Quote from: MrTim on 05/28/2010 06:30 am....we need to drop the cost of access to space both by-the-kilogram and by the cubic meter. Griffin chose to do this with mass fraction by building a massive launcher...I actually agree almost 100% with this paragraph.~Jon
....we need to drop the cost of access to space both by-the-kilogram and by the cubic meter. Griffin chose to do this with mass fraction by building a massive launcher...
I too believe that Constellation was never funded to a level to ensure success. One of the reasons Apollo succeeded was because it received generous funding early on. The cuts came later. But if one didn't know better, one could claim that Constellation was *deliberately* programmed for failure from the beginning. But I struggle to understand how anyone could have believed Constellation was going to get some sort of Magic-Beanstalk, "somehow, someday, you'll see!" funding boost to finally come into focus after Shuttle. Especially in this era of post-Hurricane Katrina, two wars and the world economic meltdown. The architects of Constellation needed to think smarter, think more pragmatically to ensure Constellation could somehow be made "cancel-proof". Not create some wish-list of fantasy Mega-rockets that nobody was going to pay for, for decades to come.Now, we are seeing a similar "somehow, someday, you'll see!" faith-based approach to the so-called "Obama spaceplan". WHO is going to ensure the new plan -- such as it is -- is cancel-proof? WHO is going to make hard decisions to preserve sensible goals and destinations? WHAT destination? WHERE? At least with the Moon, mankind could learn (or is that relearn?) how to traverse the solar system and adapt the vehicles and technologies for other missions. But building vehicles to land on Asteroids will mean you can land on... Asteroids and not much else.America needs to do better. It CAN do better in space. Constellation doesn't need cancellation; it needs pragmatic alteration
Quote from: Jim on 05/27/2010 03:20 pmDon't build a launch vehicle around a fixed first stage and expect to get all of your spacecraft requirements to be met.Clearly this is the fundamental flaw in the overall Constellation design. All other issues with Constellation arise from or become much more difficult/expensive to solve because of this.One question I would like to see answered is why this mistake was committed? We've all heard of Griffin's "my way or the highway" style of management, and we all know of the then NASA IG's "ineffectiveness" that allowed all sorts of abuses to happen, but Griffin was supposed to be a smart and talented designer. Was this a case of hubris, false pride, graft, institutional inertia, or something else that let such a fundamental flaw continue on so long that it might be impossible to kill?
Don't build a launch vehicle around a fixed first stage and expect to get all of your spacecraft requirements to be met.
Quote from: robertross on 05/27/2010 11:24 pmI'm sorry, but you are wrong.They clearly said we could build the rockets right now, without all the R&D being proposed. That isn't a position for 'large rockets', it's one of conservative use of existing capabilities.I said development program, not research. Development is required for CxP or any other Apollo-style program. In their mind a large cost-plus development program is required to return to the moon or do anything worthwhile in manned spaceflight (even to get to ISS).
I'm sorry, but you are wrong.They clearly said we could build the rockets right now, without all the R&D being proposed. That isn't a position for 'large rockets', it's one of conservative use of existing capabilities.
As I indicated in the hearing thread, the '10 year' statement by Cernan was for BOTH safe & affordable. They'll be lucky to have a safe flight history in that time.
The so-called 'experts' we have heard prior to this hearing have made some of the most non-sensical, flawed, and outright incorrect statements of them all. Bolden's "we don't have a HLV now" statement will be remembered for all eternity for me.
Quote from: jongoff on 05/28/2010 07:13 pmQuote from: MrTim on 05/28/2010 06:30 am....we need to drop the cost of access to space both by-the-kilogram and by the cubic meter. Griffin chose to do this with mass fraction by building a massive launcher...I actually agree almost 100% with this paragraph.~JonI dont. Griffin never made a choice to reduce launch costs. ( he made a lot of other choices, like attempting to gear everything up for a direct-to mars launch etc, but no choice about launch costs )
Quote from: DaveJes1979 on 05/28/2010 12:48 amIn an important way of speaking he is right. From the standpoint of payload, we have no HLV right now. Umm, so what is shuttle?
