I am going to show my ignorance here but how close are we to ML2 to be ready? From the above pics and update it seems like we are close. It should be less than a year right?
Quote from: c4fusion on 06/24/2024 10:26 pmI am going to show my ignorance here but how close are we to ML2 to be ready? From the above pics and update it seems like we are close. It should be less than a year right?Sorry, but no. Structural assembly of the ML-2 and its tower will continue for another year, at least. After that, outfitting starts, which will take another year, at least. Including testing ML-2 is at least 2.5 years away from being ready to support a launch campaign.Which is OK because it supports only block 1B of SLS, which in itself won't be ready for another 2.5 - 3 years.
Quote from: woods170 on 06/25/2024 01:05 pmQuote from: c4fusion on 06/24/2024 10:26 pmI am going to show my ignorance here but how close are we to ML2 to be ready? From the above pics and update it seems like we are close. It should be less than a year right?Sorry, but no. Structural assembly of the ML-2 and its tower will continue for another year, at least. After that, outfitting starts, which will take another year, at least. Including testing ML-2 is at least 2.5 years away from being ready to support a launch campaign.Which is OK because it supports only block 1B of SLS, which in itself won't be ready for another 2.5 - 3 years.Does anyone know how this compares with the build time for ULA's corresponding platform-2 for Vulcan?...or is this like comparing apples with peanuts?(NOT wanting to start a ULA discussion here!)
Quote from: litton4 on 06/26/2024 08:59 amQuote from: woods170 on 06/25/2024 01:05 pmQuote from: c4fusion on 06/24/2024 10:26 pmI am going to show my ignorance here but how close are we to ML2 to be ready? From the above pics and update it seems like we are close. It should be less than a year right?Sorry, but no. Structural assembly of the ML-2 and its tower will continue for another year, at least. After that, outfitting starts, which will take another year, at least. Including testing ML-2 is at least 2.5 years away from being ready to support a launch campaign.Which is OK because it supports only block 1B of SLS, which in itself won't be ready for another 2.5 - 3 years.Does anyone know how this compares with the build time for ULA's corresponding platform-2 for Vulcan?...or is this like comparing apples with peanuts?(NOT wanting to start a ULA discussion here!)That is indeed comparing apples to peanuts. The two mobile launch platforms for Vulcan and SLS Block 1B are vastly different in size, mass, complexity, mode of transport, cost, etc. They don't compare to each other in every metric except basic function.Even trying to compare them on anything would be utterly absurd and pointless IMO.
Teams with NASA’s Exploration Ground Systems at Kennedy Space Center in Florida set mobile launcher 2 on top of its permanent mounts using the spaceport’s beast-mode transporter – the crawler. This marks the completion of the jack and set milestone for the new mobile launcher.The mobile launcher serves as the primary interface between the ground launch systems, SLS (Space Launch System) rocket, and Orion spacecraft that will launch the SLS Block 1B rocket to the Moon. With its enhanced upper stage, the new rocket will allow NASA to send astronauts and heavier cargo into lunar orbit than its predecessor, SLS Block 1. With Artemis, NASA will land the first woman, first person of color, and its first international partner astronaut on the lunar surface, establish long-term exploration for scientific discovery, and prepare for human missions to Mars.Credit: NASA
NASA is developing a second mobile launcher (ML-2) to support larger variants of the Space Launch System. NASA estimates the ML-2 will cost $1.8 billion, over three times more than planned, despite efforts to improve project performance. Read the full report:
Some context:Mobile Launcher -1 (ML-1) was converted from the canceled use with Ares into the ML for SLS Block 1. With the addition of the EUS (Exploration Upper Stage) for the Block 1B SLS, the option was to convert ML-1 to accommodate the height increase of the vehicle or build a new one.A new one was cited at around $450m, and the option was taken based on the expected downtime of ML-1 during conversion, which would have meant no SLS launches for a few years during this period.ML-2 is currently being constructed but has suffered from delays and contractor issues. The OIG now estimates it at $1.8 billion, which is some cost rise.ML-2 articles over the years:nasaspaceflight.com/?s=ML-2
NASA projects the ML-2 will cost over three times more than planned. In 2019, NASA estimated the entire ML-2 project from design through construction would cost under $500 million with construction completed and the ML-2 delivered to NASA by March 2023. In December 2023, NASA estimated the ML-2 project would cost $1.5 billion, including $1.3 billion for the Bechtel contract and $168 million for other project costs, with delivery of the launcher to NASA in November 2026. In June 2024, NASA established the Agency Baseline Commitment (ABC)—the cost and schedule baseline committed to Congress against which a project is measured—for a ML-2 project cost of $1.8 billion and a delivery date of September 2027. Even with the establishment of the ABC, NASA intends to keep Bechtel accountable to the cost and schedule agreed to in December 2023.Despite the Agency’s increased cost projections, our analysis indicates costs could be even higher due in part to the significant amount of construction work that remains. Specifically, our projections indicate the total cost could reach $2.7 billion by the time Bechtel delivers the ML-2 to NASA. With the time NASA requires after delivery to prepare the launcher, we project the ML-2 will not be ready to support a launch until spring 2029, surpassing the planned September 2028 Artemis IV launch date.
