Chuck/Ross, heres the $40Bn question.
Norm Augustine has just gone on record saying that an ISS extension to 2020, coupled with flying Shuttle until Comm.Crew is available and a tech programme developing a more directly shuttle derived HLLV {Option 5C*/Dream Scenario) is about a $4Bn p/a increase to the NASA budget until FY2020.
Can you give a estimate of the reduction if a Direct architecture is adopted, allowing for an earlier flyout of the Shuttle and early flights of J130 to fill the gap?
That really is the $40bn question!
The missing element in this whole debate is the Jupiter-130.
*IF* you had no choice but to go straight to Jupiter-241 (as Aerospace studied), then there is going to be a gap. For a start you must wait for the J-2X engine to be ready, and for a completely new Upper Stage to be developed & certified. You must also pay the full total for the entire Jupiter development effort up front before the IOC flight actually happens.
Yes, of course planning to go straight to any vehicle which requires those long-lead-time items is going to take some time. Duh!
But if you look at our basic approach, we have NEVER proposed going straight to the Jupiter-24x series first.
We have always proposed the interim Jupiter 1xx series as the logical "stepping stone" which gets you operating a viable solution much sooner and for much lower cost than its bigger brother.
If you bother to stop and consider the much less demanding Jupiter-130, which is specifically intended to remove those long-lead-time items from the initial critical-path, you get a solution which solves most of the issues in terms of Cost, Schedule and Workforce:-
* Jupiter-130 re-uses the existing SSME's with no changes.
* Jupiter-130 re-uses the existing 4-segment SRB's with no changes.
* Jupiter-130 re-uses the existing manufacturing facilities at the Michoud Assembly Facility with only moderate changes needed to approx 20-25% of the tooling there today.
* Jupiter-130 re-uses most of the existing facilities at the Kennedy Space Center which are used right now to process Shuttle's, again with only moderate changes required.
These each have a MAJOR positive impact to the budget and the schedule, not to mention the workforce retention issues as well.
What Jupiter-130 brings to the table is a rational way to implement a forward-looking Heavy Lift, High Volume, safe, Crewed launch solution which can realistically become operational in the 2014 time-frame by deliberately and carefully using only existing technologies and capabilities to keep cost and schedule impacts as low as possible -- and which can still then be upgraded to full performance capability a little while later.
Jupiter-130 is the missing part of the puzzle. Once you "get" that, it opens up a whole new layer of excellent options.
So, in summary, below is what we believe is achievable if we use the general outline of the DIRECT approach, but tailored specifically to fit the proposed "Flexible Path" architecture as described by the Augustine Committee:-
Cost Profile: Flexible Path w/ hi-priority on Human Lunar Return included.
Standard Augustine Committee Margins assumed throughout: 51% Development and 25% Operational margin.
Schedule Adjustments:
In-Space Refueling: Deferred 2 years
Other CxP Elements: Deferred 2 years
Other Non-CxP-Elements: Deferred 3 years
Beyond LEO Capability: Deferred 2 years
Technology Development: Deferred 1 year
Achievable Milestones:
- STS Current 6-flight Manifest "Stretched", not "Extended" to End FY2012 (no extra missions)
- ISS Extended to: 2020 (includes Heavy-Lift launch of ESA Expansion Module around 2017)
- Commercial Crew to ISS: 2016 thru 2020
- Jupiter-130/Orion IOC:
2014 (Gap: Less Than
2 years * )
- Jupiter-246 IOC: 2017 (Option: Jupiter-241 IOC: +1 year)
- Lagrange Mission: 2018
- Human Lunar Return: 2019
- NEO: 2022
- Phobos: 2025
- Mars: 2028-2030
* - "Gap" refers to the "Crew Flight Gap". Test flights of initial Jupiter-130-X will occur before the last Shuttle flight, so "Workforce Gap" will be non-existent.
Ross.