SLS General Discussion Thread 8

[Coastal Ron]

What are the contract-termination costs? They might swamp all other factors. Such costs we used to justify SLS in the first place.

Maybe, but at some point you must pay the cost of winding down an old technology. Pay now or pay later. Call it explicit termination costs or just externalize it and hide it in the general economy, but will pay these costs. I'm surprised the cost was listed as only $1B in 2009. That's small compared to the rest of the negative value.

I don't disagree. I'm just saying that the salvage value discussed above may be negligible compared to the contract-termination fees.

I think there is very little salvage value to the SLS hardware that has been built, and the tooling and other equipment in the factory that Boeing would no longer need. It is too unique for reuse, including the engines (though maybe the RL-10s could be reworked for ULA?).

What the U.S. Taxpayer gets though is to stop paying Boeing for work on the SLS, which will be substantial. For instance, just for the SLS itself without the upper stage and payloads, the NASA OIG calculated it cost $2.5B per flight. Some of that is sunk cost, like engines and other materials, but the labor has not been spent for most of the 10ea SLS flights needed for the Artemis program, so there is well over $10B that could be saved.

Building a new, reusable space-only transportation system for Earth-local transportation would likely cost far less, and enable far more human space activity. THAT is the trade-off that Congress has been reluctant to discuss, so we'll see what the Trump II Administration does...

[mn]

What are the contract-termination costs? They might swamp all other factors. Such costs we used to justify SLS in the first place.

Maybe, but at some point you must pay the cost of winding down an old technology. Pay now or pay later. Call it explicit termination costs or just externalize it and hide it in the general economy, but will pay these costs. I'm surprised the cost was listed as only $1B in 2009. That's small compared to the rest of the negative value.

I don't disagree. I'm just saying that the salvage value discussed above may be negligible compared to the contract-termination fees.

I think there is very little salvage value to the SLS hardware that has been built, and the tooling and other equipment in the factory that Boeing would no longer need. It is too unique for reuse, including the engines (though maybe the RL-10s could be reworked for ULA?).

What the U.S. Taxpayer gets though is to stop paying Boeing for work on the SLS, which will be substantial. For instance, just for the SLS itself without the upper stage and payloads, the NASA OIG calculated it cost $2.5B per flight. Some of that is sunk cost, like engines and other materials, but the labor has not been spent for most of the 10ea SLS flights needed for the Artemis program, so there is well over $10B that could be saved.

Building a new, reusable space-only transportation system for Earth-local transportation would likely cost far less, and enable far more human space activity. THAT is the trade-off that Congress has been reluctant to discuss, so we'll see what the Trump II Administration does...

I think there's a lot of value in the custom hardware, we just have to wait for Congress to create a new monster and dictate that we should save money by reusing existing available technology.

But then you might ask if we're going to do that, why bother cancelling SLS in the first place? And that would be a fair question, but logic has never stopped Congress before so why now?

[clongton]

I think there's a lot of value in the custom hardware, <snip>

The custom hardware is junk. Sell it for scrap.

[eric z]

 If I had five bucks for every time I've seen a "Cancel SLS" post, I culd pay off my mortgage.

[spacenut]

Well, it should have been cancelled 10 years ago.  Solids are expensive, and the way SLS uses them are not reusable.  Refurbishment of the Shuttle boosters cost as much as new ones.  This is not economical.  Hydrogen, though fairly easy to make costs more than other fuels because of having to keep it at extremely cold temperatures during fueling and launch.  Equipment and tankage cost more.  The cost/kg to orbit costs more than reusable rockets.  It is just obsolete before it gets started. 

Now, with Starship/Superheavy and New Glenn, SLS really isn't needed anymore. 

[Eric Hedman]

Now, with Starship/Superheavy and New Glenn, SLS really isn't needed anymore.

We're getting closer.  But I think a few holes still exist to be closed before we're there.

[montyrmanley]

Well, it should have been cancelled 10 years ago.  Solids are expensive, and the way SLS uses them are not reusable.  Refurbishment of the Shuttle boosters cost as much as new ones.  This is not economical.  Hydrogen, though fairly easy to make costs more than other fuels because of having to keep it at extremely cold temperatures during fueling and launch.  Equipment and tankage cost more.  The cost/kg to orbit costs more than reusable rockets.  It is just obsolete before it gets started. 

