Quote from: edzieba on 03/08/2024 11:28 amQuote from: TrevorMonty on 03/08/2024 07:43 amHow can they legally take the shares for 40% less than market value.'Market value' is what shareholders are willing to sell for. Shareholders were willing to sell for the value Astra's management offered to pay, so that is de-facto their market value.They were changing hands in $0.80s up until this announcement. See trading history.
Quote from: TrevorMonty on 03/08/2024 07:43 amHow can they legally take the shares for 40% less than market value.'Market value' is what shareholders are willing to sell for. Shareholders were willing to sell for the value Astra's management offered to pay, so that is de-facto their market value.
How can they legally take the shares for 40% less than market value.
. However, I'm more curious about what the new investors are thinking. Kemp couldn't make Astra a success once under his leadership; why do they think this time will be different?
Kemp described himself as the "CTO of NASA", even as late as the IPO documents.
Quote from: ringsider on 03/08/2024 02:30 pmKemp described himself as the "CTO of NASA", even as late as the IPO documents.Why is that in any way unusual?
Quote from: edzieba on 03/08/2024 03:53 pmQuote from: ringsider on 03/08/2024 02:30 pmKemp described himself as the "CTO of NASA", even as late as the IPO documents.Why is that in any way unusual?That says he was CTO of IT for NASA. His resume just said “CTO of NASA”, which is a huge difference.
Quote from: GreenShrike on 03/08/2024 03:20 pm. However, I'm more curious about what the new investors are thinking. Kemp couldn't make Astra a success once under his leadership; why do they think this time will be different?They don't have financial reserves to make it in launch industry. Only thing left is sell most of assets and try to .ake a go of Apollo in space propulsion business. From articles I've read they neglgected that side of business when LVs were main focus. I pity any customer relying on Astra for their satellite propulsion.
...One source, who spoke to TechCrunch on condition of anonymity, described how, post-acquisition, none of the Apollo Fusion team members continued to report to Apollo CEO and co-founder Mike Cassidy. Nor did they report to the same few managers; instead, they each reported to someone different within Astra’s organization....Decision-making at Astra was also impaired by complex budgeting and approval processes. There would be long debates over decisions like job titles and reporting structures. As a result, sometimes the propulsion team wouldn’t get parts ordered quickly enough, or they were unable to hire people to work on the spacecraft engines, sources said.“It was a very schizophrenic thing where part of management was saying, ‘We have to invest, we have to do great things with Apollo,’ but there was no investment there. [There were] no hires,” the same person said, speaking of the months after the acquisition closed....The majority of the Apollo Fusion team had cleared out by October 2022, less than 18 months after the acquisition closed. LinkedIn data shows that Astra eventually lost nearly every Apollo Fusion staffer, including the engineers that took the spacecraft engine product from clean sheet to flight heritage....
Quote from: TrevorMonty on 03/08/2024 03:39 pmQuote from: GreenShrike on 03/08/2024 03:20 pm. However, I'm more curious about what the new investors are thinking. Kemp couldn't make Astra a success once under his leadership; why do they think this time will be different?They don't have financial reserves to make it in launch industry. Only thing left is sell most of assets and try to .ake a go of Apollo in space propulsion business. From articles I've read they neglgected that side of business when LVs were main focus. I pity any customer relying on Astra for their satellite propulsion.https://techcrunch.com/2023/08/28/astras-apollo-fusion-acquisition-followed-by-delays-and-desertion/According to this piece, Astra has already killed Apollo due to mis-management.Quote...One source, who spoke to TechCrunch on condition of anonymity, described how, post-acquisition, none of the Apollo Fusion team members continued to report to Apollo CEO and co-founder Mike Cassidy. Nor did they report to the same few managers; instead, they each reported to someone different within Astra’s organization....Decision-making at Astra was also impaired by complex budgeting and approval processes. There would be long debates over decisions like job titles and reporting structures. As a result, sometimes the propulsion team wouldn’t get parts ordered quickly enough, or they were unable to hire people to work on the spacecraft engines, sources said.“It was a very schizophrenic thing where part of management was saying, ‘We have to invest, we have to do great things with Apollo,’ but there was no investment there. [There were] no hires,” the same person said, speaking of the months after the acquisition closed....The majority of the Apollo Fusion team had cleared out by October 2022, less than 18 months after the acquisition closed. LinkedIn data shows that Astra eventually lost nearly every Apollo Fusion staffer, including the engineers that took the spacecraft engine product from clean sheet to flight heritage....
It's wild how many M&As happen without an appreciation that the real value in a company is the people.
