Quote from: sdsds on 08/11/2025 05:14 amIs it correct that Axiom Station is already somewhat 'bought in' to the CBM standard?I believe that's correct at least insofar as connecting to the ISS. Their graphics show CBM with IDSS adapter ports.And I do agree that if nothing needs the larger port, than it's an unnecessary requirement. What I caution, is that we may be applying an operations logic to a space station construction, where we might need outfitting with large racks. Unclear if we can launch space stations fully outfitted.
Is it correct that Axiom Station is already somewhat 'bought in' to the CBM standard?
Pam Melroy wrote an Op-ed for Payload: NASA’s New CLD Strategy Will Lose Mars, LEO to China [Aug 8]QuoteMission shift: While it may be possible to evolve a commercial space station to support longer-duration stays for future missions, not requiring that it be considered in the design up front historically means that NASA will pay more for transportation in the near term, then pay again to upgrade to long-duration flight. I can visualize the headlines in five years when this type of short-term decision-making bears ugly cost and programmatic consequences, and national capability implications. And NASA will be rightly criticized for doing it to themselves.Another problem is changing the strategy in the 11th hour for industry—never a good idea during acquisition. Industry, and its investors, have anticipated NASA will start the competition for commercial LEO destinations in earnest this year. There is a real question about how much capital can be raised for a private space station, and this change will not make it easier. Many aerospace industry partners clearly signaled to NASA that their funding sources desired a final competition, guaranteeing return on investment to the funders in the next phase. Extending development instead of going to final competition, as required by Duffy’s new directive, will likely save NASA some money up front, but reduce competition—ultimately driving up costs and hurting innovation—as some industry partners drop out due to lack of funds.
Mission shift: While it may be possible to evolve a commercial space station to support longer-duration stays for future missions, not requiring that it be considered in the design up front historically means that NASA will pay more for transportation in the near term, then pay again to upgrade to long-duration flight. I can visualize the headlines in five years when this type of short-term decision-making bears ugly cost and programmatic consequences, and national capability implications. And NASA will be rightly criticized for doing it to themselves.Another problem is changing the strategy in the 11th hour for industry—never a good idea during acquisition. Industry, and its investors, have anticipated NASA will start the competition for commercial LEO destinations in earnest this year. There is a real question about how much capital can be raised for a private space station, and this change will not make it easier. Many aerospace industry partners clearly signaled to NASA that their funding sources desired a final competition, guaranteeing return on investment to the funders in the next phase. Extending development instead of going to final competition, as required by Duffy’s new directive, will likely save NASA some money up front, but reduce competition—ultimately driving up costs and hurting innovation—as some industry partners drop out due to lack of funds.
The Phase 2 CLD strategy was approved by the ASM [Acquisition Strategy Meeting] Chair as a high-risk acquisition since the strategy would require a budget overguide. The ASM moved forward with a $4B budget shortfall.
The end capability (previously called Full Operational Capability) originally required by NASA will no longer be binding. The minimum capability required will be for 4 crew for 1-month increments. In addition, the LEO Microgravity Strategy, as published by NASA during the latest administration transition, is not binding.
Quote from: jarmumd on 08/11/2025 02:15 pmQuote from: sdsds on 08/11/2025 05:14 amIs it correct that Axiom Station is already somewhat 'bought in' to the CBM standard?I believe that's correct at least insofar as connecting to the ISS. Their graphics show CBM with IDSS adapter ports.And I do agree that if nothing needs the larger port, than it's an unnecessary requirement. What I caution, is that we may be applying an operations logic to a space station construction, where we might need outfitting with large racks. Unclear if we can launch space stations fully outfitted.As I understand it, the CBM is used as the primary ISS module interconnection interface, not just as a docking port. While IDSS may suffice for docking visiting vessels, it might be a bit restrictive if used elsewhere in a multi-module station. I'm fairly sure you can remove the docking petals from an IDSS after docking if you never intend to undock. This would provide a larger port for permanent connections, but still not as large as a CBM.Axiom originally intended to mate its module to ISS on the Harmony forward CBM, by first removing the PMC and its IDS that are currently connected there. That PMC/IDS would have then been connected to another CBM at the forward end of the Axiom module. That plan changed. I speculate that NASA was reluctant to mess with Harmony forward since it is essential for the eventual ISS deorbit scheme.
