NASA FY 2012 Budget Request for NASA Updates

[Jeff Bingham]

Just want to say, as I seem to feel the need to do every time there is a hearing review and commentary on this site, and I see folks react to what is said and the questions and answers, and somehow they appear to believe that it reflects the entirety of what is going on. Hearings are a formal function to make a record at the top level, with some indications of specific concerns raised in Member statements and in the questions asked. The Members all are equipped with a large body of possible questions from which they have to select the few they can ask in the time limits available. The rest are submitted for the record and NASA is asked to respond within thirty days. But even ALL of that represents only the tip of the iceberg of what is actually done every day at the staff level in interactions with NASA at the Directorate and program level, and with industry reps, and all the other interests at work. MANY of the questions people think aren't being adequately addressed in the hearing--and thus assume are not being adequately addressed by "the Committee", or by "The Congress" are, in fact, being addressed and focused on in a variety of ways on a daily basis. There is no way one can know, short of being in the midst of that activity, what is actually being done. Consequently, ANY observations made by anyone not familiar with or part of that internal process are simply lacking in sufficient information for them to be accurate, complete or conclusive. I seem to have to point this out after every hearing, but it doesn't stop people from leaping to conclusions that may have no real foundation in fact or the reality of what is taking place. It's frustrating, it's inefficient in many ways, and takes altogether too much time to see the "visible nodes of progress," but they are there, nonetheless. And "more will be revealed"as time goes on. 

Having said that, there are real challenges remaining in getting the Administration, the political appointees at NASA, and the key involved Members of Congress all in alignment on a consensus for the path forward. But it is not beyond the possibility of being accomplished. The were many things said--by Senator Mikulski, Senator Hutchison, and General Bolden--that have more significance to that internal consensus-building effort than could be obvious to many observers. But, from my knothole, there was real progress made today. And some of that will be buttressed I believe by the release of the full-year CR details later this evening.

I also have to make a comment about the complaints of "parochial interests." For those who have had a background, educationally, culturally, or from experience, it should be obvious that the United States has a "representative" form of government in the Legislative Branch. Members of Congress are elected PRECISELY to REPRESENT the interests of their geographic constituencies in their congressional districts. Senators each represent the interest of their respective States (not "Districts") as an essential part of their representative function. To do otherwise would be a dereliction of an important part of their constitutional responsibility.  It is in the legislative process, where compromise and accommodation are the tools which lead to passage and enactment of legislation, that those parochial interests get blended with the overriding national interests that reflect the more "statesmanlike" and "altruistic" aspects of the conduct of Members' responsibilities. To argue that those localized constituent interests are the ONLY determining factor in how Members finally reach consensus enough to pass legislation is not only a disservice to Members, but also evidence of an external, superficial, and incomplete understanding of what REALLY happens within the American congressional/legislative process.

So...enough of my "soapbox." I just add, as a matter of "credentials" for me to be saying this, that I have been intimately involved in that process since 1974, and believe I have SOME degree of experience-based "authority' to know something whereof I speak.

[TimL]

Thank You 51D, that outline really needed to be presented again. This country does have a process that has been working based on our founding principles for more than a few years.

I thought today's meeting was a good one and did address some important topics.

[DaveJSC]

Appreciate your comment 51D Mascot. But I think you need to appreciate that maybe some of us, who've been part of the space program all our careers, find it hard to watch such hearings about the "bright future" when a huge amount of people have already received the pink slips.

With the greatest of respect to you, and to Chris who said he was happy with the hearing, we have already been betrayed by our political system. Sorry, but that is how a lot of us feel.

[Jeff Bingham]

Appreciate your comment 51D Mascot. But I think you need to appreciate that maybe some of us, who've been part of the space program all our careers, find it hard to watch such hearings about the "bright future" when a huge amount of people have already received the pink slips.

With the greatest of respect to you, and to Chris who said he was happy with the hearing, we have already been betrayed by our political system. Sorry, but that is how a lot of us feel.