Quote from: XRZ.YZ on 03/08/2024 07:33 pmQuote from: TrevorMonty on 03/08/2024 03:39 pmQuote from: GreenShrike on 03/08/2024 03:20 pm. However, I'm more curious about what the new investors are thinking. Kemp couldn't make Astra a success once under his leadership; why do they think this time will be different?They don't have financial reserves to make it in launch industry. Only thing left is sell most of assets and try to .ake a go of Apollo in space propulsion business. From articles I've read they neglgected that side of business when LVs were main focus. I pity any customer relying on Astra for their satellite propulsion.https://techcrunch.com/2023/08/28/astras-apollo-fusion-acquisition-followed-by-delays-and-desertion/According to this piece, Astra has already killed Apollo due to mis-management.Quote...One source, who spoke to TechCrunch on condition of anonymity, described how, post-acquisition, none of the Apollo Fusion team members continued to report to Apollo CEO and co-founder Mike Cassidy. Nor did they report to the same few managers; instead, they each reported to someone different within Astra’s organization....Decision-making at Astra was also impaired by complex budgeting and approval processes. There would be long debates over decisions like job titles and reporting structures. As a result, sometimes the propulsion team wouldn’t get parts ordered quickly enough, or they were unable to hire people to work on the spacecraft engines, sources said.“It was a very schizophrenic thing where part of management was saying, ‘We have to invest, we have to do great things with Apollo,’ but there was no investment there. This is a large company with a large number of customers around the world. They are involved in thousands of deals with different currencies. And as stated in blog cross-border transactions allow for easy allocation of a part of this money to the development of the company. But for some reason the management failed to do so. [There were] no hires,” the same person said, speaking of the months after the acquisition closed....The majority of the Apollo Fusion team had cleared out by October 2022, less than 18 months after the acquisition closed. LinkedIn data shows that Astra eventually lost nearly every Apollo Fusion staffer, including the engineers that took the spacecraft engine product from clean sheet to flight heritage....It's wild how many M&As happen without an appreciation that the real value in a company is the people.
Quote from: TrevorMonty on 03/08/2024 03:39 pmQuote from: GreenShrike on 03/08/2024 03:20 pm. However, I'm more curious about what the new investors are thinking. Kemp couldn't make Astra a success once under his leadership; why do they think this time will be different?They don't have financial reserves to make it in launch industry. Only thing left is sell most of assets and try to .ake a go of Apollo in space propulsion business. From articles I've read they neglgected that side of business when LVs were main focus. I pity any customer relying on Astra for their satellite propulsion.https://techcrunch.com/2023/08/28/astras-apollo-fusion-acquisition-followed-by-delays-and-desertion/According to this piece, Astra has already killed Apollo due to mis-management.Quote...One source, who spoke to TechCrunch on condition of anonymity, described how, post-acquisition, none of the Apollo Fusion team members continued to report to Apollo CEO and co-founder Mike Cassidy. Nor did they report to the same few managers; instead, they each reported to someone different within Astra’s organization....Decision-making at Astra was also impaired by complex budgeting and approval processes. There would be long debates over decisions like job titles and reporting structures. As a result, sometimes the propulsion team wouldn’t get parts ordered quickly enough, or they were unable to hire people to work on the spacecraft engines, sources said.“It was a very schizophrenic thing where part of management was saying, ‘We have to invest, we have to do great things with Apollo,’ but there was no investment there. This is a large company with a large number of customers around the world. They are involved in thousands of deals with different currencies. And as stated in blog cross-border transactions allow for easy allocation of a part of this money to the development of the company. But for some reason the management failed to do so. [There were] no hires,” the same person said, speaking of the months after the acquisition closed....The majority of the Apollo Fusion team had cleared out by October 2022, less than 18 months after the acquisition closed. LinkedIn data shows that Astra eventually lost nearly every Apollo Fusion staffer, including the engineers that took the spacecraft engine product from clean sheet to flight heritage....
...One source, who spoke to TechCrunch on condition of anonymity, described how, post-acquisition, none of the Apollo Fusion team members continued to report to Apollo CEO and co-founder Mike Cassidy. Nor did they report to the same few managers; instead, they each reported to someone different within Astra’s organization....Decision-making at Astra was also impaired by complex budgeting and approval processes. There would be long debates over decisions like job titles and reporting structures. As a result, sometimes the propulsion team wouldn’t get parts ordered quickly enough, or they were unable to hire people to work on the spacecraft engines, sources said.“It was a very schizophrenic thing where part of management was saying, ‘We have to invest, we have to do great things with Apollo,’ but there was no investment there. This is a large company with a large number of customers around the world. They are involved in thousands of deals with different currencies. And as stated in blog cross-border transactions allow for easy allocation of a part of this money to the development of the company. But for some reason the management failed to do so. [There were] no hires,” the same person said, speaking of the months after the acquisition closed....The majority of the Apollo Fusion team had cleared out by October 2022, less than 18 months after the acquisition closed. LinkedIn data shows that Astra eventually lost nearly every Apollo Fusion staffer, including the engineers that took the spacecraft engine product from clean sheet to flight heritage....
