Predicting the SLS

[dks13827]

 
Delta IV  heavy...............  and it looks cool, too !!! 

[savuporo]

Congress approved Griffin primarily *because* he planned to replace the EELV option and that was what they were demanding.

So you are saying ESAS was not a real study after all ? Gasp, shock and horror.

[kraisee]

All I have personally ever needed to prove that ESAS was only done to reinforce the big-picture decisions that were already made, long before Griffin became Administrator in April 2005, is here:

http://www.planetary.org/programs/projects/aim_for_mars/study-report.pdf

Ross.

[gospacex]

Congress approved Griffin primarily *because* he planned to replace the EELV option and that was what they were demanding.   He would never have gotten nominated otherwise.

True. However, did Congress really wanted CxP to turn into bottomless (and endless time-wise) money pit?

Actually, it's not a rhetorical question. I easily can imagine a case when politicians *are* benefiting from overbloated, costly, and endless programs - they provide so many jobs, you know.

So, in this case, did Griffin concoct Ares-V-Max monster himself, or was it done with Congress conscious approval/orders?

[kraisee]

Agreed.   I don't think most of Congress ever wanted Constellation to deteriorate to the un-sustainable levels it did.

But on the other hand, there are still a few who profited by it -- and those same folk don't want to reduce their profits now, even though that threatens to create "yet another unaffordable NASA program".

Its a tough situation.   I hope that those people will decide to put the nations interests first.   But only time will tell.

Ross.

[MP99]

I predict that NASA will come back to Congress with a report that endorses the HEFT 5/5 - J252SH - Ares-V Classic launcher, using the logic that it will save money "in the long run". Which of course will actually cost more and require a substantial budget increase to meet the deadlines enacted by the NASA Auth. Act of 2010.

Congress will come back with a firm "no" answer and a scathing rebuke. NASA will pout and mutter under their breath that "we're the rocket scientists, not Congress". Congress will simply state that NASA can find a way to do what they were asked to do with the budget they were given, or they can do without.

S.3729 seems to actually mandate the 5/5 core, possibly because they wanted to push on with the 5-seg development programme, or maybe this just balanced those wanting "shuttle-sized" with those wanting Ares V:-

22 (B) The capability to carry an integrated
23 upper Earth departure stage bringing the total
24 lift capability of the Space Launch System to
25 130 tons or more.

...although to me the question is still outstanding whether this should be interpreted as short tons or metric tons.


I believe NASA needs to go with the 4/3 / J-130 config or the programme will never reach fruition. DIRECT showed how SDLV really makes sense when the SDLV can be built quickly, minimising sustainment costs and then allowing NASA to concentrate on other things.

I predict NASA will propose 5/5, but who knows whether the new Congress will push back against that.

cheers, Martin

PS J-252SH only makes sense if the upper stage burns out making the ascent, and a CPS-type stage performs in-space-only duties. And that will be hugely expensive.

[STS-200]

J-130 (i.e. without an upper stage) can only do LEO.
The only launch pad(s) for SLS will be at the Cape, which means polar orbits are pretty much out.

The DoD only basically launches to GTO and polar orbit (and to Medium Earth Orbits like for GPS). Why would the DoD want J-130 for anything?

EDIT:I see now that STS-200 said "SLS" and not J-130. SLS with the upper stage could go to non-LEO orbits, but polar orbit is still out.

Yes, I am assuming some sort of upper stage for whatever is built.

On the polar orbits: - There were some ideas for "dog leg" launches out of the Cape back in the 60s. Are these thought to be too dangerous these days?

[marsavian]

HEFT 5/5 aka Ares V Classic. The original ESAS configurations, even in 1.5 mode, were alright and that includes the original Ares I. Direct v3's Jupiters are just not going to fly, too small for MSFC and ATK, but its methodology, way of thinking and strategy will live on in SLS and its development.

[Mark S]

HEFT 5/5 aka Ares V Classic. The original ESAS configurations, even in 1.5 mode, were alright and that includes the original Ares I. Direct v3's Jupiters are just not going to fly, too small for MSFC and ATK, but its methodology, way of thinking and strategy will live on in SLS and its development.

I think we agree that HEFT 5/5 will be what NASA proposes, but I don't think Congress is going to allow it. Even before the tea-party budget hawks were elected, it became clear that someone in Congress has gotten a clue. NASA will not be given free rein in this process, because Congress is definitely going to exercise its oversight responsibilities.

Congress has mandated a sustainable, affordable, and versatile government-owned launch capability.  HEFT 5/5 is none of those.

Mark S.

