Does anyone know if the SLS programme office has heeded these hard one lessons?
I like how they planned to get around the limitations of the existing fleet of Super Guppies for moving the Altair lander around for qualifications -- via Barge, just like good old S-IC and S-II.
• NASA STD 8739.3, Soldered Electrical Connections – a 93-page document with 391 “shall” statements inclusive of room temperature/relative humidity and 1077 lumens of light per square meter or 100 foot candles on the work surface.• NASA STD 8739.4, Crimping/Cables/Harnesses/Wiring – a 66-page document containing 391 “shall” statements requiring (a) a Snell far-vision chart 20/50; (b) a near-vision Jaeger1 at 355.6mm; and (c) reduced Snell 20/20 or equivalent. Requires color vision testing and specifies temperature/humidity and lighting.• NASA STD 8719.9, Standard for Lifting Devices – a 126-page document containing 996 “shall” statements covering the use of overhead devices as well as powered and motorized devices; approves the use of manufacturer’s procedures and instructs on how to set the parking brakes on mobile and motorized units.
Contractors must verify every requirement, and the program must ensure that every requirement is auditable
Each NASA center has a standard for this [lifting hardware], and the various standards are not identical. This necessitates a contractor dealing with multiple centers to, depending on the locale, know, understand, train, and staff to implement multiple ways of lifting hardware
When everybody is responsible for everything, no-one is responsible for anything.
Due to the late start of the program relative to the start of the projects, incompatible data systems were the norm, so the program had to use a mostly manual approach to integrate data. This often involved use of non-authoritative copies of data, which resulted in decisions being made using out-of-date and inaccurate information
Obviously, the goal is not necessarily to fly. Now, I don't know what the goal is..... not sure that anyone working amongst those regulations could answer, either. Interestingly, Tom Kelly told a story about Grumman lifting the first LM out of the fixture. The Nasa guy said, let's see the hoist lift a test weight first.It failed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! They were lucky they didnt destroy the first LM by dropping it !!!
This is a really interesting thread. I didn't know about the "lessons learned" report. Wonder if there is one for Shuttle? Nevertheless, some of the insights in the report may be unintended. For example, the authors quote the CAIB report when explaining the rationale for Constellation:"The CAIB concluded that it should be possible, using past and future investments in technology, to develop the basis for a system “significantly improved over one designed 40 years earlier, for carrying humans to orbit and enabling their work in space.” "But the CAIB actually said that the Shuttle replacement should be designed solely for the task of taking humans into LEO and returning them too earth, because the resources the nation was willing to commit at the present time were not sufficient to safely accomplish a more ambitious goal. In fact the CAIB assumed the Shuttle replacement would take the form of the Orbital Space Plane, similar to today's Commercial Crew concepts. One wonders if the authors of this report actually read the one they quote.