Jared Isaacman nominated as NASA Administrator

[hektor]

How should we understand that this is put on line right before the vote ?

[Blackstar]

How should we understand that this is put on line right before the vote ?

Not important. Everybody on the Hill had a copy a month ago. If you work in space policy, as I do, it was not hard to get a copy.

[clongton]

https://x.com/mcrs987/status/1997153483166736883

Jared Isaacman's project Athena

62 pages
Here is the PDF:  <snip>

Thank you Tony.

[catdlr]

https://twitter.com/DJSnM/status/1997344513241870553

Scott Manley
@DJSnM

Jared's NASA plan 'Project Athena' asks whether NASA needs in house high performance computing, meanwhile when I visited NASA Ames they mentioned the next supercomputer they're building is named 'Athena'

[Blackstar]

The places where the document discusses the centers is a good example of how little he understands what NASA does and how and where it does it. The centers perform various missions, but these "goals/focus areas" are often not even the most important ones. Ames, for instance, also does astrobiology, and flight research. Armstrong as an "aviation center of excellence" is odd. Armstrong does flight research in the form of flying aircraft. But the wind tunnels and other major flight research facilities (not to mention the people) are at other centers like Langley, Glenn, and Ames, and they cannot be moved to Armstrong. He wrote that Marshall should do nuclear and electric propulsion. But all the people, facilities, and equipment to do nuclear are at Glenn (I've seen some of that). The people, facilities, and equipment to do electric propulsion are also at Glenn.

But that's probably not all that important. As somebody told me a few weeks ago while discussing the document, one value is that it informs the NASA people what they need to brief him about when he's administrator. For instance, show him where all the facilities are located and what they actually do.

[clongton]

Give him a few weeks at the helm and I'm sure he will figure it out. One thing about him for sure is that he does not stick to an ill-conceived path just because changing would "look bad". He's a facts-based guy and will follow where the facts go, regardless of the look. He just needs a little time to get that sorted out in his head. His "Project Athena" was always intended to be a starting point for him, designed to give him direction on Day-1. But also designed to be a living document that will reflect facts as they become apparent. It will look quite different once he's been in the weeds for a while.

[DanClemmensen]

Give him a few weeks at the helm and I'm sure he will figure it out. One thing about him for sure is that he does not stick to an ill-conceived path just because changing would "look bad". He's a facts-based guy and will follow where the facts go, regardless of the look. He just needs a little time to get that sorted out in his head. His "Project Athena" was always intended to be a starting point for him, designed to give him direction on Day-1. But also designed to be a living document that will reflect facts as they become apparent. It will look quite different once he's been in the weeds for a while.

Athena was a preliminary plan he put together when he was offered the job initially, before the president took office, and based on the president-elect's statements about the goals and objectives of his administration. He turned this document over to Duffy in May, when his nomination was withdrawn. As the nominee back then, he needed a plan to do what the president wanted him to do. At this point, he needs a plan to do what the president wants him to do now. A lot has happened in the last seven months. presumably he has such a plan. Given the conflicting goals of Congress versus the President, together with the uproar over Duffy's intentional leak of that obsolete plan, I suspect he is reluctant to disclose all aspects of his current plan.

[Blackstar]

Athena was a preliminary plan he put together when he was offered the job initially

As one person commented in one of the articles about Athena, this was a "rookie mistake." In Washington, you don't write something like that down and give it to somebody unless you are willing to have it leak.

I'm also surprised at the chutzpah it took to write a NASA administrator's speech before you even have the job.

At this point, he needs a plan to do what the president wants him to do now. A lot has happened in the last seven months. presumably he has such a plan.

The condition of NASA is also significantly different than it was in the spring. The agency has lost 20% of its workforce, many of them in key areas. Also, young engineers no longer want to work for the federal government, because they saw all the mass firings, layoffs, and hiring freezes enacted early in the year. This also extends out to the contractors and researchers who are not civil servants, but work on NASA contracts and research. There are some science organizations/departments in the US that have lost most of their people because the grants were canceled. So if the agency says "Let's go look for organics on Mars" the people who did that work 8 months ago have now left the field. Some facilities at NASA field centers have now been shuttered. Goddard practically has a "going out of business" sign on their front gate. That wasn't true when he wrote his document, it is true now. He'll have to deal with that.

Wait until Isaacman gets in the job and finds out the current condition of the agency. As one example, NASA lost a lot of people in its contracting office, meaning that it is now taking the agency longer to review and sign contracts. It will be harder to pursue bold new initiatives when the contracting office is severely understaffed.

