Pad Abort Test (PAT) - CST-100 Starliner - White Sands: November 4, 2019

[woods170]

WHY didn't Boeing notice that upon initial inspection of the close-out images? You know, those images are supposed to be reviewed BEFORE the abort test actually flew.

What is the point of taking high-resolution close-out images when prior-to-launch review of those images fails to identify that something is out-of-place, despite the fact that the images clearly show that something is out-of-place.

This is a classic case of a double human screw-up. First failing to properly install the linkage pin. Second screw-up is that inspection of the prior work fails to incover the mistake.

A similar situation gave us Apollo 13 which nearly killed 3 astronauts. Another similar situation resulted in NOAA-19 falling off a test stand, resulting in a $135 million bill to fix the damage.

and a similar situation resulted in SpaceX doing a test on a new vehicle and new engines and not having the igniters plugged in

Comparing a test vehicle, not intented to ever transport any humans, let alone fly into space, to a space-worthy spacecraft which very much IS intented to take people into space?

I probably don't need pointing out that when space-transportation of NASA astronauts comes into play essentially all room for error goes out the window.
That applies not just to Starliner but to Crew Dragon as well.

But it most certainly does not apply to a flying water tower.

[jjyach]

Space vehicles, particularly crewed ones fly SO infrequently that "typically" the personal who do the vehicle prep just dont change much.  this is different from say nuclear reactors where there is some turnover, or say any assembly line.  So the institutional memory of problems and issues and corrections... is very very high and generally fresh.  Particularly when it is a high profile thing.

Turnover on these teams across the local industry is actually pretty high.  Most are only on the team for probably 2 years at most.  In know for this CST ramp up, Boeing actually had to pull many additional folks in temporarily and they will use a similar surge capability in the future who will consist of anyone who might be available.  That is how mistakes get introduced especially for infrequent things.

[TripleSeven]

Please stop brining up the igniters in the context of the PAT. As has been pointed out upthread, the igniter incident involved a private, non-NASA, unmanned, and experimental vehicle. The PAT and Hopper tests are apples and oranges. Please.

so you would argue for a different level of safety for private, non NASA, etc vehicles" ?

I doubt 1) the FAA will buy that and 2) the people of Boca C will and 3) safety theory certainly does not

sorry there are no apples and oranges here.  they are exactly the same.  you are confusing safety with testing new technologies and leaving the igniters off had nothing to do with flight test...

there are safety levels in terms of government regulations...but not in terms of the notion of flight safety...

anyway it doesnt matter other then conversation (and we arenot in a CRM course here

the bird is going to fly lets go  "did someone remember to check the tailwheel is locked"

[TripleSeven]

Space vehicles, particularly crewed ones fly SO infrequently that "typically" the personal who do the vehicle prep just dont change much.  this is different from say nuclear reactors where there is some turnover, or say any assembly line.  So the institutional memory of problems and issues and corrections... is very very high and generally fresh.  Particularly when it is a high profile thing.

Turnover on these teams across the local industry is actually pretty high.  Most are only on the team for probably 2 years at most.  In know for this CST ramp up, Boeing actually had to pull many additional folks in temporarily and they will use a similar surge capability in the future who will consist of anyone who might be available.  That is how mistakes get introduced especially for infrequent things.

its not important but as a former 11 year Boeing employee and a five year "government assignee" before that...and as someone who still holds Boeing credentials.  I dont agree with that

but it doesnt matter...the bird is going to fly

lets wish it a safe ride

[jjyach]

Space vehicles, particularly crewed ones fly SO infrequently that "typically" the personal who do the vehicle prep just dont change much.  this is different from say nuclear reactors where there is some turnover, or say any assembly line.  So the institutional memory of problems and issues and corrections... is very very high and generally fresh.  Particularly when it is a high profile thing.

Turnover on these teams across the local industry is actually pretty high.  Most are only on the team for probably 2 years at most.  In know for this CST ramp up, Boeing actually had to pull many additional folks in temporarily and they will use a similar surge capability in the future who will consist of anyone who might be available.  That is how mistakes get introduced especially for infrequent things.

its not important but as a former 11 year Boeing employee and a five year "government assignee" before that...and as someone who still holds Boeing credentials.  I dont agree with that

but it doesnt matter...the bird is going to fly

lets wish it a safe ride

I know many of the team, and especially the surge crew to say that is the case, and quite a few issues were raised by these new  members to how things were done (Which is good!).  Boeing credentials mean nothing.  I have them as well as many many more, and that alone gives you no insight to these teams especially as they are protected by NDA's.  Every division of Boeing like every other aerospace company behaves drastically different and uses different processes.