In an important way of speaking he is right. From the standpoint of payload, we have no HLV right now.
Quote from: robertross on 05/29/2010 12:42 amQuote from: DaveJes1979 on 05/28/2010 12:48 amIn an important way of speaking he is right. From the standpoint of payload, we have no HLV right now. Umm, so what is shuttle?A 2nd stage so heavy it turns a HLV into a MLV?
R&D is Research & Development together, so my R&D statement still applies, since any provider would need to develop the interfaces, fairings, and interstages to accommodate any new spacecraft outside the standard offering.
As to their 'mind-set' of large cost-plus development, that's not entirely clear from their statements. It might be perceived by some as such, but utilizing existing rocket capabilities (as they have stated), rather than new R&D work on future 'game-changing' technologies (something they said wasn't required), sort of negates the whole premise behind cost-plus.
From a pure rocket standpoint, absolutely. But for the combined finished product (launcher + capsule), safety & reliability it starts from day 1. If they make any significant changes to the rocket, like software, then it (design) starts to get muddied.
And for a destination like ISS, with a political life (at this point) looking like 2020, that's T-(10 years-contract award date-development time). That could be only 3 years. Hardly an affordable business case at 2 flights/year = 6 flights.
Umm, so what is shuttle?
Quote from: Jim on 05/27/2010 03:20 pm[W]hat is there to show for the 9 billion spent so far[?] A few examples. - Ed Kyle
[W]hat is there to show for the 9 billion spent so far[?]
Quote from: robertross on 05/29/2010 12:42 amFrom a pure rocket standpoint, absolutely. But for the combined finished product (launcher + capsule), safety & reliability it starts from day 1. If they make any significant changes to the rocket, like software, then it (design) starts to get muddied. That's why Boeing and ULA have systems engineers. How does this make that approach unsafe in relation to NASA's approach, when they have to do the exact same thing?QuoteAnd for a destination like ISS, with a political life (at this point) looking like 2020, that's T-(10 years-contract award date-development time). That could be only 3 years. Hardly an affordable business case at 2 flights/year = 6 flights.There is a business case because they will charge NASA a fixed price high enough. And it will still be far less than the legacy cost-plus model. That is because private industry does not have the gargantuan overhead of NASA's fixed costs.
Do you expect ULA (since I think many are on the same page that these are the better contenders) to offer a capability for a future BEO spacecraft for firm fixed price? I mean, that's what it comes down to. CxP's Orion was for a BEO capability that was re-arranged to support ISS in the near term. These astronauts are fighting for what they lived through: BEO manned spaceflight.
3. After a few years, open another tender process for a new vehicle which is BEO capable, or re-start Orion as block II. If this is to be a commercial service, I highly doubt you would find a provider, or if you did, then the price for a scarry business model would be astronomical.
3. After a few years, open another tender process for a new vehicle which is BEO capable, or re-start Orion as block II.
This is depressing.Why is it that its always got to be CXP or bust CXP or bust with congress and with some on this site?!?!?! Why is it that no one seems to ever mention (even if they are considering) what the middle ground is?
Quote from: FinalFrontier on 05/31/2010 01:48 pmThis is depressing.Why is it that its always got to be CXP or bust CXP or bust with congress and with some on this site?!?!?! Why is it that no one seems to ever mention (even if they are considering) what the middle ground is?Because there isn't enough funding for a middle ground. Not every decision can be made via compromise.