[DanClemmensen]

Athena was a preliminary plan he put together when he was offered the job initially

As one person commented in one of the articles about Athena, this was a "rookie mistake." In Washington, you don't write something like that down and give it to somebody unless you are willing to have it leak.

When he gave the document to Duffy, he had no reason to believe He was ever going to be re-nominated. He almost certainly intended to go back to private life.

[DanClemmensen]

At this point, he needs a plan to do what the president wants him to do now. A lot has happened in the last seven months. presumably he has such a plan.

The condition of NASA is also significantly different than it was in the spring. The agency has lost 20% of its workforce, many of them in key areas. Also, young engineers no longer want to work for the federal government, because they saw all the mass firings, layoffs, and hiring freezes enacted early in the year. This also extends out to the contractors and researchers who are not civil servants, but work on NASA contracts and research. There are some science organizations/departments in the US that have lost most of their people because the grants were canceled. So if the agency says "Let's go look for organics on Mars" the people who did that work 8 months ago have now left the field. Some facilities at NASA field centers have now been shuttered. Goddard practically has a "going out of business" sign on their front gate. That wasn't true when he wrote his document, it is true now. He'll have to deal with that.

Wait until Isaacman gets in the job and finds out the current condition of the agency. As one example, NASA lost a lot of people in its contracting office, meaning that it is now taking the agency longer to review and sign contracts. It will be harder to pursue bold new initiatives when the contracting office is severely understaffed.

Yep, it's now very different. That's why the original document is no longer relevant. However, I strongly suspect that he is not just relaxing and doing nothing until he gets the job. He's a smart guy with leadership and organizational skills. If he cannot get the inside info he needs yet, then he is almost certainly already planning on how to get that info as quickly as possible starting on day one, and I also guess that he has some preliminary contingency plans to address the issues you point out, at least to the extent they can be addressed. This is like making a plan to assess the actual situation after a natural disaster. You don't know in detail what the situation is, but you do know how to plan to find out.

[Blackstar]

When he gave the document to Duffy, he had no reason to believe He was ever going to be re-nominated. He almost certainly intended to go back to private life.

He never should have written anything down. That was the rookie mistake.

Also, he campaigned to get the job, starting in the summer. Back in November a I made a post about that here, listing all the things he had done that indicated he had been working to re-attain the job, including appearing on conservative podcasts, getting invited to White House events, etc. For some reason, that post got deleted.

[Blackstar]

That's why the original document is no longer relevant.

During the hearing, he stated that he still stood by the original document. I think he should have emphasized a bit more that the facts on the ground, and his thinking, had evolved.

If he cannot get the inside info he needs yet, then he is almost certainly already planning on how to get that info as quickly as possible starting on day one, and

My problem with that is that the Athena document demonstrates little actual fact-finding effort at the time based upon publicly available information. He didn't even download the NASA organizational chart, which is on the internet.

I also guess that he has some preliminary contingency plans to address the issues you point out, at least to the extent they can be addressed.

That is going to be tough. The position is administrator. He doesn't have the kind of authority that many people think he does. He also has to face what Congress wants, even though the current Congress has greatly weakened itself.

But a number of the issues he will face are going to be beyond NASA's ability to deal with. I mentioned the workforce problem--how is he going to attract new talent to the agency when it is clear that the president wants to slash NASA's budget and when the government as a whole has sent the message that it is not a reliable employer? The firing of tens of thousands of probationary employees across the government did not escape notice among university students, even if they were not fired by NASA.

There is also a bigger issue that is looming. Just this past week I was in a meeting with a number of academic, industry and government leaders where a number of people with knowledge of the situation stated that university level engineering education in the United States is in dire straits. Nobody said "imminent collapse," but it's bad. It may not matter what the NASA administrator does if US engineering schools begin closing their doors in the next few years.

[edzieba]

Even beyond the lack of basic knowledge of how NASA functions (as already noted by Blackstar), there are some real stinkers in there in terms of general management. e.g. p.14, mandating that a minimum of 15% of the NASA workforce must be rated as having inadequate performance - AKA 'stack ranking', a known failure of a technique. Or p.17, suggesting auditing attendance of critical safety meetings (not like the Rogers Commission mentioned anything about the consequences of adding unnecessary barriers to communications...). Or p.20, trying to tie programme durations to term limits unless 'approved by the Administrator'.

Running NASA like running a startup is not viable: a startup can pivot to a completely unrelated product, or fail entirely and you start a new company the following day. You have hundreds, thousands of competing startups and can tolerate many or most failing.
You have one NASA. You won't get another one if it fails.

