Augustine Commission Members Announced

[Namechange User]

So with that personal knowledge did they come around to the current architecture or were they "told" this is what it should be?  Your answer will speak volumes. 

I wasn't in the room, so I can't speak to what happened.  I was around the corner though.  The security was pretty tight, for all I know Griffin told them "do this" and they did ... but I don't think that is what happened.

I am conflicted, because I know they are (mostly) all people of incredible technical honesty and rigor, and believe that the right answer informs leadership, not that leadership picks the right answer.  I am still convinced of Griffin's good intentions, but have come to believe that his own prior studies may have taken a bit of precedence over what was found in ESAS real time.  It is may simply be a case of investigational bias, where one only considers the data that supports ones expected outcome and where data to the contrary is discarded.  If (and I mean IF) that was the case for Griffin, I'm guessing it was because of schedule and external pressures and not any congnizant decisions.

I would argue that if bias did creep in, it was because the requirements were set in such a way (even in an ongoing basis revised) as to favor a particular solution.  And possibly when there were impediments to a particular solution, they were grandfathered in (much as Shuttle doesn't have to meet human rating requirements).

I am not a Griffin apologist, but I have the highest respect for Griffin and the ESAS team despite the outcome of the study and the path taken, and all of the evidence presented on these boards.  Heavy is the head that wears the crown, and hindsight is always 20-20.  Every time I saw him he was doing the best he could with the army, generals, and experience he personally had.  It just wasn't good enough.

I don't really disagree with anything you said but do believe there was some bias that went into the decision.  NASA did design reference missions for years, hell decades, and none of them included the architecuture Dr. Griffin had been pushing, yet that was exactly what was choosen.   

All that is water under the bridge though.  The thing that gets me is not that the 1.5 architecture was choosen, it was that it was constantly pursued at all costs.  The current vehicles do not even reflect what was baselined in ESAS yet we continue to through money into them at the cost of performance and schedule.  For that reason and the fact that EELV can do the job of CLV if necessary and a more shuttle derived vehicle can be developed that takes advantage of the current hardware to lower development costs, I really hope to see a change.

If there is no change I believe it will be about 7 years, assuming a shuttle standown in 2010, before we can fly our own people again.  And when we do, it will be less capable than what we have today at a higher cost.  The operations and recurring costs will be huge and leave little for more.  Cx is supposed to take us places and we are spending all the dollars in only one of the two launch vehicles that will only take us on the first 200 miles of this journey.  That is a major progromatic mistake.

[Namechange User]

And the relationship of the *Independent* Augustine committee to the *NASA* committee is?

I have to ask, what was intended by this remark?  It could be read as you already having a problem with it when you asked for so long that such a committee be formed. 

[clongton]

And the relationship of the *Independent* Augustine committee to the *NASA* committee is?

I have to ask, what was intended by this remark?  It could be read as you already having a problem with it when you asked for so long that such a committee be formed. 

Not at all. My question is intended to spark some discussion, nothing more. Personally I have no problem with it so long as it actually does function independent of NASA. Using NASA resources is not a problem, so long as they are used independently. My observation is that there is a lot of "joined at the hip" potential, and it is a topic ripe for discussion. Like I said; my rhetorical question was intended to spark the discussion, *NOT* make an accusation. I will state for the record that I personally do not yet see a cause for concern, but I happen to know that others do. I would like them to express their pov's and tell us why they feel as they do - nothing more.

[nooneofconsequence]

I believe that it is no longer possible to eliminate bias from this environment.

What should be insisted on is transparency. That exact details as to why decisions are made are completely disclosed, such that it is possible to independently validate them.

In this political climate this is achievable.

Any attempt to falsify decisions based on hidden presumptions and the like will be readily apparent. Attempts to use disinformation and related intrigues will belie transparency, rendering the commission useless, and damaging the reputation of all members.

Rapid response teams that follow commission activities could provide specific responses on the basis of such transparency (or its absence).
Many in the press would use such to question the genuineness of the commission, so it would soon be impossible to "handle them".

