SEC. 204. INDEPENDENT STUDY ON HUMAN EXPLORATION OF SPACE.(a) In General- In fiscal year 2012 the Administrator shall contract with the National Academies for a review of the goals, core capabilities, and direction of human space flight, using the goals set forth in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2005, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2008, the goals set forth in this Act, and goals set forth in any existing statement of space policy issued by the President.(b) Elements- The review shall include--(1) a broad spectrum of participation with representatives of a range of disciplines, backgrounds, and generations, including civil, commercial, international, scientific, and national security interests;(2) input from NASA's international partner discussions and NASA's Human Exploration Framework Team;(3) an examination of the relationship of national goals to foundational capabilities, robotic activities, technologies, and missions authorized by this Act;(4) a review and prioritization of scientific, engineering, economic, and social science questions to be addressed by human space exploration to improve the overall human condition; and(5) findings and recommendations for fiscal years 2014 through 2023.
(Responding again, as a way of bumping the thread.)One of the major things that can happen between now and the start of the Report is the discovery of a NEO that is reachable by humans before 2020. At the moment, we just have 1999 AO10 in 2025, which is too far out to really build a program around. If we do discover an object that we can visit soon, that makes a NEO-focus much more likely. If not, I'm pretty sure the Moon will start to look attractive again.
Also, it doesn't make a lot of sense to send a manned mission to a NEO without first sending an unmanned mission, so even a much sooner NEO mission wouldn't necessarily be feasible... we still have to build and launch a probe to such a target, and that takes time.
Quote from: Robotbeat on 10/03/2010 05:28 pmAlso, it doesn't make a lot of sense to send a manned mission to a NEO without first sending an unmanned mission, so even a much sooner NEO mission wouldn't necessarily be feasible... we still have to build and launch a probe to such a target, and that takes time.Why doesn't it make sense? Why must a probe be sent everywhere, everytime first? What specifically forces such planning into the critical path into even going to a small rock in deep space?
Quote from: OV-106 on 10/05/2010 12:48 amQuote from: Robotbeat on 10/03/2010 05:28 pmAlso, it doesn't make a lot of sense to send a manned mission to a NEO without first sending an unmanned mission, so even a much sooner NEO mission wouldn't necessarily be feasible... we still have to build and launch a probe to such a target, and that takes time.Why doesn't it make sense? Why must a probe be sent everywhere, everytime first? What specifically forces such planning into the critical path into even going to a small rock in deep space?It's all about return-on-investment. Sending a probe first means you know what questions you want to answer, and you can tailor your instruments properly and know what kind of tools to bring. We're supposedly doing this for science, remember?
I should note that without sending a probe, all we know about 1999 AO10 is what can be extracted from a point of light. With Apollo, we had maps of the landing sites, and thus could plan ahead of time. Heck, Apollo 12's landing site was first visited by Surveyor 3.Considering the cost of a small unmanned spacecraft, this seems like an obvious thing to do. NEOs generally have lots of close-encounters, and as long as you are within 10 or 12km/s for one of them, it's within our capability using off-the-shelf ion engine technology.
Quote from: Robotbeat on 10/05/2010 01:46 amI should note that without sending a probe, all we know about 1999 AO10 is what can be extracted from a point of light. With Apollo, we had maps of the landing sites, and thus could plan ahead of time. Heck, Apollo 12's landing site was first visited by Surveyor 3.Considering the cost of a small unmanned spacecraft, this seems like an obvious thing to do. NEOs generally have lots of close-encounters, and as long as you are within 10 or 12km/s for one of them, it's within our capability using off-the-shelf ion engine technology.The moon is, well, the moon. It is 1/6 the size of Earth. NEOs are not.
Define "small cost"
and keep trying on how this is "obvious" because you are not there yet.
Quote from: OV-106 on 10/05/2010 01:54 amQuote from: Robotbeat on 10/05/2010 01:46 amI should note that without sending a probe, all we know about 1999 AO10 is what can be extracted from a point of light. With Apollo, we had maps of the landing sites, and thus could plan ahead of time. Heck, Apollo 12's landing site was first visited by Surveyor 3.Considering the cost of a small unmanned spacecraft, this seems like an obvious thing to do. NEOs generally have lots of close-encounters, and as long as you are within 10 or 12km/s for one of them, it's within our capability using off-the-shelf ion engine technology.The moon is, well, the moon. It is 1/6 the size of Earth. NEOs are not. So what? We still knew about the landing site with far greater detail than we do with, for instance, 1999 AO10, from both Earth-based telescopes, and (even more importantly) the Lunar Orbiter spacecraft (which were small, less than 400kg each).QuoteDefine "small cost"from $100 million to $400 millionQuote and keep trying on how this is "obvious" because you are not there yet. I know I won't convince you.