[Blackstar]

Even beyond the lack of basic knowledge of how NASA functions (as already noted by Blackstar), there are some real stinkers in there in terms of general management. e.g. p.14, mandating that a minimum of 15% of the NASA workforce must be rated as having inadequate performance - AKA 'stack ranking', a known failure of a technique.

When I first saw that, I wondered if it is even legal, or at least allowed under current government regulations. I suspect it isn't. Another example is the recommendation to turn all cost plus contracts into fixed fee contracts ("if possible"). If the government terminates an existing contract, they probably have to pay a termination fee. In addition, they probably have to re-compete that contract and cannot simply turn it into a different kind of contract. These are reasons why I'm surprised that he didn't hire some consultants to draft this document for him. There are a lot of things in it that reflect no understanding of NASA or government.

But if he is confirmed by the Senate, which seems likely, he's going to get briefed by senior management. They're going to explain to him the law, the government regulations, what happens at each of the centers, how science actually works, and even the laws of physics. He's going to learn what he can and cannot do.

[Greg Hullender]

Another example is the recommendation to turn all cost plus contracts into fixed fee contracts ("if possible"). If the government terminates an existing contract, they probably have to pay a termination fee. In addition, they probably have to re-compete that contract and cannot simply turn it into a different kind of contract.

Because of sovereign immunity, they never have to pay a termination fee; the government cannot be sued without its permission. Congress would have to withdraw that permission, though, and create some mechanism to handle disputes, or else no one would ever bid a contract again. However, I hesitate to say anything is entirely impossible with this administration!

On the question of the government changing a contract and then forcing people to fulfill it anyway, I agree that's not possible. I'm pretty sure the 13th Amendment outlaws that! :-)

[Blackstar]

Because of sovereign immunity, they never have to pay a termination fee

I suspect the termination fee provision is included in the original contract. Maybe not all of them. But back in the spring I was talking to a NASA official who said that those projects that were canceled in the president's proposed budget had cancellation fees attached to them, and the cost of the cancellation had not been included in the budget proposal, meaning that the hits to the overall programs were going to be higher as they had to find additional money to pay for them.

Also, if you have been reliably working on a government contract for years and then the government says it is canceling the contract to renegotiate it, you might think twice about continuing with that contract with an unreliable customer. Not worth the headache.

[yg1968]

I read the entire report and it's actually a very good report. Nothing that is likely to derail Isaacman's nomination. On the contrary, it has a lot of good recommendations in order to make NASA or frankly any other organization more efficient. I suspect that a lot of these recommendations are based on Isaacman's experience as a successful business entrepreneur. If you don't feel like reading the entire report, I suggest reading Issacman's speech on pages 35 to 39. It's a good summary of the report.

The good thing about being able to read the entire report yourself is that it gives you a feel for which reporters you can trust to report space news accurately and which ones that you can't. For example, both Eric Berger and Politico reported on the Athena Report and only one of them was accurate. I will let you guess which one...

[clongton]

The good thing about being able to read the entire report yourself is that it gives you a feel for which reporters you can trust to report space news accurately and which ones that you can't. For example, both Eric Berger and Politico reported on the Athena Report and only one of them was accurate, I will let you guess which one...

I read it too and yes, it's obvious.

[yg1968]

Here are some of the highlights from the Athena Report:

I. THE PLAN

NASA will return to focusing on achieving the near impossible-doing what no other agency, organization, or company is capable of accomplishing. This will require a reorganization and a reinvigorated culture, all aimed at delivering on the following challenging objectives:

• Lead the world in human space exploration. We will accelerate current lunar ambitions and determine the scientific, economic, and national security value of sustained presence--while in parallel working alongside industry to determine a more affordable, repeatable architecture that applies to the Moon. Mars, and deep space. This includes demonstrating operational nuclear electric propulsion capability.
• Ignite the space economy. To fund the future we all envision in space, NASA must help unlock a broader orbital economy--one that extends beyond launch, observation, and communication--to support commercial activity and generate new sources of value.
• Become a force multiplier for science. We will leverage talent, launch capacity, and standardized commercial bus architectures-working alongside industry and academia to accelerate the pace of scientific discovery.

Administrator Directives

Directive #1: Recognize, Reward, Inspire (Day -3)
• · Reform the performance system to properly evaluate the workforce - identifying those that should be recognized and those that need improvement or potentially separation from the agency.
• Reinvigorate the recognition system to include flight and payload specialist opportunities.
• Consolidate NASA social media accounts and partner with space media to communicate and document the agency transformation.