Quote from: DanClemmensen on 08/11/2025 02:37 pmQuote from: jarmumd on 08/11/2025 02:15 pmQuote from: sdsds on 08/11/2025 05:14 amIs it correct that Axiom Station is already somewhat 'bought in' to the CBM standard?I believe that's correct at least insofar as connecting to the ISS. Their graphics show CBM with IDSS adapter ports.And I do agree that if nothing needs the larger port, than it's an unnecessary requirement. What I caution, is that we may be applying an operations logic to a space station construction, where we might need outfitting with large racks. Unclear if we can launch space stations fully outfitted.As I understand it, the CBM is used as the primary ISS module interconnection interface, not just as a docking port. While IDSS may suffice for docking visiting vessels, it might be a bit restrictive if used elsewhere in a multi-module station. I'm fairly sure you can remove the docking petals from an IDSS after docking if you never intend to undock. This would provide a larger port for permanent connections, but still not as large as a CBM.Axiom originally intended to mate its module to ISS on the Harmony forward CBM, by first removing the PMC and its IDS that are currently connected there. That PMC/IDS would have then been connected to another CBM at the forward end of the Axiom module. That plan changed. I speculate that NASA was reluctant to mess with Harmony forward since it is essential for the eventual ISS deorbit scheme.I think you mean PMA/IDA?No, no IDSS system allows for petal removal. There are many reasons for this, some practical (can't get to the bolts), some operational (can't be moving petals in an emergency).
Quote from: thespacecow on 08/09/2025 03:14 amQuote from: woods170 on 08/08/2025 02:04 pmSo, when a replacement of the Space Shuttle was needed, NASA justifiably did away with the requirement to fly substantial amounts of cargo on the crewed vehicle. That served to do away with the need for "wings into space" and thus the demise of space planes.The Commercial Cargo vehicle's up/down mass capacity doesn't match Shuttle's either, so even if you take the crew/cargo split into account, the capability regression from Shuttle is still there.Wrong. The cargo requirements laid down by NASA for CRS were not even close to those laid down for STS in the 1970s. The only reason Shuttle had an 18 meter long cargo bay and a capability to bring up 27 metric tons to LEO was the Space Station and certain military payloads. The military requirements for NASA vehicles went away permanently in the early 2000s and are no longer a factor to be considered.CRS didn't have to carry up 27 metric tons of cargo, but only 15% of that (at most). With the ISS complete NASA no longer has a requirement to carry 27 metric tons to orbit on one launch. Let alone a requirement that needs an 18 meter long cargo bay.As such, the CRS vehicles are not regression, because the customer doesn't require shuttle-sized numbers anymore. It makes no sense to build a cargo vehicle (Cargo Dragon) that has only one customer (NASA) and then give that vehicle six times the required cargo capacity. Even SpaceX doesn't do that.And before you begin about Starship: NASA is not its only customer. The over-sized specs for Starship come from SpaceX's own needs, not NASA's.
Quote from: woods170 on 08/08/2025 02:04 pmSo, when a replacement of the Space Shuttle was needed, NASA justifiably did away with the requirement to fly substantial amounts of cargo on the crewed vehicle. That served to do away with the need for "wings into space" and thus the demise of space planes.The Commercial Cargo vehicle's up/down mass capacity doesn't match Shuttle's either, so even if you take the crew/cargo split into account, the capability regression from Shuttle is still there.
So, when a replacement of the Space Shuttle was needed, NASA justifiably did away with the requirement to fly substantial amounts of cargo on the crewed vehicle. That served to do away with the need for "wings into space" and thus the demise of space planes.
