Jim's "Myth" thread: CxP's only problem was that it was underfunded.

[Jim]

This thread is to dispel the notion that CxP's only problem was that it was underfunded.  The documented testimony was just being kind.  Anything can fly if there was more funding.

Truth, CxP was too expensive and a waste of resources.  Proof, what is there to show for the 9 billion spent so far.  Boeing, LM, OSC and SpaceX have spent much less and have 4 launch vehicle families (not just one vehicle), 7 launch pads and 2 resupply vehicles.

Also CxP had other major problems.
It had poor system engineering from the beginning. 

Don't build a launch vehicle around a fixed first stage and expect to get all of your spacecraft requirements to be met.

Using inadequate resource margins at various stages of developments (<25% at PDR)  For a 50klb Orion means it was either to have max weight of 62.5klbs  or the mass estimate at PDR was should have been 40klbs.  Same goes for Ares I, it should have had a lift capability of 25% above the 50klb. (see Apollo spacecraft & Saturn V development)

Holding reviews (PDR) before the project is ready for it and with unresolved requirements.

Don't levy unachievable ops requirements on existing hardware.

Also simple items like the upperstage and booster being clocked wrong.

[kfsorensen]

Don't build a launch vehicle around a fixed first stage and expect to get all of your spacecraft requirements to be met.

That was probably the most fundamental flaw, and the one they tried hardest to hide.

[rocketscintist]

Same goes for Ares I, it should have had a lift capability of 25% above the 50klb. (see Apollo spacecraft & Saturn V development)

Quite right: In general, we don't design launch vehicles with large enough payload margins in this country. (The US.)

My general impression from reading about Apollo is that it was a "german" thing to put in payload margin. We don't do it because we believe it is a luxury that can be afforded only in smaller vehicles (V2); not when you are trying to drive down $/lb.

[simonth]

The truth is the current administration wants to continue parts of the same flawed program at enormous costs to create redundant capabilities. To expense 4.5 billion for an Orion capsule that cannot be used to fly to the ISS or even will regularly be used to get back to Earth, but is just used as a potential life-boat (but has to still be regularly exchanged) is just madness. Where will those 4.5 billion come from? Will it eat up the new HLV line-item AND the robotic exploration line-item? Or will it just eat up most of the R&D line-item?

The myth right now is that CxP will be gone. Quite to the contrary, politicians and NASA are doing everything to continue it, but in a horrible manner. They try to keep Ares I testflights for billions in costs, but not develop Ares I for real, they try to keep Orion for a life-boat only, but not develop Orion for actual crew access to space. It seems like the people in charge don't care about spaceflight any more at all, it's just a "how can we create the most non-sensical compromise ever".

Sorry for going a bit off-topic, but the real myth about CxP is that it failed because of  NASA. The reality is, it failed because of politics.

[rocketscintist]

Sorry for going a bit off-topic, but the real myth about CxP is that it failed because of  NASA. The reality is, it failed because of politics.

Interesting thought. Agreed: Congress gets a big share of the blame. Unfortunately, I don't have a clue on how to fix Congress.

[Jim]

In general, we don't design launch vehicles with large enough payload margins in this country. (The US.)

Incorrect, Yes, we do.  EELV has/had it, but spacecraft keep growing.

[Spacely]

The most depressing thing about CxP is that the problems Jim's outlined (and many others) didn't come into focus through hindsight, but were instead, plainly visible from the outset to countless engineers.

[FinalFrontier]

This thread is to dispel the notion that CxP's only problem was that it was underfunded.  The documented testimony was just being kind.  Anything can fly if there was more funding.

Truth, CxP was too expensive and a waste of resources.  Proof, what is there to show for the 9 billion spent so far.  Boeing, LM, OSC and SpaceX have spent much less and have 4 launch vehicle families (not just one vehicle), 7 launch pads and 2 resupply vehicles.

Also CxP had other major problems.
It had poor system engineering from the beginning. 

Don't build a launch vehicle around a fixed first stage and expect to get all of your spacecraft requirements to be met.