7x cost growth in five years is impressive, even by SLS program standards.
NASA has to be trolling with the latest cost estimate of its SLS launch tower"NASA officials informed us they do not intend to request a fixed-price proposal."by Eric Berger - Aug 27, 2024 8:18pm GMTNASA's problems with the mobile launch tower that will support a larger version of its Space Launch System rocket are getting worse rather than better.
https://twitter.com/nasaspaceflight/status/1828464158326538441QuoteSome context:Mobile Launcher -1 (ML-1) was converted from the canceled use with Ares into the ML for SLS Block 1. With the addition of the EUS (Exploration Upper Stage) for the Block 1B SLS, the option was to convert ML-1 to accommodate the height increase of the vehicle or build a new one.A new one was cited at around $450m, and the option was taken based on the expected downtime of ML-1 during conversion, which would have meant no SLS launches for a few years during this period.ML-2 is currently being constructed but has suffered from delays and contractor issues. The OIG now estimates it at $1.8 billion, which is some cost rise.ML-2 articles over the years:nasaspaceflight.com/?s=ML-2
As stated in the report, NASA recently set the Mobile Launcher 2 (ML2) Agency Baseline Commitment (ABC) of $1.873 billion. ESDMD disagrees with the OIG-projected ML2 cost estimate of $2.7 billion. Simply using a straight-line extrapolation, as the OIG did, does not accurately reflect the current development situation. EGS has transitioned to a different phase of the project (i.e., construction) than what was in place at the beginning of the audit (i.e., the design phase). Application of a straight-line projection misses this key advancement, overlooks recent performance improvements, and does not provide a credible estimate of what we can expect in the future. For example, the OIG states its concern for the increased cost associated with equipment, minor subcontractors, and estimated management reserves, which includes costs related to the procurement and fabrication of steel, aluminum, wiring, and other construction-related material. Prior to the release of this draft report, contracts were put in place for 90 percent of materials and sub-contracts and 60 percent of all steel was delivered, with 70-80 percent in process to be delivered by October 1, 2024.ESDMD values the OIG’s commitment to updating cost and schedule data during the audit to incorporate the latest ML2 information. However, the extended duration and pace of the audit created challenges and resulted in a misrepresented performance profile. The OIG projected a linear performance whereas the actual performance is nonlinear in nature. Cost reports through April 2024 further reinforce NASA’s cost estimate. ESDMD calculates that the current OIG estimate would be reduced by 15 percent based on recent reports provided by the prime contractor, Bechtel National, Inc. (Bechtel), further illustrating the nonlinear relationship.
