On the topic of costs, the funding for an extension, the first two years are costed at an extra $1.2B in 2011, followed by an extra $2B in 2012. These figures are much less than previously touted, and may have a good selling point for the huge jobs – and more so skill set – savings a shuttle extension would provide.
Good article but in respect of Shuttle costs (at the risk of nit picking), I doubt that the $1.2B and $2B are the entire Shuttle extension costs, they are just the additionnal costs above the NASA regular $19B budget that are needed for extension.
Has an Authorization Bill been proposed consistent with the budget presented by NASA on 1 February 2010? Am I correct in my belief that such a Bill must be presented by a member of Congress?
Good article but in respect of Shuttle costs (and at the risk of nit picking), I doubt that the $1.2B in FY 2010 and $2B in FY2012 are the entire Shuttle extension costs, they are just the additionnal costs above the NASA regular $19B budget that is necessary for extension. Quote On the topic of costs, the funding for an extension, the first two years are costed at an extra $1.2B in 2011, followed by an extra $2B in 2012. These figures are much less than previously touted, and may have a good selling point for the huge jobs – and more so skill set – savings a shuttle extension would provide.
While commercial transportation systems may contribute valuable services, it is in the United States’ national interest to maintain a government operated space transportation system for crew and cargo delivery to low-Earth orbit and beyond....“The Administrator is directed to develop a plan, no later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, for the establishment of a National Space Transportation System.“The National Space Transportation System shall include (1) an architecture of government developed and operated space transportation systems, including one or more launch vehicles and associated crew and cargo carriers....“(4) continuation or modification of ongoing programs, associated contracts, and testing and evaluation plans initiated under the Constellation Program, including the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle and the Ares-1 Crew Launch Vehicle, to the extent that such elements are determined to be cost effective and operationally effective.
Thanks for the kind words to the people above Yeah, the Ares I reference also made me wonder, but I'm not sure it means "go back and continue with Ares I" - they can't based on budget alone anyway, and the Augustine findings would still stand.
Quote from: yg1968 on 03/04/2010 01:28 amGood article but in respect of Shuttle costs (and at the risk of nit picking), I doubt that the $1.2B in FY 2010 and $2B in FY2012 are the entire Shuttle extension costs, they are just the additionnal costs above the NASA regular $19B budget that is necessary for extension. Quote On the topic of costs, the funding for an extension, the first two years are costed at an extra $1.2B in 2011, followed by an extra $2B in 2012. These figures are much less than previously touted, and may have a good selling point for the huge jobs – and more so skill set – savings a shuttle extension would provide. Not true, yg...the $19B includes only $700m and change for shuttle operations for the first quarter of FY 2011, which is a hedge against extending into that period in order to complete the remaining manifest. No other funding within the proposed $19 billion for FY 2011 has anything to do with shuttle operations. FY 2012 on, under the President's plan, has zero funding for shuttle ops. The $2b authorization--for money over and above what is in the President's request--is the figure for total SSP operations at a flight rate maximum of two per year, and that figure has supporting documentation in reports, both internal and in those provided to the Congress, which provide a good confidence level that the number is sufficient to do the job, if such extended operations are found to be required as a result if the ISS supportability assessment required by the bill as one of the key factors in determining what level, if any, of extended operations would be essential to ensure long-term (2020 and beyond) viability of ISS. That does not mean that SSP would need to be co-extended with ISS; only that, where it's unique capability is required in the near-term to provide delivery for large ORU/SRU elements for prepositioning aboard ISS before SSP capability is "surrendered."