Now, with Starship/Superheavy and New Glenn, SLS really isn't needed anymore.

I think the zeal for Hydrogen faded quickly when the difficulty of storage and the complexity of the GSE became apparent. Yes, Hydrogen is *theoretically* the optimal liquid fuel, but methane will get you 80-85% of the way there and is far easier to work with. The industry came around to methane a long time ago -- it just took 25 years or so for the engine technology to mature. (And it's amazing what SpaceX was able to do with humble RP-1 kerosene; densification was a game-changer.)

NASA and its contractors have a deep investment in hydrogen engines -- the RS-25, the RL-10, the RS-68, the Apollo J2 engines, etc. I think this created a mental block that prevented NASA and their partners from embracing methane in the way that the "new space" upstarts did. Hydrogen was a pain in the ***, but it was a pain they were familiar with and could design around. And since money was no object in old space, Hydrogen won the day on performance alone. Economics didn't really start mattering to rocketry until private industry got involved and price-to-performance math began to assert itself. The recent near-wholesale move of booster engine designs to methane has been pretty amazing to watch.

[Coastal Ron]

Now, with Starship/Superheavy and New Glenn, SLS really isn't needed anymore.

We're getting closer.  But I think a few holes still exist to be closed before we're there.

Other than jobs in the right political places, what "holes" still exist that need to be closed before deciding that the SLS isn't needed?

[Proponent]

I think the zeal for Hydrogen faded quickly when the difficulty of storage and the complexity of the GSE became apparent. Yes, Hydrogen is *theoretically* the optimal liquid fuel, but methane will get you 80-85% of the way there and is far easier to work with. The industry came around to methane a long time ago -- it just took 25 years or so for the engine technology to mature. (And it's amazing what SpaceX was able to do with humble RP-1 kerosene; densification was a game-changer.)

NASA and its contractors have a deep investment in hydrogen engines -- the RS-25, the RL-10, the RS-68, the Apollo J2 engines, etc. I think this created a mental block that prevented NASA and their partners from embracing methane in the way that the "new space" upstarts did. Hydrogen was a pain in the ***, but it was a pain they were familiar with and could design around. And since money was no object in old space, Hydrogen won the day on performance alone. Economics didn't really start mattering to rocketry until private industry got involved and price-to-performance math began to assert itself. The recent near-wholesale move of booster engine designs to methane has been pretty amazing to watch.

Among chemical fuels hydrogen is nearly optimal for specific impulse, but specific impulse is only one of several figures of merit. Density is another, and hydrogen is atrocious by that measure. The importance of each figure of merit depends on the constraints and the objective.

The first applications of hydrogen were in upper stages for existing lox/kerosene first stages (the Saturn I and Atlas Centaur). Hydrogen was a winner given the objective of maximizing payload and the constraint of the existing first stages. But whether a hydrogen upper stage would have been optimal without the constraint is debatable.

[clongton]

Now, with Starship/Superheavy and New Glenn, SLS really isn't needed anymore.

We're getting closer.  But I think a few holes still exist to be closed before we're there.

Other than jobs in the right political places, what "holes" still exist that need to be closed before deciding that the SLS isn't needed?

Hole-in-the head senators and legislators who still cling to the religious fervor that the government must design, own and operate its own launch services. Once these head-up-their-asses are gone, so will SLS be gone.

[Jimmy_C]

Now, with Starship/Superheavy and New Glenn, SLS really isn't needed anymore.

We're getting closer.  But I think a few holes still exist to be closed before we're there.

Other than jobs in the right political places, what "holes" still exist that need to be closed before deciding that the SLS isn't needed?

Hole-in-the head senators and legislators who still cling to the religious fervor that the government must design, own and operate its own launch services. Once these head-up-their-asses are gone, so will SLS be gone.

Horrible word choice.

[Eric Hedman]

Now, with Starship/Superheavy and New Glenn, SLS really isn't needed anymore.

We're getting closer.  But I think a few holes still exist to be closed before we're there.

Other than jobs in the right political places, what "holes" still exist that need to be closed before deciding that the SLS isn't needed?