Quote from: woods170 on 08/10/2025 02:15 pm...As such, the CRS vehicles are not regression, because the customer doesn't require shuttle-sized numbers anymore. It makes no sense to build a cargo vehicle (Cargo Dragon) that has only one customer (NASA) and then give that vehicle six times the required cargo capacity. Even SpaceX doesn't do that.And before you begin about Starship: NASA is not its only customer. The over-sized specs for Starship come from SpaceX's own needs, not NASA's.Not sure what you're arguing here, according to dictionary:* capability: noun, the power or ability to do something. the extent of someone's or something's ability.* regression: a return to a former or less developed state.So when I said "capability regression", I meant the ability of the space transportation system is reduced when switching from Shuttle to CRS, which you then confirmed for me: "CRS didn't have to carry up 27 metric tons of cargo, but only 15% of that (at most).". So no, I'm not wrong.You then proceed to explain why this is perfectly fine since Shuttle's capability is not required any more, which is literally the point of my posts, so thanks for proving my point I guess...
...As such, the CRS vehicles are not regression, because the customer doesn't require shuttle-sized numbers anymore. It makes no sense to build a cargo vehicle (Cargo Dragon) that has only one customer (NASA) and then give that vehicle six times the required cargo capacity. Even SpaceX doesn't do that.And before you begin about Starship: NASA is not its only customer. The over-sized specs for Starship come from SpaceX's own needs, not NASA's.
Also note that the lack of the Space Shuttle is not an impediment to any of the proposed commercial stations, nor to DSG/LOP-G/Gateway. Not one requires simultaneous launch of crew and large modules, or has even proposed doing that. Launching large modules along with crew was a function looking for a purpose, and the ISS could have been assembled via modules launched on other launch vehicles if STS were unavailable (as occurred with the ROS modules other than Rassvet).
Quote from: thespacecow on 08/12/2025 04:49 amQuote from: woods170 on 08/10/2025 02:15 pm...As such, the CRS vehicles are not regression, because the customer doesn't require shuttle-sized numbers anymore. It makes no sense to build a cargo vehicle (Cargo Dragon) that has only one customer (NASA) and then give that vehicle six times the required cargo capacity. Even SpaceX doesn't do that.And before you begin about Starship: NASA is not its only customer. The over-sized specs for Starship come from SpaceX's own needs, not NASA's.Not sure what you're arguing here, according to dictionary:* capability: noun, the power or ability to do something. the extent of someone's or something's ability.* regression: a return to a former or less developed state.So when I said "capability regression", I meant the ability of the space transportation system is reduced when switching from Shuttle to CRS, which you then confirmed for me: "CRS didn't have to carry up 27 metric tons of cargo, but only 15% of that (at most).". So no, I'm not wrong.You then proceed to explain why this is perfectly fine since Shuttle's capability is not required any more, which is literally the point of my posts, so thanks for proving my point I guess...The Shuttle was optimized size-wise for building a space station, not supporting it. It couldn't even stay in space for very long which is why it was never an option for supporting crew rotation - because it could never perform the lifeboat requirement for stays beyond about two weeks.And the cost of a Shuttle flight was so expensive, that NASA was compelled to cram as much into the flight as possible, which could put a strain on station operations.
So no, the Commercial Cargo vehicles were not a step back in capability, they were actually a step forward in normal operations for the ISS. Cheaper to fly, less stress on the station for each delivery, more frequent deliveries, and cargo vehicles could stay parked at the station to collect and dispose of trash.The Shuttle really only excelled at building the ISS, and future commercial space stations will be well served by Commercial Cargo and Commercial Crew vehicles - far better than the Shuttle could have provided.
Quote from: thespacecow on 08/09/2025 03:14 amThis is the point, not all the capabilities of the old system is worth preserving.As another example of this, none of the CLD station designs support delivery of an entire International Standard Payload Rack, since none of them offer CBM-sized access hatches. Everything moving in or out needs to fit through an 800 mm diameter docking port. (At least I'm unaware of any CLD stations offering CBM. Perhaps that's merely a sign of ignorance, though!)
This is the point, not all the capabilities of the old system is worth preserving.
CBM is necessary to attach permanent modules to the station via berthing.
Quote from: Danderman on 08/13/2025 03:08 pmCBM is necessary to attach permanent modules to the station via berthing.Yes, berthing is almost by definition required for a station that is designed to expand by adding permanent modules, and the set of requirements for berthing is different than for docking. Does a berthing interface need to be CBM, though? After my post above I realized it is a requirement for Axiom since it starts attached to ISS. For Starlab what drives the requirement for a berthing ring as large as that of the (~1800mm) CBM?