Using inadequate resource margins at various stages of developments (<25% at PDR)  For a 50klb Orion means it was either to have max weight of 62.5klbs  or the mass estimate at PDR was should have been 40klbs.  Same goes for Ares I, it should have had a lift capability of 25% above the 50klb. (see Apollo spacecraft & Saturn V development)

Holding reviews (PDR) before the project is ready for it and with unresolved requirements.

Don't levy unachievable ops requirements on existing hardware.

Also simple items like the upperstage and booster being clocked wrong.

Your 100% correct. I hope someone on the hill reads this.

[edkyle99]

[W]hat is there to show for the 9 billion spent so far[?] 

A few examples.
 
- Ed Kyle

[Jim]

[W]hat is there to show for the 9 billion spent so far[?] 

A few examples.
 
- Ed Kyle

None of that is compete.  Show me operating flight hardware and not test hardware. 

I will adjust my list to exclude the same*:
Boeing, LM, OSC and SpaceX have spent much less and have 4 3 launch vehicle families (not just one vehicle), 7 5 launch pads and 2 resupply vehicles.   which is still more to show for it.   But I could also list the Delta CBC  static fire and Atlas hot fire, not to mention the Atlas SRB and GEM-60 firings. 

*  this may change in a few days

Also, 5% of the 9 billion was wasted on a marginal flight test.

[SpacexULA]

The most depressing thing about CxP is that the problems Jim's outlined (and many others) didn't come into focus through hindsight, but were instead, plainly visible from the outset to countless engineers.

No, the most depressing thing is that none of the issues that Jim pointed out EVER get seriously discussed in Congressional hearings.

Senators would rather hold up a copy of Time magazine and talk about it being invention of the year.

We've got the NASA and Congress we deserve.

[DaveJes1979]

No, the most depressing thing is that none of the issues that Jim pointed out NEVER get seriously discussed in Congressional hearings.

Senators would rather hold up a copy of Time magazine and talk about it being invention of the year.

Or hold up a picture of a laid off engineer and his wife.

The discussion in these hearings, coming from the "expert" witnesses they have called, is little more than asserted opinions rather than hard facts and logical arguments. 

But the Apollo astronauts who gave testimony are not expert witnesses on this topic.  They are experts at being astronauts in the 1960's and 1970's.  Indeed, they were guilty of multiple howlers during their testimony.  Cernan, for instance, mentioned the importance of the shuttle for servicing satellites and national security.  He also seems to be the only one who thinks commercial human spaceflight is ten years away.  These guys are, at worst, out to lunch and, at best, living in the early eighties.

These older astronauts, especially, are stuck in the Apollo paradigm of large cost-plus development programs, large rockets, and large budgets.  "Apollo on steroids" is all that makes sense to them, even though it is unnecessarily expensive and unsustainable politically and financially.

[robertross]

No, the most depressing thing is that none of the issues that Jim pointed out NEVER get seriously discussed in Congressional hearings.

Senators would rather hold up a copy of Time magazine and talk about it being invention of the year.

Or hold up a picture of a laid off engineer and his wife.

The discussion in these hearings, coming from the "expert" witnesses they have called, is little more than asserted opinions rather than hard facts and logical arguments. 

But the Apollo astronauts who gave testimony are not expert witnesses on this topic.  They are experts at being astronauts in the 1960's and 1970's.  Indeed, they were guilty of multiple howlers during their testimony.  Cernan, for instance, mentioned the importance of the shuttle for servicing satellites and national security.  He also seems to be the only one who thinks commercial human spaceflight is ten years away.  These guys are, at worst, out to lunch and, at best, living in the early eighties.

These older astronauts, especially, are stuck in the Apollo paradigm of large cost-plus development programs, large rockets, and large budgets.  "Apollo on steroids" is all that makes sense to them, even though it is unnecessarily expensive and unsustainable politically and financially.

I'm sorry, but you are wrong.
They clearly said we could build the rockets right now, without all the R&D being proposed. That isn't a position for 'large rockets', it's one of conservative use of existing capabilities.

As I indicated in the hearing thread, the '10 year' statement by Cernan was for BOTH safe & affordable. They'll be lucky to have a safe flight history in that time.

The so-called 'experts' we have heard prior to this hearing have made some of the most non-sensical, flawed, and outright incorrect statements of them all. Bolden's "we don't have a HLV now" statement will be remembered for all eternity for me.