Hole # 1:  If you want Congress to Cancel SLS and or Orion,  they will need to see detailed proposals for alternatives that have cost and timeline estimates along with an analysis of the benefits.  If the new administrator with Trump's blessing puts out RFQs, you are looking at probably a year for all who would like to submit a proposal to put a plan together.  Then the political fight gets really ramped up.  In an ideal case, your are looking at two years for a go ahead decision.

Hole # 2:  By the likely minimum time a decision can be made another two years of spending will have gone into SLS. Artemis II will likely have flown and much more hardware will be in the pipeline and Congress will also consider the sunk cost and not want to waste it ignoring the sunk cost fallacy.

Hole #3: An alternative that can carry people to lunar orbit and back may need to be actually flying  for Congress to finally kill SLS.  A Starship with a crew flying from LEO to LLO and back would suffice.  I can't imagine another vehicle from any other vendor doing that in less than five years unless it would be Orion on New Glenn with refueling.

My most optimistic scenario is that NASA puts out an RFQ for alternatives and helps partially fund one or two starting in early 2027.  The earliest I think we see a mission with a crew is 2029.  In the meantime Artemis II, III and IV have flown.  Congress finally accepts a phaseout of SLS through Artemis VIII using up vehicles in the pipeline and commercial alternatives take over.  SLS supporters in Congress declare it was a success in returning to the Moon and take credit for going with the commercial alternatives.

I hope I'm wrong.  But I don't see it going any faster.

[Mr. Scott]

Now, with Starship/Superheavy and New Glenn, SLS really isn't needed anymore.

We're getting closer.  But I think a few holes still exist to be closed before we're there.

Other than jobs in the right political places, what "holes" still exist that need to be closed before deciding that the SLS isn't needed?

Hole-in-the head senators and legislators who still cling to the religious fervor that the government must design, own and operate its own launch services. Once these head-up-their-asses are gone, so will SLS be gone.

I shall reveal my theory as to why SLS would not ever soon be cancelled.  I have no direct knowledge of any info with regards to this.  But maybe this may make some sense in the long term. 

The modified engines on SLS are being flight qualified. 

What can folks do with modified (former shuttle) flight qual’d engines?  I don’t know!  Why are they being re-qual’d?  I don’t know

The SLS design makes no sense for anything as the vehicle design and ground systems changes too often from mission to mission.  Yet the engines seem to stay the same. 

[clongton]

Now, with Starship/Superheavy and New Glenn, SLS really isn't needed anymore.

We're getting closer.  But I think a few holes still exist to be closed before we're there.

Other than jobs in the right political places, what "holes" still exist that need to be closed before deciding that the SLS isn't needed?

Hole-in-the head senators and legislators who still cling to the religious fervor that the government must design, own and operate its own launch services. Once these head-up-their-asses are gone, so will SLS be gone.

Horrible word choice.

When I was in DC I learned the hard way to call a spade a spade, better yet - to their faces. If you don't call them out for what they actually are they will walk all over you until you're nothing but a splat under their feet. Politics is an extremely dirty business. They respect no one except those few who have the guts to get in their face. They do not take prisoners and have no concept of doing what's best for the citizens. They are, by and large, OUTRIGHT OWNED by the military-industrial complex. They might as well be humanoid robots programmed by Satan. When you go into Congress what you are seeing is evil in a suit and tie. So NOT horrible words - TRUTH. And one of the best examples of that is SLS. The best thing you can say about the Senate Launch System (SLS) is that it sucks - and it goes downhill from there.

[spacenut]

I've also read, that not only the SLS, but the F-35 was to be a do-all aircraft, but it is a master of none.  Seems like too many people (congress and senate) want the SLS to be a do-all rocket, but it is a master of none.  It can only launch 95 tons to LEO.  That limits what can go to the moon.  Orion is overweight.  The SLS at least should have 5 engines on the core, and a very good J2X upper stage for 140 tons to LEO payload.  They should have pushed the limits or not done it at all. 

[Greg Hullender]

What are the contract-termination costs? They might swamp all other factors. Such costs we used to justify SLS in the first place.

