From the image on this page... http://www.nasa.gov/content/boeing-finishes-commercial-crew-space-act-agreement-for-cst-100atlas-v/#.VEFrEPnF8n0Looks like the artist might've been a little rushed, the model normals for the RCS covers are inverted edit: Actually there are a -lot- of little mistakes like that, visible gaps between objects, no holddowns on the Atlas...
Quote from: joek on 10/05/2014 12:48 amQuote from: Coastal Ron on 10/04/2014 05:10 amAs to milestones during CCiCap, again despite Boeing's seeming advantages both financially and technically, they were not doing any full up hardware testing like SNC and SpaceX, and with what appeared to be the most basic design they still cost $1.6B more than SpaceX for CCtCap.Yes, Boeing's CCiCap goals were more conservative. Yes, they got more money. However, Boeing's CCiCap execution was near faultless...We already agree that Boeing had the most conservative design, and I would argue that they also had the most conservative milestone schedule too. No tests with vehicles like Sierra Nevada and SpaceX. They pushed off that type of work into CCtCap, which depending on your point of view actually increases the risk potential that they could fail, since they weren't able to validate their designs earlier in the Commercial Crew program.
Quote from: Coastal Ron on 10/04/2014 05:10 amAs to milestones during CCiCap, again despite Boeing's seeming advantages both financially and technically, they were not doing any full up hardware testing like SNC and SpaceX, and with what appeared to be the most basic design they still cost $1.6B more than SpaceX for CCtCap.Yes, Boeing's CCiCap goals were more conservative. Yes, they got more money. However, Boeing's CCiCap execution was near faultless...
As to milestones during CCiCap, again despite Boeing's seeming advantages both financially and technically, they were not doing any full up hardware testing like SNC and SpaceX, and with what appeared to be the most basic design they still cost $1.6B more than SpaceX for CCtCap.
Folks here are definitely losing objectivity and missing some key facts. The points of CCDev 1, 2 and iCAP were to mature their designs and reduce risk. By reduce risk, the companies were to identify their riskier areas and then conduct milestones to mitigate those risks. For DC it mean developing and flight test model and performing a drop test, among others since that was one of the bigger, newer things for it.For Boeing, for example, developing their abort engines, Atlas abort system and air bag systems were significant risks. So that was their major milestones. Their approach has been to leverage heavily off of Apollo and more significantly Orion (modern analysis etc to rely on). So folks criticize Boeing for picking a boring capsule - but that is why they did it. Then people criticize them for not doing more hardware tests - but there was no need to. Also, the paid milestones are not all the work the companies have been doing.
Quote from: rusty on 10/21/2014 10:19 pmSomething stinks, and it ain't me.^^Yet another person who doesn't understand the engineering design process.
Something stinks, and it ain't me.
"For Boeing, for example," you've outlined how they didn't actually DO anything to get such a massive contract and what minimal effort and absence of engineering they put forth. The "significant risks" were addressed by using other's work, previous designs and putting off testing them. The capsule is based on others work, previous designs and no where near actually tested.The only thing that can be chalked up to Boeing is "modern analysis" aka algorithmic work on their CAD compilations. In that regard, I'd point out algorithms are no substitute for the hardware tests Boeing explicitly didn't do unlike its competitors. ie; on Boeing's 787, hardware tests revealed algorithmic conclusions to be insufficient - the wingbox (delaminated), power systems (failed and fires) and fuel lines (expansion); on Lockheed's LCS, waves predictably caused the hull and structure to fracture.The only task Being actually completed (the "significant risks" were only addressed, not completed) was crunching numbers on their Powerpoint proposal and accounts for exactly bumpkiss towards developing a system. But somehow this justified a four-plus billion dollar contract at the expense of a more developed, capable and cheaper proposal. Something stinks, and it ain't me.
Quote from: SWGlassPit on 10/21/2014 10:31 pmQuote from: rusty on 10/21/2014 10:19 pmSomething stinks, and it ain't me.^^Yet another person who doesn't understand the engineering design process. There isn't just one engineering design process. The mere fact of having completed the design review doesn't mean anything definite, except that it's a box ticked off on a NASA check list.
But the other hand, Boeing has clearly done considerably more than analysis and powerpoints. They've built and tested hardware, even if they haven't built a complete capsule yet.
Quote from: Nindalf on 10/21/2014 11:11 pmQuote from: SWGlassPit on 10/21/2014 10:31 pmQuote from: rusty on 10/21/2014 10:19 pmSomething stinks, and it ain't me.^^Yet another person who doesn't understand the engineering design process. There isn't just one engineering design process. The mere fact of having completed the design review doesn't mean anything definite, except that it's a box ticked off on a NASA check list.This is what it means:http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=35717.msg1272734#msg1272734
I have a friend who worked designing cruise missiles (for a group that is now part of Boeing). He described CDRs in rather unflattering terms....He said that neither of the main CDR goals (Is the design sound? Is it ready for fabrication?) was advanced by the CDR. The first had been settled long ago, by informal meetings between the relevant technical experts. It was unthinkable that anyone would advance to a CDR with any serious technical questions unanswered....When he switched to the military side of the house (not by choice, his commercial product got cancelled), he started to have to run formal CDRs. He felt the process sucked up an enormous amount of engineering time, to very little practical benefit.
