You are assuming zero markup for the launch service for SpaceX, but markup for the launch service for ULA. ...
The part that still utterly stuns me is that Boeing completely blew it with the financial aspects of the bid. I would expect them to be more expensive, but I would also think they have enough experience writing proposals to be able to color within the lines when it comes to structuring the finances.They have already shown with Starliner that there are ways to get more money out of a fixed price contract, so why would they throw in the "conditional fixed price" nonsense?
I like Cygnus also. It has matured into a great spacecraft. The FH is basically a LV that it's pricing is about the same as the Atlas-V 401 but has over double the performance capability of the Atlas-V 551. This is extremely difficult for any other provider to overcome this capability with existing LVs.Would it have been possible for NGIS to have bid a Improved Cygnus launched by a FH?
Quote from: Brovane on 04/12/2020 06:12 pmQuote from: Coastal Ron on 04/10/2020 10:30 pmQuote from: jadebenn on 04/10/2020 04:22 pmThe far bigger upset here was Northrop Grumman. I had pegged Lunar Cygnus from the start, and I was wrong. I wish we had more info about why, but it sounds like part of the issue was they overcharged (perhaps not expecting to have such stiff competition).First of all I like Cygnus, so I'll just throw that out there. In a world where SpaceX did not exist it would be an amazing vehicle, but even in a world where SpaceX exists it is a dependable vehicle with future potential.Secondly, I would not say that Northrop Grumman "overcharged". They bid what they thought was the how much it would cost them to provide the service, and then they added some profit on top of that. That is normal contracting.What we see here is the ability of SpaceX to use all the capabilities they have developed over two decades to offer a service for a price significantly lower than their competition. SNC and Northrop Grumman did not have the same abilities or advantages that they could leverage for this specific service, but obviously both companies excel at many other things.I like both SNC and Northrop Grumman. They are both doing the right things to add capabilities for expanding humanity out into space. So if anything I am a little bummed that only one provider was chosen, but there really isn't that much work to be done on this contract on a yearly basis, so I can understand the award decision.I like Cygnus also. It has matured into a great spacecraft. The FH is basically a LV that it's pricing is about the same as the Atlas-V 401 but has over double the performance capability of the Atlas-V 551. This is extremely difficult for any other provider to overcome this capability with existing LVs.Would it have been possible for NGIS to have bid a Improved Cygnus launched by a FH? This is not true (or at the very least very misleading in how it is presented). The FH with similar pricing to the 401(~100 million) is the FH with core re-use. Which has a very similar payload capability to the Atlas-V 551 to TLI(see graph). You are talking about the FH expendable, that has never actually had a signed contract so real world prices aren't really established (and are significantly more than the Atlas 401 by every estimation).
Quote from: Coastal Ron on 04/10/2020 10:30 pmQuote from: jadebenn on 04/10/2020 04:22 pmThe far bigger upset here was Northrop Grumman. I had pegged Lunar Cygnus from the start, and I was wrong. I wish we had more info about why, but it sounds like part of the issue was they overcharged (perhaps not expecting to have such stiff competition).First of all I like Cygnus, so I'll just throw that out there. In a world where SpaceX did not exist it would be an amazing vehicle, but even in a world where SpaceX exists it is a dependable vehicle with future potential.Secondly, I would not say that Northrop Grumman "overcharged". They bid what they thought was the how much it would cost them to provide the service, and then they added some profit on top of that. That is normal contracting.What we see here is the ability of SpaceX to use all the capabilities they have developed over two decades to offer a service for a price significantly lower than their competition. SNC and Northrop Grumman did not have the same abilities or advantages that they could leverage for this specific service, but obviously both companies excel at many other things.I like both SNC and Northrop Grumman. They are both doing the right things to add capabilities for expanding humanity out into space. So if anything I am a little bummed that only one provider was chosen, but there really isn't that much work to be done on this contract on a yearly basis, so I can understand the award decision.I like Cygnus also. It has matured into a great spacecraft. The FH is basically a LV that it's pricing is about the same as the Atlas-V 401 but has over double the performance capability of the Atlas-V 551. This is extremely difficult for any other provider to overcome this capability with existing LVs.Would it have been possible for NGIS to have bid a Improved Cygnus launched by a FH?