I believe I completely understand where you're coming from, so take no offense at all. It's a huge travesty that the process has taken so long to begin to come to closure on a path that could have slowed, stopped, and even reversed some of that work-force reduction months ago. I have a lot of friends at NASA, where I worked directly for over ten years, at JSC and at HQ, and elsewhere, who have been and are being put through an unnecessary ringer over the past year. I personally believe the VERY FEW people directly responsible for the aggravating foot-dragging and efforts to continue to promote an agenda that the Congress has, in fact, rejected, are almost criminally--certainly morally--negligent in an abuse of authority and position that history, certainly, will judge them harshly on, when the real history of the past two years is written--and I fully intend to be among those contributing to that historical record.

I'm just trying to point out that more is being done to try to stem this outrage than people are aware, and to not see these "snapshots in time" that are hearings as reflecting the totality of what's being done to try to make this all work.

[Spacely]

51D, just curious as to what the logic was in switching Orion to "MPCV" in the 2010 Auth? I only ask because this name change always seems to cause Senators and Congressmen to trip over themselves during these hearings.  Even Bolden, today, said something to the effect of "I don't care what we call it," when trying to answer Senator Hutchison's confusing Orion-to-MPCV questions.

[northanger]

Mr Bolden: My plan is next week to give you "the plan for the plan".



We are not stalling or wasting money.

What's the plan for the plan? I didn't really understand that part.

Administrator Bolden's responding to Senator Sherrod Brown's final question about the specific role of NASA Glenn concerning the work they did on Orion which directly translates to MPCV / SLS. He answers the question ("any work that Glenn was doing with Orion will be the same work that Glenn continues to do with the multi-purpose crew vehicle, whatever we call it… those types of things that they were responsible for in the Constellation program they will continue to be responsible for in any program that we do going forward") and concludes…

{94:50} It is my hope that within the week we will be able to bring to the staffs a status, a report that I have received, that my senior management has been receiving incrementally now on the multi-purpose crew vehicle — the plan for the plan, if you will — on the multi-purpose crew vehicle, the space launch system, and 21st century launch complex. We have done incredible work, we have not been standing still. We've been doing this for almost a year now and we're at the point — this is what supported our making the decision on the Design Reference Vehicles. But we're now ready to bring that to the committees so that you can get incremental looks at how we're progressing. So that you see that we are not stalling, we're not standing by, we're not wasting time nor money. That we have a plan and that if we are able to follow that plan and that plan is sufficiently supported by budgets that we say we need, we will develop the Nation's best heavy launch system they have ever had and a deep space exploration vehicle that will do the things that we've all dreamed about up until now but nobody's had the courage to do. So we're going to do that and it's our desire to bring those reports to this committee, to the staffs, at increments as we go along.

[Downix]

51D, just curious as to what the logic was in switching Orion to "MPCV" in the 2010 Auth? I only ask because this name change always seems to cause Senators and Congressmen to trip over themselves during these hearings.  Even Bolden, today, said something to the effect of "I don't care what we call it," when trying to answer Senator Hutchison's confusing Orion-to-MPCV questions.

I have thought on this myself.  I think I have one possible solution.  Orion was very clearly defined, but only work on certain systems progressed.  Other systems, not so much.  I ponder if the name change is to enable NASA to explore other options for Orion, not tying it to one mission and one mission only.  By classifying it as the MPCV, it muddles things brand-wise, but makes it clear that this is not the prime movement vehicle, it is a multi-purpose vehicle.  Not just for Lunar, or Mars, or ISS, but a tool.

[savuporo]

"In any of the contracts we have now, we cannot pay the amount of money that was contracted years ago..." "...we have got to get our costs down." "We may have to descope the vehicle in some manner."

Yet it seems the vehicle is still divided in that the SM is managed by Glenn and the CM is managed by JSC, along with the "overall vehicle".

If cost is paramount does that make logical sense?  ...

Painfully obvious, isnt it ?

But it's nearly impossible for Obama to kill a project that provides jobs in 43 states

"It's about political engineering," says Mandy Smithberger, a national security staff member of the Project on Government Oversight, a Washington nonprofit. "Companies design weapons systems to make them difficult to kill."

[sdsds]

A few quotes (as best I can transcribe them) from the opening comments of Senator Hutchison (R-TX).  (Her emphasis on Orion has added relevance given the NASA wording in the Senate Appropriations "FY 2011 CR: Commerce, Justice, Science Summary" published subsequently.)