The top statement (response) is the most important though: you are not hearing about the issues with Ares I in congress. Is it to save NASA's credibility (save face)? I think so.

[edkyle99]

[W]hat is there to show for the 9 billion spent so far[?] 

A few examples.
 
- Ed Kyle

None of that is compete.  Show me operating flight hardware and not test hardware. 

I will adjust my list to exclude the same*:
Boeing, LM, OSC and SpaceX have spent much less and have 4 3 launch vehicle families (not just one vehicle), 7 5 launch pads and 2 resupply vehicles.   which is still more to show for it.   But I could also list the Delta CBC  static fire and Atlas hot fire, not to mention the Atlas SRB and GEM-60 firings. 

*  this may change in a few days

Also, 5% of the 9 billion was wasted on a marginal flight test.

Of course it isn't complete.  Constellation was a plan to send astronauts to the Moon.  The other efforts you mention are terrific, but none of them were plans to send astronauts to the Moon - and none currently possess that capability.  They are no more "complete' in that regard than Ares/Orion/Altair.

 - Ed Kyle

[DaveJes1979]

I'm sorry, but you are wrong.
They clearly said we could build the rockets right now, without all the R&D being proposed. That isn't a position for 'large rockets', it's one of conservative use of existing capabilities.

I said development program, not research.  Development is required for CxP or any other Apollo-style program.  In their mind a large cost-plus development program is required to return to the moon or do anything worthwhile in manned spaceflight (even to get to ISS).

As I indicated in the hearing thread, the '10 year' statement by Cernan was for BOTH safe & affordable. They'll be lucky to have a safe flight history in that time.

Still laughable.  From LV standpoint commerical already has a "safe" track record (EELV). 

From capsule standpoint, Boeing (and the companies it subsumed) has already made several successful manned capsules.  And in the past capsules haven't needed a 5-7 year clean flight history in order to be considered "safe".

The so-called 'experts' we have heard prior to this hearing have made some of the most non-sensical, flawed, and outright incorrect statements of them all. Bolden's "we don't have a HLV now" statement will be remembered for all eternity for me.

In an important way of speaking he is right.  From the standpoint of payload, we have no HLV right now. 

[SpacexULA]

Of course it isn't complete.  Constellation was a plan to send astronauts to the Moon.  The other efforts you mention are terrific, but none of them were plans to send astronauts to the Moon - and none currently possess that capability.  They are no more "complete' in that regard than Ares/Orion/Altair.

 - Ed Kyle

I thought Ares 1 was a LEO only crew transport rocket built to support an, at this moment, completely paper Moon rocket.

If Ares 1 is a LEO only rocket, I would say Atlas, Delta, and even Falcon are at least a little more complete than Ares 1.

If you where referring to Ares 5 there, how is Ares 5 more real than the Atlas and Delta next phase rockets?

I think most of the attacks are against the Ares section of CxP, not the Orion/Altar.  Most Flexible path advocate on here support Orion, and want some form of Altiar (eventually)

[Eric Hedman]

Sorry for going a bit off-topic, but the real myth about CxP is that it failed because of  NASA. The reality is, it failed because of politics.

Interesting thought. Agreed: Congress gets a big share of the blame. Unfortunately, I don't have a clue on how to fix Congress.

Term limits so we can regularly throw the %*##!!s out.  Otherwise the voters just don't pay attention to how incompetent and corrupt these %*##!!s get.  We do get the government we deserve.

[MrTim]

This thread is to dispel the notion that CxP's only problem was that it was underfunded.  The documented testimony was just being kind.  Anything can fly if there was more funding.

Truth, CxP was too expensive and a waste of resources.  Proof, what is there to show for the 9 billion spent so far.  Boeing, LM, OSC and SpaceX have spent much less and have 4 launch vehicle families (not just one vehicle), 7 launch pads and 2 resupply vehicles.

Also CxP had other major problems.
It had poor system engineering from the beginning. 

Don't build a launch vehicle around a fixed first stage and expect to get all of your spacecraft requirements to be met.

Using inadequate resource margins at various stages of developments (<25% at PDR)  For a 50klb Orion means it was either to have max weight of 62.5klbs  or the mass estimate at PDR was should have been 40klbs.  Same goes for Ares I, it should have had a lift capability of 25% above the 50klb. (see Apollo spacecraft & Saturn V development)

Holding reviews (PDR) before the project is ready for it and with unresolved requirements.

