Projected operating costs of SLS/Orion that includes all the ground ops is $1.5 Billion. With a projected $4 Billion Exploration budget, that leaves plenty of room for DSH and in-space propulsion stage.
Quote from: Khadgars on 11/15/2016 04:53 pmProjected operating costs of SLS/Orion that includes all the ground ops is $1.5 Billion. With a projected $4 Billion Exploration budget, that leaves plenty of room for DSH and in-space propulsion stage.Can you provide an authoritative source for these figures? That's what I'm wondering.
“My top number for Orion, SLS, and the ground systems that support it is $2 billion or less,” Hill told Ars. “I mean that’s my real ultimate goal. We were running at about three-plus, 3.6 billion [dollars] during the latter days of space shuttle. Of course, there again, we were flying six or seven missions. I think we’re actually going to have to get to less than that.Ars has learned that the agency’s ultimate goal for annual production and operations costs is about $1.5 billion."
After havign read through the RFI docs, the goal of the RFI is to investigate possible savings in the production of Orion spacecraft. Not in replacing it with someone else's spacecraft design.So the majority of the speculation as to what this RFI means is off target. The only actual alternate producer of Orion I can see is Boeing which has been involved in integrating the Orion to the SLS and could easily take over its production. But the RFI and the response from LM may be what NASA procurement was after.
In its latest request for information (RFI) released Thursday afternoon, NASA seeks solutions from industry and academia to maximize "the long term efficiency and sustainability" of its of exploration systems programs. Essentially, NASA wants ideas on how best to cut the production and operations costs for its SLS rocket and Orion spacecraft, which presently consume more than $3 billion annually in development costs. However, the RFI also offers respondents the opportunity to submit ideas about rockets and spacecraft that might compete with NASA's own vehicles for exploration funds.Specifically, the document requests responses about: "Competing exploration services in the mid-2020s timeframe and beyond if the market demonstrates such services are available, reliable, and consistent with NASA architectural needs." Ars understands this to mean that if private competitors such as SpaceX, Blue Origin, United Launch Alliance, or other companies produce less expensive rockets and spacecraft within the next five to seven years, NASA will consider using them in lieu of SLS and Orion.
Quote from: oldAtlas_Eguy on 11/16/2016 08:31 pmAfter havign read through the RFI docs, the goal of the RFI is to investigate possible savings in the production of Orion spacecraft. Not in replacing it with someone else's spacecraft design.So the majority of the speculation as to what this RFI means is off target. The only actual alternate producer of Orion I can see is Boeing which has been involved in integrating the Orion to the SLS and could easily take over its production. But the RFI and the response from LM may be what NASA procurement was after.Eric Berger highlights the following paragraph, found near the end of the RFI:If a respondent wishes to provide a broader input beyond the topics described in this RFI or beyond the technical scope of the Orion spacecraft, then it is requested alternate responses be submitted separately. However, if a respondent includes an alternate approach other than the reproduction of the Orion spacecraft developed under the current Orion contract based on NASA-provided data, the respondent shall identify which, if any, of the requirements and objectives identified in the Contemplated Future Requirements” section of this RFI could not be met or would need to be revised to accommodate the alternate approach. The respondent should also identify the cost implications, both impacts and savings, associated with the suggested changes to those requirements.I think that makes it pretty clear that NASA is willing to consider a much broader range of possibilities than just producing more copies of the Orion spacecraft.
This is why SpaceX and possibly Boeing are interested in responding to the RFI. A CC HSF BEO replacement program for the Orion HSF BEO program. With the other RFI for SLS with similar wording that would be a complete program swap out that still meets goals and schedules and lowers the costs of operations expanding the mission rates for a budget level.
