A more general thread on transatmospheric vehicles (TAV) and early designs could be fun. As an example, we talked about Rockwell International MRCC (Multi Role Common Core) spaceplane earlier. There is also a lot of material here as well One word of caution for this thread. The initial post is almost identical to the initial post at an earlier thread with identical title but different poster. https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=59416.0
[snip]If someone can search and list them here, then that would be of great assistance. 👍Thank you. 😊
Figure 2 presents a history of SSTO interest in the United States during the past 30 years. While the list is not complete, it does indicate the scope of concepts considered and a continued interest in SSTO launch vehicles in this country. In addition to those shown, advanced transatmospheric aerospace plane concepts, called Black Horse and Black Colt, have been looked at by the Air Force.
This is my article from three years ago about the ALSV. I've always loved this concept, but I never really thought it was practical.https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4161/1
The takeaway is that, in 1985, industry was judged ready to begin developing a fully-reusable TSTO system, possibly becoming operational prior to 2001. The very public emergence of the National Aerospace Plane program in late 1985, followed in early 1986 by the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger, rapidly swept aside the TAV study results. Very little about this effort was recorded in permanent Air Force historical reports. While Boeing had filed for a patent while the TAV study was underway, this would not be published until 1989. Unaware of the patent filing, for 20 years I assumed the concept was proprietary until I found the patent around 2007. Government employees are not permitted to divulge company proprietary information.
From a design perspective, it was a “sweet” design. In 1984, Boeing filed for and, in 1989, received U.S. patent 4,802,639 for this concept.
After the name sensitivity became apparent, the name “Transatmospheric Vehicle” or TAV was invented. It did not use space, spaceplane, or shuttle, but it correctly identified the intended operational characteristics of the system much as do the generic names “bomber” and “fighter.
Quote from: zubenelgenubi on 03/28/2024 08:18 pm[snip]If someone can search and list them here, then that would be of great assistance. 👍Thank you. 😊Below a list of some NSF threads I found on the quick. To help my head around "What concept, when and by whom?" I tried to put them in a historical context with limited success. The list of NSF threads is not complete by any means so please add more. Many threads where very general "SSTO" or titled confusingly such that relevant materials are hard to place in context. From my side, I'd love to learn more about 70s VTOHL, HTOHL, ANY-Orbital concepts plus military, Shuttle, and Cocorde-like relations. A visual family tree of studies, contractors, sources would be very helpful.PS: As background, I started sleuthing for documents about two years ago on these concepts. There are many questions like "What did SAC want to do with these? Just another Sānger Silbervogel?", "The military vs NASA vs Shuttle vs human spaceflight discussion.", "USA vs UK and Europe and the Concorde", NASP, X33, "SSTO vs TSTO", "Any orginal documents surviving for further study and where do we find more?" etc. <snip>
To me the most intriguing question is one you list "What did SAC want to do with these?
Quote from: LittleBird on 03/31/2024 05:44 amTo me the most intriguing question is one you list "What did SAC want to do with these?I don't think that's all that hard to answer. They did not know what they wanted to do. There was no clearly-defined requirement. They just wanted to know if a spaceplane was possible, and presumably they would figure out what to do with it later. It turned out to not be possible (or at least not possible to do anything useful for a reasonable cost). So it was abandoned.
i) what the "operational need" mentioned on page 372 of this document is (from leovinus' long list above):
Quote from: LittleBird on 03/31/2024 01:37 pmi) what the "operational need" mentioned on page 372 of this document is (from leovinus' long list above):Nothing. It was imaginary. If it was real, they would have built something.The best way to understand this is that SAC was an airplane organization trying to understand space. That was also true of Boeing coming up with these designs.
FINAL REPORT ON BOEING TRANSATMOSPHERIC VEHICLE (TAV) CONCEPTS DEFINITION (PHASE I) Boeing Report D180-27669-4 https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADB216503.pdf
One also needs to be careful since "TAV" is used both as a generic term and in reference to this specific 1982-1984 USAF ASD program. Attached is a graph showing what are the actual 14 concepts that companies submitted to this original USAF program in 1983. There is sometimes confusion created by labelling all kinds of 1980s projects as "TAV" when actually using the term in a generic meaning instead of referring to this particular program.[snip]What would be most interesting would be the final TAV reports of the other contractors.
One also needs to be careful since "TAV" is used both as a generic term and in reference to this specific 1982-1984 USAF ASD program. Attached is a graph showing what are the actual 14 concepts that companies submitted to this original USAF program in 1983. There is sometimes confusion created by labelling all kinds of 1980s projects as "TAV" when actually using the term in a generic meaning instead of referring to this particular program.
[1] https://media.defense.gov/2010/Sep/27/2001329812/-1/-1/0/AFD-100927-035.pdfAFD-100927-035.pdf roughly page 644 to 698 THE HYPERSONIC REVOLUTION - Case Studies in the History of Hypersonic TechnologyVolume II - From Scramjet to the National Aero-Space Plane (1964-1986)edt. Dr. Richard P. HallionCase VII: The Piloted Lifting Body Demonstrators: Supersonic Predecessors ot Hypersonic Lifting Reentry which includes TAV for ~50 pagesPS: @LittleBird, you'll like the SAC discussion I would think.