[mmeijeri]

A few things that caught my eye in the commission's charter:

a) expediting a new U.S. capability to support utilization of the International Space Station (ISS)

- U.S. capability, not NASA capability
- expediting, not developing
- utilization of the International Space Station, not access to LEO

b) supporting missions to the Moon and other destinations beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO)

- no mention of Mars
- no timetable
- MEO, GEO, L1 all count as beyond LEO, this would have been harder to reconcile with the old 'moon by 2020, then Mars, then beyond'

c) stimulating commercial space flight capability

- not merely using it where it is economical or where it leads to the quickest solution, stimulating it becomes an official goal

d) fitting within the current budget profile for NASA exploration activities.

- not asking for a range of options, no Cadillac vs El Cheapo as with SEI

the review should examine the appropriate amount of research and development and complementary robotic activities needed to make human space flight activities most productive and affordable over the long term, as well as appropriate opportunities for international collaboration.

- no more raiding of the science budget to fund systems development
- explicitly asking for synergy between manned and robotic activities, not just peaceful coexistence
- R&D in support of making HSF most productive and affordable in the long run, as opposed to supporting exploration in the short run
- international collaboration likely includes long term support of ISS or a successor and perhaps gateway stations like the LLO station ESA is contemplating

It should also evaluate what capabilities would be enabled by each of the potential architectures considered.

- this is not just checking up and debugging ESAS, a fundamental review of the architecture is asked for as are alternatives
- EOR-LOR is up for grabs

It should evaluate options for extending ISS operations beyond 2016.

- no definite commitment
- not ruling out a successor station either

[mmeijeri]

The transcript of the teleconference that was mentioned in this thread the other day also hints at the possibility of manned activity beyond LEO but short of the moon, let alone Mars:

With regard to the program, the Moon program and so on, our rather clear guidance is that the long term is open-ended, and that we are free to look at -- I think the terms of reference we have heard are the things beyond near-Earth orbit. To me, that would include interesting things everywhere, and I don't mean to start a prediction here because that is not my purpose, but everything from synchronous orbit to the Moon, to Mars, and beyond.

[Max_Peck]

Dr. W. Michael Hawes is leading the NASA review team that will provide
technical and analytic support to the committee. Hawes is NASA's
associate administrator for program analysis and evaluation.

Big Ares fan I'm told.

He currently leads a group of analysts who last saw action helping put the ESAS Report together. Just how likely are they to ever admit they were wrong four years ago?

The rumor at HQ is that Hawes has already tried to block any non-Contractors from providing official testimony information to the panel. Apparently George Whitesides went ballistic when he heard that someone was trying to prevent any relevant information from being submitted to the Commission. GW has the ear of the President, so Hawes will not be getting his way. If this rumor is true he should consider himself very luck if he continues to draw a salary after this. He should probably recuse himself from further participation and if he doesn't Norm needs to drop-kick his butt.

The game is afoot.

[kkattula]

Does anyone think there is any chance of Constellation getting the extra money to (maybe) finish Ares I by 2015?  My read is that the Obama Administration are just not going to accept that scenario.

Everyone on that panel knows EELV's could launch Orion or some other vehicle. Well before 2015 and for a lot less money.

Ares I simply cannot be sold as the only option any more.

So any NASA manager who tries to unduly influence the Commission in favour of Ares I is just asking for trouble.  The party is gonna end, one way or another.

[kraisee]

No.   Federal money resources are going to be getting even tighter than what has already been announced so far.   More than a few people at ISDC seemed to "know" about that already.   Schedules will be slipping further because of that, not speeding up.

Ross.

[mmeijeri]

Some more observations about the commission's charter:

No mention is made of

- the urgency of closing the gap
- the need to preserve the shuttle stack
- 'preserving the unique skill and experience base of the existing workforce'

[clongton]

Some more observations about the commission's charter:

No mention is made of

- the urgency of closing the gap
- the need to preserve the shuttle stack
- 'preserving the unique skill and experience base of the existing workforce'

That's because those are specific goals and it is not the charter of the commission to set goals. They are to perform a top to bottom review of the entire situation and then make recommendations from which a reasonable course of action can be selected.