[ericgu]

Boeing's error was a fundamental failure to follow a checklist and a secondary failure to find and correct that mistake. If they can't get the basics right, how are you so sure they'll get the difficult parts right?  Is it indicative of the corporate culture?  Are the employees being rushed and becoming sloppy?  I thought Boeing's strength was in understanding NASA procedures and documentation.  If all that rigorous paperwork doesn't actually catch a fundamental procedural error, why would we believe that simulations instead of the IFA test are any better?

This failure is eerily close to the kind of errors that have been cropping up in SLS under Boeing's management - the LOX dome being dropped and the contaminated propellant lines...

It looks systemic to me.

[dglow]

Please stop bringing up the igniters in the context of the PAT. As has been pointed out upthread, the igniter incident involved a private, non-NASA, unmanned, and experimental vehicle. The PAT and Hopper tests are apples and oranges. Please.

so you would argue for a different level of safety for private, non NASA, etc vehicles" ?

No, and I said no such thing.

sorry there are no apples and oranges here.  they are exactly the same.

We'll just have to disagree.

you are confusing safety with testing new technologies and leaving the igniters off had nothing to do with flight test...

That's quite a leap but no, I am confusing no such thing.

[woods170]

Please stop brining up the igniters in the context of the PAT. As has been pointed out upthread, the igniter incident involved a private, non-NASA, unmanned, and experimental vehicle. The PAT and Hopper tests are apples and oranges. Please.

so you would argue for a different level of safety for private, non NASA, etc vehicles" ?

I doubt 1) the FAA will buy that and 2) the people of Boca C will and 3) safety theory certainly does not

In fact, the FAA does buy that. The safety requirements FAA lays down for private, non-NASA, manned spaceflight are fully and wholly aimed at protecting the public whereas the safety requirements laid down by NASA are aimed at protecting both the public AND the NASA astronauts.

Under current FAA rules there are barely any safety requirements regarding the occupants of a space vehicle. The risks to said occupants are mostly covered under "informed consent".

Had you actually bothered to have a good look at the safety requirements set by FAA (for non-NASA private manned spaceflight) and than compare them to the safety requirments set by NASA (for NASA manned spaceflight) you would have noticed that these two sets are rather different.

Also, the safety of the public (and that includes the people of Boca Chica) is what FAA regulations are all about. Now, where did FAA require SpaceX to check its igniter lines? Answer: it didn't require that.
Reason for that is that another FAA safety requirement (evacuate Boca Chica village during flight tests) effectively took care of any failure to check the igniter lines. Which, btw, is part of safety theory (safety regulations must be effective, not burdensome).

[TripleSeven]

Please stop brining up the igniters in the context of the PAT. As has been pointed out upthread, the igniter incident involved a private, non-NASA, unmanned, and experimental vehicle. The PAT and Hopper tests are apples and oranges. Please.

so you would argue for a different level of safety for private, non NASA, etc vehicles" ?

I doubt 1) the FAA will buy that and 2) the people of Boca C will and 3) safety theory certainly does not

In fact, the FAA does buy that. The safety requirements FAA lays down for private, non-NASA, manned spaceflight are fully and wholly aimed at protecting the public whereas the safety requirements laid down by NASA are aimed at protecting both the public AND the NASA astronauts.

Under current FAA rules there are barely any safety requirements regarding the occupants of a space vehicle. The risks to said occupants are mostly covered under "informed consent".

Had you actually bothered to have a good look at the safety requirements set by FAA (for non-NASA private manned spaceflight) and than compare them to the safety requirments set by NASA (for NASA manned spaceflight) you would have noticed that these two sets are rather different.

Also, the safety of the public (and that includes the people of Boca Chica) is what FAA regulations are all about. Now, where did FAA require SpaceX to check its igniter lines? Answer: it didn't require that.
Reason for that is that another FAA safety requirement (evacuate Boca Chica village during flight tests) effectively took care of any failure to check the igniter lines. Which, btw, is part of safety theory (safety regulations must be effective, not burdensome).

I doubt the FAA requires any commercial launch to check their igniter lines.  The engine does not start if they are not attached.   I doubt if either Boeing or SpaceX were going to launch private citizens on their capsules with no government involvement at all, the FAA would require them to check their ignitir lines or for that matter their chute system.  Generally how that works is that companies demonstrate safe operation of those systems not the minitia of them.