Quote from: leovinus on 04/01/2024 08:45 pm[1] https://media.defense.gov/2010/Sep/27/2001329812/-1/-1/0/AFD-100927-035.pdfAFD-100927-035.pdf roughly page 644 to 698 THE HYPERSONIC REVOLUTION - Case Studies in the History of Hypersonic TechnologyVolume II - From Scramjet to the National Aero-Space Plane (1964-1986)edt. Dr. Richard P. HallionCase VII: The Piloted Lifting Body Demonstrators: Supersonic Predecessors ot Hypersonic Lifting Reentry which includes TAV for ~50 pagesPS: @LittleBird, you'll like the SAC discussion I would think.Thanks @leovinus. Pages 644 to 698 of the pdf indeed look v interesting at a quick skim but I can't see SAC there. What did you see ?
TAV Phase II's emphasis upon determining military effectiveness resulted in a contract from ASD's Deputy for Development Planning in August 1984 to Science Applications, Inc. of Dayton for a twelve-month effectiveness investigation. For its part, Air Force Space Command envisioned the TAV fulfilling four key military space missions: Force enhancement (including global reconnaissance, surveillance, and C3), Space support (including satellite insertion, rendezvous, inspection, servicing, repair, retrieval, recovery, support of space stations including resupply and space rescue, and acting as a small space platform for scientific and military research), Space control (including protection of U.S. space assets, satellite attack warning, satellite defense, and anti-satellite operations), and, finally, Force application (combat operations including strategic offense, strategic defense of North America including ballistic missile defense, interdiction in theater conflicts, and "surgical application of force" to protect U.S. interests and avoid crisis escalation). "Force application," one Space Command TAV paper stated, "does not infer the 'weaponization of space'; simply the use of the high altitude flight regime for the operation of military aerospace vehicles," though such a distinction smacked of strained scholasticism.27
(Though this conclusion, as will be seen, quickly changed). Planners envisioned the TAV to be the size of a small airliner, with a 1,000-2,000 cu. ft. payload bay having a capacity of between 10,000-20,000 lbs, and having a gross liftoff weight of approximately 1 to 1.5 million lbs.
For example, in contrast to the estimated 200,000 man hours per launch required of the Shuttle, the TAV would be able to be mated with a payload within one day. Launch preparations would be simple enough so that the TAV could be launched under warning of a ballistic missile attack.
Quote from: LittleBird on 04/02/2024 07:24 amQuote from: leovinus on 04/01/2024 08:45 pm[1] https://media.defense.gov/2010/Sep/27/2001329812/-1/-1/0/AFD-100927-035.pdfAFD-100927-035.pdf roughly page 644 to 698 THE HYPERSONIC REVOLUTION - Case Studies in the History of Hypersonic TechnologyVolume II - From Scramjet to the National Aero-Space Plane (1964-1986)edt. Dr. Richard P. HallionCase VII: The Piloted Lifting Body Demonstrators: Supersonic Predecessors ot Hypersonic Lifting Reentry which includes TAV for ~50 pagesPS: @LittleBird, you'll like the SAC discussion I would think.Thanks @leovinus. Pages 644 to 698 of the pdf indeed look v interesting at a quick skim but I can't see SAC there. What did you see ?One question we wondered about was what SAC was going to do with a spaceplane/TAV with a 15,000 lbs payload. Some of the military thinking is on image 653-655. It even refers to a payload of 10,000 to 20,000 lbs and 15,000 is smack in the middle. The four envisioned missions were Force enhancement, Space support, Space control, Force application. Simplified mission preparation is addressed e.g. on image 655 as quoted below. There was a quote somewhere that such a TAV should be on "alert" 24/7 like B-52s just in case.With a smile, I noticed the observation in the first quote on "strained scholasticism" image 653 / page 1341QuoteTAV Phase II's emphasis upon determining military effectiveness resulted in a contract from ASD's Deputy for Development Planning in August 1984 to Science Applications, Inc. of Dayton for a twelve-month effectiveness investigation. For its part, Air Force Space Command envisioned the TAV fulfilling four key military space missions: Force enhancement (including global reconnaissance, surveillance, and C3), Space support (including satellite insertion, rendezvous, inspection, servicing, repair, retrieval, recovery, support of space stations including resupply and space rescue, and acting as a small space platform for scientific and military research), Space control (including protection of U.S. space assets, satellite attack warning, satellite defense, and anti-satellite operations), and, finally, Force application (combat operations including strategic offense, strategic defense of North America including ballistic missile defense, interdiction in theater conflicts, and "surgical application of force" to protect U.S. interests and avoid crisis escalation). "Force application," one Space Command TAV paper stated, "does not infer the 'weaponization of space'; simply the use of the high altitude flight regime for the operation of military aerospace vehicles," though such a distinction smacked of strained scholasticism.27<snip>
One question we wondered about was what SAC was going to do with a spaceplane/TAV with a 15,000 lbs payload. Some of the military thinking is on image 653-655. It even refers to a payload of 10,000 to 20,000 lbs and 15,000 is smack in the middle. The four envisioned missions were Force enhancement, Space support, Space control, Force application. Simplified mission preparation is addressed e.g. on image 655 as quoted below. There was a quote somewhere that such a TAV should be on "alert" 24/7 like B-52s just in case.With a smile, I noticed the observation in the first quote on "strained scholasticism"
Quote from: leovinus on 04/02/2024 10:48 amOne question we wondered about was what SAC was going to do with a spaceplane/TAV with a 15,000 lbs payload. Some of the military thinking is on image 653-655. It even refers to a payload of 10,000 to 20,000 lbs and 15,000 is smack in the middle. The four envisioned missions were Force enhancement, Space support, Space control, Force application. Simplified mission preparation is addressed e.g. on image 655 as quoted below. There was a quote somewhere that such a TAV should be on "alert" 24/7 like B-52s just in case.With a smile, I noticed the observation in the first quote on "strained scholasticism" After you read through these things for a bit, you really see how this was an airplane organization that was thinking in airplane terms, but didn't really know much about space. Set aside the issue of the technology limitations--for instance, that a satellite could not just sit in a warehouse waiting, like a bomb or missile, until it was needed--but there's also the operational issues. What kind of satellite would only be needed during a war?