* We are about to see the end of our nation's ability to launch our own astronauts into space.

* While NASA should be making plans to fully utilize the station using our own launch capabilities, I don't think that is happening.

* I see the administration placing our investment in the space station and its capabilities at risk, as well as our future exploration capabilities.

* We should not expect [the Russians] to shoulder their space program and ours.

* To this day, NASA is refusing to allow [Orion] to move forward.

* [Associate administrators] know that Orion fits the bill as the MPCV and that it will take very little to modify the contracts as is allowed for in the authorization law.

* Yet we see no movement from NASA to continue the program at all.

* This budget deliberately hamstrings the ability for Orion to reach an operability date in 2016. 

* The FY12 Vision for Human Spaceflight offered as a variant of the authorization is the creation of new prime contractors. [But] there is little proof that what is being promised can be a reality.  The COTS program [...] is significantly behind schedule.
[...]  Given the track record so far for cargo [...] the nation could find itself with neither [Orion nor commercial crew transportation] available when our latest renegotiated contract with the Russians ends.

[mr_magoo]

The COTS program [...] is significantly behind schedule.

How is CxP going Kay?

[Jeff Bingham]

51D, just curious as to what the logic was in switching Orion to "MPCV" in the 2010 Auth? I only ask because this name change always seems to cause Senators and Congressmen to trip over themselves during these hearings.  Even Bolden, today, said something to the effect of "I don't care what we call it," when trying to answer Senator Hutchison's confusing Orion-to-MPCV questions.

Simply a matter of "genericizing" both the launch vehicle (SLS) and crew vehicle (MPCV) to distinguish them in a programmatic way from Constellation, which it was clear had lost political support as an overall program in the Senate, where the 2010 Act originated. Subsequent to passage of the Act, when it became clear that the elements in the Administration were intent on wiping the vehicle development slate clean--in defiance of the clear mandate and special authority granted to modify the Constellation contracts in order to expedite development of a shuttle-and-Constellation-derived combination of launcher and crew vehicle, did it seem necessary to--in the case of the MPCV--revert to calling it "Orion-based" or "Orion/MPCV" to underscore the intent of the law to use that vehicle as the basis for the follow-on development. The "confusion" has to do with the matter of inadequate NASA's legalistic explanation for not having already moved forward with the necessary contract stipulations to implement the "transition" to MPCV using the existing Orion contract. Since NASA's General Counsel and NASA's procurement office have BOTH signed off on the viability of that modification--as a means of side-stepping the no-longer-necessary 2010 appropriations prohibition against cancelling Constellation (versus redirecting it to a "new" set of requirements), it is incomprehensible why that action hasn't been taken long before now--six months after enactment of the law. (The POINT of the law pressing in the direction of using available shuttle and constellation capabilities, work-force, contracts, etc., was to EXPEDITE development of replacement systems to the Shuttle, and minimize the gap between shuttle and those replacement capabilities; slow-rolling the contract modifications and threatening (internally) to cancel all Constellation-related work and start with a "clean-sheet" design and lengthy new procurement process, is precisely what the law intended to avoid.)

[Namechange User]

"In any of the contracts we have now, we cannot pay the amount of money that was contracted years ago..." "...we have got to get our costs down." "We may have to descope the vehicle in some manner."

Yet it seems the vehicle is still divided in that the SM is managed by Glenn and the CM is managed by JSC, along with the "overall vehicle".

If cost is paramount does that make logical sense?  ...

Painfully obvious, isnt it ?

But it's nearly impossible for Obama to kill a project that provides jobs in 43 states

"It's about political engineering," says Mandy Smithberger, a national security staff member of the Project on Government Oversight, a Washington nonprofit. "Companies design weapons systems to make them difficult to kill."

Well, no.  This is about NASA project offices and NASA oversight at multiple centers.  This is about civil service employees who can easily be assigned to another project.  This is about the different centers and increased government oversight that can drive the cost of the contract.  The contract that General Bolden says we cannot spend as much on as we have in the past. 