When I was talking about "capability regression", it's never meant to be limited to Shuttle's role to support ISS, I'm talking about the overall capability of the Shuttle. This is meant as an analogy to the discussion of what ISS capability should NASA requires the commercial station to have, the point here is that NASA shouldn't just blindly require everything ISS is capable of doing.So you pointing out Shuttle can build a station while CRS vehicles can't again proves my point: The new system doesn't need to have every capability of the old system, it's fine to leave some out if they're not needed anymore.
The fact that CC (not CRS) vehicle can act as lifeboat while Shuttle can't doesn't refute my point above.
As for cost, that's a separate metric from capabilities, in fact sometimes we have to give up capabilities in order to lower cost, which is precisely what NASA is doing by relaxing the requirement for ISS successor.
I had just put the finishing touches on my next LinkedIn article when NASA changed its acquisition strategy for the Commercial LEO Development (CLD) Program Phase 2, and that has caused a bit of a kerfuffle. Thus, I put the finished article on ice in order to respond to all the hubbub.I’ll cut to the chase: the new CLD acquisition strategy is genius. [Disclaimer: My position on the new strategy is based solely on what I believe is best for the U.S. space program and not on politics.]The previous strategy was so flawed that it would not have succeeded, and it would have resulted in a significant gap in U.S. access to LEO microgravity operations. The new strategy addresses all major flaws in the previous strategy and actually gives the U.S. a chance to maintain continuous human presence in space, despite claims from its detractors.The first major flaw with the previous strategy is that NASA does not have nearly enough money to make it successful. Like really not enough money. According to public sources, the directive states, “The Phase 2 CLD strategy was approved by the ASM [Acquisition Strategy Meeting] Chair as a high-risk acquisition since the strategy would require a budget overguide. The ASM moved forward with a $4B budget shortfall.” That is a factual statement. And the CLD budget was subsequently reduced by $1 billion in the FY2026 President’s Budget Request making it a $5 billion shortfall.Only NASA would have the hubris to approve an acquisition strategy that requires $4 billion more than what it has to spend. And then, when NASA loses another $1 billion, the Agency’s response is to change…absolutely nothing?? It reminds me of the main point made in the Augustine Committee Report in 2009 when it recommended canceling the Constellation Program. The report said that NASA was “perpetuating the perilous practice of pursuing goals that do not match allocated resources.” Obviously, NASA did not learn that lesson because it did exactly the same thing when it approved the previous CLD acquisition strategy. Time and time again, NASA approves programs knowing full well it does not have the money to accomplish them, and then the Agency blames the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for not getting enough money. It is a well-trodden approach that has let the Agency avoid responsibility for underdelivering on its promises.The second major flaw with the previous strategy is that it did not have enough time to succeed. Like really not enough time. NASA said that it would publish the Draft Request for Proposals (RFP) for the previous strategy in June 2025. My calendar says it is already August 2025 and there’s been no hint of the draft RFP. NASA’s already late on the previous strategy procurement schedule and it hasn’t even really started.Here are the steps that would have been needed under the previous strategy just to release the RFP – 1) release the draft RFP, 2) give industry a month or two to respond, 3) collect and review all the comments, 4) revise the final RFP accordingly, 5) schedule a big meeting to get approval to release it, and then 6) finally release it. That’s at least six months, meaning the final RFP would not have come out until 2026 (despite NASA saying for years that it would do so in 2025), and then maybe, just maybe, make an award by the end of 2026. That means industry has to build an operational CLD that meets all of NASA’s requirements in four years. That was…never…gonna…happen.Let me restate that – by the time the ISS is deorbited in January 2031, there is no plausible way the U.S. would have had a certified CLD in orbit under the previous strategy. Meaning, with 100% certainty, there would have been a gap in U.S. microgravity operations had NASA stuck with the previous plan.How do I know that? – because I have experienced the NASA certification process for both commercial cargo and commercial crew and it always takes much longer than people expect. And the certification issue is much harder for CLDs than it was for both commercial cargo and commercial crew because NASA went nuts on the CLD requirements.Depending on how you count, the Commercial Crew Program levied about 300 top-level requirements on Crew Dragon and Starliner. According