When you write "it would have been very close" I assume you mean that it would have been risky, or even impossible for them to succeed?I agree. Although much of what has been written about their program focuses on their N-1 Moon rocket, keep in mind that we know much less about the development of their actual lander. Think about how much we know about the difficulties of designing the LM. We know that it was a really challenging vehicle on a lot of fronts. Getting the weight down was extremely difficult.Now contrast that to how little we know about the Russian lunar module development. How far did they get in testing? How good were their tests? What kind of confidence did they have that it would work as designed? I think all the information on this is rather blurry.
There is quite a bit known about the LK lander actually. It was tested in orbit, three times, on Nov 24 1970, Feb 26 1971 and Oct 12 1971. All test flights performed well. There are several LK's on display in various museums in the former soviet block territory, and one was even on display at Eurodisney at one point. A good deal of information can be found on the astronautix website:http://www.astronautix.com/craft/lk.htm
Quote from: Downix on 11/06/2009 02:08 pmThere is quite a bit known about the LK lander actually. It was tested in orbit, three times, on Nov 24 1970, Feb 26 1971 and Oct 12 1971. All test flights performed well. There are several LK's on display in various museums in the former soviet block territory, and one was even on display at Eurodisney at one point. A good deal of information can be found on the astronautix website:http://www.astronautix.com/craft/lk.htmIt was never tested with a human aboard. What fidelity were the unmanned orbital tests? As for astronautix, I am always wary of using it as a source. I've encountered serious problems with translation there before.
Are there any good english language books about the Soviet moon program?
Oberg's stuff about Soviet space is outdated, as even he will admit.The best place to start is with Asif Siddiqi's Challenge to Apollo:http://www.amazon.com/Challenge-Apollo-Soviet-1945-1974-history/dp/B0006RDSDShttp://faculty.fordham.edu/siddiqi/sws/written/cta/challenge_to_apollo.htmlI believe that the entire thing is available online. Also, I believe it was split into two volumes and published by U. Florida Press. A little digging around will answer that.
It was never tested with a human aboard. What fidelity were the unmanned orbital tests? As for astronautix, I am always wary of using it as a source. I've encountered serious problems with translation there before.
I second that. I bought both volumes. A lot of info.
The whole Soviet moonshot, when you boil it down, came to be a case of conflicting Egos. Glushko in 1961 approached Korolev about a compromize, Glushko would stop pushing for bi-propellants if Korolev would allow for a "packet" scheme, which they had used successfully years before in developing the R-7 "Sputnik". Korolev rejected the offer, and thus the Soviet moon shot suffered as a result. Glushko was an engine genius on par with Korolev's rocket genius. If these two had worked together on the same rocket, instead of Korolev on the N-1 and Glushko on the Proton, I can easily imagine the history of the lunar landing turning out quite differently.
Quote from: Downix on 11/06/2009 02:08 pmThe whole Soviet moonshot, when you boil it down, came to be a case of conflicting Egos. Glushko in 1961 approached Korolev about a compromize, Glushko would stop pushing for bi-propellants if Korolev would allow for a "packet" scheme, which they had used successfully years before in developing the R-7 "Sputnik". Korolev rejected the offer, and thus the Soviet moon shot suffered as a result. Glushko was an engine genius on par with Korolev's rocket genius. If these two had worked together on the same rocket, instead of Korolev on the N-1 and Glushko on the Proton, I can easily imagine the history of the lunar landing turning out quite differently.I'd argue that it was more complex than that (surprise!). Even if these guys had gotten along better, there was still the issue of funding and a clear directive from the leadership. They didn't have that. There were military leaders who argued (correctly) that this was taking money away from strategic missile development. The US didn't really have that problem. The US had a lot of money and could spend it on both ICBMs and Apollo.
But this is not what happened. Ego's conflicted...
Quote from: Downix on 11/08/2009 02:01 amBut this is not what happened. Ego's conflicted...It was rather more than ego.In 1938 Glushko 'Denounced' Korolev, leading to his torture and assignment to a labour camp (a Gold Mine) where he suffered permanent damage to his health (including the loss of all his teeth). He was retrieved from there rapidly, re-tried and assigned to a 'sharashka' - a prison where scientists did work for the state. He initially went to Tuplov but moved in 1942 to work in a prison with our old friend Glushko, who had by this time been denounced himself. Glushko was Korolevs boss.Everybody in Korolevs pre-war group was denounced. Korolev was the only one that didn't end up being shot and he was in constant fear of the same fate during his time in prison. Glushko was one of the principle instigators of his torture, Labour Camp time and Prison time and was then his boss in prison with the possibility that any criticism of his work would have led to Korolevs death.So, rather more than a clash of egos.Rick