The OIG states that by its projections, the ML2 will not be ready in time for the September 2028 Artemis IV launch readiness date. The ML2 ABC was established to reflect the most current position of the project taking into consideration that the ML2 has transitioned from design phase into construction phase. In prior estimates, the complete scope of the ML2 was underestimated but is now fully understood and risks associated with uncertainties have been included in NASA’s estimate. NASA also worked with Bechtel to establish and negotiate an incentive plan to motivate cost and schedule performance. To date, these changes have shown a positive effect. ESDMD continues to closely monitor Bechtel’s progress and remains confident in NASA’s ABC to complete ML2 by 2027.
It should be noted that conversion of ML-1 would have resulted in the ML/loaded stack being way overweight for the crawlerway and pad. A new ML(2) designed from the get-go for EUS weighs significantly less than a converted ML-1.
Simply using a straight-line extrapolation, as the OIG did, does not accurately reflect the current development situation.
The project was started in 2011, and the 2010 NASA Authorization Act required SLS to launch by 2016. It is now four years later, and the likely launch date for EM-1 has slipped to 2018 or later, a slip of two years in the first launch of SLS. That’s one year of schedule slippage for every two years that the project has existed. If the SLS schedule continues to slip at this rate over the next four years, the date of the first SLS launch will slip from 2018 to 2020. And then from 2018 to 2020, SLS will slip one more year or so before finally launching for the first time somewhere in the 2021-2022 timeframe.
Quote from: NASA's response on pages 32 and 33 of the IG ReportSimply using a straight-line extrapolation, as the OIG did, does not accurately reflect the current development situation. It’s possible that the IG used the wrong slope when projecting ML-2’s final cost and delivery date. But I’d bet dollars to donuts not, for a couple reasons:1) The IG is independent of the program while Koerner or whoever wrote the NASA response is on the hook for the program. Independent authorities like the IG have no incentive to oversell or undersell a program’s problems. Their incentive is to deliver as accurate a picture of a program’s problems as possible, including projecting where the cost and schedule will wind up. They want as reliable a track record on these projections over as many of these projections as they can get, not to kill or save a any particular program. Program management, however, is in the business of selling the program, which includes underselling its problems. They have every incentive — managing workforce morale, avoiding attention from senior leadership or independent authorities or OMB or Congress, avoiding cancellation, sometimes saving their salary bonuses, sometimes even just going home on time or saving their vacations — to come up with arguments that make the program look healthier than it actually is.2) Program outcomes are almost always set in stone during formulation. Despite the best intentions, once the contractor is on board and development is underway, it’s very hard to change where a program will wind up. Once the slope is set, it rarely changes, if ever. To give a couple examples from my own experience...— Back in August 2014, SLS manager Todd May was publicly claiming that SLS would launch in 2017 using the same “we’re about to turn the corner” arguments that Koerner is making for ML-2. I called baloney on May’s “projection” and wrote this:QuoteThe project was started in 2011, and the 2010 NASA Authorization Act required SLS to launch by 2016. It is now four years later, and the likely launch date for EM-1 has slipped to 2018 or later, a slip of two years in the first launch of SLS. That’s one year of schedule slippage for every two years that the project has existed. If the SLS schedule continues to slip at this rate over the next four years, the date of the first SLS launch will slip from 2018 to 2020. And then from 2018 to 2020, SLS will slip one more year or so before finally launching for the first time somewhere in the 2021-2022 timeframe.As we all know, SLS launched towards the end of 2022, not in 2017. My simple observation about the rate of SLS schedule slippage — something my 5th grader could do — was more accurate in predicting when SLS launched than the PM’s complex schedule argument by four years. More importantly, my straight line projection was actually accurate. So I would not discount a straight line projection from the IG on ML-2. I would, however, discount Koerner’s contention that the ML-2 project will behave differently than it has in the past.— I joined OMB the year after NGST (now JWST) was added to the budget. I inherited the space science portfolio from my new boss. Unlike him, I had half a degree in astrophysics and had access to papers on the relationship between the main mirror diameter and the cost of ground-based segmented telescopes. NGST was way off (the wrong way) the straight-line slope for that cost-estimating relationship (or CER). Told my boss that NGST was going to come in for billions over budget. He said it was too late. Listened to Weiler, Seery, and others bend over backwards to argue why NGST would be different. It wasn’t. The stupidity on the cost-estimating was baked into the project from the start, could never be fixed, and doomed the project to massive overruns when someone could have just used a straight line CER and much more accurately projected the final cost. Again, I’ll take a straight line analysis from an independent authority over a convoluted explanation from a program in sales mode, any day.FWIW...