Quote from: jadebenn on 04/10/2020 04:22 pmThe far bigger upset here was Northrop Grumman. I had pegged Lunar Cygnus from the start, and I was wrong. I wish we had more info about why, but it sounds like part of the issue was they overcharged (perhaps not expecting to have such stiff competition).First of all I like Cygnus, so I'll just throw that out there. In a world where SpaceX did not exist it would be an amazing vehicle, but even in a world where SpaceX exists it is a dependable vehicle with future potential.Secondly, I would not say that Northrop Grumman "overcharged". They bid what they thought was the how much it would cost them to provide the service, and then they added some profit on top of that. That is normal contracting.What we see here is the ability of SpaceX to use all the capabilities they have developed over two decades to offer a service for a price significantly lower than their competition. SNC and Northrop Grumman did not have the same abilities or advantages that they could leverage for this specific service, but obviously both companies excel at many other things.I like both SNC and Northrop Grumman. They are both doing the right things to add capabilities for expanding humanity out into space. So if anything I am a little bummed that only one provider was chosen, but there really isn't that much work to be done on this contract on a yearly basis, so I can understand the award decision.
The far bigger upset here was Northrop Grumman. I had pegged Lunar Cygnus from the start, and I was wrong. I wish we had more info about why, but it sounds like part of the issue was they overcharged (perhaps not expecting to have such stiff competition).
Quote from: ncb1397 on 04/12/2020 06:30 pmQuote from: Brovane on 04/12/2020 06:12 pmQuote from: Coastal Ron on 04/10/2020 10:30 pmQuote from: jadebenn on 04/10/2020 04:22 pmThe far bigger upset here was Northrop Grumman. I had pegged Lunar Cygnus from the start, and I was wrong. I wish we had more info about why, but it sounds like part of the issue was they overcharged (perhaps not expecting to have such stiff competition).First of all I like Cygnus, so I'll just throw that out there. In a world where SpaceX did not exist it would be an amazing vehicle, but even in a world where SpaceX exists it is a dependable vehicle with future potential.Secondly, I would not say that Northrop Grumman "overcharged". They bid what they thought was the how much it would cost them to provide the service, and then they added some profit on top of that. That is normal contracting.What we see here is the ability of SpaceX to use all the capabilities they have developed over two decades to offer a service for a price significantly lower than their competition. SNC and Northrop Grumman did not have the same abilities or advantages that they could leverage for this specific service, but obviously both companies excel at many other things.I like both SNC and Northrop Grumman. They are both doing the right things to add capabilities for expanding humanity out into space. So if anything I am a little bummed that only one provider was chosen, but there really isn't that much work to be done on this contract on a yearly basis, so I can understand the award decision.I like Cygnus also. It has matured into a great spacecraft. The FH is basically a LV that it's pricing is about the same as the Atlas-V 401 but has over double the performance capability of the Atlas-V 551. This is extremely difficult for any other provider to overcome this capability with existing LVs.Would it have been possible for NGIS to have bid a Improved Cygnus launched by a FH? This is not true (or at the very least very misleading in how it is presented). The FH with similar pricing to the 401(~100 million) is the FH with core re-use. Which has a very similar payload capability to the Atlas-V 551 to TLI(see graph). You are talking about the FH expendable, that has never actually had a signed contract so real world prices aren't really established (and are significantly more than the Atlas 401 by every estimation).When has NASA ever gotten a 401 for $108M contracted price like FH? The 401 prices I'm seeing in the last 2-3 years are more like $150M.
SNC’s launch vehicle subcontractor has received mostly goodratings for its performance in the Technical and Management areas. Early on, customers haveexpressed concerns with timely delivery of launch services; however, those schedule concernsare currently trending in a favorable direction. I have no concerns that SNC’s launch vehiclemajor subcontractor could execute the launch vehicle portion of the GLS scope.
Other citations demonstrate somewhat relevant pertinence to asubset of the GLS effort, such as NGIS’s NextSTEP BAA for habitation development and itslaunch-related citations for its launch vehicle subcontractor.
