Quote from: edkyle99 on 09/05/2011 11:51 pmQuote from: Lee Jay on 09/05/2011 07:38 pmQuote from: edkyle99 on 09/05/2011 06:58 pmQuote from: Patchouli on 09/05/2011 05:56 amBoth Ares I and V had serious design issues that made them unviable designs.I don't see the Ares I design in particular as nonviable.It was. The premise behind Ares-I was to take two existing engines and use their extensive flight experience to make a simple, reliable rocket for Orion. Then they discovered their choice for the second stage engine (SSME) wouldn't work and that they'd have to design a new second stage engine. Then they discovered that the new engine wasn't going to give the performance of the original so they'd have to design a new first stage engine as well. This is not correct. ESAS recommended the four-segment booster and SSME stage 2 design, but also described a five-segment booster and J-2 derived alternative. The alternative was selected soon after ESAS. It was selected not for any of the reasons you describe. Instead, it was selected to speed up development of five-segment booster and J-2X for Ares V - a choice that was expected to save development costs for Ares V down the road. In addition, the five-segment booster design actually outperformed the four-segment SSME design. It's all right there in the ESAS report.Yes, along with this gem about LC16, the 5-segment J-2 (and expander-cycle LR-85) derived solution (which scored behind both Atlas and Delta in the ESAS report):"The J–2 or J–2S could not support the 2011 launch date requirement.""...would be too expensive and exhibit an unacceptable development risk to meet the goal of the 2011 IOC for the CEV.""However, the five-segment development added significant near-term cost and risk and the J–2S+/expander engine could not meet the 2011 schedule target.""The J–2S option could not meet the 2011 target (whereas the SSME could) and had 6 percent less performance than the SSME-based option (LV 13.1)."In short, ESAS did include LV16, the Ares I which was developed, and it came in *behind* the other CLV options, with a risk factor of 1.3, almost to the bottom, and the highest facilities cost out of any of the other options. By the ESAS, the model to be designed should LV13.1 not be persued, was LV2, the Atlas V Heavy with a custom upper stage, with a risk of 1.03, second from the top.So, just including it in the report does not mean that it was endorsed by the report. Reading the report, it was the complete opposite, it was included and listed as a high risk of running over the budget, and missing the schedule, as well as listed as a severe risk of failing to meet performance predicted.
Quote from: Lee Jay on 09/05/2011 07:38 pmQuote from: edkyle99 on 09/05/2011 06:58 pmQuote from: Patchouli on 09/05/2011 05:56 amBoth Ares I and V had serious design issues that made them unviable designs.I don't see the Ares I design in particular as nonviable.It was. The premise behind Ares-I was to take two existing engines and use their extensive flight experience to make a simple, reliable rocket for Orion. Then they discovered their choice for the second stage engine (SSME) wouldn't work and that they'd have to design a new second stage engine. Then they discovered that the new engine wasn't going to give the performance of the original so they'd have to design a new first stage engine as well. This is not correct. ESAS recommended the four-segment booster and SSME stage 2 design, but also described a five-segment booster and J-2 derived alternative. The alternative was selected soon after ESAS. It was selected not for any of the reasons you describe. Instead, it was selected to speed up development of five-segment booster and J-2X for Ares V - a choice that was expected to save development costs for Ares V down the road. In addition, the five-segment booster design actually outperformed the four-segment SSME design. It's all right there in the ESAS report.
Quote from: edkyle99 on 09/05/2011 06:58 pmQuote from: Patchouli on 09/05/2011 05:56 amBoth Ares I and V had serious design issues that made them unviable designs.I don't see the Ares I design in particular as nonviable.It was. The premise behind Ares-I was to take two existing engines and use their extensive flight experience to make a simple, reliable rocket for Orion. Then they discovered their choice for the second stage engine (SSME) wouldn't work and that they'd have to design a new second stage engine. Then they discovered that the new engine wasn't going to give the performance of the original so they'd have to design a new first stage engine as well.
Quote from: Patchouli on 09/05/2011 05:56 amBoth Ares I and V had serious design issues that made them unviable designs.I don't see the Ares I design in particular as nonviable.
Both Ares I and V had serious design issues that made them unviable designs.