Don't levy unachievable ops requirements on existing hardware.

Also simple items like the upperstage and booster being clocked wrong.

Hard to believe that this post was written with a straight face. Jim, you are letting your ties to the EELV mess cloud your vision re everything else.

1. The cost issue raised against Cx continues to annoy not because there were no cost issues but rather because the critics of Cx and STS have long used these arguments in such a misleading way. Any program at NASA or DoD is likely to have cost issues for a large number of reasons just some of which include:

(a) Designing and building new things. It does not matter that some elements are similar to previously used elements, the complete new configuration will be new and inevitably have new issues.

(b) Pentagon and DoD requirements for everything from testing to paperwork are far higher than most businesses are used to, which means any new engineers, managers, vendors etc. have a steep learning curve about just how much more expensive things are likely go as they conform to the requirements.
 
(c) Government procurement is very different from normal civilian processes and tends to encourage such growth. Because attempts to counteract this are generally cooked-up by politicians, they often have the perverse result of driving costs up.

(d) Costs on STS and Cx have also been abused by proponents of other options by heaping much of NASA's baseline costs on to these programs. The honest way to compare options (cost-wise) would be to exclude all overhead that NASA would have anyway from all programs and then compare what remains. STS should never, for example, have borne the burden of LC-39 which the taxpayers would never allow to be discarded. To be fare, now any "commercial" program should have to bear the full costs of LC-39 and JSC (suddenly a Dragon might not look so cheap)

2. If your "proof" that Cx was too expensive rests on the claim that 9 Billion was spent with nothing to show, then your argument holds no water.

(a) SOME of the hardware built: DM-1, Ares I-X, DM-2, PA-1, MLAS, New MLP, various mockups for testing and analysis

(b) Some of the facilities work done or underway: New friction stir welding facilities at Marshall and going in at Michoud, New A-3 test stand at Stennis (not just the steel but the dredging and docks etc), new lightning protection at pad 39-B (which pays for the the plans and engineering work done so that 39-A only needs to pay for metal and work to get the same system), Facilities work at the Space Power Facility at Glenn to do the thermal, acoustics, etc tests on Cx spacecraft, Renovation and outfitting of the dynamic test stand at Marshall, renovations of O&C at KSC, new launch facility at WSMR

(c) SOME of the testing done: large number of CFD and wind tunnel tests on Ares. Drop tests on parachute systems at YPG, landing impact tests at Langley, Seat tests for crew safety including the use of both, crash test dummies and corpses (with the overhead of post-test autopsies), various roll-control and abort motor tests

There's been plenty more work done but I think I have posted enough to expose your bias against Cx. I have absolutely no personal involvement with Cx, but as an engineer who play with flight systems I get very annoyed by two arguments which arise over and over on the net relative to high-tech engineering: (a) that aliens invented everything and a few dopey humans just reverse engineered a few bits of wreckage they could understand and (b) that a bunch of engineers blew billions on a big government project before the government pulled the plug and now we taxpayers have nothing to show for it, therefore the engineers did something wrong or the project was not workable. Both arguments de-value the work of thousands of serious, competent, diligent, hard-working engineers.

Arguments over things like the PDR would irritate me more, but I find them understandable given what was happening both in the financial sense (after the Democrats took congress in 2006 and forced NASA to live under a CR instead of a budget) and in politics where one candidate (Obama) was running for president on a promise to gut Cx for education dollars and push the moon off by five years. Any program whose people actually care about it and the work they are doing is likely to get a bit rushed and desperate in that environment as they try to prove that they can finish the job if just permitted to (human nature). Direct would have met the same fate, as will Space-X if the day comes when Musk is running out of cash and starting to talk about shutting things down.