$108 million? Psyche was $117 million
Feb 28 2020 NASA LAUNCH SERVICES II - SPACE EXPLORATION TECHNOLOGIES. MOD 121: THIS MODIFICATION AWARDS THE FIRM FIXED PRICE (FFP) LAUNCH SERVICE FOR THE PSYCHE MISSION PURSUANT TO CONTRACT CLAUSE 14.0, ENTITLED LAUNCH SERVICE TASK ORDERING (LSTO) PROCEDURES. THIS FFP INCLUDES THE FALCON HEAVY STANDARD LAUNCH SERVICE AND STANDARD MISSION INTEGRATION AND THIRTEEN (13) MISSION UNIQUE SERVICES (MUSS). THE TOTAL FIRM FIXED PRICE FOR THIS LAUNCH SERVICE TASK ORDER FOR ALL DEFINITIZED WORK UNDER CONTRACT LINE ITEM NUMBER 8 (CLIN IS $108,426,940.
Is there any indication that SNC was trying to pitch a Cargo Dream Chaser variant? That would meet the cargo upmass and volume requirements, but its very heavy and pushing even Falcon Heavy Expendable's performance to TLI.
Per the Gateway, Mr. Lindsey noted that the Shooting Star module – while designed for ISS cargo runs – meets all of the requirements for pressurized and unpressurized volumes that NASA is seeking as part of its commercial lunar services transportation contracts.
Quote from: FutureSpaceTourist on 04/10/2020 03:37 pmQuote New document reveals significant fall from grace for Boeing’s space program"I have decided to eliminate Boeing from further award consideration."by Eric Berger - Apr 10, 2020 4:11pm BST[...]When comparing the selection rationale for the 2014 commercial crew contracts with the rationale for the recent Gateway logistics contract, the perception of Boeing's offering could not be more stark. In 2014, Boeing was very much perceived as the gold-standard—expensive, yes, but also technically masterful. In 2020, the company was still perceived as expensive but not ultimately worthy of consideration.https://arstechnica.com/science/2020/04/a-nasa-analysis-of-boeings-lunar-cargo-delivery-plan-is-very-unflattering/Seems rather nitpicky. For instance, Boeing has a couple dozen different defense related programs. Yet, only one of them is mentioned in the article, the one that is arguably in worst shape. The "loss" on the fixed price contract could be applied to Eric's favorite company, SpaceX, just as equally with SpaceX indicating they had to spend hundreds of millions of dollars of their own money on the Dragon Crew program over and beyond what NASA paid them to deliver the vehicle. Seems like somebody could do this to any company. SpaceX has had problems with their falcon launch vehicle(2 engine failures, 2 primary payload losses) and dragon vehicle (one exploded).
Quote New document reveals significant fall from grace for Boeing’s space program"I have decided to eliminate Boeing from further award consideration."by Eric Berger - Apr 10, 2020 4:11pm BST[...]When comparing the selection rationale for the 2014 commercial crew contracts with the rationale for the recent Gateway logistics contract, the perception of Boeing's offering could not be more stark. In 2014, Boeing was very much perceived as the gold-standard—expensive, yes, but also technically masterful. In 2020, the company was still perceived as expensive but not ultimately worthy of consideration.https://arstechnica.com/science/2020/04/a-nasa-analysis-of-boeings-lunar-cargo-delivery-plan-is-very-unflattering/
New document reveals significant fall from grace for Boeing’s space program"I have decided to eliminate Boeing from further award consideration."by Eric Berger - Apr 10, 2020 4:11pm BST[...]When comparing the selection rationale for the 2014 commercial crew contracts with the rationale for the recent Gateway logistics contract, the perception of Boeing's offering could not be more stark. In 2014, Boeing was very much perceived as the gold-standard—expensive, yes, but also technically masterful. In 2020, the company was still perceived as expensive but not ultimately worthy of consideration.
The SpaceX program is within 1% of the [NASA] budget; it’s right on budget
“We’ve spent actually, I think, quite a lot more than than expected – probably on the order of hundreds of millions of dollars more,” Musk said.
Which combined with the above just means they didn't make any profit on the development contract itself. Not that they had to spend a bunch of their own money.
Quote from: mlindner on 04/14/2020 10:34 pmWhich combined with the above just means they didn't make any profit on the development contract itself. Not that they had to spend a bunch of their own money.Musk was sort of mumbling through that part, but the NASA manager wouldn't be telling SpaceX how much they spent on Crew Dragon. They just report budget information, and from NASA's perspective, NASA spent on crew dragon nearly exactly how much they were expecting to spend. What SpaceX brought in compared to went out is a totally different story. They wouldn't be tracking that like a cost-plus contract and wouldn't be in a position to inform SpaceX that they are on budget or not.