There have been two major congressional hearings recently that brought together two of our most respected moonwalkers, Neil Armstrong and Gene Cernan. There are two arguments that they make. The first is that if Constellation was adequately funded, that it would be moving merrily on to success. The second is that the lack of a destination and clear timeline in the Obama policy abdicates American leadership in space.This following is from Gene Cernan's testimony relative to the funding issue:"Important to note is that the Committee was directed to base their conclusions and recommendations not on the FY2009 budget, but rather on the FY2010 budget from which tens of billions of dollars had already been removed between 2010 and 2020."However, NASA's funding problems started long before the FY2009 budget. This can be seen in NASA's own earlier documents and a 2007 study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the Ares 1 program. The original Ares 1/Orion design was based upon a standard four-segment Shuttle solid rocket motor, an SSME (Space Shuttle Main Engine) with modifications for air start, and a 5.5 meter Orion capsule capable of carrying up to 6 people to ISS and 4 people to the EOR-LOR rendezvous point in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) (page 404 from the ESAS Final report TM-2005-214062).The IOC (Initial Operational Capability) date was supposed to be 2011 for the Orion/Ares 1 combination (chart on page 56 of the ESAS doc [show in figure 1 here] plus Scott Horowitz's and Doug Cook's Exploration Strategy Workshop charts as late as April 28, 2006). Looking at the program in 2007, the GAO (GAO-08-51) found something completely different.Here is the chart from the NASA Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) report: ...By 2007, long before the Obama Administration, this all had changed. When President Bush announced the Vision for Space Exploration in 2004 it was stated that in order to minimize costs and workforce disruptions that the new launch vehicles be based as much as possible on the existing Space Transportation System (Shuttle stack) design. However, NASA changed the original ESAS Ares 1 design from the standard four segment booster and an modified Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME), to a five segment booster and the J2X engine. This is what the GAO found (from page 2): ....NASA knew in September 2007 that they would have insufficient budget for their planned work on Constellation in FY 2008-2010. Compounding this situation several changes were made to the Ares 1 vehicle that increased near term costs without any commensurate increase in funding by Congress. These changes, going from the four segment to the five segment booster, and changing from the SSME to the J2-X, required an additional $730 million over their existing 2007 budget, which did not happen (page 7). These changes also led to many unintended cost increases and schedule slips above that identified by NASA that were not anticipated or funded with the prime example being the Thrust Oscillation problem. ...
Quote from: robertross on 05/31/2010 03:42 pmDo you expect ULA (since I think many are on the same page that these are the better contenders) to offer a capability for a future BEO spacecraft for firm fixed price? I mean, that's what it comes down to. CxP's Orion was for a BEO capability that was re-arranged to support ISS in the near term. These astronauts are fighting for what they lived through: BEO manned spaceflight.They said nothing of the kind and you are changing the subject. They are against commercial for launch services and LEO taxi. They are not simply opposing commercial for deep space. The Obama FY2011 does not propose commercial for deep space capsule. There is no reason to oppose commercial taxi to LEO in order to support a NASA-designed and owned deep space capsule.
Quote3. After a few years, open another tender process for a new vehicle which is BEO capable, or re-start Orion as block II. If this is to be a commercial service, I highly doubt you would find a provider, or if you did, then the price for a scarry business model would be astronomical. A BEO deep space capsule could debatably be done either as traditional cost-plus-NASA-designed or commercial fixed price, but again it is a separate subject from LEO taxi and launch services. If it was done as commercial fixed price, it would not be a "scary business model" because with fixed-price contracts the requirements are set in stone BEFORE a company commits to a project.
Yes, the requirements are set in stone ahead of time, but the problem is also: how much will NASA end up paying in the end for 2 flights/year from early 2015 (start date) to end 2020 (ISS splashdown date). That's somewhere between 10-12 total crewed flights. The business model AFTER that falls apart. Sure, the contract would be written that they get paid if ISS taxi is not required for any reason. But what's after that? If we have no destination, ULA (or any other company) has just put a development effort into an uncertain future. They 'may' get a company like Bigelow to buy flights, but at this point in time there is scary business model. Though but a small portion of the business, shareholders still may have doubts. I would (if I were one).