Hmmm. That does rather open up the field does it not?Did anything remotely like this ever happen for Apollo? Or even Gemini? It sounds hard to believe.Maybe I'm just seeing things but this looks to me like LM seriously overran their cost estimates (and their new estimated cost, and perhaps a few more later estimates as well ). No doubt LM had reasons for doing so but it's pretty clear NASA is very unhappy about this and even going to a no cost SM from the ESA is not going to be enough to get the budget back on track. Interesting times ahead.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Orion Multi- Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion) program has overcome several technical challenges and made design changes to the crew capsule to reduce risk. Known challenges, however, remain—such as development of the service module and the crew capsule heatshield, among others—that could cause cost increases and schedule delays as the program undergoes integration and test. Technical challenges are inherent in complex programs such as Orion, but if not carefully managed, they could result in cost overruns and schedule delays. For example, the program has identified software development as an area of substantial risk with a potential cost impact of more than $90 million and which may result in schedule delays.GAO found that the Orion program's cost and schedule estimates are not reliable based on best practices for producing high-quality estimates. Cost and schedule estimates play an important role in addressing technical risks. In September 2015, NASA established a commitment baseline of $11.3 billion and an April 2023 launch readiness date for the program's second exploration mission. NASA used a joint cost and schedule confidence level (JCL) analysis—a point-in-time estimate that, among other things, includes all cost and schedule elements and incorporates and quantifies known risks—to establish the commitment baselines at a 70 percent confidence level, as required by NASA policy. However, NASA's JCL analysis was informed by its unreliable cost and schedule estimates. GAO found that the Orion cost estimate met or substantially met 7 of 20 best practices and its schedule estimate met or substantially met 1 of 8 best practices. For example, the cost estimate lacked necessary support and the schedule estimate did not include the level of detail required for high-quality estimates. Without sound cost and schedule estimates, decision makers do not have a clear understanding of the cost and schedule risk inherent in the program or important information needed to make programmatic decisions.NASA and the Orion program have made some programmatic decisions that could further exacerbate cost and schedule risks. The Orion program is executing to an internal schedule with a launch readiness date of August 2021, which has a lower confidence level than its commitment baseline. This means that NASA is accepting higher cost and schedule risk associated with executing this schedule. Working toward a more aggressive goal is not a bad practice; however, increasing cost and schedule risk to the program in order to pursue such a goal may not be a beneficial strategy to the program in the long term. According to program officials, the program employs most of its available budget to fund current work and holds most of its cost reserves at the end of the internal schedule. The lack of cost reserves has caused the program to defer work to address technical issues and stay within budget. As a result, the Orion program's reserves in future years could be overwhelmed by work being deferred. Program officials told GAO that they have not performed a formal analysis to understand the impact that delaying work might have on the available reserves since the program was confirmed. Without this type of analysis, program management may not have a complete understanding of how decisions made now will affect the longer-term execution of the program.
... even going to a no cost SM from the ESA is not going to be enough to get the budget back on track.
Maybe I'm just seeing things but this looks to me like LM seriously overran their cost estimates (and their new estimated cost, and perhaps a few more later estimates as well ).
And it's not actually no cost. ESA supplies the SM instead of meeting ISS logistics requirements. So the ESM is a way of siphoning money from ISS to Orion. And ESA's obligation to supply ESMs is not indefinite.
Quote from: Robotbeat on 11/13/2016 03:27 amI honestly fail to see how NASA could just hand over the plans to another company and have them build it cheaper than LM. I just don't think it works like that for something as complicated as a spaceship.I completely agree. The time it takes to get the people up to speed and the workflow processes in place is not trivial. Whoever got the contract would have to try to hire key people from LM for any chance to succeed. Moving to another company is begging for a significant, costly delay.
I honestly fail to see how NASA could just hand over the plans to another company and have them build it cheaper than LM. I just don't think it works like that for something as complicated as a spaceship.
Quote from: Proponent on 11/19/2016 03:08 pmAnd it's not actually no cost. ESA supplies the SM instead of meeting ISS logistics requirements. So the ESM is a way of siphoning money from ISS to Orion. And ESA's obligation to supply ESMs is not indefinite.That's right. For the moment it is 2 SMs they're obligated to build. Obviously once the ISS retires (presumably) in 2024 they have no obligation to continue building more. ESA would have to setup a new agreement, such as something where they get a free ride for astronauts and their own equipment. Depending on what they still owe for ISS duty or how desperate NASA is for more (E)SMs it might end up a situation like NASA was in for their own ISS rides via Russia.A further hypothetical comes to mind...especially since this thread is about 'Orion alternatives.' The SLS might fly for a good while, but the Orion might not. It's supposed to be reusable, but in light of Lockheed's cited shortcomings I'm guessing this isn't the case anymore (online articles mentioning reuse are increasingly scarce post-2014). Given that there's an EM-1 and EM-2 scheduled, this implies 2 Orions will be built, not to mention that it would ease refurbishing if there were a 2nd vehicle available while the first is worked over. Just as there were only 5 space shuttles built, we might only see a limited number of Orions (disposable or reusable) built...