What we do know is that SpaceX was expecting to spend Y and they actually spent Y + hundreds of millions more. That sounds like a problem from a profitability stand point.
“We’ve spent actually, I think, quite a lot more than than expected – probably on the order of hundreds of millions of dollars more,” Musk said.While SpaceX has had to add funding to build Crew Dragon, according to Musk the company is now sticking closely to what it’s been allotted.“The SpaceX program is within 1% of the [NASA] budget; it’s right on budget,” Musk added.
But regardless, Boeing is a public company and so this information is reported.
Oh? Then can you please point us to the detailed accounting of the Boeing Starliner program?
For example, in 2019, we recorded reach-forward losses of $489 million on the Commercial Crew contract primarily reflecting higher estimated costs associated with spacecraft completion, certification and testing, and additional reach-forward losses of $148 million on the KC-46A Tanker contract reflecting higher manufacturing costs. New programs could also have risk for reach-forward loss upon contract award and during the period of contract performance. For example, in 2018, in connection with winning the T-7A Red
Quote from: Lemurion on 04/12/2020 08:58 pmThe part that still utterly stuns me is that Boeing completely blew it with the financial aspects of the bid. I would expect them to be more expensive, but I would also think they have enough experience writing proposals to be able to color within the lines when it comes to structuring the finances.They have already shown with Starliner that there are ways to get more money out of a fixed price contract, so why would they throw in the "conditional fixed price" nonsense?A no-bid would have been embarrassing. And they likely saw the writing on the wall. So they punted. Surely they went into this understanding the likely outcome, but wanting to maintain an appropriate defense-facade. Note that it was not just the "conditional fixed price" factor which eliminated them. Takes a concerted effort to screw up this badly on a bid, and I doubt that the responsible team was operating without very specific direction.
Quote from: Coastal Ron on 04/14/2020 11:50 pmOh? Then can you please point us to the detailed accounting of the Boeing Starliner program?In terms of profit/loss?Quote For example, in 2019, we recorded reach-forward losses of $489 million on the Commercial Crew contract primarily reflecting higher estimated costs associated with spacecraft completion, certification and testing, and additional reach-forward losses of $148 million on the KC-46A Tanker contract reflecting higher manufacturing costs. New programs could also have risk for reach-forward loss upon contract award and during the period of contract performance. For example, in 2018, in connection with winning the T-7A Redhttps://s2.q4cdn.com/661678649/files/doc_financials/2019/q4/d1a66b81-489a-478c-8a8a-4e3e3d403761.pdfAnd the 2018 loss was $57 million. So, we can safely say that Boeing has lost (or invested) hundreds of millions of dollars into Commercial Crew. Maybe SpaceX did as well, it is hard to say with any uncertainty, but there are certain things that have come out that could support that assertion (it is hard to say much of anything about SpaceX's finances, at best we can stumble around in the dark).
Quote from: ncb1397 on 04/14/2020 11:57 pmQuote from: Coastal Ron on 04/14/2020 11:50 pmOh? Then can you please point us to the detailed accounting of the Boeing Starliner program?In terms of profit/loss?Quote For example, in 2019, we recorded reach-forward losses of $489 million on the Commercial Crew contract primarily reflecting higher estimated costs associated with spacecraft completion, certification and testing, and additional reach-forward losses of $148 million on the KC-46A Tanker contract reflecting higher manufacturing costs. New programs could also have risk for reach-forward loss upon contract award and during the period of contract performance. For example, in 2018, in connection with winning the T-7A Redhttps://s2.q4cdn.com/661678649/files/doc_financials/2019/q4/d1a66b81-489a-478c-8a8a-4e3e3d403761.pdfAnd the 2018 loss was $57 million. So, we can safely say that Boeing has lost (or invested) hundreds of millions of dollars into Commercial Crew. Maybe SpaceX did as well, it is hard to say with any uncertainty, but there are certain things that have come out that could support that assertion (it is hard to say much of anything about SpaceX's finances, at best we can stumble around in the dark).Why use such weasel words? We have a clear statement from the CEO that they didn't invest/lose hundreds of millions. There's no "uncertainty" or "maybe" unless you're claiming the CEO is simply lying. You're certainly free to make such a claim, however please don't state it as some kind of fact that there were hundreds of millions lost. There isn't any evidence that has stated that as far as I am aware. If you have any, feel free to provide it.