Quote from: leovinus on 04/02/2024 10:48 amOne question we wondered about was what SAC was going to do with a spaceplane/TAV with a 15,000 lbs payload. Some of the military thinking is on image 653-655. It even refers to a payload of 10,000 to 20,000 lbs and 15,000 is smack in the middle. The four envisioned missions were Force enhancement, Space support, Space control, Force application. Simplified mission preparation is addressed e.g. on image 655 as quoted below. There was a quote somewhere that such a TAV should be on "alert" 24/7 like B-52s just in case.With a smile, I noticed the observation in the first quote on "strained scholasticism" After you read through these things for a bit, you really see how this was an airplane organization that was thinking in airplane terms, but didn't really know much about space. Set aside the issue of the technology limitations--for instance, that a satellite could not just sit in a warehouse waiting, like a bomb or missile, until it was needed--but there's also the operational issues. What kind of satellite would only be needed during a war? Why would it be better to have it sitting in a warehouse than in orbit? Wouldn't it be more cost effective to have it in orbit before a war?
You get the sense that the SAC people working on this stuff were not talking to the people in the USAF that actually operated the satellites. All they knew was that this was a cool idea. And there was probably also some institutional interest there as well--they wanted that mission, even if they did not know what the mission really was.
Well yes and no. As you know this was not quite LeMay's SAC, by mid 70s it was responsible for 1000-odd Minutemen and about 50 Titan IIs if memory serves. Admittedly these were in silos not in orbit, and SAMSO developed and procured them for SAC, but there must have been some institutional relevant knowledge surely ?
Early proposals for SDI (circa 1978) split into three opposite factions -spaceborne, kinetic interceptors (smart rocks: Daniel Graham) -spaceborne chemical lasers (Maxwell Hunter) -nuclear-pumped lasers (Teller and his Livermore gang) All three of them would welcome something like RASV to haul them, and support them, in orbit... maybe out of Grand Forks AFB, since they had experience with ABM - Safeguard. Or maybe as a spaceborne complement of it.
The concept of a new space based system for missile defence, capable of nullifying the Soviet threat, became popular within the National Security Council and over the coming years this concept developed into the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) announced by Reagan in 1983 and more commonly known as Star Wars.Clearly any such system would require regular and reliable orbital access. Initial estimates suggested at least 100 new items vehicles would be placed in orbit although this was seen as highly conservative with some commentators claiming over 2000 new satellites could be required. Concurrently, some within the DoD were beginning to question the Air Force’s commitment to the Shuttle. While Air Force payloads and involvement had been vital in making the case to develop the Shuttle, by 1982 it was becoming clear that it was not going to provide the routine easily maintainable transportation system that had originally been pitched. There were also concerns about the safety of the system with a damaging 1982 study by the RAND corporation predicting that up to 3 of the Shuttle fleet may be lost during the operational life of the programme. <snip>Against this backdrop the DoD began to cast around for potential alternatives including a spaceplane of their own. The Air Force Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD) started work on an initiative for a Shuttle replacement that became known as the Trans Atmospheric Vehicle (TAV) programme, but elsewhere the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was also showing an interest.
This work on TAV/whatever started before SDI. It was looking for a requirement, not fulfilling one.
Sure, but it started at same time as the reexamination of missile defence that preceded SDI, see grabs below from Donald R. Baucom's ( former SDIO staff historian) book that has an interesting looking chapter [6] on this 1977-81 period. Book is at archive.org https://archive.org/details/originsofsdi19440000bauc/page/n14/mode/1upThe proto-SDI community and the spaceplane enthusiast community would seem in some ways to be natural allies-did they not, in fact, talk to each other ?
Quote from: LittleBird on 04/03/2024 12:23 pmSure, but it started at same time as the reexamination of missile defence that preceded SDI, see grabs below from Donald R. Baucom's ( former SDIO staff historian) book that has an interesting looking chapter [6] on this 1977-81 period. Book is at archive.org https://archive.org/details/originsofsdi19440000bauc/page/n14/mode/1upThe proto-SDI community and the spaceplane enthusiast community would seem in some ways to be natural allies-did they not, in fact, talk to each other ?Missile defense was not a SAC mission.I think this was just some people in USAF seeing the space shuttle and asking if that technology could be applied in new ways to military missions. There was no clear requirement for it.
OK. I realised belatedly that there was also a presentational problem for the pre-SDI people like Max Hunter, in that they had to argue that shuttle would already suffice for building their first tranche of laser battle stations etc, whereas the TAV people had a much more direct incentive to play up the shuttle's limitations-essentially seeing it as an X-plane to be improved on.