Has this audit been posted?https://oig.nasa.gov/audits/reports/FY16/IG-16-029.pdfWhat is "capability enhancements"?
Quote from: Oli on 11/20/2016 06:10 pmHas this audit been posted?https://oig.nasa.gov/audits/reports/FY16/IG-16-029.pdfWhat is "capability enhancements"?Probably many things that have been deferred in order to meet the EM-1 schedule like ECLSS(?) and long duration operations capabilities(?). The real sad item is that it is a ~$1B/yr expenditure.At an annual expenditure of <$1.4B /yr NASA is developing 2 CC providers for ISS. If they spent the same starting in 2019 upgrading the CC capsules to make them BEO over a period of 3-4 years you could have them available in 2022/23. This spending forever $1.4B over 20 years, a total of almost $30B just on Orion is too much!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Quote from: oldAtlas_Eguy on 11/20/2016 07:43 pmQuote from: Oli on 11/20/2016 06:10 pmHas this audit been posted?https://oig.nasa.gov/audits/reports/FY16/IG-16-029.pdfWhat is "capability enhancements"?Probably many things that have been deferred in order to meet the EM-1 schedule like ECLSS(?) and long duration operations capabilities(?). The real sad item is that it is a ~$1B/yr expenditure.At an annual expenditure of <$1.4B /yr NASA is developing 2 CC providers for ISS. If they spent the same starting in 2019 upgrading the CC capsules to make them BEO over a period of 3-4 years you could have them available in 2022/23. This spending forever $1.4B over 20 years, a total of almost $30B just on Orion is too much!!!!!!!!!!!!!Come now, can't people at least read reports before using so many exclamation points? The report its self states that the total program cost through 2030 (about 25 years into the program) is 22.1 Billion. It also states "Capability Enhancements" would be a total of 3.5 Billion over 9 years.
Quote from: rayleighscatter on 11/20/2016 09:02 pmQuote from: oldAtlas_Eguy on 11/20/2016 07:43 pmQuote from: Oli on 11/20/2016 06:10 pmHas this audit been posted?https://oig.nasa.gov/audits/reports/FY16/IG-16-029.pdfWhat is "capability enhancements"?Probably many things that have been deferred in order to meet the EM-1 schedule like ECLSS(?) and long duration operations capabilities(?). The real sad item is that it is a ~$1B/yr expenditure.At an annual expenditure of <$1.4B /yr NASA is developing 2 CC providers for ISS. If they spent the same starting in 2019 upgrading the CC capsules to make them BEO over a period of 3-4 years you could have them available in 2022/23. This spending forever $1.4B over 20 years, a total of almost $30B just on Orion is too much!!!!!!!!!!!!!Come now, can't people at least read reports before using so many exclamation points? The report its self states that the total program cost through 2030 (about 25 years into the program) is 22.1 Billion. It also states "Capability Enhancements" would be a total of 3.5 Billion over 9 years.The graphic shows $800M/year for nine years... double your figure. The graphic shows about $3-4B for Ops over these years, so maybe the legend is flipped.Note: First crewed flight in 2023. What happened to 2021 that so many have been shouting us disbelievers down with? Glad someone can do the math.
The fourth mission – Exploration Mission-2 (EM-2) – will be the first crewed flight for the combinedsystem. The Agency has committed to a launch readiness date for EM-2 of April 2023. However, theOrion Program has been managing toward an earlier launch date of August 2021 for planning andscheduling purposes
Probably many things that have been deferred in order to meet the EM-1 schedule like ECLSS(?) and long duration operations capabilities(?). The real sad item is that it is a ~$1B/yr expenditure.At an annual expenditure of <$1.4B /yr NASA is developing 2 CC providers for ISS. If they spent the same starting in 2019 upgrading the CC capsules to make them BEO over a period of 3-4 years you could have them available in 2022/23. This spending forever $1.4B over 20 years, a total of almost $30B just on Orion is too much!!!!!!!!!!!!!