Status and update article by Chris Gebhardt, and use of Nathan Koga's sexy L2 renders https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2017/06/commercial-crew-providers-significant-progress-flights/
“The other provider has placed a value on agility and rapid problem solving with beneficial results. They are also showing signs of evolving to reconcile their approach with the benefits and need for discipline and control.“However, they need to ensure that the evolution reflects an inherent desire to adopt the tenets of systems engineering.”
Quote from: Chris Bergin on 06/27/2017 06:18 pmStatus and update article by Chris Gebhardt, and use of Nathan Koga's sexy L2 renders https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2017/06/commercial-crew-providers-significant-progress-flights/Chris and Chris G: excellent article, as always. Keep up the good work.However, I'm annoyed about the remarks by Dr. Patricia Sanders quoted below:Quote“The other provider has placed a value on agility and rapid problem solving with beneficial results. They are also showing signs of evolving to reconcile their approach with the benefits and need for discipline and control.“However, they need to ensure that the evolution reflects an inherent desire to adopt the tenets of systems engineering.”It is another fine example of ASAP trying to stifle progress by expecting agile parties to adapt old-style rigidity.Very disappointing and one of the many reasons why I don't take ASAP for serious. Their stressing of safety is extreme, to the point that no manned spaceflight would be practically possible, if providers were to adhere to all of their recommendations.
I still don't understand the increased MMOD risk levels. Despite ~315 human flights and thousands of hours on orbit without even a close call to an MMOD LOC, why is it suddenly a huge risk and the responsibility of the CC providers. Shuttle flew 134 missions with it's especially fragile heat shield exposed to space and had no major MMOD incidents unless you consider a coolant loop puncture to be a "near miss" for LOC.I admit that I don't know how much protection is on the ISS modules, Shuttle Orbiter, Soyuz, etc. compared to what is on CST and Dragon. The new pressure vessels should be at least up to snuff compared to previous craft and some fraction of the protection the ISS modules have, but I have a hard time believing such protection levels weren't already planned.
Is the MMOD issue that increasing amounts of debris is increasing risk? If so then experience with shuttle may have limited value for future risk assessment.
Humor a space enthusiast with no aerospace background, how would Soyuz measure up to this standard? Thanks.
Quote from: jtrame on 06/27/2017 08:17 pmHumor a space enthusiast with no aerospace background, how would Soyuz measure up to this standard? Thanks.It does not. Not even close.
Is SpaceX still planning on doing an in-flight abort test or was that plan scrapped? I haven't heard much about that test in quite some time.
Quote from: intrepidpursuit on 06/27/2017 07:53 pmShuttle flew 134 missions with it's especially fragile heat shield exposed to space and had no major MMOD incidents unless you consider a coolant loop puncture to be a "near miss" for LOC.Actually, there have been close calls with MMOD strikes. The worst I know of was to STS-118, a hit to a radiator. The entry measured 8.1 mm by 6.4 mm, but the exit hole through the radiator’s backside facesheet measured 14 mm by 14 mm. It was centimeters away from the main coolant loop. A hit to the coolant loop would have caused loss of mission, NASA protocols would have called for an immediate deorbiting of the Shuttle. Had that hit been to a window, the crew could have perished.
Shuttle flew 134 missions with it's especially fragile heat shield exposed to space and had no major MMOD incidents unless you consider a coolant loop puncture to be a "near miss" for LOC.
Quote from: spacetraveler on 06/27/2017 10:02 pmIs SpaceX still planning on doing an in-flight abort test or was that plan scrapped? I haven't heard much about that test in quite some time.They're not doing it anymore. Kathy Lueders talked about this to the media in late-May. In-flight abort test is not mandated by the CCtCap contracts; it was something extra the two providers aimed to do.
I thought Shotwell confirmed that the in-flight abort is scheduled for H1 2018 on The Space Show interview recently. I remember her saying all 3 missions (DM-1, inflight abort, and DM-2) were scheduled for H1 2018.
Quote from: FutureSpaceTourist on 06/27/2017 08:21 pmIs the MMOD issue that increasing amounts of debris is increasing risk? If so then experience with shuttle may have limited value for future risk assessment.This is one of the reasons why there are MMOD models that produce conflicting results.