Paying such costs would be voluntary; the government cannot be sued without its permission. In the law that terminated the SLS, Congress could simply nullify the contracts and then invoke sovereign immunity. Or, more likely, specify exactly what termination costs they'd pay for specific cleanup tasks.

That assumes Congress actually wanted to do that, though.

[DanClemmensen]

What are the contract-termination costs? They might swamp all other factors. Such costs we used to justify SLS in the first place.

Paying such costs would be voluntary; the government cannot be sued without its permission. In the law that terminated the SLS, Congress could simply nullify the contracts and then invoke sovereign immunity. Or, more likely, specify exactly what termination costs they'd pay for specific cleanup tasks.

That assumes Congress actually wanted to do that, though.

When SLS gets terminated, soon or late, cancelled or just withering away, there will be actual costs to society, and these translate into costs to the taxpayers, one way or another. The best we can hope for will be some attempt to mitigate the damage and to spend the money in the most cost-effective and equitable manner. Sadly, this is hopeless. Look at the military base closures where pretty much everybody tried really hard to do it right, and the results were equivocal at best.

[Coastal Ron]

Now, with Starship/Superheavy and New Glenn, SLS really isn't needed anymore.

We're getting closer.  But I think a few holes still exist to be closed before we're there.

Other than jobs in the right political places, what "holes" still exist that need to be closed before deciding that the SLS isn't needed?

Hole # 1:  If you want Congress to Cancel SLS and or Orion,  they will need to see detailed proposals for alternatives that have cost and timeline estimates along with an analysis of the benefits.

Congress didn't need any of that to create the SLS, nor has it asked for any of that as part of any oversight of the program. Of course there really hasn't been any oversight by Congress into the SLS program, which should be the clue that Congress really doesn't care about cost of timeline - which is why alternatives really shouldn't need them.

Hole # 2:  By the likely minimum time a decision can be made another two years of spending will have gone into SLS.

OK, this one is based in reality, since budget cycles are a thing. However the Trump II Administration could, if they really wanted, propose killing the SLS as soon as they get into office. But yeah, otherwise it would have to wait for the FY2027 budget year, starting in October 2026.

Hole #3: An alternative that can carry people to lunar orbit and back may need to be actually flying  for Congress to finally kill SLS.

This has been the opinion of SLS supporters for years, despite the logic being false. NASA has never relied upon a major system by building it first and THEN deciding to rely upon it.

Now, if there truly was some sort of "Space Race" to the Moon, then maybe this argument could be made, but there isn't one - we only have political need dates for returning to the Moon, not actual "National Imperatives".

My most optimistic scenario is that NASA puts out an RFQ for alternatives and helps partially fund one or two starting in early 2027.  The earliest I think we see a mission with a crew is 2029.  In the meantime Artemis II, III and IV have flown.

I'm less optimistic about what will be flown by 2029 using the SLS, but I understand your timelines.

I hope I'm wrong.  But I don't see it going any faster.

I'll take even that, since a world without the SLS means that we can do more in space, for less money.

Thanks for the detailed reply!

[Coastal Ron]

I've also read, that not only the SLS, but the F-35 was to be a do-all aircraft, but it is a master of none.

The SLS was designed by Congress, using technology and contractors from the STS (Shuttle) program. So to be charitable, the SLS wasn't designed to do anything.

As to the F-35, yes the F-35 program was meant to satisfy the needs of three different branches of the military - the Air Force (F-35A), the Marines (F-35-B), and the Navy (F-35-C). Oh, and one of them needs to take off and land vertically. Plus it needs to be both an air superiority and strike aircraft. Over 1,000 have been built so far, including versions built for seven other countries (more coming). And while the F-35 program has had it's challenges, comparing it to the SLS is a huge insult.

Seems like too many people (congress and senate) want the SLS to be a do-all rocket, but it is a master of none.

The SLS was never designed to satisfy a specific need. Come on, you have been on NSF for how long? You should know this.

Orion is overweight.

That was known way back on the Constellation program, and it doesn't matter. The goal of the Orion program is the same as the SLS - to spend money in the right places, not to necessarily do anything.

The SLS at least should have 5 engines on the core, and a very good J2X upper stage for 140 tons to LEO payload.  They should have pushed the limits or not done it at all.