Quote from: Downix on 09/06/2011 01:29 amQuote from: edkyle99 on 09/05/2011 11:51 pmQuote from: Lee Jay on 09/05/2011 07:38 pmQuote from: edkyle99 on 09/05/2011 06:58 pmQuote from: Patchouli on 09/05/2011 05:56 amBoth Ares I and V had serious design issues that made them unviable designs.I don't see the Ares I design in particular as nonviable.It was. The premise behind Ares-I was to take two existing engines and use their extensive flight experience to make a simple, reliable rocket for Orion. Then they discovered their choice for the second stage engine (SSME) wouldn't work and that they'd have to design a new second stage engine. Then they discovered that the new engine wasn't going to give the performance of the original so they'd have to design a new first stage engine as well. This is not correct. ESAS recommended the four-segment booster and SSME stage 2 design, but also described a five-segment booster and J-2 derived alternative. The alternative was selected soon after ESAS. It was selected not for any of the reasons you describe. Instead, it was selected to speed up development of five-segment booster and J-2X for Ares V - a choice that was expected to save development costs for Ares V down the road. In addition, the five-segment booster design actually outperformed the four-segment SSME design. It's all right there in the ESAS report.Yes, along with this gem about LC16, the 5-segment J-2 (and expander-cycle LR-85) derived solution (which scored behind both Atlas and Delta in the ESAS report):"The J–2 or J–2S could not support the 2011 launch date requirement.""...would be too expensive and exhibit an unacceptable development risk to meet the goal of the 2011 IOC for the CEV.""However, the five-segment development added significant near-term cost and risk and the J–2S+/expander engine could not meet the 2011 schedule target.""The J–2S option could not meet the 2011 target (whereas the SSME could) and had 6 percent less performance than the SSME-based option (LV 13.1)."In short, ESAS did include LV16, the Ares I which was developed, and it came in *behind* the other CLV options, with a risk factor of 1.3, almost to the bottom, and the highest facilities cost out of any of the other options. By the ESAS, the model to be designed should LV13.1 not be persued, was LV2, the Atlas V Heavy with a custom upper stage, with a risk of 1.03, second from the top.So, just including it in the report does not mean that it was endorsed by the report. Reading the report, it was the complete opposite, it was included and listed as a high risk of running over the budget, and missing the schedule, as well as listed as a severe risk of failing to meet performance predicted.The 5 segment J-2 upper stage variant was rated by ESAS only slightly behind the original choice of 4 segment solid plus air started SSME.This demonstrates how deeply flawed the ESAS process was. Operating cost per launch was not even considered as a figure of merit. When cost per launch was discussed, it was based on an absurd assumption of six launches a year for all launchers.That's no way to run a space program.
Quote from: edkyle99 on 09/05/2011 11:51 pmThis is not correct. Sure it is. Jan 14, 2004:http://smartech.gatech.edu/jspui/bitstream/1853/8025/2/SSEC_SB4_doc.pdf
This is not correct.
"The J–2 or J–2S could not support the 2011 launch date requirement.""...would be too expensive and exhibit an unacceptable development risk to meet the goal of the 2011 IOC for the CEV.""However, the five-segment development added significant near-term cost and risk and the J–2S+/expander engine could not meet the 2011 schedule target.""The J–2S option could not meet the 2011 target (whereas the SSME could) and had 6 percent less performance than the SSME-based option (LV 13.1)."
Quote from: Downix on 09/06/2011 01:29 am"The J–2 or J–2S could not support the 2011 launch date requirement.""...would be too expensive and exhibit an unacceptable development risk to meet the goal of the 2011 IOC for the CEV.""However, the five-segment development added significant near-term cost and risk and the J–2S+/expander engine could not meet the 2011 schedule target.""The J–2S option could not meet the 2011 target (whereas the SSME could) and had 6 percent less performance than the SSME-based option (LV 13.1)."Right. NASA accepted the schedule slip. It had to accept the slip because Congress did not provide sufficient funding for Constellation, or for any human lunar exploration program. NASA could not afford to do SSME and J-2X and RS-68B and four segment booster and five segment booster. It decided to drop SSME and four segment booster and to accept the Ares I delay in favor of making Ares V more viable. Even then, Orion and Ares V were going to slip unless more money was authorized. The plan did not work out, but I'm not sure the Agency had a choice. - Ed Kyle
Quote from: Downix on 09/06/2011 01:29 am"The J–2 or J–2S could not support the 2011 launch date requirement.""...would be too expensive and exhibit an unacceptable development risk to meet the goal of the 2011 IOC for the CEV.""However, the five-segment development added significant near-term cost and risk and the J–2S+/expander engine could not meet the 2011 schedule target.""The J–2S option could not meet the 2011 target (whereas the SSME could) and had 6 percent less performance than the SSME-based option (LV 13.1)."Right. NASA accepted the schedule slip. It had to accept the slip because Congress did not provide sufficient funding for Constellation, or for any human lunar exploration program. NASA could not afford to do SSME and J-2X and RS-68B and four segment booster and five segment booster. It decided to drop SSME and four segment booster and to accept the Ares I delay in favor of making Ares V more viable. Even then, Orion and Ares V were going to slip unless more money was authorized. The plan did not work out, but I'm not sure the Agency had a choice.
