I actually suspect that they would not have launched the B but instead canceled the program. I don't have anything firm to support that, but money was getting tight as shuttle started to ramp up. Maybe Congress would have given them the necessary funding to launch the backup and proceed with the plan. But what would that have done to the shuttle schedule?
said it was briefly considered but would have needed about $300 million and taken 15 months and so was a non-starter.
Quote from: LittleBird on 05/30/2023 06:10 pmsaid it was briefly considered but would have needed about $300 million and taken 15 months and so was a non-starter. I'd note that the context matters. Considering Skylab B because Skylab A is totally unusable is one discussion. Considering Skylab B because Skylab A might be unusable is another discussion--and that's the situation they were in.
If the administration had gone to Congress with a request for more money to launch Skylab B, they might have gotten it. But it might have come with conditions, like taking some money out of the shuttle budget to cover it.
I'd note that Skylab was launched in the midst of the Watergate investigation, with major events like televised hearings taking place in July (Nixon fired a bunch of people in October). I don't know how this affected the functioning of government. Did the executive branch become semi-paralyzed during this time? So trying to get new funding out of Congress in that environment may not have been possible because the White House was preoccupied.
... I remember standing out in my garden on a bright, clear night and watching a moving dot of light in the sky which I realised was Skylab. I remember thinking how fantastic it was that there were men up there, and I felt really quite moved as I watched it. Through my mind there even flashed a line from every Hollywood aviation movie of the 40s, "it takes guts to fly those machines." But I meant it. Then my neighbour came out into his garden to get something and I said, "Look, there's Skylab," and he looked up and said, "Sky-what?" And I realised that he didn't know about it, and he wasn't interested.
A second Skylab, under consideration since mid-1969, was a principal casualty of the 1970 budget deliberations. Shortly after the wet-to-dry switch, Charles Mathews suggested that the center program offices begin investigating artificial gravity for a second workshop; the information gained thereby would prove valuable in planning for a permanent [117] space station. In September Mueller's office broadened the study by asking the offices of space science and advanced research to propose other experiment payloads. Guidelines for a follow-on workshop, prepared in November, listed several options-a year-long occupation of a workshop similar to the first Skylab by four three-man crews, the addition of artificial gravity, substitution of a stellar telescope for the ATM, and a more complex group of earth-resource sensors. The additional logistical support and the new experiments would be accomplished with as little change as possible to the workshop's basic configuration. Since the first Skylab's backup hardware would become the second workshop, no major changes could be made on the hardware until near the end of the first missions. The committee set a series of milestones for subsequent studies: a preliminary report on 20 January 1970 to support congressional hearings, a work statement by July, and a preliminary design review in early 1971.7The definition of new experiments continued into the new year. On 7 March, Dale D. Myers, George Mueller's successor,ii reviewed the progress of preliminary studies with his staff. The group concluded that definition of a stellar telescope had advanced far enough for present needs and that major emphasis in studies should go to artificial gravity and to payloads "providing tangible benefits of general public interest." After the meeting, Schneider asked his center program offices to provide cost estimates for three possible missions: a repeat of the first Skylab, a yearlong mission with advanced solar instruments but no major changes to the cluster, and the same configuration with advanced earth-resource instruments in place of the telescope mount.8Answers from the centers conflicted. Houston wanted a firm commitment to a more sophisticated station, even if it meant delaying the first Skylab. Huntsville, fearing that a major commitment to a follow-on Skylab would jeopardize the present program, argued that a year-long mission was impossible without major hardware changes and that artificial gravity would double or triple costs. The most that NASA could afford in Huntsville's opinion, was a combined earth resources-solar astronomy mission of eight months' duration. Both centers' views were aired at the April meeting of the Manned Space Flight Management Council, along with Schneider's proposals for further work. The council approved additional studies of Skylab II configurations and directed the committee on artificial gravity to present its findings by early May.9[118] Skylab II studies proceeded that summer in preparation for the FY 1972 budget discussions. Payload weight soon became a serious problem, whose solution might require modifying the second stage of the Saturn rocket. The cost outlook was more disturbing-estimates ranged from $1.32 billion to more than $1.5 billion. Schneider had discussed a second Skylab with officials from the Office of Management and Budget on 31 July and knew money would not come easily. After another review on 31 August, he informed Myers that Skylab II studies had provided sufficient data for planning purposes. Further steps awaited a funding decision.10The decision that fall went against Skylab II. There was some question about its utility; unless the agency made expensive modifications for artificial gravity, the mission would essentially duplicate Skylab I. NASA management found that funding another workshop dictated either a much larger budget or lengthy delays in the Space Shuttle. Although there was strong support for a second Skylab in the House space committee, the Nixon administration was unwilling to underwrite the costs, and NASA did not wish to jeopardize its future programs.11
See the attached. Many years ago I provided Thomas Frieling with a bunch of documents on this subject and encouraged him to write about it. He started with the opinion that considering that they had all the hardware built, it was a shame that they never flew it. By the time he went through the documentary evidence, he concluded that it was the right decision. You'll have to read the document to understand why.
Oct 30, 2025Restored Skylab TV broadcast featuring Skylab II astronaut Joseph Kerwin explaining the Inflight Medical Support System. The Kinescope recording was very faded, and was remastered to improve color stability and balance towards overall neutral tones. Sound was equalised, with noise and hum reduced.
