a non Cold War environment) be a more significant benchmark?

The busiest single year by an orbital class launch vehicle would likely be 63 launch attempts (including two failures) by the R-7 family in 1980.  This number does not include the March 18, 1980 pad explosion of 8A92M Vostok-2M at Plestesk, the result of a fueling accident prior to launch, that killed 48.  The breakdown was 45 Soyuz U, six Vostok 2M, and 12 Molniya M (the two failures were Molniya M launches).

I don't think we will see a number like that again for the foreseeable future.

 - Ed Kyle

Basically just over one per week. Although there were at least three different configurations, not sure how that compres with the F9 family of, basically, one. Still a great cadence from, I think, 4 different pads.

I'd expect SpaceX to start to get close to that in a year or two, if they speed up the US ranges reset time, and have the payloads ready.

[Robotbeat]

I expect 13 launches this year, 18 next. 25, 30, 35, 40 by 2022. Barring a failure, which will almost certainly happen in the next 100 launches, so within the next 3 or 4 years. 2025 is earliest they'll equal R7 rate, and actually they may have moved on to Raptor/ITS-based rockets by then, so would reset the clock on reliability (and to some extent, launch rate).

[AncientU]

I expect 13 launches this year, 18 next. 25, 30, 35, 40 by 2022. Barring a failure, which will almost certainly happen in the next 100 launches, so within the next 3 or 4 years. 2025 is earliest they'll equal R7 rate, and actually they may have moved on to Raptor/ITS-based rockets by then, so would reset the clock on reliability (and to some extent, launch rate).

Quite the high resolution crystal ball you've got there!!! 
(not even one launch per pad per month -- by 2022 -- hummm)

EM thinks the 4,425 satellite constellation (alone) will take 50 flights per year.  New application brings total sats to 270% of that figure.
GS expects to launch every two weeks from each launch pad.
Both plan for a 24hr turn around of boosters.

Payloads, launch facilities, and boosters will not be limiting it seems, so R-7 just may get challenged.
At least EM and GS think it will.

[Robotbeat]

I expect 13 launches this year, 18 next. 25, 30, 35, 40 by 2022. Barring a failure, which will almost certainly happen in the next 100 launches, so within the next 3 or 4 years. 2025 is earliest they'll equal R7 rate, and actually they may have moved on to Raptor/ITS-based rockets by then, so would reset the clock on reliability (and to some extent, launch rate).

Quite the high resolution crystal ball you've got there!!!

Just because I say "18" doesn't mean I think it's exactly that. I'm not intending to imply high accuracy. Maybe +/- 50%.

(not even one launch per pad per month -- by 2022 -- hummm)

Trying to be realistic. It's crazily ambitious no matter which way you slice it.

EM thinks the 4,425 satellite constellation (alone) will take 50 flights per year.  New application brings total sats to 270% of that figure.

Yeah, and the initial-operation constellation will be smaller. And I kind of think ITS will be used for the Constellation perhaps before other non-test payloads, and I was referring primarily to Falcon 9, intentionally excluding ITS. Also, stuff always takes longer than I, you, or Elon expect (which doesn't mean it won't happen, just a bit later).

GS expects to launch every two weeks from each launch pad.

2022 is only a few years away. Also, I don't think all pads will be equally busy. Texas isn't even built yet. It's primarily a big dirt pyramid. Maybe 2 years before it's ready for launches, and then a few years after that before it has ramped up. Meanwhile, LC-40 will need to be rebuilt by sometime this summer, and LC-39a will need upgrades for Falcon Heavy and then Commercial Crew (and perhaps later ITS) that will slow down launch rate. West Coast may not get that busy.

Both plan for a 24hr turn around of boosters.

Could easily take more than 5 years to get there.

Payloads, launch facilities, and boosters will not be limiting it seems, so R-7 just may get challenged.
At least EM and GS think it will.

Eventually it will. And I hope SpaceX will be the ones to do it.

I'm trying to do an accurate launch count projection. Last two years I've guessed slightly too optimistically, and before that I was almost spot on.

[AncientU]

Thanks for the details of your thinking.  Can't argue against any of them -- the future is just so damned empirically deficient.  I hope your estimates are the low end of the range because time isn't on the side of anyone wanting to make sweeping changes.

[FutureSpaceTourist]

Bumping this thread, after another 5 years …, to say still 100% success rate for reflown boosters and now past the 100 mark!

[AmigaClone]

I expect 13 launches this year, 18 next. 25, 30, 35, 40 by 2022. Barring a failure, which will almost certainly happen in the next 100 launches, so within the next 3 or 4 years. 2025 is earliest they'll equal R7 rate, and actually they may have moved on to Raptor/ITS-based rockets by then, so would reset the clock on reliability (and to some extent, launch rate).

Comparing some of your predictions vs what happened.
Launches.
2017 - Prediction 13, Actual 18
2018 - Prediction 18, Actual 21
2019 - Prediction 25, Actual 13
2020 - Prediction 30, Actual 28
2021 - Prediction 35, Actual 31
2017 t0 2021 - Prediction 121, Actual 111 overall within 10%

2022 - Prediction 40, Actual 34 (as of 8 August 2022). Potentially could challenge the R-7 launch rate in 1980.

Failures - 0 mission failures. While there have been 6 landing failures and 1 successful landing where the booster was destroyed on the way back to port, that has not affected the launch rate.

