Quote from: daniela on 12/07/2009 11:25 pm[ We also know why the astronauts doing the test later renamed Apollo 1 died, they were testing a spacecraft that was to bring humans outside of earth orbit; using oxygen was not an obvious mistake, and it had worked successfully for Mercury and Gemini programsNo, it was different than Mercury and Gemini programs. They did not pressurized the cabin to 16 psia with 100% O2 on the ground.
[ We also know why the astronauts doing the test later renamed Apollo 1 died, they were testing a spacecraft that was to bring humans outside of earth orbit; using oxygen was not an obvious mistake, and it had worked successfully for Mercury and Gemini programs
Quote from: daniela on 12/08/2009 02:37 am DoD payloads which caused the mess in the first place...) Urban myth.
DoD payloads which caused the mess in the first place...)
This whole "ISS was invented to give Shuttle something to do" is really strange, no, it is just plain wrong. By this reasoning we can say "the LM was invented to give Saturn V a lunar payload" or "the lunar base is designed to give Ares V something to do." And you pretty fast come to the point of the uselessness of HSF.
It's probably worth remembering STS stands for "Space Transportation System," and was originally envisioned as including a manned TSTO RLV, a 12-man LEO space station, a manned nuclear LEO/LLO transport, and a reusable manned lunar lander, supporting a permanent moonbase.
There were no obvious reasons to think that the choice of pure O2 would lead to danger (or to a tragedy),
Quote from: Jim on 12/22/2009 12:37 pmQuote from: daniela on 12/08/2009 02:37 am DoD payloads which caused the mess in the first place...) Urban myth.I have a foggy memory of either an AW&ST or maybe AIAA (Astronautics/Aeronautics) editorial from some time in the (early?) 1970s entitled, "With Friends Like These," talking about STS payload bay dimesion and cross-range requirements being tied to DoD requirements, but DoD not contributing to STS funding. I looked for an archive, but didn't find one. I wonder if any other geezer remembers something like that.
I could go on.....
In hindsight everything is easy, but in 1966 it was not that obvious. It was known that there was a danger but it was a trade-off (same with the hatch).
1. In my opinion it was wrong to completely abandon the shuttle for launching satellites (and military missions launched from Vandenberg) after the loss of Challenger.2. In my opinion human spaceflight experience, working in LEO, assembling and servicing ISS and Hubble, etc., has been more beneficial to human space flight experience than Mercury, Gemini and Apollo combined. NASA has flown about 130 space shuttle missions each of which had a crew of at least seven astronauts (except for the few earliest flights) over almost 30 years and gave more humans the knowledge and experience necessary to live and work in micro gravity in LEO.
Quote from: fredm6463 on 12/22/2009 03:17 pm1. In my opinion it was wrong to completely abandon the shuttle for launching satellites (and military missions launched from Vandenberg) after the loss of Challenger.2. In my opinion human spaceflight experience, working in LEO, assembling and servicing ISS and Hubble, etc., has been more beneficial to human space flight experience than Mercury, Gemini and Apollo combined. NASA has flown about 130 space shuttle missions each of which had a crew of at least seven astronauts (except for the few earliest flights) over almost 30 years and gave more humans the knowledge and experience necessary to live and work in micro gravity in LEO. 1. It was wrong to put them on the shuttle in the first place.2. Wrong. You are grossly over stating benefits provided by the shuttle. The shuttle only refined lessons already learned by the other programs. We would be no where without the lessons learned by Gemini.
Quote from: William Barton on 12/22/2009 02:36 pmQuote from: Jim on 12/22/2009 12:37 pmQuote from: daniela on 12/08/2009 02:37 am DoD payloads which caused the mess in the first place...) Urban myth.I have a foggy memory of either an AW&ST or maybe AIAA (Astronautics/Aeronautics) editorial from some time in the (early?) 1970s entitled, "With Friends Like These," talking about STS payload bay dimesion and cross-range requirements being tied to DoD requirements, but DoD not contributing to STS funding. I looked for an archive, but didn't find one. I wonder if any other geezer remembers something like that.http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4221/sp4221.htmThe Space Shuttle Decision by T.A. Heppenheimerhttp://history.nasa.gov/SP-4221/ch5.htmChapter 5"While NASA did not need so much length, its officials wanted a 15-foot diameter to accommodate modules for a space station.""In addition to this, NASA and the Air Force shared a concern that a shuttle might have to abort its mission and come down as quickly as possible after launch. This might require "once-around abort," which again would lead to a flight of a single orbit. A once-around abort on a due-east launch from Cape Canaveral would not be too difficult; the craft might land at any of a number of sites within the United States. In the words of NASA's Leroy Day, "If you were making a polar-type launch out of Vandenberg, and you had Max's straight-wing vehicle, there was no place you could go. You'd be in the water when you came back. You've got to go crossrange quite a few hundred miles in order to make land." The requirements weren't forced on NASA."Yet while NASA needed the Air Force, the Air Force did not need NASA."NASA make a deal with the devil.
Quote from: Jim on 12/22/2009 12:35 pmQuote from: daniela on 12/07/2009 11:25 pm[ We also know why the astronauts doing the test later renamed Apollo 1 died, they were testing a spacecraft that was to bring humans outside of earth orbit; using oxygen was not an obvious mistake, and it had worked successfully for Mercury and Gemini programsNo, it was different than Mercury and Gemini programs. They did not pressurized the cabin to 16 psia with 100% O2 on the ground.There were no obvious reasons to think that the choice of pure O2 would lead to danger (or to a tragedy), in fact there were a few advantages which everyone could see. I have also talked to someone in the Soviet space program who confirmed me that their choice (of not pursuing O2) was advised by all sorts of boundary conditions and not by anybody envisioning an intrinsic danger. (Also, I don't think that the original version of Apollo would have 100% O2 for the vehicle on the ground as a standard. It was a test.)
Thank you for your kind (?) advice. Now I suggest you google "hyperbaric oxygen therapy" and the like, confirm that the therapy is indeed regularly used, now and not in 1966, upon patients with no evidence-based medical indication (with pathologies ranging from autism to cerebral palsy and other severe disabilities), by the way usually those patients are children and in most cases are incapacitated and can not give informed consent. In my opinion this is wrong and has a risk/benefit ratio which is not acceptable. But saying that Apollo 1 tragedy (not a frivolous test, but one that was necessary to improve safety on a dangerous mission with a new vehicle) was caused by negligence, seems to me exhaggerated and perhaps outright wrong.
But saying that Apollo 1 tragedy (not a frivolous test, but one that was necessary to improve safety on a dangerous mission with a new vehicle)
was caused by negligence, seems to me exhaggerated and perhaps outright wrong.