to the “Requirement and Standards for the Commercial Low-Earth Orbit Development Program, Baseline, December 2024”, NASA has well over 700 requirements for CLDs, and that’s a low ball estimate because there are many other requirements tucked into other documents.In NASA’s history, 14 astronauts have died during the transportation to/from LEO (Challenger and Columbia). In the almost 25 years of continuous crews on ISS, zero have died in free flight on the International Space Station (ISS). Thus, NASA has over twice the number of requirements for a mission that is significantly less risky. It’s even less risky now that we have a really good lifeboat (Crew Dragon) that can undock super-fast and get back down to Earth in case of an emergency, and we didn’t have that for most of ISS’s lifetime.One requirement in particular has gotten a lot of attention – long duration. I find it intensely curious that some people are criticizing the new strategy because it does not require the capability for long duration space missions (i.e., 9-12 months or longer). Why do I find it curious? – because the previous strategy did not require the capability for long duration space missions. The latest publicly available information about the previous strategy’s requirement for duration was “2 crew members on 6-month increments”. Even more curious is that if that really is a requirement, then why is NASA not doing it now? The ISS can clearly accommodate 12+ month missions because it has already done so. Yet, no long duration missions are currently planned on the ISS. Why? – because it costs too much money. NASA studied ways to provide long duration missions on ISS, and there were several ways to do it safely and effectively. NASA rejected them all because it didn’t have enough money.So let me get this straight – the new strategy is being criticized for not being able to do something that the previous strategy was not able to do, and something that the ISS is actually currently capable of doing but isn’t.Another criticism of the new plan is that it was not discussed with Congress or with NASA internal governance councils. Well, there’s another program that was not discussed with Congress or NASA’s leadership – the Commercial Crew Program, and that program was undisputedly the most successful human spaceflight program NASA has accomplished in the last 20 years. That “not being reviewed by others” part is a feature, not a bug, because all those other people are happy with the status quo and they would have shot down the Commercial Crew Program and the new CLD strategy before they got started.So, let’s take stock…the previous strategy did not have enough money to succeed, did not have enough time to succeed, and was over-constrained technically. NASA’s response: “Sounds great, let’s go with that plan! And if anybody changes the plan, we will get mad and accuse them of losing the space race to China.”The new strategy will be much cheaper because industry does not have to go through the onerous process of producing the significant testing and analysis documentation to prove to NASA that it has met all of NASA’s 700+ requirements. And NASA will not have to go through the onerous process of reviewing all that testing and analysis documentation and agree that it is satisfactory (or not, in which cast you have to start the testing and documentation process all over again). The schedule for development will be significantly shorter for the same reason. Without having to go through NASA’s labor- and bureaucratically-intensive process of certification, the new strategy gives NASA and industry a chance to have an operational CLD by 2030 within the available budget. And since NASA will be is using Space Act Agreements, the companies will be in charge of the design decisions and there will be a much lower likelihood that NASA will over-design the CLDs, which would have taken even longer and cost even more.On top of all that, the CLD directive has many other beneficial features. It gives NASA 2 months to release an Announcement For Proposals and 6 months after that to make awards. That’s much faster than the previous procurement schedule (see above) and gives the U.S. a better chance to have an operational CLD prior to ISS deorbit.It requires “a minimum of two – preferably three or more” awards. It is unquestionably in NASA’s interests to have competition among multiple providers. As stated above, the previous strategy did not have enough money to fully fund one CLD that meets all of NASA’s 700+ requirements. To me, two or three CLDs represents more competition than ½ of a CLD, contrary to the claims of some of the CLD directive detractors.The CLD directive also requires that all of the development be accomplished under Space Act Agreements, including an “in-space crewed demonstration”. This is consistent with the true “COTS” model that NASA used for commercial cargo, and the commercial cargo spacecraft (Cygnus and Dragon) turned out great and for a fraction of what a traditional NASA program would have cost to develop the same capabilities (see Appendix B of NASA’s “Commercial Market Assessment for Crew and Cargo Systems