Quote from: tuomasn81 on 04/01/2024 01:05 pmOne also needs to be careful since "TAV" is used both as a generic term and in reference to this specific 1982-1984 USAF ASD program. Attached is a graph showing what are the actual 14 concepts that companies submitted to this original USAF program in 1983. There is sometimes confusion created by labelling all kinds of 1980s projects as "TAV" when actually using the term in a generic meaning instead of referring to this particular program.[snip]What would be most interesting would be the final TAV reports of the other contractors.While we probably all agree that it would be great to read the other TAV contractor reports, some homework is required to find them first As least, to my knowledge, we do not even know the titles, report numbers, etc for the 14 or so studies [1], page 649. For the example Boeing report we have, it has some project number, AirForce project number and contract, etc. It seems to be public because of a FOIA mentioned on first two pages. Based on what we know, a FOIA to at least get a list of contractor reports, titles, report numbers, study numbers etc to AF Wright Patterson base should be possible because that is where the TAV office was based.[snip]
Quote from: leovinus on 04/01/2024 08:45 pmQuote from: tuomasn81 on 04/01/2024 01:05 pmOne also needs to be careful since "TAV" is used both as a generic term and in reference to this specific 1982-1984 USAF ASD program. Attached is a graph showing what are the actual 14 concepts that companies submitted to this original USAF program in 1983. There is sometimes confusion created by labelling all kinds of 1980s projects as "TAV" when actually using the term in a generic meaning instead of referring to this particular program.[snip]What would be most interesting would be the final TAV reports of the other contractors.While we probably all agree that it would be great to read the other TAV contractor reports, some homework is required to find them first As least, to my knowledge, we do not even know the titles, report numbers, etc for the 14 or so studies [1], page 649. For the example Boeing report we have, it has some project number, AirForce project number and contract, etc. It seems to be public because of a FOIA mentioned on first two pages. Based on what we know, a FOIA to at least get a list of contractor reports, titles, report numbers, study numbers etc to AF Wright Patterson base should be possible because that is where the TAV office was based.[snip]Filed a new FOIA for the 14 Phase I plus any Phase II study titles and all relevant descriptions and contract numbers. Not for the document contents, just the descriptions. As deliverable, I would expect a spreadsheet with two dozen document descriptions. In case you wonder, why just for the titles et al, not the documents themselves? From my experience, full document reviews takes 10x longer, not to mention the budget. Nothing left but waiting a year till they get around to it.
Quote from: Blackstar on 04/03/2024 01:07 pmQuote from: LittleBird on 04/03/2024 12:23 pmSure, but it started at same time as the reexamination of missile defence that preceded SDI, see grabs below from Donald R. Baucom's ( former SDIO staff historian) book that has an interesting looking chapter [6] on this 1977-81 period. Book is at archive.org https://archive.org/details/originsofsdi19440000bauc/page/n14/mode/1upThe proto-SDI community and the spaceplane enthusiast community would seem in some ways to be natural allies-did they not, in fact, talk to each other ?Missile defense was not a SAC mission.I think this was just some people in USAF seeing the space shuttle and asking if that technology could be applied in new ways to military missions. There was no clear requirement for it.OK. I realised belatedly that there was also a presentational problem for the pre-SDI people like Max Hunter, in that they had to argue that shuttle would already suffice for building their first tranche of laser battle stations etc, whereas the TAV people had a much more direct incentive to play up the shuttle's limitations-essentially seeing it as an X-plane to be improved on. Meanwhile-and to offer a more factual contribution than mine above-I found an interesting set of slides at SlidePlayer.com by Jess Sponable of DARPA (and earlier of DC-X fame amung other roles). The talk is from 2014 and is called "DARPA Space: Access to and through Space". It's unclassified, though some slides have been removed. It seems to be legit, and some slides look like those in a later talk by him about the XS-1 hosted at L2 https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2016/07/darpa-pushing-experimental-spaceplane-xs-1/ , but it's not clear to me how safe the site is-my most risk-averse browser refused to download the powerpoint-so I am not linking to it or uploading whole doc. Screen grabs below are directly relevant to thread topic insofar as they help to show where the spaceplanes fit in. [Edit: I see the first two grabs below are also in Sponable's XS-1 talk at faa.gov: https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/advisory_committee/meeting_news/media/2014/sep/Jess_Sponable.pdf and I notice that the chronology confirms SAC SON 7-79 was indeed in 1979, though of course we don't know much about what it actually said. Not a lot of hits to it on the web.]