[simonbp]

Congress has mandated a sustainable, affordable, and versatile government-owned launch capability.  HEFT 5/5 is none of those.

And 4/3 is?

It uses the same launch infrastructure, same MAF/SSC infrastructure, would require just as many people to build and launch it, and the only extra technology (5-seg) is one that is nearly ready for flight. The only real long-term extra cost over 4/3 is the extra SSMEs, and if the performance more than makes up for the difference, they're worth it.

Any SLS is going to be expensive; 5/5 seems to get the most from that massive expense.

[tankmodeler]

I think we agree that HEFT 5/5 will be what NASA proposes,

How could a proposal based on the HEFT 5/5 (Ares V CLassic) ever get past any initial sniff test even at NASA? You'd have to be delusional to think that your boss (Congress) is going to buy the same program they just terminated due to high costs and the boss's belief that you (NASA) were both under reporting and unable to constrain its costs. I do understand that a great number of peoople can self delude in this manner, but surely the new administrator has got to see at least that much writing on the wall. Such a proposal must go through BOlden's desk, no? How could he put any kind of aproval stamp on such a proposal?

I'd believe that Griffen could put the blinders on and sign off on it, but I haven't seen anything from Bolden that makes me believe he's that way inclined.

Paul

[muomega0]

How about something more left-field:

Scrap one of the existing EELVs, and regard the SLS as the "other EELV" for reliability/redundancy purposes. OK - It would be far too big for most missions, but would only be used as a backup.

From an economics standpoint, that would seem to have some merit as it means supporting 2 boosters not 3, and it might help the flight rate a bit.

I have little insight into the politics of it though. If the SLS were still a "NASA rocket", could it save DoD money (as they would only have 1 EELV to support) and buy NASA some DoD friends (as they would want SLS to succeed)?

...
Reusable Solar Electric Propulsion for earth departure to a HEO 30,000 kg ?
...

That requires a true HLV.. Not sure if even J-130 + D-IV US will push that much mass to HEO?  Remind me why it needs to be placed in HEO?  Or did I misread this?

You are correct that the United States needs to examine the number of launch vehicle types necessary.

Even 30000 kg to LEO does not require a true HLV, see ULA EELV Phase 2 Growth Options , but it depends how you define HLV (30,000 or 70,000, or 100,000+ kg to LEO(?).  The tug could also be assembled in two pieces if necessary.

The question asked is what needs to be pushed into HEO or to the moon or to mars:  Deep Space habitat, Crew Return or MultiPurpose Vehicles, Landers, Transfer Stages, Rovers, Outposts, etc  depends on mission objectives.

Consider all the architecture options, all the engine types, all the propellant depot locations and fuel types, fairing size, orbital mechanics,  etc and just focus on the dry mass of the myriad of hardware assemblies possible:  Most appear to have an assembled dry mass of 5,000 to 10,000 to 25,000 kg excluding the propellant. 

For most of these challenging HSF objectives to explore beyond LEO, it ends up with all chemical propulsion hardware, at least 70% is fuel, the rest is dry mass. 

Expendable Cryogenic Propulsion stage for earth departure (may want to increase fuel for return trips + long stays)
18,000 kg +  60000 kg fuel   (combine for a HLV launch, "n" other LVs)
24,000 kg + 140000 kg fuel  (need two HLV launches, "n" other LVs)

One could think of the cryogenic propulsion stage as the D-IV US empty and stretched that is filled later, or launched fueled in the strictest sense,  but it clearly does not have the needed 60,000+ kg of fuel needed for the mission objectives listed above (need multiple launches then).

In the case of an electric tug option, is would supplement or replace the cryogenic propulsion stage.   

There are many variations for LEO Departure Techniques.

Hence, examine the dry mass of all the SLS elements for all missions and decide on the LV(s) needed, because despite over a decade of trying to reduce SDLV costs, NASA cannot execute its HSF mission.  This is clearly shown when "constrained budget" profiles show 6 launches over 12 years using HLV, but it is none-the-less very disappointing.  The flexible path was an option to say there is not enough cash to implement VSE, a very large unfunded mandate.

The low launch rate is the Achillees heel of HLV, since it carries non-recurring costs that range from 1.2B to 2.4B/year (depends on who you ask), ignoring development $. 

Historically,
External Tank Contact 2000 to 2010 2.93B, 18 Tanks = 293M/yr or 162M/tank
ATK 12 Years, $4.1Billion = 340M/yr Est: 10 Segments/yr costs $58M/seg or $580M
P$W: 2.25B 4 years = 560M/yr Est:  10 SSME Units cost $32M each

and now add Launch Operation Costs, which to be fair, includes servicing and shows only what a low launch rate does to affect each major components yearly costs.