It’s worth noting that based on SpaceX’s figures for trans Mars insertion, the Falcon Heavy performance is on the order of 18-20t TLI. That’s *not* just 20% higher than Atlas V 551. It’s such a performance advantage that they probably can recover at least the side boosters.
....Average is $136 million. For comparison, NASA recently got an Atlas V 541 launch for a total estimated launch cost of $165.7 million:https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-awards-launch-services-contract-for-environmental-satellite-missionSo, in that case, with falcon heavy you get about 20% more payload to TLI for about 20% less.....
Quote from: Robotbeat on 04/15/2020 02:36 pmIt’s worth noting that based on SpaceX’s figures for trans Mars insertion, the Falcon Heavy performance is on the order of 18-20t TLI. That’s *not* just 20% higher than Atlas V 551. It’s such a performance advantage that they probably can recover at least the side boosters.If this is a reference to my figures, my statement was Falcon Heavy (reusable) was 20% higher payload than a 541. You are talking about Falcon Heavy expendable, and the same source with the same methodology for the Atlas V configurations estimates a lot lower for TLI than that (more like 15-16 t rather than 18-20 t...if they are "sandbagging" figures they are probably doing it across the board). And that is with an instantaneous launch window BTW. Your payload will be less if you allow for a launch window.
Quote from: ncb1397 on 04/15/2020 02:41 pmQuote from: Robotbeat on 04/15/2020 02:36 pmIt’s worth noting that based on SpaceX’s figures for trans Mars insertion, the Falcon Heavy performance is on the order of 18-20t TLI. That’s *not* just 20% higher than Atlas V 551. It’s such a performance advantage that they probably can recover at least the side boosters.If this is a reference to my figures, my statement was Falcon Heavy (reusable) was 20% higher payload than a 541. You are talking about Falcon Heavy expendable, and the same source with the same methodology for the Atlas V configurations estimates a lot lower for TLI than that (more like 15-16 t rather than 18-20 t...if they are "sandbagging" figures they are probably doing it across the board). And that is with an instantaneous launch window BTW. Your payload will be less if you allow for a launch window.I'm not sure why you assume "sandbagging" is across the board. SpaceX is constantly making optimizations, ULA locks in a design before the first one is ever built. The first falcon heavy launch, the one that put a 1.3 ton car into Trans Mars Injection in what was intended to be a fully reusable configuration, used boosters that are obsolete now; it's entirely possible that the "sandbagged" numbers simply haven't kept up with the times.
Quote from: rakaydos on 04/15/2020 03:56 pmQuote from: ncb1397 on 04/15/2020 02:41 pmQuote from: Robotbeat on 04/15/2020 02:36 pmIt’s worth noting that based on SpaceX’s figures for trans Mars insertion, the Falcon Heavy performance is on the order of 18-20t TLI. That’s *not* just 20% higher than Atlas V 551. It’s such a performance advantage that they probably can recover at least the side boosters.If this is a reference to my figures, my statement was Falcon Heavy (reusable) was 20% higher payload than a 541. You are talking about Falcon Heavy expendable, and the same source with the same methodology for the Atlas V configurations estimates a lot lower for TLI than that (more like 15-16 t rather than 18-20 t...if they are "sandbagging" figures they are probably doing it across the board). And that is with an instantaneous launch window BTW. Your payload will be less if you allow for a launch window.I'm not sure why you assume "sandbagging" is across the board. SpaceX is constantly making optimizations, ULA locks in a design before the first one is ever built. The first falcon heavy launch, the one that put a 1.3 ton car into Trans Mars Injection in what was intended to be a fully reusable configuration, used boosters that are obsolete now; it's entirely possible that the "sandbagged" numbers simply haven't kept up with the times.Sort of. At first they said BFR/ITS was going to be 300 t to LEO. Then it was 150. Then it was >100. In terms of re-usability figures, it seems they may have over-estimated what they could do to the core stage and still recover it. Gwynne Shotwell has made comments that the core stage recovery has proven to be rather difficult (even though they do the water landings with f9 stages quite frequently). It then begs the question what their contracts are assuming. Are they assuming they can recover all the stages they are planning to, and if they don't that affects the profitability of the launch? Are they assuming they may not recover 1/2/3 stages and pricing in full/partial expendable and anything better than that is just gravy? Hard to say.