Right now SpaceX at Boca Chia is building a launch vehicle that might maybe someday carry passengers.  the vehicles being built right now have no chance of carrying passengers.

BUT the FAA will as the test regime gets more aggressive verify the safety of the people on the ground in all aspects of the vehicles flight.


The FAA does not intercede in company safety systems unless there is a demonstrated problem.  then it becomes a matter of flight safety.  and that intervention is irregardless if a rocket is carrying people or vehicles because there is nothing between those two that determines how it affects the safety of people on the ground

nor do safety protocols change depending on what is on the vehicle.  At least I know ULA does not treat it that way.  of course that is why Atlas has a perfect record.

MY point was that the failure to have a protocol or follow it that allowed both the drogue chute to not be connected was in fact no different then the one which allowed them to run a countdown and not verify the igniters were connected.  they are the same failure pattern...and nothing changes that

As for " (safety regulations must be effective, not burdensome)."

everything about safety is burdensome.  as a noted person told the folks out in Utah as they pushed for not launching in cold weather..."when do you want me to fly"  there is nothing about safety that is not burdensome really

I spent hours today at a meeting of the safety committee...it is burdensome

for what it is worth in my view...the minute Starship starts flying people...the FAA will care about passenger safety.  it might take an accident or so...but at some point there will be government regulation. it always works like that

I am btw pretty done with the topic.  the bird is going to fly thats good enough for me

[saliva_sweet]

I don't understand why youre so keen in pointing out that Boeing made the same type of error that Spacex made in their redneck space program down at Boca Chica. We've seen the pictures and I don't think NASA should expect the same quality standards given the goals and budgets of the two programs.

[ThatOldJanxSpirit]

Good AmericaSpace article on the anomaly (even if they can’t tell the difference between N2O4 and hydrazine).

https://www.americaspace.com/2019/11/09/boeing-discloses-cause-of-starliner-parachute-anomaly/

Details of remedial measures, including development by Boeing of new procedures including pull tests and others (?) in addition to visual inspection. Also NASA will conduct parachute inspections for crew flights.

This seems a reasonably proportionate response to a serious anomaly and should not impact OFT.

[erioladastra]

Parachutes have been mentioned as problems for both Boeing and SpaceX numerous times by both Administrator Bridenstine and ASAP. As a clear area of emphasis, it is beyond comprehension that this chute deployment failure can be traced to human error and therefore easily corrected through administrative action. How could any component of such a high profile system fall through the cracks? How can NASA sign off on human flight when such an oversight can occur after spelling out that parachutes are a known problem and their performance is under heightened scrutiny?

Because you are dealing with human beings performing a test without infinite budget or time.  This was also not a vehicle carrying humans - where the checking and cross checking goes up significantly.  NASA also has these things called humans working under limited budget and time and can't double check every single thing.  You are also confusing issues of the parachutes.  Asymmetry has received visibility for many reasons.  When you find a problem like that you don't deep dive on every aspect unless you think there could be a common thread.  For example, you don't go off and perform a deep dive on the chute deployment software because of something not related to software.

[woods170]

I am btw pretty done with the topic.  the bird is going to fly thats good enough for me

Naturally the bird is going to fly. It is a milestones based firm fixed price contract. Not flying Starliner is going to have a negative impact on payments.

Same goes for SpaceX.

Both birds will fly eventually. And that will be a good thing for both contractors as well as NASA.

[TripleSeven]

I am btw pretty done with the topic.  the bird is going to fly thats good enough for me

Naturally the bird is going to fly. It is a milestones based firm fixed price contract. Not flying Starliner is going to have a negative impact on payments.

Same goes for SpaceX.

Both birds will fly eventually. And that will be a good thing for both contractors as well as NASA.

to me that is very important.  these with the commercial cargo programs are the most important space effort going . it is essential that private enterprise and the government move away from a contractor based to a products based relationship...and that government learn how to regulate human spaceflight in a safe efficient but as hands off as possible..   that is essential for a space future

[Chris Bergin]

Stablized rework of Boeing Starliner's successful Pad Abort Test created via the video skills of Jay DeShetler (@jdeshetler).

[ShaunML09]

Apologies if covered before, but why no IFA for Starliner?  Seems like a far more useful test than a pad abort

[rpapo]

Apologies if covered before, but why no IFA for Starliner?  Seems like a far more useful test than a pad abort

Short answer, covered ad nauseum here: Boeing didn't offer it, NASA didn't ask for it.