Quote from: LittleBird on 04/03/2024 01:41 pmQuote from: Blackstar on 04/03/2024 01:07 pmQuote from: LittleBird on 04/03/2024 12:23 pmSure, but it started at same time as the reexamination of missile defence that preceded SDI, see grabs below from Donald R. Baucom's ( former SDIO staff historian) book that has an interesting looking chapter [6] on this 1977-81 period. Book is at archive.org https://archive.org/details/originsofsdi19440000bauc/page/n14/mode/1upThe proto-SDI community and the spaceplane enthusiast community would seem in some ways to be natural allies-did they not, in fact, talk to each other ?Missile defense was not a SAC mission.I think this was just some people in USAF seeing the space shuttle and asking if that technology could be applied in new ways to military missions. There was no clear requirement for it.OK. I realised belatedly that there was also a presentational problem for the pre-SDI people like Max Hunter, in that they had to argue that shuttle would already suffice for building their first tranche of laser battle stations etc, whereas the TAV people had a much more direct incentive to play up the shuttle's limitations-essentially seeing it as an X-plane to be improved on. Meanwhile-and to offer a more factual contribution than mine above-I found an interesting set of slides at SlidePlayer.com by Jess Sponable of DARPA (and earlier of DC-X fame amung other roles). The talk is from 2014 and is called "DARPA Space: Access to and through Space". It's unclassified, though some slides have been removed. It seems to be legit, and some slides look like those in a later talk by him about the XS-1 hosted at L2 https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2016/07/darpa-pushing-experimental-spaceplane-xs-1/ , but it's not clear to me how safe the site is-my most risk-averse browser refused to download the powerpoint-so I am not linking to it or uploading whole doc. Screen grabs below are directly relevant to thread topic insofar as they help to show where the spaceplanes fit in. [Edit: I see the first two grabs below are also in Sponable's XS-1 talk at faa.gov: https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/advisory_committee/meeting_news/media/2014/sep/Jess_Sponable.pdf and I notice that the chronology confirms SAC SON 7-79 was indeed in 1979, though of course we don't know much about what it actually said. Not a lot of hits to it on the web.]The last slide "SponableSlideplayer10.png " has a phrase "Weights within 3% of budget". That one sentence begs so many questions. The question is really which model or concept this refers to. The weight of a simplified concept or a full-fledged engineering model including undercarriage, wheels, attitude correction jets, etc etc? If this was for a simplified model, and the stuff to be added later is more that 3% of the weight then you loose.
In Vol III of the "Hypersonic revolution" publication about the NASP history, the first chapter is about those challenges and questions. From memory, there was a weight model used to sell the project but other project partners could not reproduce it. The design "never closed". The missing undercarriage weight was mentioned explicitly.
Tony Dupont numbers were outrageously optimistic - and false. But he got the two Roberts at DARPA (Cooper and another one) falling to his hype. Then NASA then the military. And then it went up to Ronnie Raygun himself.NASP was a ridiculous scam from day one. Scramjet airbreathing to orbit ? Seriously ? Recently found Ramon L. Chase papers. He noted that airbreathing to orbit has so much drag it pushed ascent delta-v from the classic 30000 fps to 45000 if not 60000 fps !
Quote from: LittleBird on 04/03/2024 01:41 pmOK. I realised belatedly that there was also a presentational problem for the pre-SDI people like Max Hunter, in that they had to argue that shuttle would already suffice for building their first tranche of laser battle stations etc, whereas the TAV people had a much more direct incentive to play up the shuttle's limitations-essentially seeing it as an X-plane to be improved on. Don't get me wrong: I don't think that this was inherently a bad thing. Somebody (organization) has to generate new ideas and push for applications of new technologies.My point is that it looks like these TAV/whatever proposals did not originate in the part of the USAF (or DoD) that traditionally operated and developed space programs. And there does not appear to be any requirement that was established at the top levels that then led somebody to conclude "We should develop a space transportation system to meet that requirement." I still think this TAV stuff is kinda cool. But understanding what I wrote above helps explain why it never really went into development.
For the record there's an useful article about the TAV program from the June 1984 Air Force Magazine available online https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0684bold/. Shows some of the thinking behind this at the time.
“Wouldn’t it be great,” postulates Mr. Tremaine [Deputy for Development Planning at Air Force Systems Command’s Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD)] , “if the Soviet Union suddenly found itself faced with the US Air Force having a machine that could operate on its own, totally free from counteraction, capable of rapidly delivering weapons anywhere on the globe?”
McDonnell Douglas’s [TAV program manager] Czysz disclaims any nuclear-attack notions or intentions for the TAV. “With it,” he says, “we would be able to go completely conventional. We could do what every linebacker does: Sack the quarterback without destroying him — hit his throwing arm in many different ways.”Which ways For example, by embedding needle-like kinetic projectiles into enemy tracking and fire-control radars, thus overwhelming their antennae, or by pranging titanium spikes into runways, along which no aircraft could thenceforth take off or land.“We could avoid annihilating things — simply cause them not to function,” Mr. Czysz declares. “We would deny the enemy the ability to launch an attack.”
A couple of observations about this thread:-The subject line really isn't accurate anymore. It should be more general, maybe something like "American spaceplane concepts of the 1980s and 90s." Or maybe somebody has a better suggestion?
Maybe "American spaceplane and transatmospheric (TAV) concepts of the 1980s and 90s."?
Quote from: leovinus on 04/05/2024 02:23 pmMaybe "American spaceplane and transatmospheric (TAV) concepts of the 1980s and 90s."? Okay, so here's something that puzzles me. Maybe it has already been answered up-thread, but why "transatmospheric"? That means in and out of the atmosphere. But when was that term invented, and has it ever been applied to anything other than these 1980s proposals?
Okay, so here's something that puzzles me. Maybe it has already been answered up-thread, but why "transatmospheric"? That means in and out of the atmosphere. But when was that term invented, and has it ever been applied to anything other than these 1980s proposals?