[yg1968]

51D, just curious as to what the logic was in switching Orion to "MPCV" in the 2010 Auth? I only ask because this name change always seems to cause Senators and Congressmen to trip over themselves during these hearings.  Even Bolden, today, said something to the effect of "I don't care what we call it," when trying to answer Senator Hutchison's confusing Orion-to-MPCV questions.

Simply a matter of "genericizing" both the launch vehicle (SLS) and crew vehicle (MPCV) to distinguish them in a programmatic way from Constellation, which it was clear had lost political support as an overall program in the Senate, where the 2010 Act originated. Subsequent to passage of the Act, when it became clear that the elements in the Administration were intent on wiping the vehicle development slate clean--in defiance of the clear mandate and special authority granted to modify the Constellation contracts in order to expedite development of a shuttle-and-Constellation-derived combination of launcher and crew vehicle, did it seem necessary to--in the case of the MPCV--revert to calling it "Orion-based" or "Orion/MPCV" to underscore the intent of the law to use that vehicle as the basis for the follow-on development. The "confusion" has to do with the matter of inadequate NASA's legalistic explanation for not having already moved forward with the necessary contract stipulations to implement the "transition" to MPCV using the existing Orion contract. Since NASA's General Counsel and NASA's procurement office have BOTH signed off on the viability of that modification--as a means of side-stepping the no-longer-necessary 2010 appropriations prohibition against cancelling Constellation (versus redirecting it to a "new" set of requirements), it is incomprehensible why that action hasn't been taken long before now--six months after enactment of the law. (The POINT of the law pressing in the direction of using available shuttle and constellation capabilities, work-force, contracts, etc., was to EXPEDITE development of replacement systems to the Shuttle, and minimize the gap between shuttle and those replacement capabilities; slow-rolling the contract modifications and threatening (internally) to cancel all Constellation-related work and start with a "clean-sheet" design and lengthy new procurement process, is precisely what the law intended to avoid.)

I sort of wonder if this delay in modifying the Orion contract is not partly due to the Constellation language in the 2010 Appropriation bill. Although it is clear that NASA does not want to terminate Orion, the threat of termination may be the only way for NASA to force LM to accept a modified contract. For example, NASA may have to threaten termination of Orion if LM refuses to switch from a cost plus contract to a fixed price contract. This is speculation on my part but the fact that NASA was unable to terminate their Orion contract with LM possibly makes re-negotiation of the contract that much harder. 

[Namechange User]

Although it is clear that NASA does not want to terminate Orion, the threat of termination may be the only way for NASA to force LM to accept a modified contract. For example, NASA may have to threaten termination of Orion if LM refuses to switch from a cost plus contract to a fixed price contract. This is speculation on my part but the fact that NASA was unable to terminate their Orion contract with LM likely possibly makes re-negotiation of the contract that much harder. 

A fixed-price contract for LM to *develop* Orion when it seems NASA is not changing in any way would be an assanine decision on NASA's part. 

They will pay more in the long-run and have less insight because NASA will have to pay LM the "fixed-price", regardless of what LM actually spent, and LM will place very large margins, as it should, on their proposal in order to protect themselves from NASA requirements creep. 

Again, fixed-price contract is hardly the solution to every problem. 

[yg1968]

Although it is clear that NASA does not want to terminate Orion, the threat of termination may be the only way for NASA to force LM to accept a modified contract. For example, NASA may have to threaten termination of Orion if LM refuses to switch from a cost plus contract to a fixed price contract. This is speculation on my part but the fact that NASA was unable to terminate their Orion contract with LM likely possibly makes re-negotiation of the contract that much harder. 

A fixed-price contract for LM to *develop* Orion when it seems NASA is not changing in any way would be an assanine decision on NASA's part. 

They will pay more in the long-run and have less insight because NASA will have to pay LM the "fixed-price", regardless of what LM actually spent, and LM will place very large margins, as it should, on their proposal in order to protect themselves from NASA requirements creep. 

Again, fixed-price contract is hardly the solution to every problem. 

Yes I suppose that you are right. But I thought Bolden's answer on fixed vs cost plus contracts yesterday was interesting. He said that when you are trying to retire risks by advancing technology at the beginning, you might be better off with a cost plus contract but once those risks are retired, you are often better off with a fixed price contract.  He wasn't talking about SLS or Orion specifically when he said that. But I thought that his response was interesting.