Yes, they claimed they would reach new orbits, but in fact, they forced out the people who constituted the main essence of acquisition and caused a collapse. To me, it looks like sabotage, only it's unclear for what purpose.
At various points during the second half of 2023 and thus far in 2024, the Company has considered and even begun preparations to file for voluntary relief under either Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code because the Company faced an inability to fund its ongoing operations. The Company entered into the Merger Agreement as the only actionable alternative to the filing of a petition for voluntary relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, in which case all of the assets of the Company would have been liquidated and the stockholders would have received no value for their shares of Class A Common Stock.
• Our losses from operations and liquidity condition raise substantial doubt about our ability to continue as a going concern. As a result, there is significant risk in the investment in shares of our Class A Common Stock and you may lose all or part of your investment.• We have incurred significant losses since inception and we may not be able to achieve or maintain profitability. Our current financial condition is precarious and we are at risk of insolvency.
The Company does not have sufficient funds to operate until the expected closing of the Merger. If the Company is unable to secure interim financing, it may run out of money before the Merger can be consummated. In addition, the closing of the Merger is dependent on certain investors providing financing at closing consistent with their equity commitments. If one or more of these investors fail to provide their financing at closing, it could delay or prevent the closing of the Merger.
Okay, to summarize: hype train to smallsat launcher, technology acquired, dehydrateI'll be carefully watching future developments of the orbital-capable Kemp tribe.
Astra Space Inc. Receives and Subsequently Cures Deficiency Notice from Nasdaq Due to Late 10-Q FilingMay 31, 2024 09:00 AM Eastern Daylight TimeALAMEDA, Calif.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Astra Space, Inc. (“Astra”) announced that on May 22, 2024, it received a deficiency notice from Nasdaq indicating that, because Astra did not timely file its Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2024 with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), Astra was not in compliance with Nasdaq Listing Rule 5250(c)(1), which requires Nasdaq-listed companies to timely file all required periodic financial reports with the SEC. As previously reported by Astra on its Notification of Late Filing on Form 12b-25, filed with the SEC on May 14, 2024, Astra was unable to file its Form 10-Q without unreasonable effort or expense by the prescribed due date for such filing. As previously disclosed on Astra’s Current Reports on Form 8-K filed with the SEC on April 19, 2024, and April 26, 2024, respectively, Astra is not currently in compliance with Nasdaq Listing Rules 5450(a)(1) (the “Minimum Bid Price Requirement”) and 5550(b)(1) (the “Minimum Stockholders’ Equity Requirement”).The May 22, 2024 deficiency notice had no immediate effect on the listing of Astra’s Class A common stock. The notice provides that Astra has until July 22, 2024, to submit to Nasdaq a plan to regain compliance with the Rule. Subsequently, on May 29, 2024, Astra filed its Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2024, and regained compliance with Nasdaq Listing Rule 5250(c)(1).There can be no assurance that Nasdaq will accept any plan or grant an exception period, that any hearing would be successful or that Astra will be able to regain compliance with the Minimum Bid Price Requirement or the Minimum Stockholders’ Equity Requirement within the deadline or any exception period that may be granted, or maintain compliance with the other continued listing requirements set forth in the Nasdaq Listing Rules.
Astra, which once traded at up to $209 a share, will pay investors 50 cents a share as part of its deal to go private.
each Common Share (other than (i) the Rollover Shares, (ii) any Canceled Common Shares and (iti) any applicable Dissenting Shares) issued and outstanding immediately prior to the Eflective Time (such Class A Shares, the "Converted Shares"):• will automatically be canceled and converted into the right to receive $0.50 per share in cash, without interest (the "Merger Consideration");• will no longer be outstanding and cease to exist;
Astra's financial advisors approached 30 different buyers for the company in 2023. These prospective buyers were primarily interested in the spacecraft business. None of them ultimately bought in.
On October 17, 2023, PJT Partners notified the Company of its resignation as the Company's financial advisor, citing concerns that it may be conflicted moving forward, given that its prior involvement with Party A and certain members of Company management in connection with prior transactions and the increasing likelihood that Party A and certain members of Company management would be participating in a potential transaction at that time.During its engagement, at the direction of the Company, PJT Partners reached out to 30 parties, which included a combination of financial buyers and strategic parties, who were ultimately most interested in the Space Products business. Of those parties, 14 parties executed a confidentiality agreement with the Company and only seven parties actively engaged in due diligence (including Party A). PJT Partners' process resulted in only the October 14Term Sheet from Party A and PJT never met separately with the Special Committee about the Sale Process.