Here is how others view "NASA" Cost Estimates
Joint Confidence Level Paradox: - A History of Denial

The first "innovation" is to launch rockets multiple times (8-10) per year to optimize the $/kg.   If you need to launch more than that, the size of the LV needs to be increased.  Dry Mass must not exceed LV capability.

The second "innovation" is to save the non-recurring costs of HLV and spend them on "payloads".  In your scenario, you keep just one of two EELVs + HLV.   

[Mark S]

I think we agree that HEFT 5/5 will be what NASA proposes,

How could a proposal based on the HEFT 5/5 (Ares V CLassic) ever get past any initial sniff test even at NASA? You'd have to be delusional to think that your boss (Congress) is going to buy the same program they just terminated due to high costs and the boss's belief that you (NASA) were both under reporting and unable to constrain its costs. I do understand that a great number of peoople can self delude in this manner, but surely the new administrator has got to see at least that much writing on the wall. Such a proposal must go through BOlden's desk, no? How could he put any kind of aproval stamp on such a proposal?

I'd believe that Griffen could put the blinders on and sign off on it, but I haven't seen anything from Bolden that makes me believe he's that way inclined.

Paul

Here, Paul, let me demonstrate the mindset:

Congress has mandated a sustainable, affordable, and versatile government-owned launch capability.  HEFT 5/5 is none of those.

And 4/3 is?

It uses the same launch infrastructure, same MAF/SSC infrastructure, would require just as many people to build and launch it, and the only extra technology (5-seg) is one that is nearly ready for flight. The only real long-term extra cost over 4/3 is the extra SSMEs, and if the performance more than makes up for the difference, they're worth it.

Any SLS is going to be expensive; 5/5 seems to get the most from that massive expense.

See? The extra development cost of finishing the J2X and 5-segment RSRM, and the inability to launch without an upper stage for LEO missions, as well as the ongoing operational cost of two extra SRB segments and two additional SSMEs per flight, are negligible. Once you've convinced yourself of that, the conclusion is obvious.

Mark S.

[kraisee]

Here is how others view "NASA" Cost Estimates
Joint Confidence Level Paradox: - A History of Denial

Your URL has an "=" sign on the end of it that prevents the file from loading.   I have removed it for you.


BTW, the irony is writ large, regarding Mike Griffin's quote at the bottom of page 10.   I'd laugh, if only it didn't make me want to cry.

Ross.

[marsavian]

HEFT 5/5 aka Ares V Classic. The original ESAS configurations, even in 1.5 mode, were alright and that includes the original Ares I. Direct v3's Jupiters are just not going to fly, too small for MSFC and ATK, but its methodology, way of thinking and strategy will live on in SLS and its development.

I think we agree that HEFT 5/5 will be what NASA proposes, but I don't think Congress is going to allow it. Even before the tea-party budget hawks were elected, it became clear that someone in Congress has gotten a clue. NASA will not be given free rein in this process, because Congress is definitely going to exercise its oversight responsibilities.

Congress has mandated a sustainable, affordable, and versatile government-owned launch capability.  HEFT 5/5 is none of those.

Mark S.

See? The extra development cost of finishing the J2X and 5-segment RSRM, and the inability to launch without an upper stage for LEO missions, as well as the ongoing operational cost of two extra SRB segments and two additional SSMEs per flight, are negligible. Once you've convinced yourself of that, the conclusion is obvious.

Mark S.

The HEFT2 document showed no real long-term cost difference in either development or operations between the two and recommended 5/5 (5/5 will require less missions which will counter higher unit costs and won't require the 4-seg facilities being kept warm whilst being developed). I don't know why you are all ignoring the current latest official NASA documentation as if it has no bearing on what will happen and 5/5 can launch without an upper stage too. Ares V was never the problem, it was the redundant duplicative capability Ares I that annoyed everyone except the Griffin purists. If Shelby's utterances are anything to go by how Congress is thinking he wants Ares V too rather than any Direct vehicle.

[kraisee]

I hope someone on HEFT bothers to go study the costs ATK are claiming for 4-seg right now with the 4-seg costs we've had for the last 30 years on Shuttle.

"Amazingly" ATK want as much for 'new' 4-segs as they do for 5-segs -- which is why HEFT see's no difference.   But this operational figure is quite different from Shuttle's heritage costs and nobody has noticed yet.

Ross.

[Pheogh]

I hope someone on HEFT bothers to go study the costs ATK are claiming for 4-seg right now with the 4-seg costs we've had for the last 30 years on Shuttle.