Directive #2: Organizational/Productivity Enhancement (Day ~3)
• Request consolidation proposals from executive leadership.
• Flatten the org structure and eliminate deputy/assistant roles and reinstate voluntary retirement.
• End large recurring meetings and other productivity drags unless approved.
• Suspend boards and committees that delay decision making and pivot towards individual ownership and accountability.

Directive #3: Programmatic Review (Day -6)
• Launch deep-dive reviews of the top 10 programs to assess schedule, critical paths, and acceleration levers.
• Initiate a broader phased review of all programs.
• Deploy an engineering strike team to accelerate/fix/delete high priority programs.

Directive #4: Finance and Infrastructure Review (Day -6)
• Stand up a "finance strike team" to perform a bottoms-up independent analysis to inform the broader reorganization effort.
• Conduct a thorough infrastructure review to assess demand and determine opportunities for investment, decommissioning or potentially further monetization.
• Implement commercially--friendly procurement reforms.

Directive #5: Invest in the Future (Day ~9)
• Launch the Mars Program, Project Olympus. including an expanded nuclear electric propulsion program.
• Begin IT and communication modernization. Al integration, and workforce software alignment.
• Develop the "Mission Control of the Future'' initiative to consolidate and upgrade operations including modernization of communication systems.

Directive #6: Ignite the Space Economy and Accelerate Scientific Breakthroughs (Day -9)
• Appoint a Chief Commercial Officer and consolidate the "front door" for external engagement.
• Prioritize and accelerate research throughput on the ISS to include external industry engagement.
• Kick off bulk-buy and science-as-a-service programs to bring down the cost of routine science and energize academic institutions to fund their own flagship missions.
• Reevaluate decadal prioritization process, expand access to existing data.

Directive #7: Aeronautics Restructuring (Day 21)
• Consolidate aeronautics related activities under a single Mission Directorate and at a primary operating facility.
• Review all programs for relevancy and focus resources on cutting-edge technology.

Directive #8: Study: Starfleet Academy (~Day 60)
• Begin outlining a regulatory framework for the maturing space industry.
• Develop a training and certification roadmap for spaceflight crew, operators, vehicles, and spacecraft.

Core Objectives in Action

#1: Lead the World in Human Space Exploration
• Pull forward Artemis II & III to the greatest extent possible
• Work alongside industry to establish repeatable and affordable architectures for subsequent lunar and eventually mars missions.
• Launch Mars program, Project Olympus & Nuclear Electric Propulsion Programs
• Build "Mission Control of the Future"
• Streamline science and research programs to enable human spaceflight objectives alongside national security, scientific, and economic value

#2: Ignite the Space Economy
• Maximize the remaining life of ISS and unlock the economic potential of LEO to support future LEO destinations.
• Prioritize high potential research and reducing process friction
• Improve ISS utilization. increase crew and research throughput
• Establish new industry/academic incentives (e.g., 7-seat Dragon. front door, internship tracks)
• Prepare for a future regulatory roadmap for vehicle/crew/operator certification requirements

#3: Become a Force Multiplier for Science
• Make flagship missions routine and affordable
• Take advantage of science-as-a-service models where applicable
• Reevaluate Earth science priorities. decadal frameworks, and mission pacing
• Encourage and enable academic institution-funded science and exploration missions.
• Introduce new processes for prioritizing and vetting science proposals
• Investigate ways to alleviate the DSN

SLS/Gateway
• Fly Artemis II and Ill to determine the reasons to be on the Moon.
Gateway Terminate as appropriate after sunk costs are expended and pivot to routine and affordable commercial transportation.
• Pivot Gateway hardware to commercial LEO or nuclear programs .

Mars/Olympus
• Rapid contract for 2026 Mars mission (discovery base)
• Technology investments that will enable the future of American astronauts landing and returning from Mars

Blue Origin

Credibility of New Glenn+ Orion (or in-house) for possible Artemis IV+ as competitor to Starship

SpaceX

Starship & HLS credible path to return to Moon
• Mars Discovery Base contract - Olympus. plan for ISRU
• Ongoing Dragon support & rate 7 seat modification

Mars Program, Project Olympus

Immediately prepare a dedicated program, working alongside industry and international partners, to launch an uncrewed mission to Mars during the 2026 launch window, as aligned with presidential direction.

Objective: Land the first infrastructure on Mars to accelerate the technologies needed for future crewed missions.

This effort should stimulate innovation, investment, and collaboration across the technologies required to enable routine Lunar & Mars exploration and eventual sample return missions.

a. Workforce Directive: Commission a Study for a Starfleet Academy

Background:

The commercial space industry remains in its early stages, operating largely under a limited regulatory framework known as the "learning period." As NASA envisions a thriving future in space-with multiple space stations, lunar and Martian outposts, and a growing cadence of crewed and uncrewed missions-it is essential to prepare now to properly enable the people, organizations, and vehicles that will support safe, sustained and peaceful exploration.