In a perfect world, the CDR is where you certify that the design is complete and correct and you are ready to start cutting metal - but in reality, with concurrent engineering practices the wall between "design" and "fabrication" is largely broken down....The other thing is that there is no such monolithic thing as "CDR". Every individual system usually has their own CDR, and in some organizations they have both "internal CDRs" and "external CDRs". There are "Mission System CDRs" and "Flight System CDRs" and "Program CDRs"....the worst CDRs I've ever been involved with were the ones where the organization wasn't ready, but the program schedule said this was when the CDR took place, and they held it anyway. That wastes everyone's time for a week and gives rise to the worst possible outcome, a "Delta CDR" where you spend another week doing it all over again.
Exactly what a CDR means varies from case to case, and when the CDR is a contract milestone you get paid for meeting, it clearly means a lot less because you're given such a strong incentive to declare it completed.
Quote from: Nindalf on 10/21/2014 11:58 pmExactly what a CDR means varies from case to case, and when the CDR is a contract milestone you get paid for meeting, it clearly means a lot less because you're given such a strong incentive to declare it completed.Clearly. Right. Because, clearly, it couldn't be that a company has internal checks and balances, hires top-notch consultants to get additional insights and external checks on its checks and balances, and the teams involved have not only professional capability but pride invested in doing a good job.Sheesh.
Because these kinds of shenanigans do happen, saying the contractually mandated CDR is done tells you approximately nothing, by itself.
Quote from: OpsAnalyst on 10/22/2014 12:18 amQuote from: Nindalf on 10/21/2014 11:58 pmExactly what a CDR means varies from case to case, and when the CDR is a contract milestone you get paid for meeting, it clearly means a lot less because you're given such a strong incentive to declare it completed.Clearly. Right. Because, clearly, it couldn't be that a company has internal checks and balances, hires top-notch consultants to get additional insights and external checks on its checks and balances, and the teams involved have not only professional capability but pride invested in doing a good job.Sheesh.I'm talking about what having the CDR done means, not what the situation may be when the CDR is done.obi-wan mentioned cases where people just did a CDR prematurely for the sake of keeping on schedule, and then quietly did the real one when they were ready for it.Because these kinds of shenanigans do happen, saying the contractually mandated CDR is done tells you approximately nothing, by itself.
Sorry, no, that's not what I said. Delta CDRs are a bad thing - it announces to the world you screwed up your CDR
And, by the way, there's no such thing as a meaningless CDR. You always come out of it stronger because smart, experienced people who are not on your team sit on a review board and critique your work. It is an incredible pain in the ass and worth its weight in gold to your program...
Here it my contribution about the topic.
Quote from: obi-wan on 10/22/2014 05:03 amSorry, no, that's not what I said. Delta CDRs are a bad thing - it announces to the world you screwed up your CDRSorry, I did misunderstand what you were saying. However, you were saying that there are CDRs, and there are CDRs. There isn't just one that always means the project is really good to go, which is what people are treating it as.QuoteAnd, by the way, there's no such thing as a meaningless CDR. You always come out of it stronger because smart, experienced people who are not on your team sit on a review board and critique your work. It is an incredible pain in the ass and worth its weight in gold to your program...That seems like it must depend on the relative ability, level of effort, and match-up of design philosophy of the review board to the design team.LouScheffer's friend sounds like he sure doesn't think they're worth their weight in gold.It seems to me that trying to satisfy all of a board's concerns can turn into something closely resembling a design-by-committee, and letting that happen is the easiest way to pass review.
All due respect but it sounds to me as though you're reaching over and over again to find ways to question the validity of Boeing's CDR, adjusting your argument as you get new facts.
Also by your logic, NASA doesn't know how to evaluate a CDR (remember they have to concur that milestones are met) - which is laughable. Unless you also want to say that "the fix is in".There are standards in engineering. Just like the rest of the world, sometimes people don't meet those standards. But Boeing is not one of the world's top-of-class engineering companies by accident, or by dint of rent-seeking, or via any other mechanism. Take a look at ISS - talk about _pain_ as regards CDRs and FRR's and all the rest (I was there) - and done with an international team speaking multiple languages just learning how to play together. It has a superb on-orbit ops record. Without hyperbole, it is one of the greatest engineering achievements (and systems integration achievements) in human history. They must've had some idea what they were doing.
It's quite entertaining to watch someone with very little actual knowledge of the CDR process actually try to stare down a professional expert. Thanks for the light-hearted moments
Quote from: archipeppe68 on 10/22/2014 07:47 amHere it my contribution about the topic.Thanks for the upload. Just cause it was going to bug me the rest of the day, I rearranged the projections so that the capsule is never pointed sideways. The drafter in me is lashing out.