Oh, so now you are arm chairing the design of the SLS just like Congress did, and you expect that dumping MORE money into a bad design will solve anything?

Prior to Starship there has always been a much cheaper and better solution, and even with the advent of the Starship the same solution works - using existing rockets to move commodity sized payloads to space, build a reusable space-only transportation system in space that relies upon propellant depots supported by the commodity rockets.

The U.S. Government does not need to build their own rockets anymore. NASA is the last U.S. Department or Agency that does, and Congress needs to stop that.

[clongton]

I've also read, that not only the SLS, but the F-35 was to be a do-all aircraft, but it is a master of none.  Seems like too many people (congress and senate) want the SLS to be a do-all rocket, but it is a master of none.  It can only launch 95 tons to LEO.  That limits what can go to the moon.  Orion is overweight.  The SLS at least should have 5 engines on the core, and a very good J2X upper stage for 140 tons to LEO payload.  They should have pushed the limits or not done it at all.

Example history of the SLS:
Once Congress passed the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, NASA went to work with its military/industrial complex partners to change it from DIRECT’s Jupiter HLV which (while not referred to by name) had been authorized by the bill, into another iteration of Constellation’s Ares-V, and it was renamed to the SLS. Charlie Bolden, then the NASA Administrator, set about determining the final configuration of the renamed HLV, by authorizing studies of various potential configuration options.

One of the proposals was to power the 1st stage with four (4) redesigned RS-25 engines, coupled with a pair of LRBs, each powered by twin F-1A engines (RP1/LOX) in lieu of the pair of SRBs. The LRBs would power the SLS thru its liftoff up to the point of jettison with the vehicle continuing onward to the ignition of the EUS upper stage. This configuration would put 150 tons plus into LEO. It had the advantage of the LRBs, when coupled with a J-2X powered upper stage, being a launch vehicle in its own right, taking the place of Constellation’s failed Ares-1 crew launch vehicle (CRV). This configuration effectively recreated a more powerful and flexible version of Constellation's Ares-V. The LRB with upper stage could easily put the overweight Orion spacecraft into LEO, with lots of margin to spare, to rendezvous with Constellation's Altair Lunar Lander, orbited by the renamed Ares-V. The updating of the F-1A engine had already been done and the gas generator already successfully hot fire tested. This configuration, while arguably not what had been authorized in the bill, was in fact the very best of the best of the presented options. It was the most powerful, the least expensive to build and operate, and was the most flexible option.

But because it did not check all the political boxes and put enough money into the coffers of the military/industrial complex partners, Bolden chose the least capable, most expensive and least flexible option, the one that coupled the vehicle to the expendable SRBs that power it today. That configuration was the only option that checked all the political boxes. Which option was the best choice for the country was never a consideration.

I am personal friends with one of the lead design engineers which was part of the team that developed the LRB option, and was informed that NASA considered the option as “non viable”, the exact same excuse given for every option except the one chosen. Knowing from personal experience how Washington works, I believe (opinion) that the chosen option was already selected before the option study was even ordered. The option study was nothing more than a cover so that NASA could ultimately say “See? We looked at all possibilities and chose this as the best one”. Then tens of billions of taxpayer dollars began flowing into the coffers of the “partners”.

This is the kind of bait and switch that has become standard procedure at NASA today and that governs nearly every aspect of the decisions and selections that the agency makes. The first order of business is ALWAYS to check all the political boxes FIRST, and only then is technical merit used to narrow the remaining choices to a final selection. This is the kind of thing I had in mind when I said how politics in Washington, which leads NASA around by the nose, is a very dirty business.

In my opinion, the once proud agency has been corrupted beyond redemption. SLS is only the latest example of that cancer that has spread throughout the upper echelons of the agency. The cancer is so deep that it cannot be extricated. I only hope I live long enough to see it replaced by an organization or company that will pick up the mantle of what NASA used to be back in the day before the corruption began. NASA had so much promise. But not anymore. SLS will eventually die; the sooner the better. I pray that SLS is the last gasp of a dying cancer. We desperately need better choices, and leaders with the gonads to make them and go toe to toe against the professional corruptors who don't give a damn about what is best for the rest of us.