Edited.

[Namechange User]

He's correct that certain function, where risk is minimal and the systems are well understood, etc can be, or lend themselves well, to a fixed-price contract.  I have thought for years that Shuttle should have been a fixed-price contract but NASA chose not to do that so they could be more "involved". 

Development tends not to be that way in many cases and typically lends itself to be cost-plus, which isn't bad, if managed well.   

[mike robel]

My somewhat limited experience with fixed price contracts is the customer says this is what I want and this is how much I will pay.  The contractor then has to cram as much work as he can into the smallest amount of money to realize the largest profit.

I have never seen an FFP go the way of hey, tell us how much this will cost...

[Namechange User]

My somewhat limited experience with fixed price contracts is the customer says this is what I want and this is how much I will pay.  The contractor then has to cram as much work as he can into the smallest amount of money to realize the largest profit.

I have never seen an FFP go the way of hey, tell us how much this will cost...

Well, like with everything, there are negotiations on the contract and the customer has to live in reality.  If they say they are only willing to pay X, when it may cost Y, then their is a potential for it, whatever "it" is, to ultimately cost more.

[OpsAnalyst]

51D, just curious as to what the logic was in switching Orion to "MPCV" in the 2010 Auth? I only ask because this name change always seems to cause Senators and Congressmen to trip over themselves during these hearings.  Even Bolden, today, said something to the effect of "I don't care what we call it," when trying to answer Senator Hutchison's confusing Orion-to-MPCV questions.

Simply a matter of "genericizing" both the launch vehicle (SLS) and crew vehicle (MPCV) to distinguish them in a programmatic way from Constellation, which it was clear had lost political support as an overall program in the Senate, where the 2010 Act originated. Subsequent to passage of the Act, when it became clear that the elements in the Administration were intent on wiping the vehicle development slate clean--in defiance of the clear mandate and special authority granted to modify the Constellation contracts in order to expedite development of a shuttle-and-Constellation-derived combination of launcher and crew vehicle, did it seem necessary to--in the case of the MPCV--revert to calling it "Orion-based" or "Orion/MPCV" to underscore the intent of the law to use that vehicle as the basis for the follow-on development. The "confusion" has to do with the matter of inadequate NASA's legalistic explanation for not having already moved forward with the necessary contract stipulations to implement the "transition" to MPCV using the existing Orion contract. Since NASA's General Counsel and NASA's procurement office have BOTH signed off on the viability of that modification--as a means of side-stepping the no-longer-necessary 2010 appropriations prohibition against cancelling Constellation (versus redirecting it to a "new" set of requirements), it is incomprehensible why that action hasn't been taken long before now--six months after enactment of the law. (The POINT of the law pressing in the direction of using available shuttle and constellation capabilities, work-force, contracts, etc., was to EXPEDITE development of replacement systems to the Shuttle, and minimize the gap between shuttle and those replacement capabilities; slow-rolling the contract modifications and threatening (internally) to cancel all Constellation-related work and start with a "clean-sheet" design and lengthy new procurement process, is precisely what the law intended to avoid.)

First, thanks for the reminder that what is visible on the surface is not the whole story. Everything that follows is written bearing that in mind.

Ongoing behind-the-scenes "negotations" between Congressional and Executive players have been in play since the Authorization Act was passed (and before) - yet as you have said repeatedly we have a slow-roll that has been quite effective, despite the Authorization language and the mod.

Summoning NASA Administrators and AAs and OMB and OTSP to the Hill is certainly a method of conveying intent but seems to have little effect.  Certainly everyone involved would prefer to handle things below the level of open and obvious conflict but it _appears_ that those engaged in waiting out the clock and the budget and/or using threats of clean-sheeting are also counting on the unwillingness to publicly throw down the gauntlet.

I recognize you can't speak about internal thinking re: strategy.  I also know that timing is everything, and that in addition to the strategic aspects of same there are other issues confronting the gov't - chief among them closing the deal struck last Friday, which is certainly a higher priority than NASA's struggles.  Finally, I realize that surfacing conflicts and invoking legal consequences for absence of cooperation is an expenditure of political capital that invariably leads to payback. Personally, I'm not inclined to act in such a way most of the time - not for lack of will, but for precisely those reasons.