Sure they did. Go DIRECT...You really want a separate CLV capability? Man rate an EELV Heavy.Seriously, spending more than twice the money on a continuous basis just for a negligible decrease in mission risk is not a good use of cash, especially after it became plain said cash was not going to materialize. I thought we had this discussion years ago.Ed, you were the one who inspired Ross' original question. Have you forgotten everything we learned over those five years?
Quote from: edkyle99 on 09/06/2011 04:32 amQuote from: Downix on 09/06/2011 01:29 am"The J–2 or J–2S could not support the 2011 launch date requirement.""...would be too expensive and exhibit an unacceptable development risk to meet the goal of the 2011 IOC for the CEV.""However, the five-segment development added significant near-term cost and risk and the J–2S+/expander engine could not meet the 2011 schedule target.""The J–2S option could not meet the 2011 target (whereas the SSME could) and had 6 percent less performance than the SSME-based option (LV 13.1)."Right. NASA accepted the schedule slip. It had to accept the slip because Congress did not provide sufficient funding for Constellation, or for any human lunar exploration program. NASA could not afford to do SSME and J-2X and RS-68B and four segment booster and five segment booster. It decided to drop SSME and four segment booster and to accept the Ares I delay in favor of making Ares V more viable. Even then, Orion and Ares V were going to slip unless more money was authorized. The plan did not work out, but I'm not sure the Agency had a choice. - Ed KyleAnd you're re-inventing things. Those statements were *with* the added budget NASA never got. So, you can't say it was accounted for, when the ESAS report itself says it wasn't.
Quote from: Downix on 09/06/2011 05:56 amQuote from: edkyle99 on 09/06/2011 04:32 amQuote from: Downix on 09/06/2011 01:29 am"The J–2 or J–2S could not support the 2011 launch date requirement.""...would be too expensive and exhibit an unacceptable development risk to meet the goal of the 2011 IOC for the CEV.""However, the five-segment development added significant near-term cost and risk and the J–2S+/expander engine could not meet the 2011 schedule target.""The J–2S option could not meet the 2011 target (whereas the SSME could) and had 6 percent less performance than the SSME-based option (LV 13.1)."Right. NASA accepted the schedule slip. It had to accept the slip because Congress did not provide sufficient funding for Constellation, or for any human lunar exploration program. NASA could not afford to do SSME and J-2X and RS-68B and four segment booster and five segment booster. It decided to drop SSME and four segment booster and to accept the Ares I delay in favor of making Ares V more viable. Even then, Orion and Ares V were going to slip unless more money was authorized. The plan did not work out, but I'm not sure the Agency had a choice. - Ed KyleAnd you're re-inventing things. Those statements were *with* the added budget NASA never got. So, you can't say it was accounted for, when the ESAS report itself says it wasn't.http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2010/09/23/6/"Our first reaction on seeing the Vision Sand Chart was that we were appalled. There was no way we could do our job with that little amount of money, and to develop a new deep space system for that pittance was beyond belief." Wayne HaleHowever you dice or slice it, the bottom line is that there wasn't enough money. There still isn't enough money. - Ed Kyle
Ed, the report said that the 5 seg, j-2 design was too expensive, even under the planned budget. Which means, the budget was limited already, and switching to that only made the problem worse.
If "Direct" could have saved the lunar mission, NASA would be going to the Moon right now. It isn't. Instead, it is trying to figure out how to pay for, and what to do with, a big "Direct"-like SLS design that it can't afford to use.