"Amazingly" ATK want as much for 'new' 4-segs as they do for 5-segs -- which is why HEFT see's no difference.   But this operational figure is quite different from Shuttle's heritage costs and nobody has noticed yet.

Ross.

At the congressional level is there any kind of team in place or scheduled to be put in place to keep an eye on Marshall and NASA proper? 51D eluded that there were mechanisms in the authorization that would stop these kind of shenanigans again but didn't elaborate specifically?

[kraisee]

If Shelby's utterances are anything to go by how Congress is thinking he wants Ares V too rather than any Direct vehicle.

Shelby wants to ensure he gets as much work (read money) as possible for MSFC/Alabama.   Like it or not, that is his job description, and nobody doubts that he fights hard for his district in this area.

All I wish he would understand, though, is that not everything MSFC works on, has to be a frakkin' launcher.

If we can halve the cost of the launcher development, we can then add a new spacecraft development to the mix -- and Shelby has sufficient political clout to ensure that both projects still get run out of MSFC.

The same money would still go to MSFC, which would satisfy Shelby, but the rest of us would get double the bangs for the bucks and the program would get much greater capabilities than just getting a single large launcher with nothing to fly on top of it!

Ross.

[cro-magnon gramps]

At the congressional level is there any kind of team in place or scheduled to be put in place to keep an eye on Marshall and NASA proper? 51D eluded that there were mechanisms in the authorization that would stop these kind of shenanigans again but didn't elaborate specifically?

Aside from the very, to me anyway, prescriptive passages in section 302, the only area that I see is the RIF's and Reports - I have taken a post that I grabbed, without getting the person's name, (my bad, if you recognize your work, grabbed the credit ) and calculated the times that these reports "should" be handed in to Congress, but from other posters here and elsewhere, I gather that the past experience has been rather poor, regarding NASA compliance; Dates are calculated as of Oct 11 being O day;

Study Reports for Congress Science Committee
         With Milestone Dates Post Signing By President

As best I can tell, just about every able-bodied NASA employee is going to be needed to complete the paperwork!  According to the bill just passed, NASA now owes Congress:

(First Date) Straight Time Days from date of signing

(Second Date) 5 day work week Counts only work days

(Third Date) 5 day work week w/holidays Counts only work days, and deducts 2 weeks Christmas / New Years holidays (I'm a generous boss  )


60 days: Dec 10, Jan 3, Jan 17
 - HUMAN RATING REQUIREMENTS Report [403(b)(1)]

90 days: Jan 9, Feb 14, Feb 28
 - SLS and MPLV Report [309]
 - VEHICLE AND COMPONENT REVIEW (ISS) Report [503(c)(1)]
 - INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION Report [702]
 - TRANSITIONING EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH TO OPERATIONS Report [703]
 - ESMD/SOMD/SMD COLLABORATION ON ROBOTIC MISSIONS Plan [807]
 - Cost Control Reports [1203]

120 days: Feb 8, Mar 28, Apr 11
 - REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION [301(b)]
 - REPORT ON NASA LAUNCH SUPPORT AND INFRASTRUCTURE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM [305(c)]
 -SEC. 306. REPORT ON EFFECTS OF TRANSITION TO SPACE LAUNCH SYSTEM ON THE SOLID AND LIQUID ROCKET MOTOR INDUSTRIAL BASES.
 - REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION CARGO RETURN CAPABILITY [404]
 - RESTORATION OF RTG MATERIAL PRODUCTION Report [806]
 - SPACE TECHNOLOGY IMPLEMENTATION PLAN [905]
 - STEM Report [1001]
 - Information Security Update [1207]

180 days: Apr 9, Jun 20, Jul 5,
 - COMMERCIAL MARKET ASSESSMENT Report [403(b)(2)]

[93143]

It uses the same launch infrastructure, same MAF/SSC infrastructure, would require just as many people to build and launch it, and the only extra technology (5-seg) is one that is nearly ready for flight. The only real long-term extra cost over 4/3 is the extra SSMEs, and if the performance more than makes up for the difference, they're worth it.

See? The extra development cost of finishing the J2X and 5-segment RSRM, and the inability to launch without an upper stage for LEO missions, as well as the ongoing operational cost of two extra SRB segments and two additional SSMEs per flight, are negligible. Once you've convinced yourself of that, the conclusion is obvious.

Couple of things you missed (besides the SRB cost thing Ross pointed out).

First, the infrastructure can't currently handle 5/5; it would need upgrades.

Second, if you don't need something, and you're as budget-limited as NASA is now, it doesn't matter how cost-effective it would be; it's not worth it.