Who will write the full story of NLS/Constellation/Direct/HLLV/SLS?

[JAFO]

On occasion I've tried to explain to my non-space geek friends what happened to Constellation, about Direct and it's heritage in NLS, and the rumors of reprisal for anyone who disagreed with the Constellation.

Do you think anyone will ever put it all together in one volume? I'd buy that book.

[daver]

Title:  How We Lost The Moon

[Downix]

On occasion I've tried to explain to my non-space geek friends what happened to Constellation, about Direct and it's heritage in NLS, nd the rumors of reprisal for anyone who disagreed with the Constellation.

Do you think anyone will ever put it all together in one volume? I'd buy that book.

Hmm, I'm not doing anything...

[MATTBLAK]

One of the only troubles writing such a book will be reading the reviews later; you'd be accused of bias and so called paraphrasing. You've only got to read some of the arguments over the years on this website (and others) where you get people saying "That's not how it happened" or "That's not what they meant" or "that's not how they got to that decision".

[edkyle99]

On occasion I've tried to explain to my non-space geek friends what happened to Constellation, about Direct and it's heritage in NLS, and the rumors of reprisal for anyone who disagreed with the Constellation.

Do you think anyone will ever put it all together in one volume? I'd buy that book.

Any such story will be hard to present in unbiased fashion, perhaps impossible to present in unbiased fashion by anyone involved, and I'm not sure if enough would want to read it to make it worthwhile.  Your "rumors of reprisal" is an example of the loaded, unsubstantiated types of discussions that have surrounded this affair, for years.  The topic is personal, and political, and rumor plagued, and it doesn't have a happy ending. 

 - Ed Kyle

[MATTBLAK]

"Rumors of reprisal" may on occasion have been exaggerated and comments/actions related to it apocryphal even. But the reprisals - severe or not - were real. I'm sure people like Chuck Longton and Ross Tierney have stored up anecdotes of events recounted by their colleagues, not to mention things that happened to themselves through the whole 'Direct' process.

[QuantumG]

pfft.. unbiased. Publish the most biased account of history you can.. if you annoy enough people they'll publish their own biased account. Future readers will argue over which account was true, and keep the memory alive. Oh, and in a hundred years, no-one will read your blog but dead trees will still sit on shelves.

[kraisee]

I don't normally come to the forum any more, but a friend mentioned this thread so I thought I should momentarily come out of retirement and respond, to put this subject to rest once and for all.

As the only person on the DIRECT Team with access to every other member of the team my input in a book would be essential.   With the utmost respect to both, neither Steve Metschan nor Chuck Longton have all the pieces.

I am sorry to say, but I have already refused to be involved in a book because it would only serve to pick at scabs, embarrass the agency and stroke some people's ego's.   That was never part of the reason for me creating DIRECT.

I apologize to all those who would like to learn more about what we did and how we did it, but everything that will ever see the light of day is already published -- most of it on this forum.

DIRECT is over.   I suggest everyone concentrate on building the future instead of reminiscing over the past.

Ross.

[MATTBLAK]

Appreciate your reply, Ross and its good to hear from you. And if you fully re-read some of the posts above, mine included, you'll see that we already agree with you. 'Picking at scabs' seems to imply, from my point of view, that this subject is hard for you to talk about. I respect that as doubtless others do as well.

Nonetheless, if anyone does write a future book about the demise of Constellation and talks about why; the blogosphere's hatred of CXP will certainly be mentioned and we must expect 'DIRECT' to make up one or three paragraphs in such a book. Its only natural. 'DIRECT' was important - for a time. Anyone who denies that may be, er... In denial. All other related factors can be disseminated endlessly. Er... But I hope not!

[Downix]

Appreciate your reply, Ross and its good to hear from you. And if you fully re-read some of the posts above, mine included, you'll see that we already agree with you. 'Picking at scabs' seems to imply, from my point of view, that this subject is hard for you to talk about. I respect that as doubtless others do as well.

