Quote from: iamlucky13 on 02/02/2013 04:40 amI don't see or recall reading about loss of hydraulics, except articles from the first few weeks after the accident...Read the Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report.http://history.nasa.gov/columbia/columbiacrewsurvival.pdf
I don't see or recall reading about loss of hydraulics, except articles from the first few weeks after the accident...
Quote from: Lee Jay on 02/03/2013 12:50 amQuote from: Jorge on 02/03/2013 12:39 amThat's not the original. It was a highly enhanced version, made painstakingly during the months after the accident.I know that. All I'm saying is that the out-of-focus tracking camera wasn't the only one shooting the launch with high resolving power.What was the veiwing angle of the out of focus camera?Was it filming the underside of the wing?Wouldn't that have been the best possible perspective to analyze the point of impact and the clocking angle?
Quote from: Jorge on 02/03/2013 12:39 amThat's not the original. It was a highly enhanced version, made painstakingly during the months after the accident.I know that. All I'm saying is that the out-of-focus tracking camera wasn't the only one shooting the launch with high resolving power.
That's not the original. It was a highly enhanced version, made painstakingly during the months after the accident.
The out of focus camera would have had a view of the underside of the wing and shown where the foam debris impacted; perhaps even shown resulting damage. This view is fine but it doesn't show what we needed to know.
- NASA is not a regulatory agency.- But NASA has set up a set of "human rating" requirements for vehicles that NASA personnel will fly on.- Possibly ported over to FAA regs but not a good idea. Portions are too conservative and rigid.
The lasts posts are the exact reason why I enjoy this forum so much.Over the last two weeks I spent lot of time and energy digging the web for informations on that E-208 camera, trying to understand (and figure) what it would have showed had it been not out-of-focus. Now thanks to this forum I have a clearer understanding of the issue.To try and imagine what E-208 would have showed, one has to look at the ET-208 picture and try to figure more details (by how much, incidentally ?) Thank you all !
So our (NASA's) approach may need to be more incremental than it typically has been, to realize we aren't as smart as we think, and cover more of the bases before we put a human in harm's way. That doesn't necessarily mean we never get off the ground, but simply that if we plan to put man (a person) on the moon again, there is at least a way for that person to survive until a rescue attempt (with sufficient margin) can be mounted.
Mr Hale has done an excellent job of pointing at the fundamental issue, which transcends specifics like ascent imagery. I'd sum it up as, "Before you rely on a system to function properly, be confident you know what state the system is in."
I'd have to say, "be confident that you've designed a good system", from the o-rings on up.The fundamental issue was relying on external foam without an external skin, or a kevlar reinforcing net, or something other than only the tensile strength of the foam at max-Q. The foam for the ET was the final design, not the initial design.All the big rockets before shuttle had skins, and all the big rockets planned for today have skins.
This document has some clues about the decision process. http://www.spaceflightnow.com/columbia/report/inflight.html
Quote from: JohnFornaro on 02/12/2013 02:41 pmI'd have to say, "be confident that you've designed a good system", from the o-rings on up.The fundamental issue was relying on external foam without an external skin, or a kevlar reinforcing net, or something other than only the tensile strength of the foam at max-Q. ...All the ... rockets before shuttle had skins, and all the ... rockets planned for today have skins.It isn't a 'big' rocket issue, it's a 'what's in the debris path' issue.
I'd have to say, "be confident that you've designed a good system", from the o-rings on up.The fundamental issue was relying on external foam without an external skin, or a kevlar reinforcing net, or something other than only the tensile strength of the foam at max-Q. ...All the ... rockets before shuttle had skins, and all the ... rockets planned for today have skins.
The foam wouldn't have been an issue if criticality-0 components weren't immediately down-stream in the air-flow.
Delta-IV uses the same foam and will continue to do so without problems. Why? No re-entry TPS components down-stream.It sounds like a 'duh' realisation but it wouldn't surprise me if no-one at all had thought of this issue until the first strikes started showing up and everyone seemed confident that they weren't dangerous enough to justify a stand-down, an ET redesign and the consequential loss of lifting capability because of the heavier ET.
@waynehale (march 1st)25 years ago today, Tom Holloway selected 3 new Flight Directors: Bob Castle, Rob Kelso, and me. The Three Amigos! Seems like yesterday.Couldn't find anything from 1988.....