Pursuant to Section 403 of the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-267)”: https://newspaceeconomy.ca/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/section403bcommercialmarketassessmentreportfinal-1.pdf ).So, what’s not to like with the CLD directive? Well, it puts the companies, not NASA, in control. That part irks NASA to no end. Also, some industry players will not like it because they believe it advantages some other company vying for the CLD Phase 2 awards. Maybe that’s true, but all the companies will have to do some sort of pivot to respond to the CLD directive. The companies that win the Phase 2 awards will be the ones that pivot the best. And there will be more awards, meaning everyone has a better shot getting an award. The last group that won’t like the directive are all the people who are hoping that the ISS lifetime gets extended (and there are a lot of them) because it actually gives the U.S. a chance to have an operational CLD in orbit before 2030. If there wasn’t a CLD in orbit by that time, the “ISS forever” crowd would start complaining about a gap and lobby for an extension. That lobbying has already started, by the way.[Another disclaimer: Some people will accurately point out that I was nominally in charge of the CLD Program during the development of the prior strategy. That is true. And it will be one of the more profound disappointments of my career that I wasn’t able to do better. I could give a bunch of excuses why I wasn’t able to do better. But, in the end, it doesn’t matter. What matters is that the CLD Program now has a chance to be successful because of the CLD directive. It is better for industry, better for NASA, and better for the U.S. space exploration enterprise.]And now back to your regularly scheduled programming...
Phil McAlister is not holding back, this is a glorious read: No Changes Allowed
NASA excels at many things, but being open to positive change isn't one of them. This reminds me of when Congress cut our Commercial Crew budget request so severely that you and I were able to argue for continuing Space Act Agreements instead of moving more quickly to a FAR based acquisition strategy. Lots of folks now acknowledge that saved the program.As you wrote.... "there’s another program that was not discussed with Congress or NASA’s leadership – the Commercial Crew Program, and that program was undisputedly the most successful human spaceflight program NASA has accomplished in the last 20 years." The commercial crew strategy was of course discussed with NASA's leadership in the early development of our 2011 budget submit. In fact, we'd already begun the program (as you know) with stimulus funds in 2009 and Congress was fully aware of that as well. But the new Administrator tried to thwart the Obama Administration's path of pursuing commercial crew in favor of NASA's career leadership's recommendation to stay the course on Ares I and Orion. Entrenched interests lamented a lack of transparency in the budget process, but in truth - what they were opposed to was change.
Frankly, if that crew certification process was as critical and useful as NASA thinks it is, Boeing would've knocked things out of the park with Starliner, rather than faceplanting. Funding the CLD providers to build and operate MVP versions of their stations, even if initially without NASA crew makes a ton of sense, at least to me.~Jon
Quote from: thespacecow on 08/17/2025 03:11 amPhil McAlister is not holding back, this is a glorious read: No Changes AllowedI finally had a chance to review this, and I think I completely agree with Phil's points. The new CLD approach is a good one, and the fact that it both allows fitting 2-3 providers within a realistic budget, and is more likely to yield actual MVP space facilities before 2030 are both really strong selling points for me. One of my big lessons learned on COTS vs CCrew, is that IMO SpaceX's success with Crew Dragon owed a lot more to the fact that they were able to build and fly Cargo Dragon first, under a NASA insight rather than oversight approach, rather than there being anything magic in NASA's crew certification process. Frankly, if that crew certification process was as critical and useful as NASA thinks it is, Boeing would've knocked things out of the park with Starliner, rather than faceplanting. Funding the CLD providers to build and operate MVP versions of their stations, even if initially without NASA crew makes a ton of sense, at least to me.~Jon
13. How long does NASA plan to provide for industry proposals post final Announcement for Proposal release?NASA is still evaluating proposal schedule and industry review periods between 30 60 days. NASA will finalize this plan no later than draft Announcement for Proposal (AFP). NASA plans to release a draft AFP, which will also provide additional opportunity for industry to prepare for the final AFP. Currently, NASA plans to release a draft Announcement for Proposal no earlier than Sept. 2, 2025, followed by an Industry Day no earlier than Sept. 5, 2025. The agency is planning for the release of the final Announcement for Proposal no later than Oct. 4, 2025.