Five segment J-2 cost more in the short term, but eliminating SSME and four-segment booster would save much more money in the long term.
Quote from: Downix on 09/06/2011 02:28 pmEd, the report said that the 5 seg, j-2 design was too expensive, even under the planned budget. Which means, the budget was limited already, and switching to that only made the problem worse.Five segment J-2 cost more in the short term, but eliminating SSME and four-segment booster would save much more money in the long term. That was the rationale. The budget was busted even before the project began regardless. - Ed Kyle
... the goals of NASA as authorized by Congress do include going back to the moon - they referred to the '05 and '08 Authorizations as guidance for the decadal survey. The only reason it looks like NASA isn't going back to the moon is because Obama doesn't want to and Bolden is his puppet.
Finally, you said you were "not sure the Agency had a choice" but to switch to a plan that would cost roughly twice as much as DIRECT and take about twice as long. There's a link missing from your logic...
Quote from: 93143 on 09/06/2011 09:20 pm... the goals of NASA as authorized by Congress do include going back to the moon - they referred to the '05 and '08 Authorizations as guidance for the decadal survey. The only reason it looks like NASA isn't going back to the moon is because Obama doesn't want to and Bolden is his puppet.The President does not want NASA to go to the Moon. So, the reason it looks like NASA isn't going back to the Moon is - because NASA is not going back to the Moon!QuoteFinally, you said you were "not sure the Agency had a choice" but to switch to a plan that would cost roughly twice as much as DIRECT and take about twice as long. There's a link missing from your logic...The missing link is that a "Direct" plan would not have cost half as much as the Constellation plan. NASA itself showed in ESAS that a dual-launch plan like "Direct" cost somewhat less, but only fractionally less than the 1.5 launch architecture. The really big costs, the crew and lander spacecraft, would not have been reduced with a dual-launch plan like "Direct". - Ed Kyle
Quote from: edkyle99 on 09/06/2011 08:48 pmQuote from: Downix on 09/06/2011 02:28 pmEd, the report said that the 5 seg, j-2 design was too expensive, even under the planned budget. Which means, the budget was limited already, and switching to that only made the problem worse.Five segment J-2 cost more in the short term, but eliminating SSME and four-segment booster would save much more money in the long term. That was the rationale. The budget was busted even before the project began regardless. - Ed KyleBut that was the post-ESAS rationale, so you cannot claim that LV16 was endorsed by ESAS for reasons which are not in ESAS. They listed LV16 as the wrong option, and gave very good reasons why. Any rationale given to the decision was rationalizing a bad mistake to themselves.
The President does not want NASA to go to the Moon. So, the reason it looks like NASA isn't going back to the Moon is - because NASA is not going back to the Moon!
Quote from: Downix on 09/06/2011 11:34 pmQuote from: edkyle99 on 09/06/2011 08:48 pmQuote from: Downix on 09/06/2011 02:28 pmEd, the report said that the 5 seg, j-2 design was too expensive, even under the planned budget. Which means, the budget was limited already, and switching to that only made the problem worse.Five segment J-2 cost more in the short term, but eliminating SSME and four-segment booster would save much more money in the long term. That was the rationale. The budget was busted even before the project began regardless. - Ed KyleBut that was the post-ESAS rationale, so you cannot claim that LV16 was endorsed by ESAS for reasons which are not in ESAS. They listed LV16 as the wrong option, and gave very good reasons why. Any rationale given to the decision was rationalizing a bad mistake to themselves.I don't think I said it was "endorsed", only that it was studied and described as an alternative. Griffin later said that it came in a close second, or words to that effect. By switching to five segment/J-2X, Griffin was prioritizing Ares V - a rocket really designed to go to Mars. Had they stayed with four-segment and SSME, they would have suffered the same final result (cancellation). Ares I would still have been delayed due to tight budgets and Shuttle overhang, and Ares V would have been utterly impossible to afford. I don't see NASA's Ares I decision as a mistake. The mistake was lack of funding from the outset. - Ed Kyle
Worst case scenario, Obama stays to 2016. Assuming SLS survives, it will be just about ready by then. Orion will be ready before then. Due to the magic of sequential development, the lunar lander won't really get started before then regardless of who's the president, so does Obama really have any say at all in whether or not NASA goes to the moon with SLS?