Quote from: Blackstar on 04/05/2024 03:57 pmQuote from: leovinus on 04/05/2024 02:23 pmMaybe "American spaceplane and transatmospheric (TAV) concepts of the 1980s and 90s."? Okay, so here's something that puzzles me. Maybe it has already been answered up-thread, but why "transatmospheric"? That means in and out of the atmosphere. But when was that term invented, and has it ever been applied to anything other than these 1980s proposals?Was that term used for the X-15?
Since ICBM's do leave the atmosphere before the warhead re-enters, as opposed to any kind of more conventional (IE air-breathing) aircraft it would probably also be a trans-atmospheric vehicle. TBH I've always thought it a bit of an odd term as well. When I looked at the SCramjet designs that came up I could square the term with the engines. Were they going to flame out, then re-start back inside the atmosphere? It made no sense.
In early 1983, as ASD was about to issue short-term study contracts to define useful solutions, SD’s sensitivity to ASD’s focus on space access became apparent and a political hot potato. Especially, they opposed any use of “space” in the title such as in “spaceplane”. After the name sensitivity became apparent, the name “Transatmospheric Vehicle” or TAV was invented. It did not use space, spaceplane, or shuttle, but it correctly identified the intended operational characteristics of the system much as do the generic names “bomber” and “fighter.” In late 1983, ASD’s Deputy for Development Planning wrote:
Quote from: DanClemmensen on 04/05/2024 05:06 pmQuote from: Blackstar on 04/05/2024 03:57 pmQuote from: leovinus on 04/05/2024 02:23 pmMaybe "American spaceplane and transatmospheric (TAV) concepts of the 1980s and 90s."? Okay, so here's something that puzzles me. Maybe it has already been answered up-thread, but why "transatmospheric"? That means in and out of the atmosphere. But when was that term invented, and has it ever been applied to anything other than these 1980s proposals?Was that term used for the X-15?I was delighted to discover a few years ago that in those days there was (also?) an even better term ... satelloid c.f. this kit box (but also more official places).
PS: I had one of those model kits too
[1] https://media.defense.gov/2010/Sep/27/2001329812/-1/-1/0/AFD-100927-035.pdfAFD-100927-035.pdf roughly page 644 to 698 THE HYPERSONIC REVOLUTION - Case Studies in the History of Hypersonic TechnologyVolume II - From Scramjet to the National Aero-Space Plane (1964-1986)edt. Dr. Richard P. Hallion
McMullen launched a major planning effort under the overall direction of Stanley Tremaine, then ASD's Deputy for Development Planning, for such craft. Tremaine subsequently dubbed these "Transatmospheric Vehicles" (TAV), since they hopefully could operate with equal efficiency both within the atmosphere and within space.
Quote from: Blackstar on 04/05/2024 03:57 pmQuote from: leovinus on 04/05/2024 02:23 pmMaybe "American spaceplane and transatmospheric (TAV) concepts of the 1980s and 90s."? Okay, so here's something that puzzles me. Maybe it has already been answered up-thread, but why "transatmospheric"? That means in and out of the atmosphere. But when was that term invented, and has it ever been applied to anything other than these 1980s proposals?The impression is that it goes back to a military turf battle. A name was needed which was not "spaceplane". They invented a new term and came up with "transatmospheric vehicle". It was mentioned upthread in post #9 and in this TheSpaceReview article - Solving the commercial passenger spaceflight puzzle (part 3) where it says QuoteIn early 1983, as ASD was about to issue short-term study contracts to define useful solutions, SD’s sensitivity to ASD’s focus on space access became apparent and a political hot potato. Especially, they opposed any use of “space” in the title such as in “spaceplane”. After the name sensitivity became apparent, the name “Transatmospheric Vehicle” or TAV was invented. It did not use space, spaceplane, or shuttle, but it correctly identified the intended operational characteristics of the system much as do the generic names “bomber” and “fighter.” In late 1983, ASD’s Deputy for Development Planning wrote:As this TAV term/name/designation was a political work-around, it would explain why the term was dropped in 90s and the NASP became a spaceplane again.
Quote from: tuomasn81 on 04/05/2024 09:36 amFor the record there's an useful article about the TAV program from the June 1984 Air Force Magazine available online https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0684bold/. Shows some of the thinking behind this at the time.I just read this article and it is... interesting. (Sidenote: "interesting" is such a useless word when you really think about it. Does it mean anything at all?)While reading it, it is worth keeping in mind that it was written 40 years ago. In that article, some people talk as if space warfare, including shooting down from space to destroy stuff on Earth, is imminent. It was going to happen really soon.
For example, Gen. Robert T. Marsh, Commander of AFSC, had long asserted that USAF “should move into warfighting capabilities in space — that is, ground-to-space, space-to-space, and space-to-ground capabilities.”Space Plan lays the doctrinal groundwork for all that. In its acknowledgment of USAF’s need to be able to fight not only in but from space, it goes well beyond the 1982 long-range planning document, “Air Force 2000.” The new Space Plan (in its unclassified version) has this to say:“To prevail in theater conflict, the Air Force must seize the initiative and quickly achieve both air and space superiority.“Air Superiority will require the capability to effectively attack and neutralize enemy airfields, destroy aircraft before they can employ their weapons, and destroy surface-to-air weapons.“Space superiority is required to ensure that our space-based assets are available to support theater forces. Superiority in space will require a robust force structure and the capability to destroy hostile space systems.”