Quote from: Robotbeat on 10/05/2010 02:07 amQuote from: OV-106 on 10/05/2010 01:54 amQuote from: Robotbeat on 10/05/2010 01:46 amI should note that without sending a probe, all we know about 1999 AO10 is what can be extracted from a point of light. With Apollo, we had maps of the landing sites, and thus could plan ahead of time. Heck, Apollo 12's landing site was first visited by Surveyor 3.Considering the cost of a small unmanned spacecraft, this seems like an obvious thing to do. NEOs generally have lots of close-encounters, and as long as you are within 10 or 12km/s for one of them, it's within our capability using off-the-shelf ion engine technology.The moon is, well, the moon. It is 1/6 the size of Earth. NEOs are not. So what? We still knew about the landing site with far greater detail than we do with, for instance, 1999 AO10, from both Earth-based telescopes, and (even more importantly) the Lunar Orbiter spacecraft (which were small, less than 400kg each).QuoteDefine "small cost"from $100 million to $400 millionQuote and keep trying on how this is "obvious" because you are not there yet. I know I won't convince you.No, you probably won't.Interesting that you bracket "small cost" at nearly an additional 1/2 billion that must be spent any time we want to go anywhere, even "smaller" destinations. Now, that's some overhead. Facinating how this is acceptable yet so many other things are not.
... Thanks for sharing your insight.
That's all-inclusive costs, total. The high end would be for a large spacecraft orbiter (weighing over a ton) likely with a separate lander and long-term study of the NEO. The low end would be a mapping mission, with a possible touch-down. It could be much lower... subsequent missions of the smaller spacecraft could be done for much less, perhaps around $50-60 million each.I was being conservative in my cost estimates and using historical examples.
Quote from: Robotbeat on 10/05/2010 03:43 amThat's all-inclusive costs, total. The high end would be for a large spacecraft orbiter (weighing over a ton) likely with a separate lander and long-term study of the NEO. The low end would be a mapping mission, with a possible touch-down. It could be much lower... subsequent missions of the smaller spacecraft could be done for much less, perhaps around $50-60 million each.I was being conservative in my cost estimates and using historical examples.Ahh...but that really changes nothing.
The moon is, well, the moon. It is 1/6 the size of Earth. NEOs are not.
And what about safety? You'd want to characterize the hazards. For example, will thrusters impinging on the surface generate a hailstorm of pebbles that might damage an approaching spacecraft?
Quote from: Proponent on 10/05/2010 01:23 amAnd what about safety? You'd want to characterize the hazards. For example, will thrusters impinging on the surface generate a hailstorm of pebbles that might damage an approaching spacecraft?Didn't happen with the lunar landers and they had much higher thrust requirement than anything that would land/rendezvous on an asteroid. Just assume the worst (that the asteroid is a moving pile of rubble of the worst size, whatever that happens to be) and design your thrusters accordingly so that they don't focus the exhaust enough to make this an issue.Even if you do need to "characterize the hazards" prior to a manned activity, it doesn't need to be that far ahead of time. I still think a few hours is more than enough time. As I understand it, the claim is that we have to significantly delay a manned activity (say by years or decades) because a probe needs to be sent ahead of time. Thing is that we know any NEO is going to be interesting. So there's no reason not to send people no matter what the probe reports (unless it's say, hostile aliens that shoot everything that gets near them). If there turns out to be a nasty hazard that the mission isn't prepared for, then they abort and head home.Added: For a historical example, it's worth noting that the unmanned part of Apollo didn't delay the program in any way. I don't consider it that hard to plan any unmanned requirements (even with trickier launch windows and tougher trajectories) so that your manned part doesn't slip in schedule.
We might be okay for NEOs as we currently understand them, but if we get there and realize we 'goofed' and can't even get close enough except to take pictures, there will be difficult questions asked by congress.