To that end, the Chief Program Management Officer will commission a team within 30 days to assess the creation of an institution capable of certifying launch and spaceflight hardware for operation, training operators and flight crew members, and certifying the competence of such personnel. Study results to be published within 90 days.

Study Scope and Objectives

• Mission Framework: establish a framework focused on safely enabling, not stifling, the peaceful exploration and scientific pursuits of commercial and private space activities.
• Comparative Research: analyze comparable education and certification institutions supporting other mass transportation sectors, including aviation, maritime, and rail industries.
• Curriculum Development: explore potential curricula and certification requirements covering human and non-human spaceflight operations, scientific missions, ground control operations, spacecraft launch vehicle design, manufacturing and repair, flight and ground safety, orbital debris mitigation. and other critical disciplines.
o Industry Feedback: Solicit input from commercial space companies, private operators, and academic institutions to assess demand. ensure curricula relevance. and align certification pathways with future industry needs.
• Instructor Talent Pool: Identify subject matter experts capable of serving as instructors. mentors. or curriculum advisors.
• Mission Control Integration: coordinate with the Next Generation Mission Control initiative to ensure future commercial and private operators are familiar with, and prepared to integrate into. a multi-mission environment.
• Facility Location Assessment: evaluate potential locations for the academy based on proximity to existing NASA facilities. workforce expertise. supporting infrastructure, and subject matter relevance.
• Financial Viability: project the operational costs needed to establish a costing model for long-term viability.

Strategic Objectives

• #1 Lead the World in Human Space Exploration:
Accelerate our lunar objectives.
Establish a bold and achievable path to Mars.
Evaluate our architecture and partnerships to ensure safety, affordability and sustainability in deep space missions.
Dramatically increase investment and urgency around next-generation propulsion-especially nuclear electric systems.

• #2 Ignite a Thriving Space Economy:
Shift beyond perpetual government funding toward enabling real economic activity uniquely possible in space and the lunar surface.
Prepare a ''Mission Control of the Future" to manage flourishing crewed and uncrewed commercial missions, LEO platforms, and future lunar and deep space operations.

• #3 Become a Force-Multiplier for Science:
Accelerate frequent, ambitious, and affordable scientific missions.
Accept more development risk on uncrewed missions to increase the pace of discovery.
Leverage international partnerships, commercial entities, and academic institutions to co-invest in exploration.

President Trump has made it clear that American astronauts should plant the Stars and Stripes on Mars. Commercial industry is investing heavily in the capabilities to make this possible, but returning from Mars without nuclear propulsion would require a string of miracles requiring production of cryogenic propellant on another planet. NEP investments are essential for NASA and fully complementary to (not competitive) with commercial industry.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/16j95BNM4wDRD2bcHFhYJ7m-L3pAThuUf/view

[Proponent]

Because of sovereign immunity, they never have to pay a termination fee

I suspect the termination fee provision is included in the original contract. Maybe not all of them. But back in the spring I was talking to a NASA official who said that those projects that were canceled in the president's proposed budget had cancellation fees attached to them, and the cost of the cancellation had not been included in the budget proposal, meaning that the hits to the overall programs were going to be higher as they had to find additional money to pay for them.

Also, if you have been reliably working on a government contract for years and then the government says it is canceling the contract to renegotiate it, you might think twice about continuing with that contract with an unreliable customer. Not worth the headache.

I recall one particularly indecorous House space subcommittee meeting in the 2010s when Republicans proposed to "expend the termination reserve" for SLS, i.e., to give to contractors the money that the government had set aside to cover termination costs if SLS were to be cancelled. The rationale was that the money wasn't doing anything productive while held in reserve, so why not spend it to speed up SLS?

This was, of course, an extraordinarily bad idea. Not only was SLS already generously funded, not only would expending the reserve make SLS essentially immune to cancellation, not only would it neutralize NASA's power over its cost-plus contractors, but the very politicos so keen on it all had refused (on grounds of fiscal responsibility, incredibly) to countenance spending any money on in-space elements needed to give SLS a meaningful mission.

So what did Democrats do, confronted with their colleagues' gross disregard for the stewardship of public money? In a spectacular all-snouts-in-trough moment, they voted for it and then proposed expending the termination reserve for JWST!

Fortunately, none of this was approved by the full House. The point is, that termination fees are routine and taken seriously, even by the US government.