Finally, your argument re-gurgitates a common criticism of the Cx program that I will simply no longer let pass without comment: Part of the job of the Ares I-X was to carry Orion and the crew to LEO, but the other part of the design which so many seem to always conveniently forget is that it was also the testbed for the J-2X and the 5-seg SRB. As a result, every difficulty imposed but the 5-seg SRB first stage was not entirely a negative (a failing of the Ares I-X team), but was in fact part of the overall understanding of the technology, performance, structures, etc. The Ares-I people were not idiots for not dropping the SRB and going to something else as soon as problems arose; Using an SRB was every bit as important a part of the effort as putting a capsule atop it. In other words: their mission was not "put six people into LEO" but was, rather, "put six people into LEO using an SRB as part of the development leading to Ares V"

By the way, your beloved EELVs are just as big of a mess. They were supposed to provide the DoD with redundant reliable launchers at low cost while winning in the commercial markets. They've ended-up as the sort of "commercial" that Bolden and Garver are swooning over: Their only real, dependable customer is Uncle Sam and he pays more for them than all those early promises said he would. Also, since few people have seen all the engineering that went into them or the test and assembly facilities, any money their developers claim to have spent on them was probably wasted (sigh) Clearly too expensive and unsustainable  (your argument, applied to your sacred cows)

[Nittany Lion]

I don’t think valid comparisons can be made between commercial endeavors and government programs. Commercial efforts must have expected financial returns commensurate with expected financial risk. Governmental efforts just need to be politically feasible. Constellation would likely have been very different if it wasn’t required to utilize existing resources in Utah, Louisiana, Alabama, and Florida.

Constellation was designed from the outset to be man-rated, in fact, ultra-man-rated. The commercial efforts have yet to tackle man-rating. Apparently man-rating is a significant hurdle. There was testimony during the Augustine Commission that it would take seven years to man-rate the Delta IV Heavy. Falcon 9 is having difficulty demonstrating the viability of its self-destruct mechanism; man-rating is a long way beyond that.

From the outset Constellation was designing for LEO, the Moon, and to some extent Mars. What proportion of the commercial efforts are focused beyond LEO?

Constellation has had two flight tests which were pretty much on-time and pretty much successful. I know those points will be disputed so I’ll leave the quantification of “pretty much” to others.

Designing launch vehicles and spacecraft today should require smaller weight-lifting and weight margins than in the 1960s. The process is more mature today than it was then, the computational capabilities of design hardware and software is greater, and everything electronic is smaller, more capable, and requires less energy.

We’re all “feelin’ the love” for the shuttle just now, but if we could go back to say 1975 when the shuttle was at Constellation’s current stage of development . . .

(1) How late was the first flight?

(2) How does the demonstrated flight rate compare to the design flight rate?

(3) What proportion of the design payload capacity was ever achieved?

This U.S. voter and U.S. taxpayer greatly preferred the 2009 program-of-record (Constellation) to the 2010 program-of-record (nothing).

[MrTim]

Term limits so we can regularly throw the %*##!!s out.  Otherwise the voters just don't pay attention to how incompetent and corrupt these %*##!!s get.  We do get the government we deserve.

Term limits are the worst possible solution:

1. Congress messed with the Constitution to implement presidential term limits after FDR served. As a result, every President is now a lame-duck the moment he is re-elected and his political power shrinks. This is one reason why major multi-year federal projects of all types are now very difficult. The threat that a president might run a 3rd time provided presidents up to FDR with 2nd term muscle.

2. With term limits, you get a ballot with a handful of unknowns on it and must vote knowing far less that the little we currently know.

3. You lose the institutional knowledge that long-timers bring. With term limits, Mikulski would not have been there to preserve Hubble, and every two years another congress would convene with another bunch of idiots who want to gut NASA to build a bridge or pay-off a buddy in their district.

4. With massive turnover, the feds would likely be overwhelmed with corruption prosecutions on all the people that big business and various special interests would spend time and money getting into office just for a single term of concentrated corruption. News people and watchdogs would barely have time to get to know the people enough to spot the corruption and hold anybody to account before the next election cycle would bring in a new bunch of paid stooges (as the retiring ones skipped-out to the Bahamas or some such place with comfortable pay-off retirement packages provided by their special interest masters).

Hate to go this far off-topic, but this subject comes-up occasionally among idealistic people (including space supporters) and I want to encourage you to see that simple fixes (particularly where lawyers and politicians are involved) may not be what space supporters should reach for. We really do need to actually pay attention to the political class and put pressure on them, rather than grabbing for a quick fix and then going back to sleep