I have a some questions:1) I recall seeing a document (but can’t find ATM) that mentioned vehicles with more than 14 successful flights in a row to be considered human rated. Is there no consideration for demonstrated reliability?2) The existing EELV fleet launches nuclear payloads from time to time. How do the risks and requirements of “Nuclear rating” compare to “Human rating”?Perhaps Boeing/SpaceX should focus on commercial crew for Bigelow and allow NASA to find its own way.
I have many data points from at least 2 of the CxP projects of requirements being inserted to ensure individuals or offices were still needed to verify and own them later. Managers were too weak or averse or supportive/collusive to fight them.
Quote from: Space Pete on 11/14/2010 03:33 pmA very interesting new post from Mr. Hale - "The coming train wreck for Commercial Human Spaceflight".http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2010/11/14/the-coming-train-wreck-for-commercial-human-spaceflightThe room stands, cheers and says "Bravo!" to Wayne!Here's hoping this gets wide circulation and has a positive impact!
A very interesting new post from Mr. Hale - "The coming train wreck for Commercial Human Spaceflight".http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2010/11/14/the-coming-train-wreck-for-commercial-human-spaceflight
Quote from: Antares on 11/14/2010 09:46 pmI have many data points from at least 2 of the CxP projects of requirements being inserted to ensure individuals or offices were still needed to verify and own them later. Managers were too weak or averse or supportive/collusive to fight them.Did you do anything about it if it was in excess to what was considered necessary? After all, these were government projects and those "offices" are required to ensure their compliance. I assume, based on previous posts, you are a government employee too. With all due respect to you, I have seen multiple posts where you claim to have "proof" of certain "ills" but if another government employee does not stand up to other government employees to hold them accountable, then how does it ever change on the levels that Wayne is refering to in his post?
Tried to avoid Constellation, failed. Tried to help Constellation, failed, was told to sit down and shut up, didn't have RIDs accepted, was threatened by a manager and other engineers. They eventually stopped asking for my help. I fight battles I might actually win. It was clear that Constellation would collapse eventually, so it was wise to get out.
Excellent thread, it exposes the inside politics of NASA which many of us usually have to guess about.Quote from: Antares on 11/15/2010 08:36 pmTried to avoid Constellation, failed. Tried to help Constellation, failed, was told to sit down and shut up, didn't have RIDs accepted, was threatened by a manager and other engineers. They eventually stopped asking for my help. I fight battles I might actually win. It was clear that Constellation would collapse eventually, so it was wise to get out.Out of interest: I understand why managers didn't like what you were doing (by trying to do "the right thing" in the technical sense, you were endangering their careers), but why *engineers* were against you?
Out of interest: I understand why managers didn't like what you were doing (by trying to do "the right thing" in the technical sense, you were endangering their careers), but why *engineers* were against you?
And let me be the first to say, Phil is exactly right. It is a complex business and ensuring safety is difficult.
Quote from: Wayne Hale on 11/19/2010 08:40 pmAnd let me be the first to say, Phil is exactly right. It is a complex business and ensuring safety is difficult.I guess at a fundamental level, that's the problem -- everyone has the same end in mind, it's just a matter of how you get there.
Still, commercial space proponents said the initial draft demonstrates the reluctance by some NASA officials to the type of dramatic changes in oversight necessary to create a thriving commercial sector.
“The document runs a mind-numbing 260 pages of densely spaced requirements,” Hale wrote.
“Most disappointing, on pages 7 to 11 is a table of 74 additional requirements documents... Taken all together, there are thousands of requirement statements...
And for every one NASA will require ... massive amounts of paperwork and/or electronic forms. ... This is one of the major reasons why spaceflight is as costly as it is.”
McAlister countered those assertions, saying the space agency is striving “to maximize safety and reliability” without burdening commercial firms with unnecessary requirements that lead to higher development and operations costs.
“A simplistic page count” of the commercial crew requirements document does not “reflect the quality of the requirements,” he wrote...
... adding that most of the pages published include the rationale for requirements to show industry the intent of the requirements and give them “the flexibility to meet the requirements in innovative ways.”
What’s more, the task being undertaken is extremely complex, McAlister wrote.
Space agency officials must evaluate a wide variety of factors to gain the confidence that missions will be successful. Those factors include ... the contractor’s flight vehicle, ... systems, operating conditions, mission planning and flight crew training, McAlister wrote.
“NASA and the aerospace community have developed an outstanding complement ...
“Simple, straightforward requirements and the flexibility to use good industry based standards could allow commercial space flight to be as successful as those programs or the NASA Launch Services program,” Hale wrote. “But we are not on that path.”