Nonetheless, if anyone does write a future book about the demise of Constellation and talks about why; the blogosphere's hatred of CXP will certainly be mentioned and we must expect 'DIRECT' to make up one or three paragraphs in such a book. Its only natural. 'DIRECT' was important - for a time. Anyone who denies that may be, er... In denial. All other related factors can be disseminated endlessly. Er... But I hope not!

It also would depend on how it is done as well. If presented as an either-or message, yes, would be used to bruise egos, pick at scabs, etc. But it could be done differently, instead focusing less on the conflict, but on the lessons learned from both and how they lead to SLS. Focusing on the future by presenting the past for lessons learned.

[MATTBLAK]

Agreed. And doing a chronological run through of 'this was proposed by so-and-so, and adopted' or 'this was proposed and rejected/cancelled' is essential. Just report the facts without showing bias and teeth-gnashing. "The Direct men made their presentation and this is what they believed". Just that - no second guessing or post-mortems as such. Let the reader decide who was right. Or quote notable people on both sides of the fence; "we believe this was good because" and "this is why we think this was a bad idea."

No editorializing - just the facts. Hard in this day and age, I know.

[daver]

  I'd like to hear the NASA side/bias of this story.   I'm fairly angry that so much money

 and a once in a generation opportunity was wasted.    How was a rocket (Ares I) selected that

 wasn't possible to build and function as advertised?    How did NASA interpret VSE into ESAS?   

[sdsds]

How was it selected? Probabilistic Risk Assessment. Would it have worked? Probably.

[Downix]

How was it selected? Probabilistic Risk Assessment. Would it have worked? Probably.

If they'd have stuck to it, sure. Although I suspect the cost to air-start the SSME would have been higher than the original estimate.

[MATTBLAK]

It's some story, Daver - quite a story. But to try and summarize it here would probably make the Moderators step in after quite a 'pie throwing' fight had got up and running. I will just keep my version to one sentence: Constellation did not need cancellation; just pragmatic alteration - some of it radical. That's all I'm going to say.

Read back through the old threads and a picture may emerge for you.

[Downix]

It's some story, Daver - quite a story. But to try and summarize it here would probably make the Moderators step in after quite a 'pie throwing' fight had got up and running. I will just keep my version to one sentence: Constellation did not need cancellation; just pragmatic alteration - some of it radical. That's all I'm going to say.

Read back through the old threads and a picture may emerge for you.

You put it well.

[daver]

I'm pretty familiar with the whole story.   Guess that's why I'm angry and want to hear NASA's side.

[FinalFrontier]

I don't normally come to the forum any more, but a friend mentioned this thread so I thought I should momentarily come out of retirement and respond, to put this subject to rest once and for all.

As the only person on the DIRECT Team with access to every other member of the team my input in a book would be essential.   With the utmost respect to both, neither Steve Metschan nor Chuck Longton have all the pieces.

I am sorry to say, but I have already refused to be involved in a book because it would only serve to pick at scabs, embarrass the agency and stroke some people's ego's.   That was never part of the reason for me creating DIRECT.

I apologize to all those who would like to learn more about what we did and how we did it, but everything that will ever see the light of day is already published -- most of it on this forum.

DIRECT is over.   I suggest everyone concentrate on building the future instead of reminiscing over the past.

Ross.

I honestly never expected to see you around here again, but I appreciate the reply and I agree as far as the history is concerned. I won't comment on what you said about Chuck and Steve.


This is perhaps, one piece of history that should fade with time. Those of us who were here to watch it, or were a part of it can pass it on to our children and grandchildren if we want, or share it with friends, but aside from that this is not really something that ought to be made into a book or a movie, although someone here is attempting the latter atm.

I do hope you read this reply at some point.

FF

[FinalFrontier]

I'm pretty familiar with the whole story.   Guess that's why I'm angry and want to hear NASA's side.

What side would that be? Most of the people who would have provided counterpoints are fired, disgraced, or both over the cxp nightmare. And this is essentially their biggest embarrassment I doubt they would want to discuss it.