But. I suppose I'm just adding my voice to those who are saddened by obfuscations, and voicing my personal opinion that the unwillingness to publicly put the screws to foot-draggers is a part of their calculus - which to date, has been largely successful.  Under those circumstances, one wonders how long discussion and negotiation should continue?

[Jeff Bingham]

51D, just curious as to what the logic was in switching Orion to "MPCV" in the 2010 Auth? I only ask because this name change always seems to cause Senators and Congressmen to trip over themselves during these hearings.  Even Bolden, today, said something to the effect of "I don't care what we call it," when trying to answer Senator Hutchison's confusing Orion-to-MPCV questions.

Simply a matter of "genericizing" both the launch vehicle (SLS) and crew vehicle (MPCV) to distinguish them in a programmatic way from Constellation, which it was clear had lost political support as an overall program in the Senate, where the 2010 Act originated. Subsequent to passage of the Act, when it became clear that the elements in the Administration were intent on wiping the vehicle development slate clean--in defiance of the clear mandate and special authority granted to modify the Constellation contracts in order to expedite development of a shuttle-and-Constellation-derived combination of launcher and crew vehicle, did it seem necessary to--in the case of the MPCV--revert to calling it "Orion-based" or "Orion/MPCV" to underscore the intent of the law to use that vehicle as the basis for the follow-on development. The "confusion" has to do with the matter of inadequate NASA's legalistic explanation for not having already moved forward with the necessary contract stipulations to implement the "transition" to MPCV using the existing Orion contract. Since NASA's General Counsel and NASA's procurement office have BOTH signed off on the viability of that modification--as a means of side-stepping the no-longer-necessary 2010 appropriations prohibition against cancelling Constellation (versus redirecting it to a "new" set of requirements), it is incomprehensible why that action hasn't been taken long before now--six months after enactment of the law. (The POINT of the law pressing in the direction of using available shuttle and constellation capabilities, work-force, contracts, etc., was to EXPEDITE development of replacement systems to the Shuttle, and minimize the gap between shuttle and those replacement capabilities; slow-rolling the contract modifications and threatening (internally) to cancel all Constellation-related work and start with a "clean-sheet" design and lengthy new procurement process, is precisely what the law intended to avoid.)

First, thanks for the reminder that what is visible on the surface is not the whole story. Everything that follows is written bearing that in mind.

Ongoing behind-the-scenes "negotations" between Congressional and Executive players have been in play since the Authorization Act was passed (and before) - yet as you have said repeatedly we have a slow-roll that has been quite effective, despite the Authorization language and the mod.

Summoning NASA Administrators and AAs and OMB and OTSP to the Hill is certainly a method of conveying intent but seems to have little effect.  Certainly everyone involved would prefer to handle things below the level of open and obvious conflict but it _appears_ that those engaged in waiting out the clock and the budget and/or using threats of clean-sheeting are also counting on the unwillingness to publicly throw down the gauntlet.

I recognize you can't speak about internal thinking re: strategy.  I also know that timing is everything, and that in addition to the strategic aspects of same there are other issues confronting the gov't - chief among them closing the deal struck last Friday, which is certainly a higher priority than NASA's struggles.  Finally, I realize that surfacing conflicts and invoking legal consequences for absence of cooperation is an expenditure of political capital that invariably leads to payback. Personally, I'm not inclined to act in such a way most of the time - not for lack of will, but for precisely those reasons.

But. I suppose I'm just adding my voice to those who are saddened by obfuscations, and voicing my personal opinion that the unwillingness to publicly put the screws to foot-draggers is a part of their calculus - which to date, has been largely successful.  Under those circumstances, one wonders how long discussion and negotiation should continue?

Valid question about the "threshold," and the "degree of freedom" that allows for any foot-dragging that might be going on. For all the reasons you mention--and a couple more, hehe--I can't answer your question more specifically, though I'll likely be accused of obfuscation myself....we'll have to see how far metal can bend.