Dissent against STS-121 launch was widespread

[apollolanding]

DaveS - 20/6/2006  6:54 PM

I just hope that we'll only see one tanking of ET-119 as we all know what MAF found when examining ET-120 which had two tankings.

Well we've had two tankings and we've had shedding.  Not due to launch and not associated with the ice/frost ramps but NASA did attribute it to the two tankings.  See http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/forums/thread-view.asp?tid=3125&posts=41&start=1

[James (Lockheed)]

zinfab - 30/6/2006  8:25 AM

http://space.com/includes/iab.html?url=/missionlaunches/060629_newtools.html

AORP is finally "out there." I saw it on NASA-TV's press conference yesterday afternoon.

It was on this site a long time before the above. It was "out there" from that point.

[FutureSpaceTourist]

I know this is a very old thread, but Wayne Hale has now started a series of blog posts about the STS-121 launch decision:

https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2017/04/27/sts-121-the-hardest-launch-part-1/

[Jarnis]

I know this is a very old thread, but Wayne Hale has now started a series of blog posts about the STS-121 launch decision:

https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2017/04/27/sts-121-the-hardest-launch-part-1/

Ugh, it is a multi-parter with a cliffhanger... 

[FutureSpaceTourist]

I hadn't realised that the doc Wayne references (attached to this post) is the STS-121 certificate of flight readiness with missing signatures (don't know how normal that was) and caveated signatures:

I remain no go based on potential loss of vehicle however for this mission I have no intention to appeal the decision based upon ISS capability to provide CSCS

I am no go based on loss of vehicle risk (ice frost ramps). Based on appeal to administrator I have no intention to appeal his risk acceptance and concur with proceeding with the mission

In my career I have been invovled in (software) safety review/approval meetings (not space-related) but nothing as safety critical as STS. On a much smaller and less critical scale I've had occassion to think hard about whether I was comfortable with known residual risks, but I can only imagine how magnified that dilemma would have been for STS-121. I can fully sympathise with all those involved - irrespective of which personal decision they made as to the acceptability of risk.

Really looking forward to Wayne's future posts (personally and professionally).

[Confusador]

I hadn't realised that the doc Wayne references (attached to this post) is the STS-121 certificate of flight readiness with missing signatures (don't know how normal that was) and caveated signatures:

There are no missing signatures.  Page 3 is duplicated, with signatures from different days, and "Associate Administrator for Prime Mission" on page 8 is N/A because it's ISS.

[yg1968]

http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/content/?id=4569

From a series of PRCB, SCIM and FRR documents on L2 - and there's likely to be more articles to come as we're still going through some other areas (not foam) for the next article.

Here is the updated link to this article:

https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2006/06/dissent-against-sts-121-launch-was-widespread/