Protecting such space assets and many others on benign but classified missions against the amply demonstrated Soviet antisatellite (ASAT) capability is the goal of USAF’s ASAT program. Arms-control developments or political pressures may slow or undo that program. From philosophical and national security standpoints, however, the safeguarding of US satellites seems to have widespread acceptance as a justifiable, solely defensive measure.There is a big difference, however, between using force only to protect space assets and applying force from space to shoot down bombers or ballistic missiles and even to shoot up runways and armor. This distinction is drawn — and thus inferentially underscored — in USAF’s Space Plan.It subdivides its candidly outlines “combat” category into tow parts: “space control” and “force application.” As defined by Maj. Gen. Neil Beer, Space Command’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans: “Space control is synonymous with space superiority.” Under this heading fall such strictly defensive weapons as USAF’s F-15-launched, rocket-boosted, heat-seeking Miniature Vehicle (MV) ASAT weapon, now in the very early testing phase, and whatever directed-energy or other ASAT devices may ensue from AFSC-Space Command technology programs.Force application is something else again, something far more portentous. Whereas space control means “counterspace operations” and “space interdiction,” as state in USAF’s Space Plan, force application means “ballistic missile defense” and — strikingly — “space-to-earth weapons.” And that, in turn, strongly implies future strategic and tactical missions from space.
And then there are descriptions of things that sound really cool, but which still have not happened four decades later. For instance, the description of taking out radars with high-velocity needles. Nope, not really. Even today we pretty much smack them with an explosive, although that explosive may be surrounded by tungsten balls. But the article also includes some notes of caution where people say that implementing stuff like the TAV will probably be really expensive, so it may not happen, and if it does, it won't happen until sometime in the 1990s. And the thought-provoking aspect of that is: we can ask ourselves, if the Cold War continued, would the TAV have happened? The answer is probably no.
“Let me add a word of caution.” Says Secretary Aldridge. “There are lots of implications here, in putting vehicles into space that can attack targets on the ground, that we haven’t thought through as part of national policy and national security objectives.”
Overall, I found that the article seemed to confirm my existing puzzlement and skepticism about the whole TAV idea. It seemed like a concept in search of a purpose. It was not going to be clearly superior to existing systems, or alternatives, nor would it necessarily be all that useful. After all, even a handful of TAVs would not carry enough weapons to be decisive, and they would be really expensive.One other thing that was in the back of my head while reading the article was stealth. When the article was written, the stealth program was top secret. I think this was even before the leaks about the F-117. If stealth had been public at that time, it would have made that conversation a lot different. One could ask "Why do we need the TAV when we have aircraft that are mostly invisible to radar?"
[Interviewer] Well, wasn’t the larger vehicle design closer to the goals of the National Aerospace Plane (NASP) project that you worked on later in the 1980’s, for hypersonic passenger & cargo transport?[Paul Czysz]Well, it’s hard to say what NASP was aimed at. Between about ’76 and ’83, I was involved with some special programs at McDonnell. On the last day in July in 1983, I was out there on Thursday and I was supposed to leave the next morning to be home for the weekend.Anyhow, I got a call from one of the Directors who said, “I happen to be out here for something — you’re not going home yet, you’re going to meet me at the Air Force station tomorrow for lunch over by the Aerospace Corporation on Sepulveda. Maybe you’ll make it home by Monday — we’ll see.”So I show up for lunch over at the Air Force station, and Harold Ostroff was sitting down at this table with a big group of military & civilian guys in business suits, and as I walked up to the table, he turns to the other guys sitting there and says, “I’d like to introduce you all to the new head of McDonnell’s Advanced Aerospace Program.” Anyhow, I didn’t know anything about this beforehand, and when he said it I looked around a bit for the person he was talking about — and after a second I guess that it finally sunk in that he was talking about me.So that was how I found out about it — I had a deputy program manager from Huntington Beach, and there was a group there from Aerojet — Don Kissinger, Mike Hamel, and Ron Samborski — that were there to talk about the air-turbo ramjet work that they’d patented back in 1946.I went out to Aerojet the next couple of days for briefings on their engine designs, and when I came back home, we did a proposal for the Air Force TAV program, but the main thrust was a proposal that we put together with the people from Huntington Beach on a 2-stage to orbit vehicle. The first stage would fly with air-turbo ramjets to about Mach 6 or 7, and then it would stage with a scramjet vehicle a rocket that would deploy up into orbit.We had several different concepts for this, depending on how soon we wanted we wanted the thing to fly. One of the people out at Huntington Beach named Joe Shergi had a concept for what he called a “toss-back booster”, that looked like an Apollo capsule with engines mounted in what looked like the heat-shield. After you separated the upper-stage, this thing would turn around and retrofire to toss back to the launch site, making everything recoverable.We had 2 or 3 concepts that we were briefing as 2-stage to orbit vehicles. The first one that we could build quickly, based on all the hardware that was available, was a hypersonic FDL-7C glider on top of a toss-back booster. Then we went to an air-turbo ramjet first stage which went to about Mach 7 to 8, and later we went to a scramjet first stage that went to about Mach 12.We hired a guy named Larry Fogel from the Titan Corporation, and he actually toured all of the SAC bases that had operational B-52 squadrons and asked them what they would do if they had one of these NASP vehicles — how they use it, maintain it, and stuff like that. We built an entire database on what the Strategic Air Command estimated these vehicles would cost to operate. We’d given them all the numbers that we had at the outset — how much thrust we had, how much propellant we needed, how many times the engines could be re-used, etc — and they gave us back operational cost estimates compared to a traditional B-52 squadron. It was quite interesting…We took this information and used it for briefings in Washington DC, which is where I met Scotty Crossfield, who was working with Dan Glickman — and what we ended up with was the first stage vehicle, which was a large, Mach-6 vehicle. This led to the development of a prototype that we created as a demonstrator to validate the technology.So the prototype was built to show how the NASP vehicle could fulfill 3 primary mission roles. The first was simply as a Mach-6 transport for passengers, the second was a Mach-8 strategic strike-aircraft for the Air Force, and the third involved combining the vehicle with an upper-stage rocket to go into Low-Earth Orbit.
