Quote from: laszlo on 08/05/2016 01:02 pmI've seen speculation by Cold War historians that if Kennedy had not been assassinated America's involvement in Viet Nam would have been very much smaller, never expanding much beyond advisors on the ground. They based this on the idea that Kennedy, having come through the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis, would had a strong enough anti-communism reputation to avoid having to demonstrate his opposition through military entanglements. If so, that would have left much more money for the moon, as well as probably denying Nixon the presidency.That is a common myth in most history text books. Looking at his record with the Berlin Crisis, Cuban Missile Crisis, Bay of Pigs I question that. Personal opinion based on the stands he took, Kennedy would have ratcheted up VietNam. How the war would have progressed after that point is anyone's guess. I also do not think we would have had as large a space program. There is a good chance that he would have closed the money valve sooner. That said, Johnson would have never launched the Great Society social programs, which also drained a large amount of money.
I've seen speculation by Cold War historians that if Kennedy had not been assassinated America's involvement in Viet Nam would have been very much smaller, never expanding much beyond advisors on the ground. They based this on the idea that Kennedy, having come through the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis, would had a strong enough anti-communism reputation to avoid having to demonstrate his opposition through military entanglements. If so, that would have left much more money for the moon, as well as probably denying Nixon the presidency.
I have finished the book. Took a while to get through because it was so disturbing to me the dismantling of the Apollo program. It was shocking to me to read how Apollo 16 and 17 were almost canceled by Nixon. A big reason they were not canceled was so Nixon could win California in the 1972 election. How Apollo 16 was moved so it wouldn't coincide with Nixon's trip to China in February 1972. Makes me wonder what would have happened if a Democratic President was elected in 1968 instead of Nixon.
The education this site has provided has change my mind that 'it's Nixon's fault' (a position I've held since Nixon was in office) to 'it was inevitable'. International politics created the conditions for Apollo to be proposed and flown. There was no political need for Apollo by the time it succeeded . Sure, we see the benefits of the program beyond the political but we don't control the budget.
There's a memo dated May 24, 1972 that discuss long term storage of Saturn V, well into the 80's. Main issue: lost of skills, and money.
In particular, there had been pressure from OMB to build a smaller Shuttle, but the decision to go with the larger one appears to have been based largely on the fact that the larger Shuttle would generate more employment in California.NASA's argument for the larger Shuttle was that the smaller version preferred by OMB would not have been able to carry big military payloads, so the Air Force would have had to keep the Titan III in service. In retrospect, that would have been a very good thing.
That is a common myth in most history text books. Looking at his record with the Berlin Crisis, Cuban Missile Crisis, Bay of Pigs I question that. Personal opinion based on the stands he took, Kennedy would have ratcheted up VietNam. How the war would have progressed after that point is anyone's guess.
...to 'it was inevitable'. International politics created the conditions for Apollo to be proposed and flown.
Quote from: Archibald on 08/05/2016 07:20 amThere's a memo dated May 24, 1972 that discuss long term storage of Saturn V, well into the 80's. Main issue: lost of skills, and money. I used to have a copy of what I think was that memo, but, if I recall correctly, it addresses only the Saturns -- likely for launching space stations. I don't believe it covers the preservation of the Apollo spacecraft and systems.By the way, if anyone has a copy of that memo, I'd be grateful for a copy.
By the way, anyone who doesn't have access to a copy of Logsdon's book may get the flavor of it from the attached article by Logsdon that was made available on the website of the journal Space Policy.
Quote from: Proponent on 08/07/2016 09:16 pmBy the way, anyone who doesn't have access to a copy of Logsdon's book may get the flavor of it from the attached article by Logsdon that was made available on the website of the journal Space Policy.A very good read. After Apollo is now on my (expensive) Amazon wish list (among 10 books totalling 300 euros)
Quote from: Archibald on 08/08/2016 08:06 amQuote from: Proponent on 08/07/2016 09:16 pmBy the way, anyone who doesn't have access to a copy of Logsdon's book may get the flavor of it from the attached article by Logsdon that was made available on the website of the journal Space Policy.A very good read. After Apollo is now on my (expensive) Amazon wish list (among 10 books totalling 300 euros) Keep a sharp eye out on the prices, for some reason they tend to change for what seems no rhyme or reason and what it quotes might not be the lowest price available I was looking to order a paperback reference book I'd lost a few years ago when my wife looked over my shoulder and said "NO!" in no uncertain terms. Looking closer the one Amazon defaulted to was a "used-paperback" copy listed for $243.00! I found one for a much more reasonable $25.00 but...
I really enjoyed Logsdon's book. In fact, it was the first piece of non-fiction I've read in a while that I found difficult to put down. It's pretty clear that NASA was due for a fall: the moon landing having been accomplished, there was no possibility of a similarly aggressive follow-on program. Not only was Nixon not interested, but for the most part, neither was Congress.
Maybe Apollos 18 & 19 would have flown under another president. Nixon seems to have been quite traumatized by Apollo 13. But -- and this is what I found most interesting -- parts of NASA were not that keen on continuing Apollo either, partly because of risk aversion, and partly because what they really wanted to do was develop new hardware. And that last factor largely answers the question that had most interested me before I read the book, namely why an Earth-orbit-focused program based on Apollo hardware never got much consideration. It seems to me that would have been the best course.
The thing I'd really like to know more about is the Flax Committee, which in the run-up to the Shuttle decision was charged with exploring options for post-Apollo human spaceflight. A wide range of options were under consideration, including Shuttles of various sizes, Titan III-launched spaceplanes and others. Unfortunately, the Flax Committee never produced a final report, and googling has revealed no interim reports or other records.
Logsdon tends to confirm an accusation I've hurled at the Nixon administration in the past. Why would you entrust NASA, of all agencies, to develop and operate a vehicle which was tasked primarily with being economical? NASA had done the impossible -- after being given a blank check. But running something for economic gain requires a different mindset, a different skill set. At the higher levels of the Nixon administration, this never seems to have been appreciated. But then, if the main point of the Shuttle was just to fly astronauts, it didn't much matter either.
Probably should take this one to the alt-history boards instead but I'd like some opinions