The rest are people who either won't speak about it, or won't have much to say if they do, largely because they were involved.

I do get where your coming from I just don't see the point.


World's moved on already.

[Chris Bergin]

Sorry to interupt the armwaving, but here's the DIRECT story:

http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2010/10/direct-handover-movement-leaders-work-complete/

[FinalFrontier]

Sorry to interupt the armwaving, but here's the DIRECT story:

http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2010/10/direct-handover-movement-leaders-work-complete/

Yep. No need for a book really that tells the story fine.

[Jim]

Also, Direct is a footnote and not a real player in this.  This forum is the only place where is where it got real attention.  Most of the industry had no idea that Direct existed.

This is the sequence

STAS/ALS/NLS/SEI/SLI/CYCLES/ESAS/SLS

Direct might make into the discussion but it would get less attention than OSP, X-38, etc.  Augustine presentation was a blip on the radar.

[clongton]

I don't normally come to the forum any more, but a friend mentioned this thread so I thought I should momentarily come out of retirement and respond, to put this subject to rest once and for all.

As the only person on the DIRECT Team with access to every other member of the team my input in a book would be essential.   With the utmost respect to both, neither Steve Metschan nor Chuck Longton have all the pieces.

I am sorry to say, but I have already refused to be involved in a book because it would only serve to pick at scabs, embarrass the agency and stroke some people's ego's.   That was never part of the reason for me creating DIRECT.

I apologize to all those who would like to learn more about what we did and how we did it, but everything that will ever see the light of day is already published -- most of it on this forum.

DIRECT is over.   I suggest everyone concentrate on building the future instead of reminiscing over the past.

Ross.

As we (the DIRECT team) indicated countless times, if/once our efforts got to the point of being accepted, which they finally were, that we would turn everything over to NASA to follow thru on and then DIRECT would become a footnote in history. We used the phrase “we intended to fade into the mist”, which we largely have, as promised. Our intent was never to create a program that competed against NASA, but rather to create a program sufficiently well technically grounded that NASA would *seriously* look at it, adopt its guiding principles and then use it to create *their* program instead of the financial disaster of Griffin's CxP. Our hope was that NASA would do this soon enough to prevent the huge manned launch gap and avoid any need to depend on Russia to take US astronauts to the ISS.

Well NASA did finally accept our work and the President signed the law authorizing it in October of 2010. From that point forward, DIRECT ceased to exist – as promised. We had done what we had set out to do, not as quickly as we had hoped, but NASA was now designing their flagship HLV based on the principles we had espoused. It looks like a Jupiter but it is not a Jupiter. We never believed it would be. It is NASA's as yet unnamed flagship HLV and we (DIRECT team) hope that NASA succeeds with this effort.

I am still around, posting and contributing, but if you will look at what I write, I never mention DIRECT or Jupiter anymore except in proper context for a different subject. There is no need. Dwelling on the past robs us of the future.

Ross is right. DIRECT is DONE. NASA has a new program now. Given the economy it was inevitable that Griffin's vision for CxP would implode, and we are gratified that we were able to play a small part in providing a path out of the mess that implosion left behind. But that is the past and the past, as interesting, exciting, absorbing, taxing and thrilling as it was, is still the past. Let us learn the lessons of the past well so that we do not repeat the avoidable mistakes as we all move forward into a new future, not looking back. There is an entire solar system out there waiting for us; planets, moons, asteroids, comets, NEO's. Let's focus there, not on the past. Forward!

[Rocket Science]

With all due respect to our friends Chuck and Ross I feel the last chapter is yet to be written. There are still unknowns out there not so much technically but politically in the upcoming months. Stay tuned…

When we see its first iteration sitting on the pad, we can think of a book and then it will be a new beginning and not an ending….

Thanks again for all their hard efforts and to the many still unnamed members of their team that contributed to this nation’s spaceflight history.