[mars.is.wet]

Good analysis mmeijeri.  I think you hit the salient points.

[Danny Dot]

I believe that it is no longer possible to eliminate bias from this environment.

snip

It has never been possible to get rid of bias.  We need the decision makers to hear all the different biases.  In ESAS it is obvious a very biased analysis was done by the NASA support team and only this data was presented to the ESAS members.  I have no problem with this as long as, say, ULA can present their EELV biased analysis to them also.  Now we need the Direct team to have direct access to the commitee.  NASA is the only government organization I am aware of that all the different biased opinions are not presented to the decision makers.  The decision makers do not only want to hear the consensous of the analysis team.  They want to and need to hear all the voices.

Danny Deger

[Danny Dot]

Tell us more about Mr. Whitesides.  I already like him.  I do hope Hawes gets severly repermanded in attempting to quash any dissenting opinion.  This is the heart of the NASA culture that killed 14 astronauts.  Let's see if NASA can grow out of this problem with its culture.

Danny Deger

[Norm Hartnett]

Could someone compare and contrast the differences and similarities of the ESAS and the Augustine 2.0 charters? (other than the 90 (120?) day time frame)

From what I've read so far it appears that the Augustine commission is not ESAS v2.0 but more of a top level review.

What is the historical performance of Augustine 2.0 type reviews? Do they get implemented or are they more of a dog and pony show?

[Bill White]

Tell us more about Mr. Whitesides.  I already like him.  I do hope Hawes gets severly repermanded in attempting to quash any dissenting opninion.  This is the heart of the NASA culture that killed 14 astronauts.  Let's see if NASA can grow out of this problem with its culture.

Danny Deger

Via Wikipedia (quick and convenient, even if only you get what you pay for)

George Thomas Whitesides is Senior Advisor at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, a position to which he was named after serving on the NASA transition team for the incoming Obama Administration.

From 2004 to 2008, Whitesides served as the Executive Director of the National Space Society. He is the co-creator of Yuri's Night.

He has served as Senior Advisor to Virgin Galactic, Richard Branson's space tourism company, from which he took a leave of absence in November 2008.

Whitesides is the Chairman of the Reusable Launch Vehicle Working Group of COMSTAC, the advisory committee for the FAA's Commercial Space Transportation Division. He is a board member of Astronomers Without Borders and the Space Generation Foundation.

He has served as a coach for Zero Gravity Corporation's parabolic flight service.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_T._Whitesides

[Danny Dot]

Sorry for not looking at wiki myself.  I am on my Treo and wiki doesn't work well on this thing.  Does he report to the president or the administrator?

Danny Deger

[Antares]

At the end of OSP the LSP (part of NASA) concluded they were not needed

Commission folks reading this thread (on topic, see ) need to request the Bullman study (MSFC) and the response to the Bullman study (not MSFC, ahem).  The latter exists only in draft because some managers are... yella, to put it in G-rated terms.  They both contain proprietary data and would be useless under a FOIA.

[Namechange User]

Leroy Chiao is asking for comments on what the commission should do:

http://leroychiao.blogspot.com/

I would encourage anyone with good and valid inputs to use this method of communication.

[nooneofconsequence]

...
The rumor at HQ is that Hawes has already tried to block any non-Contractors from providing official testimony information to the panel. Apparently George Whitesides went ballistic when he heard that someone was trying to prevent any relevant information from being submitted to the Commission. GW has the ear of the President, so Hawes will not be getting his way. If this rumor is true he should consider himself very luck if he continues to draw a salary after this. He should probably recuse himself from further participation and if he doesn't Norm needs to drop-kick his butt.

The game is afoot.

This is an example of attempting to be non-transparent (and it being found out). Recommend you note the details of this closely.

There's lots more fun to be had with the transparency game. Be the first on you block to find another. Does wonders for the process.