While officials expect cost growth to lessen over time now that Bechtel has started construction of the launcher, it is too soon to tell if these developments will have an impact on the overall cost growth and schedule delays.
Although it took a long time, even James Webb eventually turned a corner.
NASA awarded Bechtel the contract for ML-2 in August 2019 valued at $383 million, with the platform scheduled for delivery to NASA by March 2023. However, costs have grown significantly while schedules slipped. A previous OIG audit of the project in 2022 found that the official cost had grown to $960 million, with independent projections estimating the cost would reach nearly $1.5 billion.The OIG report noted that NASA established what is known as the agency baseline commitment for the ML-2 project in June, setting a cost of $1.8 billion and delivery date of September 2027. That cost includes $168 million in NASA’s own costs for ML-2 outside of the Bechtel contract. NASA, though, said it would hold Bechtel to an estimate made the previous December of $1.3 billion and delivery in November 2026.However, an independent review done as part of development the agency baseline commitment estimated that the project will instead cost $2.1 billion and not be delivered until January 2028. That review, as well as a separate assessment done by NASA’s Exploration Ground Systems (EGS) program, “both found a zero percent likelihood of Bechtel delivering the launcher by November 2026,” OIG stated in its report. [emphasis added]The OIG report also estimates that cost growth in Bechtel’s contact will continue, reaching $2.5 billion by 2027. That would be 6.5 times the original value of the contract when awarded five years ago.“Our projections are based on the substantial cost growth that the Bechtel contract has incurred over the last 3 years, past performance issues observed during design with the production of detailed drawings for steel fabrication and management of the launcher’s weight, and the significant amount of construction work that remains,” the report stated... “Bechtel has yet to demonstrate the sustained level of performance needed to reduce overall costs.”The report added that the overall cost of the ML-2 project could reach $2.7 billion, counting NASA’s contributions that have grown from $96 million at the project’s inception to $168 million today. Part of that growth involves work removed from the Bechtel contract, such as development of 6 of the 11 umbilical arms for the launch tower that NASA will instead build and provide to Bechtel as government-furnished equipment.
The cost growth, OIG added, could strain NASA’s budget. NASA, in its fiscal year 2025 budget request, projected spending $415.5 million on EGS development projects, including ML-2, in fiscal years 2025 through 2027, a 72% increase from the 2024 request. However, that would not be sufficient to cover the OIG’s projected costs of ML-2 development in that time span, with a projected shortfall of nearly $400 million.
There is little NASA can do, the report concluded, to encourage Bechtel to reduce its costs. The cost-plus contract does include an option to convert it into a fixed-price contract, but NASA is unlikely to use that option, the report concluded, since it would require Bechtel to approve that change. “Bechtel would likely provide a cost proposal far beyond NASA’s budgetary capacity to account for the additional risk that comes with a fixed-price contract,” the report stated, citing discussions with NASA officials.
One might expect the audit to come up two days later at a meeting of the NASA Advisory Council’s human exploration and operations committee, given the long-running concerns about the ML-2 project. Instead, NASA officials and committee members focused not on the auditors’ report but on the auditors themselves.
The committee was sympathetic to Koerner’s concerns. Later in the meeting, they started drafting a recommendation that the NASA administrator “seek relief from the burden of multiple external audits” by asking the White House and Congress to limit such audits unless required by law.“We all absolutely agree with and, quite frankly, support independent assessments,” said one committee member, Kwatsi Alibaruho, “but the level of audits that have been requested have now grown to the point where it’s becoming a significant portion of the team’s overall work.Another committee member, Paul McConnaughey, was worried that when OIG or the Government Accountability Office (GAO) releases audits, “the press takes that and sensationalizes it, and inappropriately so.