SpaceX has demonstrated  two launches in 14 days from all three F9 pads, (LC 4, LC 39A, and LC40), but appears to have decided not to pursue trying to refurbish a booster in 24 hours.

[Surfdaddy]

Still looks valid to my eyes.  Those experiments were not free.  $1 billion, according to Elon on March 30 after the SES 10 flight.  That is an extra $10 million per-flight surcharge over 100 flights to recover.   Not free.

 - Ed Kyle

This is the same short term, stock oriented thinking that allowed ULA to be so stagnant.  It is not about the 1 billion now.  It is about a sustainable 20-50 launches per year that leads to billions in the future.  When you have 20 stages sitting around in warehouses, production rate is not the determining factor.

You counter with the same wild-eyed optimistic projections that appeared during the early STS years, during the go-go "Little-LEO" times, etc. 

In all history, only two launch vehicles have ever crossed the 20 per year barrier (R-7 and Thor/Delta) over an extended number of years.  Both did so as Cold War machines launching now-obsolete film-return reconnaissance satellites during the 1960s-1980s.  No others have come close since the end of the Cold War.   China's DF-5 based CZ family currently leads the way, flying about 16.9 times per year (annual average since 2010, inclusive).  R-7 is currently logging about 16.1 per year.  Proton is flying 8.6 times per year average.  Atlas 5 is at 6.1 flights per year.  Ariane 5 is at 5.9 annually.

 - Ed Kyle

20 per year for several years sounds like a benchmark that will persuade you of Falcon's potential.
We'll come back to this in a few years...

I've bolded a couple of key phrases from this 2017 exchange in post #67.
It's now been a few years. It seems that AncientU was correct, and Ed Kyle was mistaken

[FutureSpaceTourist]

Interesting discussion at about the 25m 25s mark (of Crew-6 briefing below), about some unexpected fire seen in an F9 engine bay on a Starlink flight.

It was a 12th flight and there was evidence of combustion seen in post flight inspection. Speculation is may be a slight O2 leak, perhaps due to number of flights. Benji Reed said something like this has also been seen before.

So interesting data on potential effects of repeated reuse.

For the record NASA, are fine with crew mission, given analysis and testing performed.  Also crewed flights must be on at most the 5th flight of a booster.



Edit to add: the issue seen on the 12th flight did not cause any problems with the flight. The engine did not shutdown early.

[JamesH65]

What was the highest single year for any launcher in history?
Would topping that (in a non Cold War environment) be a more significant benchmark?

The busiest single year by an orbital class launch vehicle would likely be 63 launch attempts (including two failures) by the R-7 family in 1980.  This number does not include the March 18, 1980 pad explosion of 8A92M Vostok-2M at Plestesk, the result of a fueling accident prior to launch, that killed 48.  The breakdown was 45 Soyuz U, six Vostok 2M, and 12 Molniya M (the two failures were Molniya M launches).

I don't think we will see a number like that again for the foreseeable future.

 - Ed Kyle

This aged well.

[steveleach]

People often fail to see the potential of disruptive change beforehand. There's no value in rubbing their faces in it though.

How many times have we seen wildly optimistic predictions that come to nothing?

[edzieba]

Bumping this thread, after another 5 years …, to say still 100% success rate for reflown boosters and now past the 100 mark!

With one caveat: 100% primary mission success rate, but 3 re-used boosters have failed after completing the primary mission, during recovery. Since this is well past the 'experimental landing' phase, I'd call these 'operational failures' but not 'mission failures', for a 3/185 (counting only re-flown missions) operational failure rate or a 98.4% operational success rate. Pretty danged good, and SpaceX hardly seem short of cores to backfill their schedule with.

[DanClemmensen]

Bumping this thread, after another 5 years …, to say still 100% success rate for reflown boosters and now past the 100 mark!

With one caveat: 100% primary mission success rate, but 3 re-used boosters have failed after completing the primary mission, during recovery. Since this is well past the 'experimental landing' phase, I'd call these 'operational failures' but not 'mission failures', for a 3/185 (counting only re-flown missions) operational failure rate or a 98.4% operational success rate. Pretty danged good, and SpaceX hardly seem short of cores to backfill their schedule with.

Yep. This increases SpaceX's internal expected cost per launch by 1.6% of the cost of a booster. But during this same interval, SpaceX has self-certified an increase in the max number of booster flights from ten to twenty, very roughly cutting the booster cost per launch in half. In the real world, there are all sorts of caveats here, of course, especially if older boosters have higher refurbishment costs.

[meekGee]

This thread started in 2017.

It's important to note that when SpaceX finally had a failure, it was *not* because they pushed reusability too far..  It was on an expendable stage..

Had it been on a reusable stage, it would have put flight 1 of that stage at risk, not flight n...  and depending on what the root cause turns out to be, it might have been something that would have been caught earlier, before an actual failure occurred.

[deltaV]

It's important to note that when SpaceX finally had a failure, it was because they pushed reusability too far..

Missing "not" after "was"?

[meekGee]

It's important to note that when SpaceX finally had a failure, it was because they pushed reusability too far..

Missing "not" after "was"?

Thx!  I would ... have found it without you! 

[Nomadd]

It's important to note that when SpaceX finally had a failure, it was because they pushed reusability too far..

Missing "not" after "was"?

Thx!  I would ... have found it without you! 

Blame the radio.

[seb21051]

Sure, easy to blame Marconi, he's not here to defend himself . . .