[clongton]

STAS/ALS/NLS/SEI/SLI/CYCLES/ESAS/(DIRECT) SLS

Added (DIRECT) because the 2010 Authorization Act signed by President Obama actually incorporated our design parameters in funding SLS. The SLS HLV is *not* a Jupiter, but is solidly designed around it.

Yes, DIRECT is a footnote, as it should be, but it is a prominent footnote.

This forum is the only place where it got real attention

It also got a *lot* of very real attention in the Senate. We were there.

[edkyle99]

Also, Direct is a footnote and not a real player in this.  This forum is the only place where is where it got real attention. 

It did garner some public attention.

http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/space/nasa/4295233?page=3&series=35

Personally, and I don't mean this to disparage those who worked on it, I think that Direct hurt NASA's chances at a lunar landing by giving ammunition to those who opposed Constellation. 

But, in the end, Constellation didn't end because of Direct.  It ended because a new President was elected, who cancelled it.

 - Ed Kyle

[Jim]

Personally, and I don't mean this to disparage those who worked on it, I think that Direct hurt NASA's chances at a lunar landing by giving ammunition to those who opposed Constellation. 

There never was a chance with Constellation

[clongton]

I think that Direct hurt NASA's chances at a lunar landing by giving ammunition to those who opposed Constellation. 

The only "ammunition" that we provided was the truth; that Griffin's CxP was over-priced, inefficient, technically inferior and completely incapable of meeting its objectives on the schedule it had and with the funding available.

All we did was design and analytically show a way to save the entire program, keep the people working, eliminate the gap, retire the shuttle and operate Constellation launch vehicles and spacecraft with a 1-year overlap with STS, and at the same time provide a way for NASA to actually achieve the lunar goals outlined in the ESAS, sooner than CxP and for just over 1/2 the cost.

That's all we did.

[sdsds]

The saddest lesson to learn from the story is that smart people (including an aerospace engineer turned NASA Administrator, and executives of large corporations) can grievously mis-predict how other people (say United States Senators and Representatives) are likely to respond in certain situations. It was difficult to believe the country would allow itself to enter another extended gap in its ability to launch humans into space.

IMO an unbiased assessment would conclude this led to "brinkmanship," with sad results.

[sdsds]

No telling could claim to be the "full story" unless it described the outcomes which participants like Dr Griffin were trying to avoid. In particular he seemed to fear the "trapped in LEO" outcome where the CLV got developed but not the CaLV, nor its EDS, nor the lander. The CLV would then have flown Orion to LEO; those missions would consume the available budget, and no further progress developing BEO systems would be made. He similarly feared shuttle extension because its operating costs would preclude development of BEO systems.

And subtly, he feared an active LEO space program would erode support for a BEO space program. Why fund expensive spaceflight development if we can already "do" spaceflight?

Note that the "SLS + Commercial Crew" compromise attempts to solve this dilemma in a way that Dr Griffin apparently did not believe would work.

[spectre9]

I don't understand why Griffin is demonised.

I find him to be the sort of dry intellectual person that is switched in on many levels and excelled at the job he was given.

Didn't seem to me like he had any agendas or friends to look after, just wanted to develop the stategies and technologies that will get NASA out into deep space.

He steered NASA towards exploration. He wanted a rocket big enough to go to Mars, he wanted to put American men back on the moon and women there for the first time.

He oversaw shuttle return to flight in which every mission launched and returned safely. Factor in the awesome progress being made on ISS and the launch rates of shuttle over this period and I'd say he has earnt his place in spaceflight history.

Many of the progams he started had enough foresight that their progress could be taken and used in future programs.

Tooling to build Ares V will now be used to build SLS. 5-seg solids developed for Ares 1 will be the initial boosters. J-2X will be used for the upper stage and will be a great asset for the USA spaceflight industry even if not used for SLS.

Orion is now rebadged as MPCV for BEO missions.

I once looked at some of this stuff as constellation leftovers but I now see that these programs were continued because it was seen that they would be needed long in advance.