The 2000's papers of Paul Czysz are many, and they often overlapped. I have a few of them on my HD. See attached.
“Manned Hypersonic Test Vehicle Study” McDonnell Aircraft Company Report A9727 for United States Force, contract AF(33)600-2751, August 1964
Quote from: Spiceman on 06/26/2024 02:17 pmThe 2000's papers of Paul Czysz are many, and they often overlapped. I have a few of them on my HD. See attached.Did you notice that 6.2004-5888.pdf titled "An Essential Element in Affordable Space Access is the Return Vehicle. A Historical Perspective Based on Support Vehicles for the Manned Orbiting Laboratory, circa 1964" has lots of interesting cross references? To MOL, to logistics. Need to read it again but there was a reference to Quote“Manned Hypersonic Test Vehicle Study” McDonnell Aircraft Company Report A9727 for United States Force, contract AF(33)600-2751, August 1964 The "AF" contract number looked familiar as "AF 33(600)" is the same for all MTSS contracts which start with that prefix in 1959. I was also reminded of the five SLOMAR SR-79814 contractors in roughly 1961. SLOMAR stands for Space Logistics, Maintenance and Rescue Systems and contemporary with the MTSS. SLOMAR studied gliding reentry vehicles as well. The exact SLOMAR contractors were:AF 33(600)-42014 Douglas Aircraft Co., Santa Monica, Calif.AF 33(600)-42015 Northrop Corp., Norair division, Hawthorne, Calif.AF 33(600)-42016 Martin Co., Denver Colo.AF 33(600)-42017 General Dynamics/Astronautics (GD/A), San Diego, Calif.AF 33(600)-42018 Lockheed Aircraft Corp, Burbank, Calif. Hence I wondered about the relation of the quoted MAC (McDonnell Aircraft Company) Report A9727 to SLOMAR et al where they also studied lifting body and DynaSoar as well. I guess Douglas was not starting from scratch with the 1964 report.
Quote from: leovinus on 09/27/2024 05:23 pmQuote from: Spiceman on 06/26/2024 02:17 pmThe 2000's papers of Paul Czysz are many, and they often overlapped. I have a few of them on my HD. See attached.Did you notice that 6.2004-5888.pdf titled "An Essential Element in Affordable Space Access is the Return Vehicle. A Historical Perspective Based on Support Vehicles for the Manned Orbiting Laboratory, circa 1964" has lots of interesting cross references? To MOL, to logistics. Need to read it again but there was a reference to Quote“Manned Hypersonic Test Vehicle Study” McDonnell Aircraft Company Report A9727 for United States Force, contract AF(33)600-2751, August 1964 The "AF" contract number looked familiar as "AF 33(600)" is the same for all MTSS contracts which start with that prefix in 1959. I was also reminded of the five SLOMAR SR-79814 contractors in roughly 1961. SLOMAR stands for Space Logistics, Maintenance and Rescue Systems and contemporary with the MTSS. SLOMAR studied gliding reentry vehicles as well. The exact SLOMAR contractors were:AF 33(600)-42014 Douglas Aircraft Co., Santa Monica, Calif.AF 33(600)-42015 Northrop Corp., Norair division, Hawthorne, Calif.AF 33(600)-42016 Martin Co., Denver Colo.AF 33(600)-42017 General Dynamics/Astronautics (GD/A), San Diego, Calif.AF 33(600)-42018 Lockheed Aircraft Corp, Burbank, Calif. Hence I wondered about the relation of the quoted MAC (McDonnell Aircraft Company) Report A9727 to SLOMAR et al where they also studied lifting body and DynaSoar as well. I guess Douglas was not starting from scratch with the 1964 report.Note that the 2010 DIA report linked to here https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=60623.msg2603571#msg2603571 has a couple of pages summarising this era's reports-at least from Csysz's pov-see grabs below:
Robert R. Stephens; "Mission Requirements of Lifting Systems-Engineering Aspects"; Volume I Condensed Summary; McDonnell Aircraft Company Report B831 for NASAManned Spacecraft Center; contract NAS-9-3562; August 1965.
• Robert R. Stephens; "Mission Requirements of Lifting Systems-Engineering Aspects";Volume II Mission Analysis - Spacecraft Selection - Performance Analysis; McDonnell Aircraft Company Report B831 for NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; contract NAS-9-3562; August 1965.
* Robert R. Stephens; "Study of the Engineering Aspects, Mission Requirements of Lifting Systems"; Summary of Significant Results and Figures from Report MAC- B831; McDonnell Aircraft Company Report B947 for NASA Manned Spacecraft Center; contract NAS-9-3562; August 1965.