I'm inclined to agree with OV et. al. that dedicated probe is not necessary. Regarding instruments: the HSF mission would carry whatever's the most reasonable set of generic instruments that fit within the electrical power and development budget available. 1) A first probe might allow you to chose custom instruments for the follow-up HSF mission, and do somewhat better science, but that first mission costs money not available elsewhere. You're likely to get more overall science for your buck spending it on a mission to a type of body that you are not otherwise going to visit. 2) The best instruments are at home on Earth, regardless. The most important thing the HSF mission can do for science is take a wide variety of samples. Free sample return. 3) Ultimately, science is not the point of a NEO mission, although it comes along for the ride. The real goal is demonstrating that BEO HSF is possible (habitation beyond LEO, reliability of our systems, infrastructure to operate at high delta-v) -- demonstrating those to ourselves as engineering achievements for further planning, and to the world (and the US public and Congress) that we are on the cusp of something great, something worthy of continued funding. Regarding safety: 4) If we regard a NEO (especially a small one) as a fragile agglomeration, we can proceed prudently, no? ISS (and MIR) has already given considerable experience with prox ops & thruster plume impingement. Take it a step at a time, use a very small (tethered?) probe from Orion, use MMUs or the MMSEV, etc. 5) A comet might be considerably more hazardous -- outgassing, ice crystal discharges? But a NEO is not going to be something like Armageddon, or landing on Enceladus. 6) Ultimately, we need to be willing to embrace more risk. Live TV of the first astronauts reaching, gently, to touch the surface ... well, cynically, so much the better in the long run if it's not completely hazard free. Reality TV of the highest sort. -Alex
Quote from: yg1968 on 06/20/2011 02:05 pmIn any event, I see the flexible path as a descoped version of Constellation (a "Constellation lite"). But this descoped version has more chances of succeding because it is incremental. However, it will also need very effective streamlining measures for it to work. Sure, I guess it is easy to call something a success when you have absolutely zero metrics in which to measure it against. I mean the "flexible path to Mars" is so vague and non-specific with zero destination(s) or time table(s). Ok- I guess we are supposed to go to a small rock, somewhere, maybe 15-20 years from now, exciting and sure does provide focus and motivation to do something now!!In order to "streamline" something you first have to have "something" in place.
In any event, I see the flexible path as a descoped version of Constellation (a "Constellation lite"). But this descoped version has more chances of succeding because it is incremental. However, it will also need very effective streamlining measures for it to work.
Look, the bottom line is this: From the congressional viewpoint, as the consistent language of three different Acts over a six-year period should make clear, is that NASA has clear-cut "authority" to undertake a mission to return to the Moon, prepare to go to Mars, decide interim missions to NEO's, Lagrange points, anywhere in Cis-Lunar space; any of the above, all of the above, some intelligent combination of the above. Will it be essential to have a clear focus on and support for specific missions, which will guide the development of the additional capabilities needed to either simply transit out and back to any given point, orbit the Moon, or land and do either short or long-term or permanent establishment of bases? Of course, and it is the hope and intent of the 2010 Act that the National Academies Review will help develop a consensus on just what options make the most sense and around which a political/policy consensus can be built. In the meantime, the fundamental fact--maybe debatable for those who want to continue to debate--is that virtually any of those prospective missions will require a substantial follow-on launch capability to the Shuttle. The Congress resolved that debate in the form of the 2010 compromise leading to the 2010 Act in the best way it could with the best information it could find and validate, and the result was the combination of the SLS and MPCV. The lead-time necessary for those developments is sufficiently long under almost any funding scenario, that the desire was to get moving quickly, and the determination was made that the best way to do that was to maximize the use of known capabilities, rather than start with a clean sheet for a brand spanking new high-technology vehicle that would have an extended development time and provide no interim capability for addressing the REALITY of a vehicle (the ISS) that is now the focal point for the near-term of active U.S. human spaceflight operations. Those were the driving factors underlying the approach taken in the 2010 Act with regard to the development of a government-owned and operated system intended to ENABLE missions beyond low-earth orbit, and do so on as timely a basis as possible. The bill was not "unipolar" in its approach, and included provisions and authorization of funds for the responsible development of commercial capabilities for both cargo and crew to LEO as the primary means of meeting the needs of ISS. It is specifically designed to be a dual-path development. The ONLY reason that there is any sense of competition between those two concurrent activities is in the event the Administration chooses not to request sufficient funding to enable both efforts to move forward--as they have done in the FY 2012 Budget Request. It is THAT shortsightedness--fostered within OMB as opposed to at the true policy level of the White House--that represents the greatest single threat to the US being able to move forward on a responsible path to sustain not only a presence in, but a leadership role in future human space flight. There is a secondary threat in the form of a widely prevalent and growing attitude within Congress to cut, cut, cut, all too often without regard to the actual long term consequences of such cuts. The challenge is to make the case to both of those "blocks" of power that HSF is an investment worth making that historically contributes enough to economic growth and technical excellence that serves as an "engine" of economic strength that it is something that the nation cannot afford NOT to invest adequate funding in. Those are the real challenges we face, and that is where the real energies and debate should be focused, in my view. The Act sets up a mechanism for helping shape that debate in the National Academies review requirement that is intended to put "meat on the bones" of a firm set of consensus goals and objectives. By the time that is completed in 2014, we should be at an excellent point to start defining the specific destinations, payloads, additional space-based capabilities required, and build the expanded public and political constituencies to provide the sustaining support needed to see them through.