[alexw]

If your metric is the disruption to the space industrial base of the US, Griffin was doing a better job of propping that up too.

    Likely not so according to Greason, who would seem to be in a reasonable position to make such an estimate.
          -Alex

[QuantumG]

If your metric is the disruption to the space industrial base of the US, Griffin was doing a better job of propping that up too.

    Likely not so according to Greason, who would seem to be in a reasonable position to make such an estimate.

What in particular? I find it hard for anyone to argue that NASA is supporting the space industrial base better now than it was under Griffin, or would have if Constellation had been steaming along for the last few years rather than the years of nothing that we've had. PWR wasn't for sale under Griffin.

Obviously if you're having private conversations with Jeff you should keep those to yourself, but if you're talking about one particular public comment, quote it.

[alexw]

If your metric is the disruption to the space industrial base of the US, Griffin was doing a better job of propping that up too.

    Likely not so according to Greason, who would seem to be in a reasonable position to make such an estimate.

What in particular? I find it hard for anyone to argue that NASA is supporting the space industrial base better now than it was under Griffin, or would have if Constellation had been steaming along for the last few years rather than the years of nothing that we've had. PWR wasn't for sale under Griffin.
Obviously if you're having private conversations with Jeff you should keep those to yourself, but if you're talking about one particular public comment, quote it.

    2010 ISDC talk. I can't say for certain what he'd say about how NASA is supporting the space industrial base now, but he was fairly emphatic that Constellation was detrimental to it, absent very large funding increases that he also argued weren't going to happen, much less over the long term.
                   -Alex

[MATTBLAK]

Dr Griffin could have saved Constellation if he made pragmatic changes to it: the biggest money pits were Ares V - too big and expensive - and Ares 1: not needed because it has consequently been proven that Delta IV-H would have been good enough. Initially, Ares 1 was said to cost $17 billion to develop and deploy. But when the figure came back as $35 billion dollars instead and was going to be years late, credibility started to slip. And Ares V was estimated to cost at least that much again on top of that!! There was no way NASA was going to be able to raise $70 billion dollars to develop one too-large booster and one unneeded one!

That's part of the reason the 'DIRECT' guys came up with an Inline design that was a very sensible compromise - at least as far as Shuttle Derived was concerned. With a more 'basic' Shuttle Derived launcher that wouldn't overtly tear up the existing Shuttle infrastructure like Ares V would have done, Griffin could have orbited more mass in two launches - not the "1.5 launch" architecture - and cut the cost & schedule of booster development in half. And then, there probably would have been enough money to develop a re-usable Altair lunar lander; not one that might cost - conservatively - $1 billion dollars per craft to build.

And if Dr Griffin had wanted to save even more money, he could have developed John Shannon's big "Side Mount" HLV, giving up some payload capability of course. But adjust the hardware and architecture to cope and to compensate. And finally, if Griffin wanted to save even more money: proceed with the development of Phase I EELV upgrades and adjust the mission architecture to compensate for the lack of lifting power. But the often-discussed, often-debated views have been that there were too many vested interests who had Dr Griffin's ear and because he was not willing to compromise - even to the extent of actually saving his precious Moon & Beyond missions - his legacy has been tainted. For a time, he had bi-partisan support for Constellation and he had a literally once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to build NASA back up to something (more) special again. He failed.

Look; I met Dr Griffin last year and he was really nice to talk to for the brief minutes I had with him, so it's hard for me to demonize him as others had. But if he ever gets the chance to be NASA Administrator again - something that would fill some folk with dread, I know - I hope he would have learned the History lessons, partly of his own making and then make things right. Its a slim chance that he would get back in; such as if there were a change of President, but stranger things have happened.

You know that old Chinese curse about "living in interesting times?" Well, I think we are in them, right now...

[Chris Bergin]

I see it got a bit crazy overnight. Trim and lock (Matt's post came as I was trimming, so adding to the end as it wasn't part of the crap I keep telling people not to post on here.

Annnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnd locked!